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Green Lantern Tries Analogies

13 Nov 2006 02:01 pm

William Stuntz in The Weekly Standard offers us a classic Green Lantern Theory account of Iraq, urging us to merely try harder in Iraq and demonstrate our implacable resolve to win. D at Lawyers, Guns, and Money takes some of this apart, but perhaps we can dig deeper.

Part of what we see here is a really inept analogy to Abraham Lincoln's late-Civil War statement that "the nation's resources are unexhausted and, we believe, unexhaustable." One thing to say about this is that, obviously, it wasn't true. Any nation's resources are capable of being exausted. Lincoln's point, however, really was to demonstrate implacable resolve. He intended to govern as if it was worth bearing any burden, paying any price, to restore the Confederacy to the Union. But why did Lincoln say that? It wasn't just a tactical gambit, it represented his actual beliefs about the stakes of the war.

Lincoln's view was that the Civil War was, quite literally, a war for the nation's survival. Recognition of the right to seceed would destroy the United States as he understood it, turning it into a loose confederation of quasi-independent states easily subjectable to domination by stronger European powers.

Perhaps his view of that situation was mistaken, but I think it was a credible sort of thing to believe. And, under those circumstances, a maximum resource-commitment to the war effort is a reasonable policy idea.

It just doesn't stike me as credible at all to think that the imposition of a stable American-backed government in Baghdad with effective control over Iraqi territory is a matter of national survival for the United States of America. Indeed, I think that's a crazy thing to believe.

By contrast, most of Iraq's Kurds, Sunni Arabs, and Shiites seem to feel that the maintainance of ethnosectarianly specific military forces is a genuinely crucial matter of near-existential importance to their respective communities. This is a totally non-crazy thing for people to believe. Kurds and Shiites both have, in the very recent past, been subjected to incredibly brutal repression by a Sunni-dominated central government. They, not unreasonably, fear the return of such repression. Sunni Arabs, meanwhile, have an also-not-unreasonable fear that Kurds and Shiites will, in their desire to avoid a return to repression, engage in similar repression.

What's more, unlike the American military, the vast majority of Iraqis can't leave Iraq. Under the circumstances, any effort by the US government to demonstrate "resolve" to outlast the various militias and insurgent groups isn't going to be viewed credibly by anyone. Stuntz analogizes his proposal to poker, and it's not a terrible analogy, it just cuts the wrong way -- doing what he proposes would be like trying to bluff someone who's already gone all in. It's essentially impossible for countries -- even very rich, very technologically advanced and militarily adept countries -- to perpetually occupy foreign territory in the face of determined opposition for precisely this reason. The occupier can leave, and the occupied cannot.

What could break the dynamic in Iraq would be an intra-communal settlement. In principle, major Sunni, Shiite, and Kurdish groups could reach a mutually acceptable agreement about how to organize the country at which point the violence would sharply diminish. Such an agreement would render US forces unnecessary. Meanwhile, absent such an agreement, US forces -- though perhaps keeping a lid on the killing -- are failing to actually solve anything and are doing so at enormous expense.

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Lincoln's view was that the Civil War was, quite literally, a war for the nation's survival. . .

Perhaps his view of that situation was mistaken, but I think it was a credible sort of thing to believe. . .

It just doesn't stike me as credible at all to think that the imposition of a stable American-backed government in Baghdad with effective control over Iraqi territory is a matter of national survival for the United States of America. Indeed, I think that's a crazy thing to believe.

By contrast, most of Iraq's Kurds, Sunni Arabs, and Shiites seem to feel that the maintainance of ethnosectarianly specific military forces is a genuinely crucial matter of near-existential importance to their respective communities. This is a totally non-crazy thing for people to believe.

I give Matt a ton of criticism. I do that because when he's working it--as he is here--he shows that he's going to be the very best. Ideas matter, and it's tough for me to think of anybody in the daily business of idea-trafficking who does it better.

Grr. Ended the blockquote too early...

"Lincoln's view was that the Civil War was, quite literally, a war for the nation's survival."

And apparently enough people in the country believed that as well to ensure that the Union won the War.

But the dynamic in Iraq is remarkably un-similiar. Whatever certain people in Washington may believe, the largest sectarian group in the country is at least divided about going their own way if not more enthusiastic about having their own nation-state than governing a unified Iraq, and the smallest major sectarian group is decidedly unenthusiastic about a unified Iraq. The only people who really want a unitary Iraq are the Sunnis and the neoconservatives.

Iraq did not exist long enough for there to be a great deal of national pride about the idea of Iraq, and without a great deal of national pride about Iraq reconstruction of the country let alone liberal democracy was liable to fail.

Linus--today's issue is not whether victory for one side or the other in the Iraq Civil War is essential for Iraq's survival--the issue is whether something constituting "victory" in Iraq is essential for the survival of the US--which, obviously, it is not.

The fact that the stakes are existential for Iraqi ethnic communities and nonexistential for us reminds me why it has been so hard to sit through compulsive reiterations of these two delusional assumptions:

1) That the daily violence in Iraq is intended primarily to intimidate and scare us off (see that brilliant counterinsurgency strategist John Tierney, inter alia), as opposed to, say, advancing the cause of one community as against another--although notice how strongly the issue of stakes cuts against us here (as Matt says, you can't bluff the guy who's all in).

2 ) That said violence is primarily caused by terrorists--be they Baathist "dead-enders" or al-Qaeda union locals or whatever--who are intent on fighting the U.S. occupation forces.

It's just not about us, guys, and it hasn't been since about the time the lights went out on Baghdad Bob. We're just in the middle of a street fight without the means to referee it, let alone prevent it. Perhaps our sole utility in Iraq at this point is to prevent massed military battles and battlefront casualties on the scale of our own Civil War. Oh joy.

It would be possible to outlast this current Iraqi civil war. It just may be at a price that doesn't make it worthwhile. If the US occupied the country for 30 more years, there would be so few Iraqis left that all we'd have is a desert.

Americans would create a desert and call it peace.

I just love the "Green Lantern" framework! As a universal theory of mocking ridiculousness, it's tough to beat. We need more stuff like this.

The "and a pony" framework is good too.

Matt,
for those not in the know, you might provide a link to your original Green Lantern post.

Stuntz analogizes his proposal to poker, and it's not a terrible analogy

To my mind his (mis)use of a poker analogy is telling. He speaks of doubling down. Which for the non-card savvy among us, is what you do in BLACKJACK.

Fine game though BJ is, it is a series of largely independent, slightly weighted coinflips. Poker is far more complex due to multiple decision points and players, not to mention metagame considerations.

("Image" is pretty important in poker, but for exactly the opposite reason that Stuntz et al think it is. Your bets - your rhetorical blusterings, have to maintain some degree of credibility. Credibility you swiftly lose if your only moves are "bet" and "raise" - then you have actually have to have the cards. Stuntz and co. make the dual mistake of thinking that we in fact have the cards and that the opponent will fold if we make the bet big enough, neither of which appear to be true.)

This reduction of the situation's complexity to such an absurd degree as to become a different game entirely largely explains the Rumsfeld/Cheney foreign policy fiasco.

Truly, there is not much more to be said here. Matthew has covered all the bases.

However, it might be worthwhile to note two things:

1. This is incredibly reminiscent of Vietnam, for the zillionth time. What Vietnam hawks failed to accept, as MY has so artfully articulated here, is that we couldn't just wish ourselves into wanting victory more than the Viet Cong and North Vietnam did. They wanted victory more because it was their country.

2. On the other hand, the deeply held belief that you can just wish yourself into wanting something so bad that you will eventually achieve it is a truly foundational feature of the American character and creed. "Believe in yourself, right from the start", as the Wiz says. You can do anything you want to do, if you just want it bad enough. It's partly evangelical Christian, it's partly Emersonian -- it goes right back to the 19th-century days when those two strands weren't so separate. To say, in the middle of a war, that we are losing because for various structural reasons we can't win, and the whole war was a dumb idea in the first place, is from a certain 100% American vantage point like being in the halftime locker room, down two touchdowns, while the coach is trying to fire everybody up, and being the selfish asshole who responds "We can't possibly win this game. There was no point even showing up." And I think that's what drives some of the fury one sees in conservative responses to perfectly rational and accurate explanations of what was happening in Vietnam in 1968, and what's happening in Iraq today.

Brooksoe,

That certainly could be. One would hope without much optimism that the lesson of "measure twice, cut once" might sink in at the 3rd (or more?) time of asking...

There really should be some sort of battle between "And a Pony" and "Green Lantern Theory of FP." And maybe the "BTKWB." But would Yglesias want it enough? Color me doubtful.

But would Yglesias want it enough? Color me doubtful.

No, he'd thoughtfully consider all the alternatives, then cede the field to BTKWB. East Coast liberals like Matt can't even hate with conviction.

To add to those pushing the Vietnam analogy, some choice quotes from Halberstam's The Best and the Brightest...

"(Indeed, a few months earlier Mac Bundy had shown a member of his staff some of the planning for the escalation, particularly the bombing, and the aide has been impressed by how thorough it all was, lots of details. Bundy asked the aide what he thought, and he answered that though he didn't know anything about the military calculations, "the thing that bothers me is that no matter what we do to them, they live there and we don't, and they know that someday we'll have to go away and thus they know they can outlast us." Bundy considered the answer for a moment. "That's a good point," he said. (578)"

"Add to it the fact that one side was a nation with the nationalist element of unity, and the Communist element of control, that the bombing helped unite its people, that its leadership was able and popular, that its people were lean and tough and /believed/ in their mission, which was to unify the country and drive the foreigners out, that there were no free newspapers, no television sets, no congressional dissent, and that this war was not only the top priority, it was the only priority they had. (619)"

The second quote isnt particularly analogous to various Iraqi militant groups (the situations are very different), but the very last clause is certainly the case - that fighting is the only priority for them, and it will never be for us.

Lincoln was re-elected in November 1864 because the Union was winning the war. The victory at Mobile Bay in August and the fall of Atlanta in September doomed the presidential prospects of Gen. George McClellan, who campaigned on a peace platform. If we had seen even one genuine sign of success in Iraq in the past three months, the Republicans would have retained the Senate and probably the House as well.

The undercurrent in Green Lantern thinking is that fighting must become Americans' top priority: Americans need to think like the North Vietnamese did. The nation must perceive itself as under existential threat, and act accordingly.

To complicate matters, I believe that the U.S. is under something like an existential threat in the medium to long term (8 years +): the risk of an attack, or series of attacks, of far greater magnitude than 9/11. The existential threat comprises not only the direct and indirect damage such an attack would cause, but also the likely political and social responses to the event. American society would be damaged forever and your country would be a measurably worse place to live, even for those not directly affected.

The irony is that the Green Lanterners themselves are a big part of that threat. First, their chosen policies have probably increased the risk of more attacks. Second, their response to an attack will be an even more radical appeal to militarism and authoritarianism. They are at risk of ending the New American Century, not ushering in a new birth of freedom.

Some very cogent points, but Gabe Rocklin, the Vietnam analogy is not necessarily a good one. Read General Vo Nguyen Giap's view after the war and it undoes a lot of the revisionist history (that we couldn't win in Vietnam). Giap says the North was extraordinarily close to quitting several times and suing for peace because of the bombing of the North by B-52's. The problem is that screams by the peaceniks stopped the bombing every time right when it was on the verge of working. That seems to reinforce the "Green Lanternists" if you will - which is a view I do not share. I simply think the Vietnam analogy can be taken too far and stretched beyond utility and liberals are all too quick to jump on Vietnam as proof of something (because I guess "they" won that one for us??), which it simply does not support. Philip Davidson's Book, "Vietnam: A history" was the first book I read that talked about this, but there are subsequent works which also discuss how close the North came to suing for peace.


Comments closed November 27, 2006.

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