Meawhile, In Lebanon

In a series of events predicted by virtually nobody allowed access to high-profile media positions, but virtually everyone who knows anything about Lebanon, the upshot of Israel's military campaign against Hezbollah has been to strengthen Hezbollah's political position and throw Lebanon's relatively Israel-friendly into crisis, possibly setting the stage for a return to power of pro-Syrian elements or else for a re-meltdown of the Lebanese state. One wrinkle here that seems to go perennial unmentioned is that had the Cedar Revolution actually brought democracy to Lebanon (as opposed to the takeover of government by an anti-Syrian political coalution) victory for Hezbollah and its allies would be all but assured. The Taif Accords, among other things, implemented an odd electoral system that structurally overrepresents Christians and underrepresents Shiites. That's not necessary a bad thing, under the circumstances, but a more normal and more democratic system would significantly enhance Hezbollah's political power.

This seems like as good a time as any to mention George W. Bush's recent decision to bestow a National Humanities Award on Lebanese emigré Fouad Ajami. As Martin Peretz points out, Ajami has probably been the single largest influence on American understanding of the Arab world; his books have been very influential and his writings have appeared widely in major publications. The non-Peretzian notion I would interject into this stream of praise is that America's understanding of the Arab world, as evidenced by years of recent policy fiascos, is . . . extremely bad. Ajami has, in essence, become prominent by being a seemingly credible voice willing to tell American elites what they want to hear, offering an interpretation of Arab affairs that's significantly more palatable than the analysis provided by the scholarly mainstream.

That some view represents that scholarly consensus is, of course, no guarantee that it's correct -- dissidents are sometimes right. Nevertheless, we've been using Ajami and Ajami-ism as our guide to the region for quite some time now and it keeps working out very, very badly.

Comments

"That some view represents that scholarly consensus is, of course, no guarantee that it's correct -- dissidents are sometimes right."

Okay, but what if the "scholarly consensus" and the "dissidents" (otherwise known as elite cocksuckers) are both wrong? Juan Cole keeps telling us how traumatic it would be to partition Iraq. I gather it would be, but what if not only the partition of Iraq but the partition of the whole damn Arab world and Central Asia is something like inevitable? The whole conversation is still trapped in this useless dichotomy between preserving the status quo and the glories of liberal democracy.

Posted by Linus | November 13, 2006 1:19 PM

the upshot of Israel's military campaign against Hezbollah has been to strengthen Hezbollah's political position

I'm still not convinced this is true. Hezbollah is trying to act as if it is true, but that doesn't necessarily make it true. (The other parties have not played along, so far, for example, which could be interpretted as a sign that Hezbollah's strength has not been increased.) The proof would be in the votes.

Posted by Al | November 13, 2006 1:28 PM

Bush just gave some award to Bernard Lewis, too. It's important that America keep its insane vision of the way the Arab world works.

Posted by dj moonbat | November 13, 2006 1:30 PM

Ajami has, in essence, become prominent by being a seemingly credible voice willing to tell American elites what they want to hear, offering an interpretation of Arab affairs that's significantly more palatable than the analysis provided by the scholarly mainstream.

In that sense, the prevalence of the Ajami and others in US ME policy-making is like the prominence of global warming denialists in US science policy-making and indeed the whole political/bipartisan 'war on science' which is inextricably linked to any form of political power. It's the powerful groups which determine the acceptability of intellectuals, not vice versa.

Posted by otto | November 13, 2006 1:35 PM

Interestingly, it was Syria more than Israel that prevented the partition of Lebanon at the end of the (first?) Civil War. But Lebanon is still more likely than not to be partioned at some point, and Jerusalem is going to have to negotiate directly with the Hezbollah-led government of Southern Lebanon.

Posted by Linus | November 13, 2006 3:12 PM

the upshot of Israel's military campaign against Hezbollah has been to strengthen Hezbollah's political position and throw Lebanon's relatively Israel-friendly [government] into crisis

I hate to say it, but I agree with Al on this (assuming that's the same conservative Al that trolls other comment boards). I don't think it's 100% assured that it has strengthened Hezbollah. I think it may have strengthened the dedication of those who were already down with Hezbollah, similar to the GOP idea of strengthening their electoral chances by coming down even harder on abortion issues, etc. It does little or nothing to pull in the mainstream of the body politic. I'm not saying that the Israeli bombing did nothing to push Hezbollah up in the popularity ranks, but I don't think it makes them popular across the board, either. And there is a decent amount of evidence that it pissed people off pretty well too.

The other point about "Lebanon's relatively Israel-friendly [government]" is... well, pointless. Who cares? If tolerating cross-border missile attacks by Hezbollah is what a relatively Israel-friendly government gets, what happens if they don't like you? Or, if the argument is that the government isn't strong enough to stop the attacks in the south (which was really the case), then that government is already in crisis.

Posted by Rick | November 13, 2006 3:13 PM