Just last week, I was saying to myself "how come TNR doesn't publish Simon Blackwell anymore?" And -- bam! -- here's a Simon Blackburn article reviewing Harry Frankfurter's On Truth and defending a somewhat postmodernist take against the now-fashionable slanders of Frankfurter and his ilk right there in The New Republic. Blackburn's Ruling Passions defending a kinda sorta "moral relativism" (not a good term, but most people would probably understand the view he supports as relativism) and Essays in Quasia-Realism are two of my major philosophical touchstones.
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Blackburn on Truth
23 Oct 2006 09:56 am
Comments (10)
Yeah, okay, they've got a good new piece by Simon Blackburn, but why aren't they publishing anything by Simon Blackwell any more?
The circle of philosophers named after sausage remains an exclusive one.
Is Blackburn's position here even kinda sorta postmodernist? He's being awful slippery. He endorses a perfectly banal point about the perspectival nature of belief, and the non-self-interpreting nature of experience. Even the most table-thumping realist agrees. And then he says scientific method "gives us a field where we can hope for rational convergence. The pressure of experience is itself enough to flatten out any differences in the variously prepared minds that come to the problems of science." And the best explanation for why science creates "hope" for convergence would be that there is a way the world is, and science does a better job of tracking the truth about it than the alternatives.
Blackburn is right that the individual utility of adherence to cognitive best-practices is not clear. And there is no transcendental argument for the obligation to pursue truth, just as there is no transcendental argument for the obligation to constrain self-interest by morality. Blackburn and Frankfurt are agreed about this. So why doesn't Blackburn just accept that Frankfurt is setting out non-binding reasons for personally valuing truth.
A more interesting question concerns the social utility of widespread adherence to truth-tracking norms of reason. Perhaps there are no drop-dead reasons for an individual to conduct their cognitive affairs in a truth-tracking way, but there may be compelling reasons for individual's to prefer societies in which such cognitive norms are cherished and promoted, i.e., societies in which the arts and sciences rapidly progress.
People give you too much shit about the names. Otherwise, great post, Julio.
Only a moral relativist would post to subscription only TNR content without mentioning parenthetically that the content is unavailable to the proles.
Yeah, well I can't use Will's fancy technical language, but it probably advantageous to be a conscious liar in a society where lip service is given to truth-tracking norms of reason.
If most other brokers are honest and promise 10% ROI, you can gain at least a temporary advantage by promising 20, because your customers will presume you simply have better ideas. It is done every day.
In case my broker example was unclear, I will offer Bush and FNC as alternatives.
Blackburn's intellect and copious knowledge are impressive, but I can't help but notice a stench of envy rising from most his criticisms, betraying bad faith, and revealing a decidedly adolescent snobbery. As a purveyor of similarly packaged philosophical books for the layman, Blackburn is less than forthcoming. In fact he has three such titles that I know of: Truth, A Guide (yes, that's a direct competitor), Being Good, Think, and Lust. He also is all too aware of how well Frankfurt's On Bullshit has sold and the hope Knopf has in the new volume. In philosophy, appeal to the masses is not an argument, but in envy, it obviously is, especially when your own books have not sold as well. There's nothing like an old crank to tell us how well he knows the conventions of a genre--here the after-dinner before bed time essay--and then to expound how the example before us fails to be a paragon. Thank you Mister Blackburn. And he's so good at hand slapping, always gently, but still with force: now now Frankfurt, where are your footnotes? Where, dear professor, is your effort to situate your theory of truth within the context of over 2500 years of reflection? Where is your concern for Bernard Williams Mr. Frankfurt? Are you now or have you ever been one who unjustifiably dismisses post-modernists?
Matthew: you'd benefit greatly from reading Michael Devitt's "Realism And Truth".
Comments closed November 06, 2006.
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Heads in the Sand
Harry Frankfurt. Not as tasty as Frankfurter.
Posted by Will Wilkinson | October 23, 2006 10:07 AM