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Onward

04 Oct 2006 12:58 pm

Spencer Ackerman notes that we now have confirmation that the invasion of Iraq was intended as the overture in a broader regional war, including one aimed at prompting regime change in Teheran. It's worth noting that this isn't just something to file away in the "wacky pre-war predictions" file, but led directly to the administration massively screwing the pooch on several fronts.

First, in Iraq. Whatever it is you're trying to do with Iraq policy, it's always going to be easier to accomplish it if the countries surrounding Iraq -- including Iran and Syria -- are helping you rather than trying to undermine you. Iran and Syria are not, however, run by blithering morons. Thus, when you hint in your public and private statements that one of your ultimate aims in Iraq is to overthrow the governments of Iran and Syria you wind up pushing them heavily into the "undermine" camp and essentially making it impossible to accomplish anything.

Second, in Iran. As we now know, soon after the invasion of Iraq, Iran tried to open talks aimed at a broad US-Iranian diplomatic settlement. On the table would be Iran ending its nuclear program and curtailing its support for Palestinian rejectionists, in exchange for the United States lifting sanctions disavowing a regime change policy, and trying to accommodate Iranian interests in Iraq and Afghanistan. That would have been a very good deal for the USA to take, as anyone with a functioning brain to see. Unfortunately, though, functioning brains were in short supply inside the administration which believed that the Iranian domino was about to fall so there was no need to talk settlement.

Thus we have a major cause of our current mess in Iraq and of our current mess vis-a-vis Iran all wrapped up in one neat package.

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Comments (31)

Iran and Syria are not. . .run by blithering morons.

Must be nice.

If we had fielded the Iranian initiative in 2003 and worked out a deal that included the terms mentioned here, sure, we'd probably be better off today. But how much better off?

You don't have to be Michael Ledeen to believe that Iran's efforts to amass regional power and influence will inevitably tend to conflict with our interests, in large part because of the nature of the clerical regime. That's not to say we should go to war with them. But we should at least recognize the reality of the conflict.

It's not something we could have preempted by shaking hands over a formal settlement at an opportune moment for us. If our position of power looks less imposing three years later, how much do we really think Iran would be constrained by a formal agreement that reflects an apparent balance of power that no longer exists?

You don't have to be Michael Ledeen to believe that Iran's efforts to amass regional power and influence will inevitably tend to conflict with our interests, in large part because of the nature of the clerical regime.

There is only one regime for Iran whose "nature" would not conflict with U.S. interests: a puppet regime. Our interests are clear: maximal exploitation of Middle East oil reserves by U.S. corporations.

In The Assassins' Gate, it talks about Jay Garner's visit to the White House after coming back from Baghdad. Bush was basically uninterested in anything Garner had to say about the Iraq occupation. However, as Garner was leaving, Bush turned to him and said, ‘So, you wanna do Iran next?’

It just boggles the mind….

"You don't have to be Michael Ledeen to believe that Iran's efforts to amass regional power and influence will inevitably tend to conflict with our interests"

So why the heck was the prelude to our inevitable confrontation with Iran a war to overthrown Saddam's anti-Iranian government in Iraq, and to replace it with a pro-Iranian government?"

Jesus, Ackerman's reading of this Woodward bit is even more strained and tendentious than Marc Lynch's reading of the al Qaeda letter.

Again, we have something where the plain English meaning of the text doesn't support the interpretation.

Conveniently, Ackerman omits the helf of a sentence mentioning "a model for the creation of a Palestinian state". That's obviously not talking about starting a war with Palestine; it's talking about setting up a democratic Palestine. The second half of the sentence is obviously talking about the same thing in Iran - the establishment of a democratic Iranian government. Which is something quite different than the theocracy Iran has now.

So why would Ackerman ever read "Iranian overthrow" to mean a US war against Iran??? The text itself says nothing about a US war against Iran and, when read in context with the statement about Palestine immediately before, it quite clearly has a completely different meaning.

My goodness, the confirmation bias among lefties is overwhelming these days, isn't is?

As an immature nation-state that never cohered around a strong set of national institutions or national identity, Iraq was always more likely (than anything else) to slip into anarchy and civil war at the first hint of democracy; it will ultimately be partitioned. The same is true of virtually every other Arab nation-state, not to mention parts of Central Asia (including Afghanistan; bringing the Taliban into the Afghan government is likely to be as effective as bringing the Sunnis into the Iraq government...eventually we will have to talk about partition there too).

It's my belief that a new and better Arab world will emerge from this mess, and that it will look something like a postmodern version of the premodern Ottoman Empire (ethnically and religiously-centric nation-states with corrupt but nominally representative governments, open borders, and some kind of centralized bureaucracy to manage trade and currency policy). It's also my belief that the process of getting there is liable to look more like the end of Yugoslavia, and less like the end of Czechoslovakia. And unless we're willing to draft a two-million-man army (at a time of spiraling defificts, and on the verge of exploding entitlement spending) and massively increase taxes (something to which I object strongly [although I will accept nominal tax increases to preserve entitlements]) for a region-wide humanitarian relocation of ethnic and religious minorities to majority zones (we pretty much allowed the Yugoslavs to do this for us before going in, and we seem inclined to do the same thing in Iraq), there's really no point in maintaining a largescale military presence in the region.

So, Al, based on your comment at 1:58, I gather that you are opposed to any military strike agaisnt Iran? That's good to know . . .

Al, please, talk about willful misreading (and i don't mean by ackerman!).

as for matthew's comments, it's worth remembering the brief period when the bush administration referred to the "battle of iraq" so as to symbolize that it was only one part of the bigger "war." iirc, bush even used that phrase during the "mission accomplished" photo op.

Rea, at the moment I am. But I don't see how you gathered that from my 1:58 comment, which simply pointed out that Ackerman's reading of the Woodward text was completely strained and tendentious.

I suppose there are all kinds of international agreements, treaties, conventions and laws regarding premptive war, wars of aggression, overthrowing regimes, unprovoked attacks and deposing heads of state, etc. They all probably say any of the above are forbidden. And they're all not worth the paper they're written on. Nevertheless, if we honor the pretense they're valid shouldn't Bush be in a cell somewhere?

Howard, yes, Iraq is part of a larger "war" - the ideological war against Islamic extremism. And, indeed, Iran is part of it too. But that does not mean that all parts of the war need to be fought in the same way as we did in Iraq; it is no different an idea than the idea that engaging in the Korean War, as part of the larger Cold War, didn't mean we had to fight the USSR the same way we did the North Koreans. Is that so difficult to understand? It's a point that the President has been making for quite a while now.

Also, can you tell me why my read of the Woodward text was a "willful misread[ing]" while Ackerman's reading is correct?

All here seem to agree that Bush might want to attack Iran in the future, does that mean Iran would be justified in a pre-emptive attack on DC?

can you tell me why my read of the Woodward text was a "willful misread[ing]" while Ackerman's reading is correct?

Sometimes I think Al has lost a step, and is no longer the biggest hack on earth. But then he comes up with something like this. No wonder he's legendary! Like Jordan, he's the best there ever was.

"So, Al, based on your comment at 1:58, I gather that you are opposed to any military strike agaisnt Iran?"

"Rea, at the moment I am. But I don't see how you gathered that from my 1:58 comment"

Because, Al, it would make no sense to defend somebody by claiming that they hadn't really called for a military strike against Iran, if you yourself favored such a strike. But perhaps I'm giving you too much credit for sense . . .

Al, if you read Matt's original post more carefully, you’ll see that he’s using the word ‘war’ in the exact same way you are; the phrase ‘a broader regional war, including one aimed at prompting regime change in Teheran’ doesn’t necessarily mean a direct US invasion of Iran. You guys don’t really disagree on this point.

In any case, you’re eliding Matt’s larger point, which is that the administration’s naïve and stupid belief in a domino theory of regime change in the Middle East led it into misguided policies which have worsened our position with regard to both Iraq and Iran. Do you agree or disagree with this?

If I may: Read the Herbits memo. It's about U.S. action. What Al neglects to mention about the Palestinian-state part of the memo is that Herbits was talking about what Iraq would allow *Bush* to do -- namely, by midwifing a democratic Iraq, Bush would have a more viable model to offer the Palestinians. In short, as best we can tell from Woodward -- and he has an annoying tendency to paraphrase when he needs to quote -- Herbits was talking about what Iraq would *allow Bush to do*. The Iran stuff fits right into that context.

Look, let's say that all the Herbits memo was saying was that regime change in Iran would be desirable, even though the memo makes that reading rather doubtful. As Matt points out above, that's an idiotic strategy if you're trying to occupy Iraq. Which proves what we already know: no one really gave a shit about Iraq absent a context of broader regional destabilization. Al, you defend these guys why, exactly?

al, others have already answered your second part about woodward, so i won't pile on (unless you are still confused). instead, let's just spend a moment on your first: in exactly what way was saddam an exemplar of "islamic extremism?" and what exactly is an "ideological war?" why does that require actual american soldiers and actual iraqi civilians to lose their lives? and on what basis is the korean war - with its actual, you know, causus belli - relevant to the iraq war?

Al:

Iraq is part of a larger "war" - the ideological war against Islamic extremism.

Really? So removing a secular strongman who we put in power, in no small part to control Islamist extremists, and replacing him with an Iranian born Ayatollah, is a step AWAY from Islamist extremism?

Iraq after this war will be closer to Iran than before it. Don't you agree? Bush's father doubtless told him so.

By analogy, you must think it a good idea to topple Musharraf (who is a dictator who overthrew a democracy, allowed AQ Khan to spread nukes from Libya to North Korea and has signed a treaty allowing bin Laden safe harbor in his country) and letting the Ayatollahs rule there too?

The Iraq war has made the world less safe. It will cause instability in Turkey and Iran decades from now as the Kurds use there new autonomous territory and oil money to agitate for a greater Kurdistan.

Of course this was all predicted by most of the world's intelligence services prior to the war. Including ours. Which is why Clinton didn't invade. And why Bush's father correctly defanged Saddam without overthrowing him.

Do you think the Iraq war is going well? Just asking to check on your ability to perceive reality.

Yes, the conventiona wisdom is really out of whack.

"By analogy, you must think it a good idea to topple Musharraf (who is a dictator who overthrew a democracy, allowed AQ Khan to spread nukes from Libya to North Korea and has signed a treaty allowing bin Laden safe harbor in his country) and letting the Ayatollahs rule there too?

The Iraq war has made the world less safe. It will cause instability in Turkey and Iran decades from now as the Kurds use there new autonomous territory and oil money to agitate for a greater Kurdistan."

Well the Turks and the Kurds need to work it out, just like the Isarelis and Palestinians the need to.

Fact: Without toppling Saddam, Libya never would have given up on its WMDs and we never would have found out about the AQ Khan network. Sorry, it's true. The world would have been less safe not knowing about the network.

After 9-11, the goal is to clean up the Middle East. It's going to take a long time. You can't come out and say you want regime change in Egypt and Saudi Arabia, but is it any wonder they dislike the US's democracy initiatives?

As Bush has said, the status quo in the Middle East caused 9-11.

People say how brilliant OBL is about drawing the world's hyperpower into a quagmire, but I just don't see it. First off, Pakistan's ISI had inflicted the fundamentalist Taliban on Afghanistan. This was metastasizing back into Pakistan and there was a good chance Muslim fundamentalists would have topled Musharraf and gotten control of Pakistan's nukes. OBL should have waited. Likewise Saddam was close to getting nukes before he annexed Kuwait and admitted to his followers that he should have waited to invade until after he had nukes. No doubt if OBL had waited and Saddam had waited, the world would have been a safer place and the US would have much more liked than it is today.

As Bush has said, the status quo in the Middle East caused 9-11.

That's pungent analysis like Grandma used to make. The way things were brought about subsequent events. Mmmm.

Can I borrow that when you're done? I've got lots of personal failings I'd like to justify which were caused by the status quo somewhere.

"Fact: Without toppling Saddam, Libya never would have given up on its WMDs and we never would have found out about the AQ Khan network. Sorry, it's true."

And you know this...how, exactly? Your amazing psychic powers? Or just because you wrote "Fact" in front of it? Wait, let me try. Fact: the Iraq invasion had just about nothing to do with Libya's decision to surrender it's WMDs. Sorry, it's true!

Unlike you, though, I have actual evidence, like Qaddafi offering to give up his WMD program during the Clinton administration:

http://www.brookings.edu/views/op-ed/indyk/20040309.htm

The status quo also brought us disco. Fact.

"Fact: Without toppling Saddam, Libya never would have given up on its WMDs and we never would have found out about the AQ Khan network"

No, fiction. We knew about the AQ Khan network years before the Iraq War--that's why we pressured Pakistan into dismissing him from his position as head of their nuclear program in the summer of 2001. And we could have had the Lybia deal for the asking at any time over the previous decade.

If I may: Read the Herbits memo. It's about U.S. action. What Al neglects to mention about the Palestinian-state part of the memo is that Herbits was talking about what Iraq would allow *Bush* to do -- namely, by midwifing a democratic Iraq, Bush would have a more viable model to offer the Palestinians. In short, as best we can tell from Woodward -- and he has an annoying tendency to paraphrase when he needs to quote -- Herbits was talking about what Iraq would *allow Bush to do*. The Iran stuff fits right into that context.

Read the Herbits memo? Do you have a link? I had assumed it was one of those papers that Woodward has a copy of but we'll never see.

I agree with you completely, Spencer, that the memo appears to be saying that by midwifing a democratic Iraq, Bush would have a more viable model to offer the Palestinians. My point was, why would you think it saying something completely different about Iran? I think the memo was saying that, after a successful Iraq, Bush would have more to offer people advocating democracy in both Palestine and Iran. But offering something to people advocating democracy in Iran doesn't mean that the US was going to attack Iran. It is no different than the President's current policy - we're not going to attack Iran to change the regime, but we support the Iranian people who want democracy.

So I don't think the memo was merely saying that "regime change in Iran would be desirable". It was saying that, if we get post-war Iraq right, we will have something more to offer to the Iranian people desiring democracy, just the same as we would have something to offer to the Palestinian people.

BTW, Spencer - RC, above, asserts that Matthew (and I assume you) in fact do NOT mean to say that the Herbits memo supports the view that the Bushies really wanted to attack Iran after Iraq was done, but rather that this was just a reference to the ideological struggle, not a hot war. Is that right? When you write "the Iraq war was indeed supposed to lead to an Iran war", I took that to mean that the Iran war to which the memo referred would be a shooting war like the Iraq war. Perhaps I was wrong, and you merely meant that the "Iran war" to which you referred would simply be an ideological struggle?

Look, let's say that all the Herbits memo was saying was that regime change in Iran would be desirable, even though the memo makes that reading rather doubtful. As Matt points out above, that's an idiotic strategy if you're trying to occupy Iraq. Which proves what we already know: no one really gave a shit about Iraq absent a context of broader regional destabilization. Al, you defend these guys why, exactly?

I didn't comment on Matthew's point above (I assume you mean his second paragraph), but I'll do so now. I think it's unbelievably naive. He really thinks that if we assured Iran that we wouldn't attack them, Iran would help us out in Iraq??? That's so completely fantastical that I wouldn't even know where to start. Iran and Syria would likely be undermining us in Iraq no matter what threats or assurances we have given them. Indeed, it seems MUCH more likely to me that Iran would STAY OUT of Iraq as a result of our threats than the scenario Matthew posits.

"The status quo also brought us disco. Fact."

Congratulations, Steve! That's the first sensible argument in favor of the Iraq War I've heard!

"[He] had concluded that the U.S. was in for a two-generation war with Islamic extremists that had to start with Iraq, [and] wrote that success could mean Bush would have 'a model for the creation of a Palestinian state' and even eventual 'Iranian overthrow.'"--according to the link.

Note that it does NOT say, "success could mean Bush would have 'a model for the creation of a Palestinian state and a democratic Iran'" nor does it say,"success could mean Bush would have a model for 'the creation of a Palestinian state' and even eventual 'Iranian overthrow'" nor does its say success could mean Bush would have 'a model for the creation of a Palestinian state' and even an eventual 'Iranian revolution.'"--

"Success could mean Bush would have . . . eventual "Iranian overthrow." sounds like a prediction that success would lay the groundwork for our overthrow of Iran.

Because, Al, it would make no sense to defend somebody by claiming that they hadn't really called for a military strike against Iran, if you yourself favored such a strike.

Why? I can't ask for an accurate interpretation of the memo if I disagree with the substance of the memo?

But perhaps I'm giving you too much credit for sense . . .

Ahem.

Note that it does NOT say, "success could mean Bush would have 'a model for the creation of a Palestinian state and a democratic Iran'"

But the Bush Administration's long-term strategy for winning the "two-generation struggle with Islamic extremists" is through a democratic Palestinian state and democratic Iran!

Al, I was referring only to Matthew's statement, which seems right to me. I think Spencer goes a little bit too far in characterizing the administration's intentions. But, it's pretty clear that administration believed in a domino theory of regime change in the Middle East that has been proven wrong, and that a policy of forcible regime change in Iran was under active consideration by certain elements in the administration, including the President himself. The Bush anecdote I posted about above is evidence of that.

As far your rebuttal to Matt's original point, there's nothing fantastical about a country acting in its own interest. All things being equal, an unstable Iraq isn't in Iran's interests. However if the Iranian regime thought that America might to try and cause their overthrow, then of course it would be in the Iranian regime's interest to try to cause as much trouble in Iraq as it could, so that America would be tied down and weakened. This is fairly elementary logic.

If the Iranian regime had the attitude thay you say they do, why did they originally offer to make peace with the US? And why haven't US threats stopped them from interfering in Iraq? It seems the facts back Matt's case and not yours.

"the Bush Administration's long-term strategy for winning the "two-generation struggle with Islamic extremists" is through a democratic Palestinian state and democratic Iran!"

And ponies for everyone!


Comments closed October 18, 2006.

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