I keep wondering about this and keep not seeing any reporting on it, but when, exactly, did we make the policy shift that the United States is at war with Muqtada al-Sadr's militia again? As you'll recall, there was a period when we weren't fighting his forced. Then there was a period when we were fighting his forces. Then there was a settlement and we weren't fighting. Then his political party participated in the elections and even took seats in the Iraqi cabinet. But now we, along with Iraqi government troops, are fighting him again. When did this happen? And why? I'm not criticizing, per se, but I'd like to know what's going on and I'd think people would be more interested in this sort of subject. Instead, you still hear talk about "succeeding" or "failing" in Iraq but it's not obvious what the administration is even trying to do.
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Fighting al-Sadr
08 Oct 2006 11:51 am
Comments (15)
Haven't we always been at war with Eastasia?
It's not obvious what the administratin is trying to do until you consider designed chaos. Then you have to ask what does chaos gain this administration.
Last I knew they were key supporters of the government and controlled some the Health ministery
This is correct, Sadr has wisely sought to control ministries (Health, Transportation) which deliver services directly to people, and let others fight over "big name" ministries like oil, defense, etc.
The Mahdi Army is better described as a coalition of militias, united more by allegiance to Moqtada's father, Grand Ayatollah Sadeq al-Sadr (assassinated by Saddam in 1999, resulting in a Shi'i intifada which went little noticed in Western media), than to Moqtada himself. Moqtada has advocated against violence at this time, but it's unknown whether the Mahdi militiamen are working with his knowledge, or, perhaps more likely, on the orders of Sadrist clerics who have begun to show some dissatisfaction with Moqtada's leadership.
In any case, Moqtada is probably the most powerful leader in Iraq right now, especially since Sistani announced his withdrawal from politics last month (in large part a result of Moqtada's growing influence). There's just no one out there speaking for poor Iraqi Shi'is the way he is, combining strongly Arab, Shi'i, and lower-class identities in a potent nationalist-nativist stew. He's Huey Long, but with Kalashnikovs.
Then, of course, there's the fact that the conditions created by the U.S. invasion could have been designed in a lab to facilitate Sadr's rise.
Presumably the Coalition forces haves been sparring with both the Mehdi Army and the Badr Brigade ever since their mission expanded to include protecting the Sunnis from the Shi'ites' 'sectarian violence'. Who did you think the violently sectarian Shi'ites were?
The Mehdis and the Badrs sometimes mix it up with each other too, but I don't know if the Coalition forces are supposed to get in the middle of that. If one of the local groups is in Iraqi government uniform I suppose the Coalition forces would be expected to side with them.
Kind of like how we decided we were at war with Aidid in Somalia in 1993, when he felt, with some justification, that he was the most plausible strongman to bring order to the place.
It makes sense to me. SCIRI and co. control the big bits of the government, so I'll bet that they're using this action to weaken Sadr's military strength. Meanwhile, you also get to show the Sunnis that there's action being taken against the folks who are engaged in sectarian killings. Which basically allows the IG to kill two birds with one stone.
Let me say this about that:
We fought them before we ddn't fight them
so now we fight them.
Couldn't be clearer.
;-P
--ml
I think it's worth raising the question of whether this move, along with the arrest of the commanders of a brigade of Interior Ministry police and the "retraining" or whatever of the rank and file, signals a really stepped up effort to go after the problem of the militias and death squads (or the fruit of the Baghdad surge) - a problem that, I take it, is more than a matter of protecting Sunnis from quote unquote sectarian violence (whatever that was supposed to mean), it's seen as the biggest military threat in the whole enterprise, with JAM as the biggest of that biggest threat. I also wonder whether even describing it as a coalition of militias united by allegiance to elder al-Sadr - or united by much of anything - is attributing more cohesion to it than it has. I don't know, obviously, but it might be a case where something has been unleashed that's not united at all anymore, and hence not controllable even in principle by some central figure.
It seems the Mahdi Army is a bit like that old description of the Ford Trimotor, "it's not an airplane, exactly, it's about 100,000 parts flying in loose formation." I've often analogized Iragi factions - Sunni, Shi'a, it doesn't matter - to L.A. street gangs because, hey, a lot of them are street gangs. The Mahdi Army is about as cohesive and top-down as the Crips and Bloods.
As I understand it, a fair number of the local turf-level gang leaders are going off the reservation since Moqtada passed the word to quiet things down now that he and his closest homies have themselves some nice government sinecures. He's got his, but many of the smaller fry don't feel like they've got theirs yet, apparently, so they're free-lancing.
And of course there's all the usual background noise of revenge and vendetta and payback that is organic to Arab societies since time immemorial. The most tenacious enemy in this war is simply the centuries of ingrown bloody-mindedness of Arabs in general. When lethal violence has been a first resort to practically every problem for 5,000 years, the pacification job is understandably difficult and protracted.
I gather it's the more egregious loose cannons among the Mahdi "formation" who have now become official Coalition targets. One hopes their fates will prove "encouraging," in the French sense, to those still sitting the current dance out at MalS's direction.
The most tenacious enemy in this war is simply the centuries of ingrown bloody-mindedness of Arabs in general. When lethal violence has been a first resort to practically every problem for 5,000 years, the pacification job is understandably difficult and protracted.
Have you heard Martin Peretz has a new blog? Those with an interest in characterizing "Arabs in general" as bloody minded savages should probably go post over there, and let the adults talk over here.
But what about this?
Cleric Is Said to Lose Reins Of Parts of His Mahdi Army
By SABRINA TAVERNISE; RICHARD A. OPPEL JR. contributed
New York Times, September 28, 2006
blurb:
The radical Shiite cleric Moktada al-Sadr has lost control of portions of his Mahdi Army militia, which are splintering off into freelance death squads and criminal gangs, a senior coalition intelligence official said. The question of how tightly Mr. Sadr holds the militia is of critical importance to American and Iraqi officials.
There were rumblings about a new offensive against various Sadrists over the past couple of months, starting with this NYT piece.
Who did you think the violently sectarian Shi'ites were?
Well, SCIRI controls the Interior Ministry, and they're the ones associated with Shi'a death squads.
Those with an interest in characterizing "Arabs in general" as bloody minded savages should probably go post over there, and let the adults talk over here.
I don't have an "interest" in anything but the truth. Maybe in your world being in denial of obvious facts on the ground is considered a mark of the "adult." I would not, in fact, be surprised.
The dominant attitudes of whole peoples are not genetically imprinted and are capable of changing radically - e.g., 1939-vintage Germans and Japanese vs. their present-day descendants. Many Arabs in the West - where they have, until recently, been tiny minorities - have abandoned "the old ways" and done great things. Arabs are not inevitably doomed to carry the attitudes and folkways of medieval horse barbarians into perpetuity. But there is powerful inertia to such things, especially in societies in which this mindset is the majority, even the vast majority, way of seing the world. It took being utterly crushed, militarily, to snap the Germans and Japanese out of their baseless superiority complexes and malignant national fantasies. Iraq constitutes an attempt to accomplish a similar end through appreciably less draconian means. The jury is still out on whether this will prove possible. I'm an optimist. I think the Islamic world is capable of learning to play nicely with others. That does not mean I can't recognize the plain fact that it is in no way willing to do so in its present form and that this is not a good thing.
You really should be hanging out at Martin Peretz's blog, Dick. I also hear Benny Morris has a blog.
Comments closed October 22, 2006.
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Heads in the Sand
I've been wondering about this as well. I increasingly hear people refer to the Mahdi army as "the insurgency". Last I knew they were key supporters of the government and controlled some the Health ministery. I wish we would get some good reporting on what is going on, but unfortunately no one outside of Juan Cole and a few others even talk about this.
Posted by Judy | October 8, 2006 12:03 PM