Public Choice Models of Iraq

Tyler Cowen suggests a simple model, I'll explain and elaborate a bit below the fold.

Dictatorships are generally most brutal when the fear of being overthrown is strongest. The most benevolent dictatorships, in relative terms, tend to have strong roots in the country's social and economic power centers. This would help explain, for instance, why the minority Sunni Saddam Hussein was so tyrannical against his potential opponents. Without extreme oppression, he would have lost power and his life.

The optimistic scenario for Iraq was (way back when) that a Shiite autocracy, with broad-based public support, would be considerably less brutal. Once in power, the ruling clique would find it much easier to stay in power without extreme brutality. At least that is how the theory went. [...]

The pessimistic scenario is that there are no broad-based constituencies left, or perhaps there never were any in the first place. Under the former case American policy has been far more harmful, in net terms, than under the latter case. It is possible that our handling of the transition disbanded whatever broad-based groups were in place to eventually rule. Or perhaps Saddam had already destroyed them.

One good reason to think Iraq better-fits the pessimistic scenario is simply that the Shiite Arab majority group in the population is a quite narrow majority. The country is only about 60 percent Shiite Arab. Thus, insofar as there are any significant cleavages within the Shiite bloc, even the broadest possible political group is going to be pretty narrow -- i.e., less than a majority. Importantly, from this point of view, members of Muqtada al-Sadr's movement killed Mohammed Bakir al-Hakim (leader of the Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq) very early on in August 2003. This sort of major intra-Shiite fighting precludes the construstion of any governing coalition with a genuinely broad base of support and it happens so soon after the invasion that it suggests it reflects pre-existing conditions rather than the upshot of US policy choices.

This suggests that any collapse of the Baath regime, whether or not precipitated by direct US military intervention, was likely to lead to a fairly bloody outcome as divergent minoritarian movements (pre-war, at least, some non-trivial segment of the Shiite Arab population was largely secular) among Iraq's Arab communities contending for power while the two Kurdish groups competed with each other for control of Kurdistan while seeking to maximize that region's autonomy.

Comments

Do we know that Sadr's people killed al-Hakim?

Posted by Brian Ulrich | October 22, 2006 1:51 PM

No, of course not. AFAICT, he's no more likely suspect than anyone else. Maybe Matt means that SCIRI thinks it's him?

Posted by David Weman | October 22, 2006 2:29 PM

I think the idea that "the fall of Saddam was likely to lead to a fairly bloody outcome anyway" has a lot of the moral palliative in it. The mere preexisting fact of SCIRI-Sadr rivalry isn't that persuasive. The vastly overlooked fact is that the US has had a political stance in Iraq, backing the Kurds and SCIRI in the federalism/partition drive, and the present crisis has a lot to do the failure of that. The vote on federalism-mechanisms on Oct 11 is widely viewed as having been rigged, Sunni political parties were sidelined, and the Sadrists were put in fear of the menace of SCIRI dominance over their traditional areas in the South. None of this was preordained demographically or otherwise. How can this be verified, I hear you asking. Luckily, I have just posted on my blog (click on my name, I guess) a summary of what has gone on in October, with particular reference to the US debate on this. If that doesn't work, its http://arablinks.blogspot.com

Posted by Badger | October 22, 2006 3:27 PM

I agree that Cowen's "benevolent dictator" model does not work when 40% of the population belongs to an opposition sect.

But would it even work if a mere 20% belonged? A mere 10%?

Suppose that the split in Iraq were 90% Shiite/ 10% Sunni, and that for the last few decades Saddam had ruled Iraq with something like the brutality he used, but only the Sunni 10% on his side. (Impossible? Think apartheid-era S.A.)

Now imagine the Baathists overthrown, the 90% Shiites empowered, but the 10% Sunni unwilling to give up the insurgency.

Do you think a Shiite dictatorship could stay un-brutal with 10% of the population planting IEDs everywhere, assassinating Shiite leaders, disrupting the economy and infrastructure, and so on?

I would say that one lesson of the insurgency is that a small number of people can make life impossible for a very large number of people.

And eventually, the 90% Shiite majority would get sick of it and crack down. Brutally.

So I don't think the numbers and percentages are the critical thing.

Posted by kid bitzer | October 22, 2006 3:33 PM

Why doesn't Tyler Cowen simply suggest we leave Iraq and let the Iraqis govern themselves as best they can? This is simply so much pretend science or really a way of excusing the terrible tragedy we have brought on Iraq. Let's have Tyler give a damn and suggest we leave and I'll pay attention to what he thinks then.

Posted by Ari | October 22, 2006 3:34 PM

Anything to excuse America and keep us in Iraq for years to come.

Posted by Ari | October 22, 2006 3:36 PM

Ari, what are you talking about?

Posted by washerdreyer | October 22, 2006 4:17 PM

Think apartheid-era S.A.

I don't know if 90/10 is possible or not, but S.A. was closer to 80/20. Or do you mean the Afrikaaners alone as the ruling group, excluding the 'English'?

Posted by David Tomlin | October 22, 2006 5:33 PM

Ari is right, we need to leave Iraq and that is what matters, possibly all that matters.

Posted by lise | October 22, 2006 8:06 PM

Do we know that Sadr's people killed al-Hakim?

I think Matt's getting his murdered ayatollahs confused. Sadr is suspected of involvement in the stabbing of a cleric named Khoei near the Imam Ali shrine in Najaf in April 2003; Hakim was blown up by a car bomb there in August of that year (which is generally blamed on Baathist insurgents).

Generally speaking, though, Matt is right; there is a reportedly longstanding family rivalry between the Sadrs and the Hakims that has culminated in their currently having the two largest Shiite political factions/militias -- and being at each others' throats.

Posted by Swopa | October 22, 2006 10:09 PM

Suppose that the split in Iraq were 90% Shiite/ 10% Sunni, and that for the last few decades Saddam had ruled Iraq with something like the brutality he used, but only the Sunni 10% on his side. (Impossible? Think apartheid-era S.A.)

I think a more relevant example would be the Alawites in Syria.

Posted by Al | October 22, 2006 10:29 PM

This suggests that any collapse of the Baath regime, whether or not precipitated by direct US military intervention, was likely to lead to a fairly bloody outcome as divergent minoritarian movements (pre-war, at least, some non-trivial segment of the Shiite Arab population was largely secular) among Iraq's Arab communities contending for power while the two Kurdish groups competed with each other for control of Kurdistan while seeking to maximize that region's autonomy.

This is exactly correct.

However, I'm sure Matthew wouldn't want to follow through with this. Because you would have to acknowledge that the US presence in Iraq then has likely SAVED a lot bloodshed that otherwise would have occurred upon the collapse of the Baath regime. After all, the US presence provided an authority that otherwise would never have been present in Iraq upon the fall of the Baathists. Moreover, the US presence likely prevented a more outright role of Iran and other countries, and of al Qaeda, that otherwise would have occurred upon the collapse of the Baath regime.

So, if you follow that through, you would have to acknowledge that the US invasion was actually quite beneficial for Iraq. And I'm certain that nobody else on the thread other than me, including Matthew, would be willing to acknowledge that.

Posted by Al | October 22, 2006 10:35 PM

Furthermore, humanity will eventually go extinct at some point in the next 100 trillion years of the universe's history. Undoubtedly, billions -- perhaps trillions -- will die in the extinction. Since population is projected to grow, there will be more people to lose their lives in the future than now. As such, we should attempt to use any available means to destroy humanity now, to avoid larger losses later.

I'm also skeptical of the public choice model. Nazi Germany wasn't horrifically brutal because it faced broad opposition from the German population. Nazi Germany was horrifically brutal because they decided that the world would be a better places if Jews, Roma, communists, gays, etc, didn't exist. For that matter, the Taliban had support when it first started up. Its brutality, far from being a measure necessary for maintaining its rule, was precisely what alienated so many people and precipitated its downfall. It may be that there are circumstances in which the only way to maintain rule is to rule brutally, but there are other circumstances in which brutality is so alienating that it undermines rule. Exactly how this relates to how much of the populace supports the regime to begin with, before it alienates previous supporters or befriends previous opponents the populace, is unclear.

Posted by Julian Elson | October 23, 2006 2:48 AM

Julian has a good point. But there are a few ways of fitting the Nazis, the Taliban, and others into Cowen's model. For one thing, it's important to recognize that dictatorships (and totalitarian regimes) are also much more brutal in their early stages, while they are still establishing themselves and face internal political opposition.

The Nazis did not in fact enjoy overwhelming public support - they had a plurality in I think the high 30 percents in the last election prewar Germany held. And they were operating with a governing structure whose professional cadres often despised them, or were at least unreliable, including the diplomatic corps and the military. The stridency and violent purges of the '30s were part of a familiar self-establishment phase of totalitarian regimes, when they are exterminating any possible bases of political opposition. And it is true that many totalitarian regimes, once any potential challenge to the Party is eliminated, become much less violent, more rule-governed and conservative. Nazi Germany never had a chance to get to that phase, because the Napoleonic dynamic of its youthful craving for military expansion drove it straight into a vast and obliterating war which ultimately wiped it out. And while the pure evil of Nazi ideology is unchallenged, it isn't certain that the Holocaust would have taken place had Germany not been at war.

The Taliban faced ongoing armed and violent opposition throughout their rule. And they never got past the initial phase of self-establishment. They were certainly never governing from a self-assured position.

What Cowen is referencing is the observation that in regimes like the USSR, China, and Iran, the brutality of the regime declined strongly as its rule solidified and challenges disappeared. One problem is however that new challenges to the regime can arise at any time, and then the regime either reveals its fangs (see Tiananmen) or reveals itself to be a toothless old biddy (see the Berlin Wall).

Posted by brooksfoe | October 23, 2006 5:46 AM

With strongly religious governments (Muslim and non-Muslim), you also need to add in the surplus hatred and repression directed towards women, which isn't particularly rational and is explained only with serious difficulty through Cowen's chosen metic.

There was a time that our intervention was supposed to result in equal rights for women -- unfortunately, it was around the same time that our intervention was going to lead an Iraqi government to recognize the state of Israel.

In any case, it's important to remember that repression isn't just about warring ethno-religious factions dying in the street.

Posted by anon | October 23, 2006 10:04 PM