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Proliferation Pessimism

16 Oct 2006 08:40 am

One of the most subtly insidious notions to gain purchase on the American psyche is the view you might call "proliferation pessimism" -- that it would be unfortunate if places like Iran and North Korea got nuclear weapons, but there's ultimately nothing we can do but resign ourselves to a world of massive proliferation, where those countries go nuclear and so do a great many others. Proliferation pessimist William Langewiesche makes that argument in the LA Times:

In Islamabad, an official close to the nuclear-armed Musharraf regime said to me: "The best way to fight proliferation is to pursue global disarmament. Fine, great, sure — if you expect that to happen. But you cannot have a world order in which you have five or eight nuclear weapons states on the one hand, and the rest of the international community on the other. There are many places like Pakistan, poor countries which have legitimate security concerns — every bit as legitimate as yours. And yet you ask them to address those concerns without nuclear weapons, while you have nuclear weapons, and you have everything else? It is not a question of what is fair, or right or wrong. It is simply not going to work."

Now the thing of it is that this is correct. The only way to combat proliferation is in the context of universal disarmament. Not immediate universal disarmament, which is unrealistic, but universal disarmament as a long-term goal. The the other thing of it is that this is exactly the context the Non-Proliferation Treaty and other diplomatic accords established. And, as Joe Cirincione explains, that non-proliferation regime was actually working fairly well until conservative politicians made the United States start pulling away from the rules. It wouldn't be easy to get the global disarmament regime back on track, but it's a bit frightening that such a large segment of the policy elite in The World's Only Superpower seems to have decided that "not easy" equals "impossible." We're talking, remember, about big, long-term structural goals so you don't need to get everything done at once. But here's what some steps might look like.

With Iran and North Korea, we need to try and cut deals that involve serious carrots. Getting those deals would be much easier if we had sticks on the table. But the sticks available to the United States (airstrikes) would be very destructive to deploy, and threatening to use them is a bad idea. Russia and China, as it happily happens, can wield some much more credible sticks. So one key to action is to make getting Russia and China on board a priority -- meaning doing things they want on other fronts.

Well, happily, both Russia and China don't like the "Stars Wars" national missile defense concept. Scrapping it, and returning to the ABM Treaty would, in and of itself, help rebuild the global arms control regime. It would also help get Russia and China to help us on other fronts. What's more, by most indications Russia would welcome a large bilaterial reduction in American and Russian nuclear arsenals. Both countries have arsenals that are bigger than we need. For the cash-strapped Russians, this is a major burden. For the USA it's mainly the reverse -- there are financial interests with a large stake in us maintaining a nuclear arsenal that's an order of magnitude too big.

But cutting a deal like that would save us some money, make the Russians and Chinese happy, and constitute a serious downpayment on our promise to the non-nuclear world of eventual universal disarmament.

At the end of the day, nuclear proliferation is a very normal collective action problem. Insofar as nukes are around, individual countries will have some good reasons to want to build them. But a world of widespread proliferation doesn't really serve anybody's interests, while a world of universal disarmament would be very beneficial to overhwhelming majorities of people and states. It's a question of doing the hard work of actually conducting negotiations and creating institutions that will allow states to cooperate on this goal.

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Comments (14)

Both countries have arsenals that are bigger than we need.

I'm not sure this is self-evidently true. I seem to recall newspaper references to a DOD study that indicated that we could now "win" a nuclear war with either Russia or China. I assume that means that neither Russia nor China can completely destroy the US anymore. I also assume that "as big as we need" means "total destruction of the other guy's country" for some strategists.

Genuine question:

Given that you only need about five nukes to have a very scary arsenal, and given that it would be pretty damn easy for the US, Russia, or China to hide five nukes, why isn't disarmament effectively impossible?

Maybe you're arguing that significantly reducing the number of nukes is itself a goal worth pursuing, in which case I'm on board, but don't people think "disarmament," in the sense of getting rid of the world's nukes, is impossible because it is?

In general I tend to agree with Matt's perspective on matters of policy, but on this one I beg to disagree. It's inapposite to compare the nonproliferation successes of 1950-1990 to what is possible today, for one glaring reason: the state of global technology has changed. That is, for a growing number of states, it is no longer extremely difficult to produce a nuclear weapon. In the past, when nukes were possible but extremely expensive, international diplomacy was an effective means of producing a MORE rational choice NOT to start down the nuclear path. Now, it is much more difficult to use diplomacy to manipulate state rationality. That said, convincing various states to accede to the nonproliferation regime may still be achievable with respect poorer, less developed nations, but (I would say) much less so with respect to economically expanding nations. These nations, Iran being one of them, aspire to first-world status; nukes are a symbol of that success. I would like to see proffered real possibilities of how the G8 might convince aspiring countries to change that equation.

Even granting that the United States, Russia, and China have some "right" to nuclear weapons due to their size and power, what about England, France, Israel, and India? If those four midsized regional powers hold nuclear weapons, what exactly is the moral justification for other midsized regional powers not holding them? If France's reasons for maintaining not just nuclear weapons but a nuclear ballistic missile submarine (hint: fall 1940) are understandable, why are Iran's reasons for wanting nuclear weapons not understandable (hint: Cheney, Bolton)?

Not Really

I don't think the NPT was ever seriously designed to bring about total nuclear disarmament. It was in the text, but no nuclear power had any intentions of actually disarming. Arms control was always about stability, making sure that no one felt threatened. It was never about complete disarmament.
With nuclear weapons, you are vulnerable if your adversary feels vulnerable. The NPT was part of the framework designed to reduce change in the system (new powers to worry worry about) and make all sides feel secure. Thus, no unwanted Armageddon. Ogged is right in thinking that disarmament is an impossibility with the current global governance.

Given that you only need about five nukes to have a very scary arsenal, and given that it would be pretty damn easy for the US, Russia, or China to hide five nukes, why isn't disarmament effectively impossible?

I'm not sure that five nukes make a scary arsenal. I think both China and India have made noises about being sized, in terms of population, to withstand a nuclear attack. One of the Iranian leaders made the same claim about the Muslim world at large. And I think the US has said as much in the past, when we were analyzing nuclear outcomes in potential conflicts with the USSR.

Or put differently: as I understand it, Israel has somewhere between 150 and 200 nukes. There are creation and maintanance costs associated with nuclear weapons, and I assume there's a reason that Israel is willing to pay those costs for the excess 145-195 weapons.

I started writing a comment here, but then it got to be about a zillion pages long and I decided to put it on my own blog instead of clogging the pages here. You can read it at http://www.mikemeginnis.com/2006/10/proliferation-pessimism-in-which-i.html if you're curious.

The short version: Matthew, ogged, and graeme are all simultaneously right. Plus my own ideas!

"And, as Joe Cirincione explains, that non-proliferation regime was actually working fairly well until conservative politicians made the United States start pulling away from the rules."

That is quite obviously false. Examples: India, Pakistan, Israel. All got their weapons before "conservative politicians blah blah blah".

Iraq 1989. The weapons inspectors completely failed in Iraq in the 1980s. If Saddam hadn't invaded Kuwait they wouldn't have discovered his very advanced (one-year away according to the inspectors AFTER the war) program. That was just dumb luck on our part and hubris on his. That had nothing to do with "conservative politicians.

South Africa. They had an advanced nuclear program until they realized that it was about to end up in the hands of a black-run government. Then they destroyed it.

Libya. They abandoned their program right as Iraq was getting invaded over a nuclear program. The international community pretty much didn't even know that the program existed! That success has almost nothing to do with the international arms control world because the international arms control world didn't even count them as a country of serious interest.

Iran and North Korea. The international community has pretty much done zero in either case. North Korea has always been thrown in as something the US is expected to take care of. Iran has been laughing at the EU negotiators for years now.

"But cutting a deal like that would save us some money, make the Russians and Chinese happy, and constitute a serious downpayment on our promise to the non-nuclear world of eventual universal disarmament."

As is almost always the case in this type of agreement, people can easily identify what the US will do, but not what China and Russia will be expected to do. Will the stop Iran and North Korea for this kind of trade? Clearly no.

Now if we could figure out something to with North Korean refugees if the NK government collapsed....that is something China might appreciate enough to cause action.

The only way to combat proliferation is in the context of universal disarmament.

I've never understood the logic here.

We, the Russians, French, Brits, Chinese, Israelis, Indians and Pakistanis all give up our nukes tomorrow. This causes Iran and North Korea to reverse course how, exactly????

In fact, Matthew's got it exactly backasswards. Mid-size countries like Iran would have far MORE incentive to produce nuclear weapons if we gave up ours - since their development of nuclear weapons would automatically reverse the balance of power between the two countries. As it is currently, if Iran got nuclear weapons, it would only slightly change the balance of power, so there is far less incentive for Iran now.

"If Saddam hadn't invaded Kuwait they wouldn't have discovered his very advanced (one-year away according to the inspectors AFTER the war) program. That was just dumb luck on our part and hubris on his."

No, if Saddam hadn't invaded Kuwait, he'd still be on our side, and we wouldn't regard his nukes as threatening--see Pakistan.

Matt is wrong here.

The NPT was always hypocritical from the very start. None of the five original nuclear powers has ever disarmed and none ever will. So the NPT, in effect, means that some nations are allowed to have nuclear weapons and others aren't. And it's not surprising that the nations on the have-not side aren't particularly enamored with this state of affairs - especially when they routinely get the shit bombed out of them by the US and Israel whenever they feel like it.

How are you going to force India and Pakistan to disarm? I don't see how this is even theoretically possible. How are you going to forbid Arab states from acquiring nukes while Israel has them? Israel is obviously not going to give them up, and the Arab states are not going to sit back forever and let their hated enemy have an advantage they lack.

Mutually-assured destruction WORKS. It may not be the best, most edifying, or most moral policy, but it works. It averted nuclear war for half a century between the US and USSR and has averted war for a decade between India and Pakistan. And if an Arab or Islamic power in the Middle East gets nukes, then this will mean Israel has to start behaving. Why is all this a bad thing?

Nuclear proliferation is going to happen. There will never again be a situation in which "Whatever happens/We have got/The Maxim Gun/and they have not."

This blog is full of ill-considered and indefensible assertions. For instance, it starts of with a bold and implausible thesis that sensible steps to inhibit proliferation can occur ONLY in the context of universal disarmament. That would imply they'll occur never. But then first, it turns out the disarmament is only in the sweet bye and bye, and then that the proposals themselves would keep in place armaments of enormous destructive power, only reducing them and balancing them in sensible ways.

I trust that in his book the author will be more careful, if he does mean to embrace proposals that defy the deep logic of international anarchy, will define with more care and defend them with at least a modicum of perspicacity.

Any summation of NPT is going to be wrong in some regards, as it is a very detailed and complex subject.

The area where the NPT failed horribly, is in regard to reducing the Major Powers inventories of Nuclear Weapons. Back in the early 1960s a RAND study noted that the US only needed 300 20 megaton weapons to destroy both China and Russia, and this was long before the concept of Nuclear winter.

As the US at the time had about 250 weapons, the study was hailed and lauded. By the time the US reached 300 weapons the study was derided and ignored, and now that the US has some 10,000 weapons of course, the study has been forgotten.

(China read the study, and stopped their program in the late 1970s at roughly 300 weapons, and spent the money elsewhere. Of late however, China has restarted her program to produce about 600 swervable MIRVs with decoy warheads).

However, nobody who proliferated after the majors, did so because there was this huge inventory of weapons in Russia and the US.

NPT worked moderately well until of late, because for the most part, while countries like Pakistan feared India, they did not fear the US. This was because of the general concensus that countries like the US would use political, diplomatic and multilateral and not military solutions to deal with issues with places like Pakistan.

India got the bomb, one of the dumbest decisions ever made, as there never was even the slightest chance that India would lose a war with Pakistan, and other than minor border skirmishes with China, war with China was never a real threat because of the natural barriers between the two countries.

This guarenteed that Pakistan would get the bomb, once Pakistan had the bomb, there suddenly became no way that India could ever win a war against Pakistan.

However, the world has been changed. The US withdrawl from the ABM Treaty, the sabre rattling, the invasion of Iraq, the attempts to develop so called Usable Nuclear weapons, and the release of Military doctrines enabling their use, even against countries not nuclearly armed, has many nations, now seeing the US, Russia and China as very real threats, to their own relatively tiny countries.

The perception is that the US and Russia, in particular, ( not so much China) will resort to military attacks including the limited use of nuclear weapons, to deal with issues with nations like Pakistan, Iran, Venezuela, Cuba, Georgia, rather than attempt to use political, diplomatic and multilateral tools.


Comments closed October 30, 2006.

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