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Waxing Hawkish

16 Jan 2007 08:23 am

Well, I don't get to do this very often these days, but this Atrios post offers the opportunity:

[I]t's also true that taking the longer view it's not clear what the Great and Glorious First Gulf War actually accomplished that was positive. Obviously if you're a member of the Kuwaiti Royal Family you're a fan. And, obviously, if you think that in the modern world someone should act as a global cop to prevent nations from invading other nations (irony overload causing brain damage here) maybe you're a fan.

The global cop question strikes me as something it's odd to raise and not to state an opinion on. It seems to me to be an excellent thing that the world's major military powers, led by the most major military power of all, supported by the bulk of regional governments and acting under the auspices of the United Nations beat back and punished a clear violation of an extremely basic norm of international law. The "irony overload" factor is real, but much more constitutes a reason for this country to engage in fewer (ideally none whatsoever) ill-motivated invasions in the future, not to become more tolerant of other countries' ill-motivated invasions. Which is all to say, I think Atrios is wrong about this. One can ironize all one likes, but as far as these things go the first Gulf War was a good idea.

And not just because saying otherwise is a damn, dirty hippie kind of thing to say. Some of the best-dressed people I know are skeptical about that kind of global role for the United States. If you're interested, the best analytic case against the Gulf War and the presumptions underlying it is Tucker and Hendrickson's Imperial Temptation: The New World Order and America's Purpose. I would say that whether or not past views on Gulf War I cast doubt on a person's credibility is going to come down (to be a bit banal about it) to what they actually said . . . folks who underestimated America's ability to beat a conventional adversary were obviously wrong, whereas folks who simply think US security could be optimally achieved by reorienting the military to a stricter self-defense mission haven't really been put to the test.

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Comments (50)

cost-benefit analysis isn't really my beat, but when making this claim: "it strikes me as an excellent thing that the world's major military powers, led by the most major military power of all, supported by the bulk of regional governments and acting under the auspices of the United Nations beat back and punished a clear violation of an extremely basic norm of international law."

it's probably worth a mention of the dying that resulted too. Plenty of people argued that there were better ways of punishing Iraq that didn't cause so much death and destruction -- or, as has been recently been pointed out, internatialism does not necessarily mean blowing shit up.

The important thing to note is that even when the US (and others) act as 'global cop', they are not doing it with the underlying purpose which one would associate with being a global cop in any real sense. The US and other states act as they do because of the small groups that control their decision-making. When their behaviour is compatible with the UN use of force regime, they look like global cops. When their behaviour is incompatible with the UN use of force regime, they look like global bandits. But the motivations for their behaviour are the same in both cases.

Put me down as another "global test" guy.

I don't think we really know enough about the run up to
Gulf War I to say that it "was a good idea". I suspect that
future historians will find the effort to have been a little less noble than some now think. After all, it was a Bush/Baker Production. We know about them guys.

To be clear I wasn't trying to make an argument against the war, just stating that I found it weird that it was seemingly universally (in our mainstream discourse) believed to be so.

Certainly the global cop thing and the idea that countries shouldn't be invading other countries is a relatively appealing one, and if we tried to apply that idea on a pretty consistent basis through international institutions I'd probably be behind it - the value being that the credible threat of us stepping in would mean that we wouldn't have to very much.

But, as I've said before wars are obviously failures and the real question is what could have been one before the war to stop it. Going with my credible threat idea, it's hard to imagine that hussein would've invaded kuwait had he thought we'd invade iraq in turn, so the question is why we failed to communicate that to him.

Hey, if you think that a Saddam Hussein armed with the full panoply of nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons (after all, as we found, Saddam most certainly would have had all of the above had it not been for the first Gulf War), with a dominant position in the region and the global oil market, and with proof that violating international norms is acceptable, is perfectly fine... then I can see how you might wonder whether the First Gulf War "actually accomplished that was positive".

Those of us who think those things are not fine are convinced that the first Gulf War really did accomplish something that was positive.

Note: I supported Gulf War I at the time.

There's no question that Saddam's conquest of Kuwait violated international norms against offensive war. It was a much, much better casus belli for collective self-defense than anything since.

But. A big question GWI doves asked was, "Then what?" And I think the answer not only turned out to be "very bad stuff," but very bad stuff that was foreseeable. Three things happened: 1. as a matter of rational calculation, Very Important People in the US and Britain decided that Saddam couldn't be safely left in power lest he simply reinvade Kuwait or take it out on the Saudis or whatever. So the anti-WMD sanctions regime became a de facto policy of trying to topple Saddam. 2. Because countries don't run wars on noble impulses, but rather on hatred and fear, late 1990 began the program of personally demonizing Saddam - bad enough to be sure - as "worse than Hitler," making it impossible to climb down from the stance in part 1. 3. Very Important People in the US used the opening GWI provided to establish the permanent military presence in Saudi Arabia they had long wanted anyway, for reasons that had nothing to do with enforcing international norms.

All of these things could end in only one place, which was the place that crazed, incredibly unserious Cato foreign policy scholars like Leon Hadar warned us it would end: in a determined anti-American terrorist movement motivated to strike on American soil. I did not buy their arguments at the time of the war itself. I wish I had.

I think that the meme has really sunk in that Gulf War I was a good idea. I think it basically comes down to a huge bias, on the part of not only the mainstream media but historians as well, to believe that whatever action was taken was the right action.

For example, people generally think Wilson was right to get us involved in WW I. If he had kept us out of it, I'm sure the same historians would be telling us how important and vital it was that he kept us out of it.

In this particular case, I think our involvement in the war was probably a good idea. However, as Matt pointed out, the alternative course hasn't been tested. I just think people have a built in bias to think that, looking back, any alternative actions are risky and probably would have been worse than what was done.

Its only when the actual decisions made are truly disastrous that people decide that an alternative would have been better, such as with the latest war.

I think a crazed terrorist movement intent on striking on American soil is vastly preferrable to letting Saddam get away with invading Kuwait and developing his weapons. Despite the ridiculous hype that you hear, crazed terrorist movements are really not much of a problem. The problem was a huge hole in our security, in terms of basically taking no precautions against airline hijackings.

20 years from now, on the other hand, crazed terrorists probably will be a huge problem, what with the increased availability of technology for making biological weapons.

All of these things could end in only one place, which was the place that crazed, incredibly unserious Cato foreign policy scholars like Leon Hadar warned us it would end: in a determined anti-American terrorist movement motivated to strike on American soil.

Why is a "determined anti-American terrorist movement" the only possible reaction to American military presence in Saudi Arabia? America has a military presence in many, many countries that hasn't caused a "determined anti-American terrorist movement".

Believe it or not, Al, different cultures actually respond DIFFERENTLY to the SAME provocations. There are professionals in the CIA and State Dept. whose job it is to make predictions of how they respond. Then there are people in the White House whose job it is to ignore these predictions and get us involved in quagmires.

But, as I've said before wars are obviously failures and the real question is what could have been one before the war to stop it. Going with my credible threat idea, it's hard to imagine that hussein would've invaded kuwait had he thought we'd invade iraq in turn, so the question is why we failed to communicate that to him.

That, Atrios, is a heck of a question for April Glapsie, no?

Keep in mind, in most cases the first Gulf War is brought up entirley to contrast it with the second, and specifically to contrast the first Bush's performance with his son's. In this situation, is it any wonder the first Gulf War looks like it was run by geniuses and guided by angelic moral clarity?

"The important thing to note is...when the US act as 'global cop', they are not doing it with the underlying purpose which one would associate with being a global cop....When their behaviour is compatible with the UN use of force regime, they look like global cops. When their behaviour is incompatible with the UN use of force regime, they look like global bandits. But the motivations for their behaviour are the same in both cases." - otto

This is not only "a" very important point, it is the most important point that needs to be addressed when discussing the USA's role as enforcer. The US never has behaived in a way resembling a police officer, neutraly enforcing the law. We pursue what our elites believe to be our national interest exclusively. More often than not, when it comes to using force (or guiding proxies) we are in direct violation of international law. We are quite often in violation of US law. That is not behaivor that can be associated with a cop, and we should seriously stop using that metaphor. It is entirely unhelpful and not in the least descriptive.

Why is a "determined anti-American terrorist movement" the only possible reaction to American military presence in Saudi Arabia? America has a military presence in many, many countries that hasn't caused a "determined anti-American terrorist movement".

Because of a well-observed history of aggrieved Arab subnational groups using terrorism against enemies with powerful conventional militaries. Given Algeria, Lebanon and the Palestinian territories among others, the surprise would have been had stationing American troops permanently in Saudi Arabia while continuously bombing Iraq and perpetuating sanctions had NOT led to an anti-American terrorist movement. It would have been an extraordinary claim on the part of anyone who said we shouldn't expect it.

We pursue what our elites believe to be our national interest exclusively.

You are so close it hurts!

You are so close it hurts!

Obviously, political leaders pursue what they believe to be in their interest and seek to convince people that the national interest is identical to their interests.

Matthew Y:

Your argument is predicated on the probably wrong assumption that there was no way of getting Hussein's regime out of Kuwait short of war.

That cliche is true: no war is unavoidable until it starts.

Meanwhile, the war led to grievances #1 and #2 on bin Laden's list and got the neocons' foots in the door with the sanctions regime and the no-fly zones.

The global cop principle is a respectable one in theory, and it worked about as well as it could have been hoped during the first Gulf War.

However, as the second Iraq War clearly illustrates, there is a serious disconnect between the resources that the US and its allies can bring to the battlefield, and the demand for "cops" around the world. The US can obliterate the military and national infrastructure of any non-nuclear power anywhere in the world, in a matter of weeks. The NATO nations can send enough ground troops to occupy a handful of small countries indefinitely. And that's about it. There is no global police department capable of maintaining the world order by force. And as America continues to operate as a hegemonic rogue cop, the international resentment of our policies will continue to rob us of the credibility needed to perform honest police work.

The continued employment of oh-so-serious hawkish politicians, bureaucrats, think-tank brats, and pundits who fail to grasp even the most basic limitations of US military force, which are clearly recognizable and readily exploitable by even the dumbest America-hating militants, is perhaps the single most dangerous trend that America faces today.

There are really only a small number of options for moving forward. Either the US and its allies expend much of their wealth to build up massive armies of draftees or mercenaries to conduct global police work, or we operate by arming unsavory proxies to play "bad cop" in trouble zones around the world, or we have to seriously reorient our military policy toward a more defensive-minded internationalist or isolationist posture. People who possess the gall to pop up on major editorial pages and flack for war against 5 or 10 different enemies, but can't specify where the money or boots on the ground will come from, should be properly tarred and feathered, heckled mercilessly, and run out of Washington on a rail.

Going with my credible threat idea, it's hard to imagine that hussein would've invaded kuwait had he thought we'd invade iraq in turn, so the question is why we failed to communicate that to him.

This I agree with. See my January 4 post on this matter. Significant questions as to what happened here and why have not been answered to my satisfaction (though note Joe Wilson's view that the Bush I administration did nothing wrong here). On balance, it seems to me that the pre-war diplomacy was bobbled (normally you don't get a war unless one or more parties screw up) but that once Saddam invaded Kuwait, Bush handled it properly.

Note that if the issue purely hinged on America threatening to go to war Saddam could have withdrawn from Kuwait before we counterattacked as the "Desert Shield" pre-war military and diplomatic buildup took a long time and offered plentiful opportunity to back down. Saddam either thought he could fight the US-led coalition to a standstill or else that it would be better for his credibility vis-a-vis Iran and domestic opponents to stand his ground and fight, even if that meant losing, than to back down and admit that he'd misjudged the situation.

For example, people generally think Wilson was right to get us involved in WW I.

Yeah, the conventional wisdom in the USA is definitely that we bailed Europe out of two Big Ones. Some students of history have suggested an alternate view:

America should have minded her own business and stayed out of the World War. If you hadn't entered the war the Allies would have made peace with Germany in the Spring of 1917. Had we made peace then there would have been no collapse in Russia followed by Communism, no breakdown in Italy followed by Fascism, and Germany would not have signed the Versailles Treaty, which has enthroned Nazism in Germany. If America had stayed out of the war, all these 'isms' wouldn't today be sweeping the continent of Europe and breaking down parliamentary government - and if England had made peace early in 1917, it would have saved over one million British, French, American, and other lives.

-- Winston Churchill, 1936.

As for what Saddam thought, keep in mind that well before Desert Storm launched, Maggie Thatcher and GHWB avowed that mere withdrawal from Kuwait would not save Iraq from war.

yeah, what jim said. Once we decided to get our war on, the war was on.

This I agree with. See my January 4 post on this matter.

As I noted in that post, there are OFTEN reasons that one doesn't communicate with absolute clarity one intentions. See our Taiwan policy for the last 50 years.

Because of this asinine idea that our ambiguity (if there was any) makes Saddam's invasion somehow our fault, we never get into a discussion as to the reasoning behind our ambiguity.

The conventional wisdom between the wars was that America should have minded its own business and not gotten into the First World War. This only changed after World War II, I'd say, and even then the older view has always remained pretty common. You see Niall Ferguson advancing something similar wrt Britain, for instance.

As to Churchill, he's just wrong. Totally and utterly wrong. There is absolutely no way the allies would have made peace with Germany in the spring of 1917 had not America entered. In the spring of 1917 there was no sense that American participation really meant anything - there were no American troops, and not even any clear promise of American troops for a long time. The Allies were committed to the war, and all the leaders knew that a negotiated settlement - which would, by necessity, involve large concessions to Germany - would be politically fatal for them (and probably they were decent enough people to think that it would also be terrible for their countries). That was was going to go on until one side was defeated. The only country on either side that was really willing to stomach a status quo ante peace was Austria-Hungary, and it was in no position to negotiate independently.

There were several actual mediation efforts around the time churchill is saying peace would've broken out - Wilson's mediation efforts in late 1916, and the Pope's the next year - and both were rejected by both sides, but more vehemently by the Allies. Churchill was, as so often, living in a fantasy world, assuming he actually said that - and it's possible, at least, that it was a fabrication. Read a book on the diplomacy of the First World War. It rapidly becomes apparent that nobody was interested in peace in the spring of 1917, and Churchill surely knew this, at least on the British and French side, whose leaders at the time were men he knew personally.

As I noted in that post, there are OFTEN reasons that one doesn't communicate with absolute clarity one intentions. See our Taiwan policy for the last 50 years.

Al, what would be the plausible reason to leave any doubt that if Saddam invaded Kuwait, we would not in fact be okay with it?

Re: "...Because of this asinine idea that our ambiguity (if there was any) makes Saddam's invasion somehow our fault, we never get into a discussion as to the reasoning behind our ambiguity."

It seems to me that a big blind spot a lot of conservatives have, is that they worry most about whether or not what happens is a country's "fault", or whether or not a country is "justified" in doing something. Its the fallacy of treating countries as if they were human beings that need to be taught right and wrong. They really seem to think that we should deal with all the muslim countries as if they were a bunch of 4 year olds that have to learn to behave.

This is idiotic. What we need to worry about are what the RESULTS of our policies are. Concepts like blame or justification are beside the point.

Having said that, I do think Al has a point, in that our default position in a lot of cases, such as Taiwan, is ambiguity.

Re: Plenty of people argued that there were better ways of punishing Iraq that didn't cause so much death and destruction

The point was not to "punish" Iraq, as if it were a naughty child to be stood in a corner. The point was to evict Iraqi occupying forces from Kuwait.

Re: Had we made peace then there would have been no collapse in Russia followed by Communism, no breakdown in Italy followed by Fascism, and Germany would not have signed the Versailles Treaty, which has enthroned Nazism in Germany.

Maybe not the last one in the list, but the collapse of Russia was inevitable by 1916 (if not by 1914), and Italy's slide into fascism had a lot more to do with domestic problems than foreign policy issues (Italy after all was one of the victors of WWI and gained territory at Austria's expense).

Looking at this in "realist" terms, what happens if we did give Hussein the subtle wink and nod to invade, he then invaded, and we condemned it strongly, etc., and let it lie? Would he not have sold us oil? In fact, would he not have been somewhat beholden to us for not kicking his ass out of Kuwait? Maybe he develops a nuke. And therefore, what? He is somehow immune to the natural interest in not being obliterated that kept the Soviet Union and China from nuking us and others? Is it worse for Hussein to have a nuke than Pakistan? Why? And whatever you think of our support of Hussein prior to our demonization of him, the fact remains that having a counterweight to Iran in the region was a pretty good idea that looks even better in light of recent events.

I ask all of that as someone who certainly supported the Gulf War and has only recently come to view it in the context of later disasters, and wonder if we'd have been better off just leaving well enough alone. Obviously, the first Gulf War did not necessitate the current quagmire, but it did spawn a decade of bad things that only get worse as time goes on. And those historians that Bush is always talking about probably will not view the first Gulf War as a stand-alone event at all. It will be the prelude to a couple of decades of disaster and chaos, and it will not be judged in isolation, but as an object lesson in unintended consequences and strategic reversal.

I was also surprised reading Atrios' comment - as I watched friends protest the first gulf war, I couldn't see how Saddam invading Kuwait was in any way different than Hitler invading Poland -- certainly each could've been stopped earlier, but that ship had sailed.

The denouement, however, was regrettable in the extreme -- inciting the shiites and leaving them to Saddam, sanctions, bush 43's oedipal psychosis, and the present disaster.

And so what if our self-serving ambiguity causes a little war or genocide?

Nothing sociopathic about American foreign policy at all.

"I couldn't see how Saddam invading Kuwait was in any way different than Hitler invading Poland"

Whatever your feelings on Hussen and the attemped Kuwait annexation, this conflation of the Nazis with just about any and everything we don't like is unhelpful. To start with, Nazi Germany was the most powerful and ruthless military machine in world history. It was very large population-wise, was scientifically and industrially advanced compared to other major powers, was internally unified, and had long standing and publicly declared intentions to rule the whole world. By contrast, Baathist Iraq was small, divided, relatively poor, and militarily dependent on importing foreign technology.

Iraq trying to conquer Kuwait for its oil is a lot more like Peru taking big chunks out of Ecuador for its natural gas, than it is like Hitler trying subjegate the entire human race. While Hussein deserved a beatdown, these Nazi Germany-Baathist Iraq comparisons need to stop. The right has long used this non-equivalency as a way to tap into and manipulate Americans nationalism and they certainly don't need our help in doing so.

"All of these things could end in only one place, which was the place that crazed, incredibly unserious Cato foreign policy scholars like Leon Hadar warned us it would end: in a determined anti-American terrorist movement motivated to strike on American soil. I did not buy their arguments at the time of the war itself. I wish I had."

Do you have a reference for that warning by Leon Hadar?

Matthew C, who cares about the actual capabilities of our adversaries? If we compare them to Nazi Germany, and then we stand up to them, then we get to feel a little bit like Winston Churchill. Yippee!

Al, what would be the plausible reason to leave any doubt that if Saddam invaded Kuwait, we would not in fact be okay with it?

Same reasons as Taiwan, I'd imagine. We think that announcing our policy would actually be detrimental to a negotiated settlement of the dispute. I'm not saying, BTW, that I AGREE with that reasoning, either as regards Saddam or as regards Taiwan. Just that it is a rational explanation over which reasonable minds could differ.

I can see why we didn't explicitly guarantee Kuwait's independence before the war. It wasn't at all obvious that the Saudis would give us basing rights before the crisis, and without those rights we'd have had to do a straight-up invasion with the Marines and not much more than carrier aviation in support. Kind of a ghastly proposition.

On that Churchill quote: yeah, he was kind of kidding himself about the allies making peace in 1917. But if the US didn't join the war, the Central Powers would have won an outright victory in 1918. And who knows how events in Russia would have played out in those circumstances.

It seems to me that a big blind spot a lot of conservatives have, is that they worry most about whether or not what happens is a country's "fault", or whether or not a country is "justified" in doing something. ... What we need to worry about are what the RESULTS of our policies are. Concepts like blame or justification are beside the point.

I don't understand this. The persons "faulting" the US (i.e., saying the US is to "blame") for some negative occurrence are saying exactly that: that the occurrence is the result of our policy. (C.f., Murph, at 1:07 pm.) Conservatives are merely saying that the occurrence is NOT the result of our policy - that is, Saddam's invasion of Kuwait is not the result of American policy.

What I mean is, they are not saying the US is to blame in a moral sense, which seems to be the way conservatives interpret it. What they are saying is, they made a policy mistake by not making it clear to Saddam what the results would be, in order to dissuade him from attacking.

Whatever the policy mistakes were from the Bush 1 administration, the moral blame lies 100% with Saddam. Pointing out these mistakes doesn't mean people hold Bush morally responsible in any way for what happened.

"As for what Saddam thought, keep in mind that well before Desert Storm launched, Maggie Thatcher and GHWB avowed that mere withdrawal from Kuwait would not save Iraq from war."

This is interesting and odd. It isn't as if we continued the war after Saddam withdrew.

No Gulf War, no 9/11.

Matthew C:

Nazi Germany wanted to "rule the whole world" and "subjugate the entire human race"? Where did you get your knowledge of WWII? Old newsreels?

Nazi Germany was quite bad enough without your exaggerating. A comparison of Saddam Hussein's invasion of Kuweit (or our invasion of Iraq) is perfectly apt and legitimate. It was, as they say, a "miscalculation", much the way Hitler miscalculated in thinking the Western allies would honor a pact with Poland.

I meant: "...miscalculating in not believing the Western allies..."

The first Gulf War can be summarized thusly: Country A, ruled by dictator 1, invaded Country B, ruled by dictator 2, and threatened Country C, ruled by dictator 3. The United States, spent billions of dollars and ruined thousands of American lives to: defend Country C and its dictator 3, drive out Country A from Country B, and return rightful ownership of Country B back to dictator 2. Country A was left with dictator 1. In the end nothing changed, all three countries were still ruled by the same three dictators. Not one step forward for American values, or democracy in general. Iraq, Kuwait, and Saudi Arabia all remained the same and all are a danger to the US.

I think we should encourage more comparisons to Nazi Germany, not less. We are, after all, embarking on "World War IV".

brendan, I got it from studying history, so save your insults. If you think all the Nazis wanted was to annex Poland and go home, you need to put down the David Irving revisionism. The Germans were always very clear, and fairly honest in stating their intent. It goes back at least to World War 1, and before that to 1870 (and really, as far back as you want to go). German imperialism, and their capacity to achieve it, isn't some sort of American propaganda. It has a very long and very horrifically violent history that climaxed, fortunately, in German defeat, but in fact came very close to a global Nazi empire.

Nazi Germany was intent on suceeding not only where the German Empire had failed, but also to exact revenge on all parties that participated in Germany's humiliation. The German Empire in World War 1 was attempting (and their generals, intellectuals, and political leaders were very public about their intent) to annex large chunks of Russia, all of France, and all of France's overseas colonies and territories. Their entire military and all of their government policy was built around this goal (see Barbara's Tuchman' Guns of August), and indeed they saw German supremacy in Europe as their right, as their destiny. While they had success on the eastern front, British and American aid to France led to their ultimate defeat.

Twenty years later, Nazi Germany's intent included all of the old Empire's goals and then some. Aside from client states like Italy, the Nazis had every intention, from the very beginning, of conquering all of Europe (including Great Britain), the Soviet Union (despite their secret alliance), and (once again) seizing all of their overseas colonies and territories, which encompassed a huge portion of the world's population and resources. If they had succeed (and they may have if not for US involvement or the ill-concieved invasion of the Soviet Union), the Nazis would not only have found themselves as masters of all of Europe, but inheritors of all the colonies and territories of the defeated.

So, yes, the Nazis did want to rule the whole world (or at least the majority of it under Europe colonial control) and were both very clear about that and capable of it, and they would have wiped out 'undesirables', as they did wherever they could (I would call that subjugation, no?), and no, a comparison between Hitler's invasion of Poland followed by the rapid conquest of Western Europe, and Hussein's invasion of Kuwait to pay off its war debts to its former masters is not apt in any meaningful way, as Iraq had neither the history of wider imperialism (aside from trying swipe Iran's oil fields while they were distracted by internal upheaval) nor the capacity to pursue it. Like I said before, Iraq is more accurately compared to a small regional power like Peru that tries to steal resources from their neighbors.

Militarist Americans will call me naive, but I believed then and still believe that behind the scenes diplomacy could easily have persuaded Saddam to leave Kuwait without war. "Oh no, you can't negotiate with a madman." Right, and believing the rest of our own childish propaganda is how we got into this second war too.

Matthew C:

I'd like you to retract the David Irving comment. It exceeds mere insult.

Much as I love "Guns of August" it's popular history and should be taken with a grain of salt.

After their successful wars of 1866 and 1870 Bismarck's Germany wanted nothing more than the status quo, so I would trace the beginning of Germany's goal of European dominance to the beginning of the 20th century.

My point is that no wars are inevitable. Even Hitler's wars. For example, if Poland had assented to German territorial demands, would an attack of the whole country been inevitable? If appeasers had remained in power in England and France renounced its treaty obligations to Poland, would further war have been inevitable?

My point is not that those things were desirable, or that appeasers or capitulators were far sighted, which they clearly were not -- like most Americans, I consider Churchill heroic (at the moment I am indulging a guilty pleasure and reading another popular history, "The Duel"). It's just that even "just wars" can escalate to horrific ends, many of which may not have been intended or anticipated by the parties involved.

I think that you have too credulously absorbed a narrative of WWII that undiscriminatingly flatters us.

Gary Sugar:

I wish I could give you a link, but a couple of years ago I read a great interview with an ex-diplomat (with the first Bush, I believe) who described how we could have given Hussein a token island in the Gulf in exchange for his retreat from Kuwait, but that by the time of the buildup war was deemed more desirable.

There is some conspiracy-minded theorizing that even the "realists" of the first Bush administration viewed the invasion of Kuwait as a window of opportunity after the Glaspie blunder they didn't want to forego with diplomacy. Other commenters might know something more about this.

I do take back the Irving comment and I sincerely apologize, that was below the belt. I was just irked by your 'old newsreel' comment.

As for your recent post, Bismarck may have wanted that, but he was not Germany, and was sidelined by Wilhelm II in part because of his views on peace and status quo. I don't know what to say about your assertion that Germans only developed their desire to conquer Europe in the 20th century, other than its refuted for example by the development of the Schlieffen Plan, signaling at the very least a widespread idea developing post-1870 that Germany would soon find itself at war with Russia and France. You could argue they had a non-imperialist reason for this, but I personally don't think that would be a credible argument.

By the time of the invasion of Poland, there was no possibility that the Germans would refrain from invading France. If France had backed out of its treaty obligations, all that would have done is shown Germany how weak France had really become. Germany wasn't after Poland, they were after France. I don't understand the argument that appeasing the Nazis or abandoning Poland would have prevented anything (and that view does not mean I think the Iraqi insurgents will follow us home).

I absolutely agree that 'just' wars are horrible and avoidable, and that up to a certain point in time World War II was avoidable, but I suppose I disagree with you about at what point that was. Nazi Germany had a uniquely terrifying combination of intent and capacity that some third rate dictator like Hussein couldn't hope to match, and when people compare every country that invades another to the Nazis, it is pandering to the same myths you've accused me of reguritating.

I'm not sure who you mean by "us", if you're also an American, because I do not believe I've flattered the US, as I believe our role was a relatively small one and have said so here before. I can both acknowledge how close the Nazis came to conquering Europe and seizing its collective colonies, and dismiss American national myths for what they are. In fact, after reading more of your posts, I'm not sure we broadly disagree about war, only the intent and power of the Nazis.

I have read on several occasions that Kuwait was stealing Iraqi oil with the (then) new horizontal drilling techniques.
Is there anything to this?

To the one who asked, Please check-out my Quagmire: America in the Middle East published in 1992! http://www.amazon.com/Quagmire-America-Leon-T-Hadar/dp/0932790933/ref=ed_oe_p/103-5898828-8959839


Comments closed January 30, 2007.

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