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The Plan

12 Dec 2006 10:52 pm

Josh Marshall observes:

Another point, and one I'm not sure is widely appreciated. The folks who brought you the Iraq War have always been weak in the knees for a really whacked-out vision of a Shi'a-US alliance in the Middle East. I used to talk to a lot of these folks before I became persona non grata. So here's basically how the theory went and, I don't doubt, still goes ... We hate the Saudis and the Egyptians and all the rest of the standing Arab governments. But the Iraqi Shi'a were oppressed by Saddam. So they'll like us. So we'll set them up in control of Iraq. You might think that would empower the Iranians. But not really. The mullahs aren't very powerful. And once the Iraqi Shi'a have a good thing going with us. The Iranians are going to want to get in on that too. So you'll see a new government in Tehran. Plus, big parts of northern Saudi Arabia are Shi'a too. And that's where a lot of the oil is. So they'll probably want to break off and set up their own pro-US Shi'a state with tons of oil. So before you know it, we'll have Iraq, Iran, and a big chunk of Saudi Arabia that is friendly to the US and has a ton of oil. And once that happens we can tell the Saudis to f$#% themselves once and for all.

Now, you might think this involves a fair amount of wishful and delusional thinking. But this was the thinking of a lot of neocons going into the war.

Of course, it goes beyond this. With a new regime in Teheran, Hezbollah was suddenly going to become impotent in Lebanon, leading to the setup of a pro-American, anti-Syrian government there. Then with its grip on Lebanon lost, Syria would be the next domino to fall. At which point, everything would be awesome.

Now that's crazy, but pay attention to the really crazy part. Even if all of that happened what would it accomplish? This was all supposed to be part of the master plan to beat al-Qaeda, but even if the plan worked it . . . wouldn't have done anything to damage al-Qaeda. Thank God for the grownups.

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Comments (16)

Can we finally admit that al-Qaeda was not the neo-con reason for the Iraq War? The phrase "the road to Jerusalem goes through Baghdad" was a hint.

Just a few additions to the picture Josh Marshall recalls:

1. The Shia who were supposed to take over in Iraq were the so-called secular Shia Richard Perle was always talking about. Who were they? Apparently, Ahmad Chalabi and a few of his friends.

2. Much is packed into this statement:

The mullahs aren't very powerful. And once the Iraqi Shi'a have a good thing going with us. The Iranians are going to want to get in on that too. So you'll see a new government in Tehran.

In effect, Iraq was supposed to serve as a forward base for the management of an Iranian revolution. Indeed, quite a few of the post-9/11 actions - in Afghanistan, in Pakistan, in Azerbaijan and in Iraq - can be seen as part of an effort to put a noose around Iran. It seems that this still remains high on the agenda of the top men in the White House, as evidenced by their complete intransigence on the question of negotiations with Iran.

3. At least in the Laurent Murawiec version of the grand plan, the wave wasn't to stop with Syria, but was ultimately to sweep over Saudi Arabia (the strategic pivot) and Egypt (the prize).

As for how this was supposed to help with al Qaeda, two points:

4. Al Qaeda per se was never a big part of neocon thinking. It was all about "securing the realm", not fighting the war on terror. Al Qaeda attacks helped furnish useful propaganda for putting the plans into effect, but were not the focus of the regional transformation effort. Several published accounts, such as Clarke's, report that even following 9/11 it was hard to get people like Cheney and Wolfowitz to take al Qaeda seriously. In response to Clarke's insistence that the US had to deal with al Qaeda and Bin Laden, Wolfowitz is reported to have replied "Why are we talking about that little guy?" This was after 9/11.

5. To the extent that al Qaeda was a subject for concern, they were supposed to be taken care of by the "draining the swamps" effect. Remember, these guys remained convinced at the time that the key to Islamic terrorism was state sponsorship. They really believed the Laurie Mylroie-style accounts of the role of Saddam in the the "terror network", and believed that the rest of the problem was a matter of state support from places like Saudi Arabia, Syria and the "terror masters" in Iran. Once the pro-American tsunami had swept the region, the state sponsorship would dry up and the problem would largely disappear. The idea that terrorism was enabled by self-supporting or privately supported non-state networks did not compute in the minds of neocon thinkers, captivated as they were with classical legends of oriental conspiracies and despotic viziers and mandarins calling all the shots.

If the plan had worked, it would have been great for Israel.

If the US had succeeded in installing a puppet government in Iraq with a democratic facade, Israel have been glad to see that government pressure Syria to give up the Golan Heights and for Iran to back down in its quest for strategic parity with Israel.

The publics of very few countries were as supportive of the US invasion of Iraq as Israel's public. They would seem like geniuses now if the plan had worked.

Now the US has failed but it is absurd to think Israel should share in this defeat by ceding the Golan Heights or watching the US back down in its quest to contain Iran.

In response to Clarke's insistence that the US had to deal with al Qaeda and Bin Laden, Wolfowitz is reported to have replied "Why are we talking about that little guy?" This was after 9/11.

I don't have a copy of Clarke's book handy but I was sure that was before. Right in the same section Wolfowitz was saying "Why aren't we talking about Iraqi terrorism?" so I had a different read on things. All Cheney's people were Laurie Mylorie supporters who believed that all Arab type terrorism was secretly coordinated by the Elders of Araby headed by Saddam Hussein, or at least they all signed her book alleging that.

You're right Ed. I just checked - Wolfowitz's statement about "that little guy" did come earlier in 2001. Good catch.

but even if the plan worked it . . . wouldn't have done anything to damage al-Qaeda.

See, that just shows the blinkered small-minded thinking of the so called intellectual US liberal. Why, if that super-awesome plan had worked (and mind you it probably still will, it's just we may have to wait a decade or four), Osama and that Zawahiri guy definitely would have become christian neocons.

Does anybody in this pack of jokers know what a non-state actor is? Seriously.

Don't forget the Clean Break plan -authored by among others Richard Perle- in 1995 which advocated the return of the Hashemite dynasty in Najaf and from there, the control of the Lebanese Shias.

Thusly, Israel would win its security too!

Number one, JMM is doing a not-so-good job of playing catch-up with what's going on, without due acknowledgments of others leading the way. Number two, what he says here has nothing to do with what's going on right now. It's pertinent to some years ago. But not now. What you cite is his only original analytic contribution at the moment, and it's some combination of totally irrelevant and wrong. So it's a very, and probably influential, misleading contribution to the understanding of what's going on with regard to Iraq and the region right now.

For instance, there is no doubt that OVP believes, for whatever reason, that empowering Hakim and Sciri within the Shiite coalition is not a too risky tilt toward Iran. But the idea that OVP might see such an empowering of Sciri as some kind of incitation to regime change in Iran is absurd and ridiculous. My suspicion is rather that they have other, somewhat more sophisticated things in mind for accomplishing what they want to accomplish with regard to Iran. But even they are not wishful and deluded enough thinkers to imagine that somehow a powerful Sciri would be a threat to the Iranian regime.

Totally lame.

The neocons figured the best case scenario was that they would kill a lot of Arabs and turn them into pro-American moderns people; and the worst case scenario was that they'd just kill a lot of Arabs. From a neocon perspective, what wasn't to like?

I think you're being completely unfair to the neodream. A miraculous transformation of the middle east overnight would *hugely* impact al-Qaeda by drying up their recruitment and fundraising pool. Sure, there's still Pakistan and they're the ones who're probably gonna give al-Qaeda nukes, but once every Arab and Persian smiles and salutes Old Glory I think Musharrif, a very pragmatic . . . the proper title eludes me, do we call him General or President these days? Pakistani Commander in Chief Musharrif would see the love and feel the love and crack down on al-Qaeda.

But Matt. aren't you forgetting the importance of Eritrea in all this? The grand US-Isreali-Eritrean alliance was the linchpin to the entire strategy. And if the American people hadn't lost their will (those traitors!) we'd all be mounted on ponies by now.

"Ahh, but the strawberries that's... that's where I had them. They laughed at me and made jokes but I proved beyond the shadow of a doubt and with... geometric logic... that a duplicate key to the wardroom icebox DID exist, and I'd have produced that key if..."

- Humphrey Bogart,The Caine Mutiny,1954

"This was all supposed to be part of the master plan to beat al-Qaeda..."

Really? Cuz I'd swear that this plan existed well before 9/11, and that the neocons didn't (and don't) really give a hoot about al-Qaeda. And it's not an accident that "oilfields" are mentioned so many times. The whole agenda was one of "transformation," wherein leaders could be installed throughout the Middle East who would reliably sell us oil, deposit their money in our banks, buy our F-14s, etc. "Democracy," "human rights," "war on terror," "stemming the tide of Islamic extremism" are all post-hoc justifications for what is a remarkably simple and old-school agenda of replacing leaders who are or can be a pain in the butt politically and economically with those who won't be.

Does anybody in this pack of jokers know what a non-state actor is?

Sure - they have lots of experience with non-state actors. PNAC, AIPAC, Heritage Foundation, Carlyle Group, Halliburton...you wonder why they think non-state actors need state sponsors to survive?

Not following you, Jeff. Pointing out the nutty ideas that the current administration used to advocate strikes me as quite reasonable when discussing current policy -- hope I can be forgiven for dignifying our current flailings with the term "policy."

Nobody except you mentioned "empowering of Sciri as some kind of incitation to regime change in Iran." The nutty idea currently on the table is our participation on the Shiite side in a war of religious subjugation. Though it's actually a little past that, since the Iraqi police have already started the war.

AlanC9

The nutty idea currently on the table is our participation on the Shiite side in a war of religious subjugation.

Agree, that is well established by the reporting and analysis that Marshall is piggybacking on without crediting. Marshall's own analytic contribution is to suggest that the same logic that was in place a few years ago is still the one driving this nutty idea. Thus Marshall:

So here's basically how the theory went and, I don't doubt, still goes ...

My point is, it doesn't still go like that. Marshall is wrong, and so as a way of illluminating what is going on right now, Marshall's analysis is irrelevant at best. As for Sciri, the point is that the same reporting has established that those advocating a tilt toward the Shiites are in favor of empowering Sciri specifically. And it is just not the case that the strategy behind siding with the Shiites in Iraq now goes like this:

And once the Iraqi Shi'a have a good thing going with us. The Iranians are going to want to get in on that too.

For what it's worth, I do think the hawks in the administration have their sights and hearts set on Iran. But it's not by inciting regime change with the example of Iraq anymore. In fact, I think it's almost the opposite of what Marshall suggests, namely by counterbalancing Iran with Saudi Arabia et al in the region.


Comments closed December 26, 2006.

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