Hakim to the Rescue

I've noted this before, but the notion that the big problem in Iraq is Muqtada al-Sadr's influence over the government and that we can solve this problem by giving Abdul Aziz al-Hakim more influence over the government instead is absurd. Recall that Muqtada came to this level of influence in the first place because we'd decided that the problem with Ibrahim Jafari's government was its overly large dependence on . . . Abdul Aziz al-Hakim and his party. Maliki was the compromise solution to the Hakim problem. Now Hakim is the solution to the Sadr problem! And around and around we go.

From the get-go, our Iraq policy has been hobbled by an undue personalization of issues there. First killing Saddam's sons was going to change things. Then we needed to capture Saddam. Then we were going to kill Muqtada. Then we weren't going to kill Muqtada. Then Jafari was the problem. Now Maliki is the problem. Somewhere in between killing Zarqawi was the solution. And somehow it never occurs to anyone that there might be something about the structure of the situation that makes it impossible for the United States to achieve its goals. It's always one more bad guy to kill, capture, or sideline.

Comments

This brings me back to my theory of Exponential Stupidity Acceleration. There is, at this point, no "Iraq policy." America is simply too stupid to have a policy, due to Exponential Stupidity Acceleration. The cause or causes of ESA are still under investigation. But the reality of the phenomenon is undeniable.

Posted by SqueakyRat | December 12, 2006 10:10 AM

we personalize everything in iraq because george bush is only able to deal with matters in terms of personality. it is impossible for bush to think in structural terms....

Posted by howard | December 12, 2006 10:21 AM

You can't make this stuff up, just goes on and on. All the mad logic of a Three Stooges movie. Love ESA. As a concept.

Posted by Sam Thornton | December 12, 2006 10:23 AM

Recall that Muqtada came to this level of influence in the first place because we'd decided that the problem with Ibrahim Jafari's government was its overly large dependence on . . . Abdul Aziz al-Hakim and his party.

I don't believe this is true, in part because it implies a greater U.S. influence over the matter than I think existed. The U.S. wanted Hakim's candidate, Adel Abdel-Mahdi, to be prime minister -- and Sadr's insistence on keeping Jaafari until finally relenting in favor of Jaafari's top deputy stymied both SCIRI and the Americans.

Granted, part of the purported rationale for backing Abdel-Mahdi was to pry SCIRI away from controlling the Interior Ministry by giving them the PM slot. But that has nothing to do with boosting Moqtada.

Posted by Swopa | December 12, 2006 10:26 AM

Recall that Muqtada came to this level of influence in the first place because we'd decided that the problem with Ibrahim Jafari's government was its overly large dependence on . . . Abdul Aziz al-Hakim and his party.

And here's the Times today, in line with what Swopa says:

If the parties move to replace Mr. Maliki as prime minister, one possible candidate would be Mr. Hakim’s deputy, Adel Abdul Mehdi, who was favored by the White House last spring to take the top job.

In any case, Sciri and Hakim are being majorly rehabilitated on the right as the good Shiites. Watch for it.

Posted by Jeff | December 12, 2006 10:29 AM

Overpersonalization is certainly a sound critique of past American policies, but at this point we may need to get used to the idea that the Iraqis themselves are driving events. I doubt Hakim is getting marching orders from us; he's making his own play. The interesting thing is the extent to which he gets Sunni backing. The past alignment on things like federalism has been, broadly speaking, Hakim's faction and the Kurds versus Sadr's faction and the Sunnis, with the Hakim side favoring decentralization and prevailing by a thin margin. If the Sunni's really are switching sides en masse, this may signal a willingness to accept some version of decentralization in return for help against the greater threat of Sadr's death squads. Recent articles about an emerging deal to share all oil revenue by population provide some more evidence that this might be happening. If so, that may be an alliance that could actually wield power effectively.

Posted by rd | December 12, 2006 10:31 AM

So, as I understand it, the Bush Administration has rejected out of hand the ISG recommendation for negotiations with the government of Iran -- in favor of a policy of extending every possible assistance to the most obvious Iranian proxy in Iraq.

Posted by Dave L | December 12, 2006 10:56 AM

There are only 2 scenarios that have both sense and consistency.

The first is that Bush went to war cynically: to solidify Republican domestic power and to advance his agenda at home. And his agenda is more power. The result is that Bush likes what he sees and tossing out the war would return him to talking to mayors and governors and conventioneers about school boards and water projects.

The second is that Bush went to war ignorantly, that he didn't understand that Saddam's opposition to Iran was a value in and of itself, that pulling Saddam out of the MidEast Jenga stack would simply breed chaos. Now, every single stupid thing we've seen him do is an attempt to save face in a Pee Wee Herman, "I meant to do that" fashion.

Cynicism or stupidity. Both on a history stripping scale.

Posted by Jeffrey Davis | December 12, 2006 11:07 AM

Well, let's not personalize the Bush administration unduly either, Jeffrey. Bush is not the decision-maker here.

Probably there were four groups pushing for the Iraq war:
1. Rove and the institutional Republican party, that wanted a "war president" to win elections.
2. The neo-cons, who wanted to "pick up some small crappy little country and throw it against the wall, just to show the world we mean business."
3. Rumsfeld and his allies in the Pentagon, who wanted a war to justify/solidify their program of transforming the military.
4. The oil industry, represented by Cheney, who wanted something involving oil -- I'm agnostic about exactly what.

It will be years before we know the relative weight of those four groups. but I'm pretty confident that when the definitive history of the Iraq war is written, Bush's personal failings will not be the main story.

Posted by lemuel pitkin | December 12, 2006 11:24 AM

The US occupation of Iraq was based on projecting the experience in Germany and Japan. Perhaps these models were used because of the intellectual laziness of the neo-cons, or perhaps because those were our most recent successful occupation experiences.

Nevertheless, they are totally inappropriate models. In both Japan and Germany, the populations were compliant, no doubt in part because they knew they were complicit in aggressive war.
The Iraqi population was not complicit in any crime, if anything they had been mistreated by the sanctions. Their attitudes toward an occupation will logically and reasonably be quite different than the Japanese or Germans. Arguments over which Iraqi puppet governement to support are ludicrous sideshows. Any Iraqi governement propped up by American power will be seen as tainted and temporary by the Iraqis.

A reasonable question is then - Can any occupation succeed when the occupied does not perceive it as legitimate? Personally, I doubt this is possible without extraordinary levels of violence by the occupier. It worked in many colonial situations, but only when the occupier was ready to wipe out the native population. It has failed in Iraq before when the British were the occupier, it has failed in Lebanon, and it is in serious trouble in Palestine. (Perhaps that is why Avigdor Lieberman is in the governement.)

One could argue that a benign occupation might have worked in Iraq. I wouldn't agree, but nevertheless, that was destroyed by the building of permanent military bases, the promulgations of Bremer and Abu Graib.

Posted by p.wilmington | December 12, 2006 11:26 AM

lemuel, you're mising
5. Jesus told Bush to invade to show up his daddy

In any case, if Bush let those other 4 groups set the policy it is a sign of weak leadership. Bush's personal failings are very close to the main story.

Posted by miguel | December 12, 2006 11:33 AM

Miguel, your 5 is actualyl the kind of explanation I'm rejecting. Note that Cheney, who does not share Bush's personal weaknesses, would have purused a similar (or if possible worse) course in Iraq.

The larger issue here is whetehr you see Iraq as a dramatic departure from or essentially continuous with past US foreing policy. Max Sawicky is the only major proponent of the second view in the blogosphere (although Crooked Timber shows signs of coming around), btu I'm trying to spread the gospel.

Posted by lemuel pitkin | December 12, 2006 11:57 AM

lemuel,

I'm amazed that you left out the Israeli/Zionist desire to weaken any strong Arab country.

Posted by p.wilmington | December 12, 2006 12:10 PM

Well, that would be a subset of 2.

Personally, I'm inclined to believe that the influence of Israel on US policy-makers -- as opposed to elite opinion -- is actually not that great, and that Israel serves US interests much more than the reverse. But debate on these questions almost always produces far more heat than light.

Posted by lemuel pitkin | December 12, 2006 12:22 PM

If the administration does decide to go with Hakim, we could resurrect an old ditty from the early Vietnam era. We could say that U.S. policy is: "Sink or swim with Abdul Aziz al-Hakim."

Posted by PeterP | December 12, 2006 1:09 PM

lemuel,

Please help me understand where Israel helps US interests.

Posted by p.wilmington | December 12, 2006 1:26 PM

Score for the personalization argument.

Posted by Gabriel | December 12, 2006 4:00 PM

I really think personalization of issues is a rightist fallacy, or at least rightists seem FAR more prone to it.

Kill Saddam and Iraq becomes a paradise, kill Amahenijad (I cannot spell it) and Iran becomes a garden, kill Zarqawi and Iraq becomes peaceful. Lean on Assad and Syria will be okay, and so on and so on.

Look most of us on this side despite Bush for a variety of reasons but we also know that Bush while pre-eminent CURRENT threat is not the real danger to the realm (America) but the giant apparatus of greed, Christianists, and fear that he used to get into power.

Posted by MNPundit | December 12, 2006 4:04 PM

This policy of installing some guy to marginalize a bad guy, then installing or supporting another bad guy to marginalize this newsly bad guy is all very reminscent of Springfield's experience with the Bolivian Tree Lizard.

Skinner: Well, I was wrong. The lizards are a godsend.
Lisa: But isn't that a bit short-sighted? What happens when we're overrun by lizards?
Skinner: No problem. We simply release wave after wave of Chinese needle snakes. They'll wipe out the lizards.
Lisa: But aren't the snakes even worse?
Skinner: Yes, but we're prepared for that. We've lined up a fabulous type of gorilla that thrives on snake meat.
Lisa: But then we're stuck with gorillas!
Skinner: No, that's the beautiful part. When wintertime rolls around, the gorillas simply freeze to death.

hmm, maybe the sunni militas will just...freeze to death, that seems to be the best approximation of Bush's policy these days

Posted by Matt Z | December 12, 2006 4:05 PM

Al-Hakim is a nasty Islamist who is very friendly with Iran. Furthermore, the biggest barrier to a peaceful political settlement in Iraq today is the Shiite militias attacking the Sunnis From what I understand, al-Hakim's Badr Organization is quite as active at this as is Sadr's Mehdi Army. Making him the kingpin of a new ruling coalition isn't going to help anything.

Posted by Les Brunswick | December 12, 2006 10:38 PM