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Who's Backsliding?

12 Mar 2007 09:06 am

Washington Post editorial page editor Fred Hiatt helpfully publishes under his own byline to assure us that dissent from the anti-Putin line that dominates the DC conventional wisdom reflects hatred of America. In fact, he's missing the point. "Who lost Russia? As the world's biggest country backslides ever more quickly into authoritarianism," Hiatt writes, "the answer you hear increasingly is: the United States."

The point skeptics will raise here isn't that the United States is to blame for Russia backsliding ever more quickly into authoritarianism, but that it's mighty hard to discern this process of rapid backsliding. Vladimir Putin, after all, was re-elected a few years ago in a vote. But it wasn't a proper vote you say? All the available broadcast media outlets were strongly supporting him and the opposition didn't have a chance? This is true. But it differs from Boris Yeltsin's re-election how, exactly? And then of course there was Putin's first election, the literal bridge between the Yeltsin era and the Putin era where, again, one can easily discern the near-total continuity between the undemocratic practices of America's favorite Russian and of America's most-loathed Russian. Putin appears to have quite possibly had a hand in the assassination of a handful of political opponents, yes. Yeltsin, by contrast, deployed tanks to shell the parliamentary opposition.

This is where the United States enters the pictures. Skeptical observers will discern that complaints about Putin do not appear to be genuinely concerned with the integrity of the procedural aspects of Russian governance. Rather, it seems that semi-authoritarian leadership of Russia was welcome when said leadership governed in a manner that was conducive to the financial interests of some well-connected western elites and when said leadership took a generally weak and compliant attitude toward international questions. Putin leads a stronger country than Yeltsin's shell-shocked wreck, one that's much more willing to challenge American policy. So, suddenly, it appears that Russia is led by a vicious dictator.

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Comments (26)

The election was literally a bridge? Interesting.

Wait - I thought Putin was an OK guy because Bush looked into his soul!

A literal bridge, eh? Are there any photographs of it available?

By the way, who's blaming the US for Putin's authoritarian practices? Nobody I know, or read. What people (like me, but also ones with a public platform) do blame the US for is the tension between the US and Russia in foreign policy matters. Completely different thing - but I guess Hiatt's unable to make the distinction.

So the folks who track those freedom index doo-hickies and say Russia is becoming less democratic, they're making it up? I haven't followed this super-closely, but to me, it seems like a lot more journalists have been shut down, put in jail, etc., than under Yeltsin.

There's also the fact that in the early '90s, Russia was not very democratic, but it was moving in the right direction -- it was way, way more democratic than it had ever been before. Things are only slightly worse now, but the place is, as they say, backsliding. Things are moving in the wrong direction.

Yep. Different day, same authoritarian sociopath, only this time, perhaps not reeking so much of the vodka.

That said, Putin couldn't possibly be in such a strong position were it not for Bush's disastrous missteps. So where are the Dems recalling the idiot Dauphin and his lax minder Condi looking into Pooty-Poot's heart and treating him as a strategic partner, not an obvious once and future adversary and enemy of democracy? Granted, this is the umpteenth foreign policy disaster of the Bush Administration, and we've hardly started accounting for the first twenty or so. But Russia, unlike any of our other adversaries, has nukes capable of hitting Milwaukee.

Well, Putin is also responsible for the war in chechenia (is that how you spell it?), that does look pretty genocidal.

It is quite possible that Yeltsin did something similar but lets not froget that ´Putin is pretty bad.

You're right to bag on Yeltsin and point out that he was no friend to democracy in any interesting sense and ruled in a highly autocratic and bad way. But, during Yeltsin's time there _were_ other centers of power and those have nearly all been undone under Putin. This difference is important both now and for the future of the country and it's foolish to ignore this.

But Russia, unlike any of our other adversaries, has nukes capable of hitting Milwaukee.

I thought you said Russia was a foreign policy disaster.

Hey-Oh!

Kidding. Milwaukee, we love you.

But it wasn't a proper vote you say? All the available broadcast media outlets were strongly supporting him

No similarity to Berlusconi of course, because he's a good friend of America.

Also Yeltsin started the idiotic war in Chechnya, Putin is really just continuing what Yeltsin started. And unfortunately most of the Russian elite agree with Putin's aims in Chechnya if not his means.

What American pundits always miss in these discussions is that discussions of "Democracy" at a macrolevel are meaningless. Democracy is only valid if local government is accountable to the population. The Russia I knew in the 90s was far from democratic or transparent - local governors controlled local media, businessmen were forced to pay massive bribes to stay in business, there were really no groundrules and in most regions local officials ruled their own private fiefdoms. My understanding is that for the most part the situation at a local level is far better in Russia today than it was in the 90s. At least local governments tend to obey the groundrules once they've set those rules and local governors are not acting as arbitrarily or capriciously as they did in the past. No one in Russia wants to go back to 1994 and if America is perceived as pushing Russia in that direction anti-Americanism will only grow.

But Russia, unlike any of our other adversaries, has nukes capable of hitting Milwaukee.

Good job none of us are in Milwaukee.

TINTIN: The piranha can strip a horse to the bone in two minutes.

CAPTAIN HADDOCK: Good job I'm not a horse, then.

Well, Putin is also responsible for the war in chechenia (is that how you spell it?), that does look pretty genocidal.

Define "responsible for". The First and Second Checen Wars started under Yeltsin's watch. (What Putin is often accused of is manufacturing a terrorist bombing in Moscow to blame on the Chechens, in order to drum up support for a military endeavor that the Russians were then losing. Also, a great many war crimes happened while he was president, but I don't think that distinguishes him from Yeltsin.)

I would think Russia's "slide into authoritianism" is just a case of follow the leader. After all, it's working so well for George...

So just because Yeltsin wasn't a very good democrat and Putin isn't a good democrat, therefore any perceived difference between them is just a case of corporate sour grapes?

There's something to what you say; the destruction of the corporate entities in Russia is more important to many elites than any real democratic issues. But the idea that capitalism (in whatever form as long as it's open to corporations) is more important than democracy to many in our foreign policy elite isn't exactly a cutting-edge observation. And Putin destroying the corporate power centers in Russia, while also consolidating the anti-democratic tendencies of the Yeltsin regime, is evidence of increasing authoritarianism in Russia.

Matt (not famous) writes that "during Yeltsin's time there _were_ other centers of power and those have nearly all been undone under Putin."

I'm not sure that's right. I have a friend who's a foreign-policy wonk specializing in Russian affairs says that the essential problem is that the government there no longer has a monopoly on the use of force--in other words, there are many centers of power in modern Russia. The Russian people see this, and that's why Putin has a 70% approval rating: they feel he, or someone like him, is the only hope they have of reining in the thugs and gangs who are battling for position.

And don't forget that some of those "other centers of power" were the oligarchs, who were (are) merely gangsters under the colors of capitalism.

Dear Johan Richter

Yeltsin sent the army into Chechenia. Putin basically returned to Yeltsin's policy,
so it is not true that Yeltsin "did something similar" he did something identical.

Dear Too Many Steves
You ask
"So the folks who track those freedom index doo-hickies and say Russia is becoming less democratic, they're making it up?"
You should examine "those folks" a bit before declaring their index to be authoratative. For example you might find out
who they are. They are "Freedom House." Yglesias's claim is not that the index is completely made up, but that it is
distorted so that Pro US governments are given better ratings than anti US governments even if they are equally (un)democratic.

The fact is that "the folks" changed during the 80s. The original leader of the team that made the political rights index
(Raymond Gastil iirc) came to a parting of the ways with Freedom House (that is decided to spend more time with his family)
immediately after he refused to declare El Salvador a democracy (remember death squads and such). The claim that Freedom
House is a perpatrator of the equivocation between "Pro US" and "Democratic" is not paranoid, it is, more or less, an
established fact. I might be wrong about Freedom House, but you should, at least, know who you are citing as an unbiased
authority.

You say
"There's also the fact that in the early '90s, Russia was not very democratic,
but it was moving in the right direction -- it was way, way more democratic than it had ever been before."
However the Yeltsin administrations lasted a while, so it is not obvious (as you seem to assume) that the direction Russia
was moving was the same throughout. My perception is that Yeltsin's first election (president of Russia then still part of
the USSR) was a great step forward towards Democracy and that the end of the USSR made Russia a democracy for the first time ever.
this was moving in the right direction. However, the direction changed during Yeltsin's two terms in office with the
shelling of parliament, the use of massive force in Chechenia and general contempt for the rule of law and the division of powers
(not to mention a level of corruption which would make Duke Cunningham blush). To be picky and (I admit) Wiki, Yeltsin
was president until 1999, thus progress in the (very) early 90s is not the latest evidence on his devotion to Democracy.
How was the Yeltsin of 1999 more democratic than the Putin of 2007 ? That is the question.

Is Freedom House still run by Bay Buchanon? Nothing they say is meaningful.

Speaking of "meaningless", talking about "democracy" without any kind of working definition inevitably leads to 2 Bush elections. Pop political science seems to define it as "a bicameral 2-party state-sponsored system" which makes all of Europe undemocratic.

I'm just going to lump Putin with Castro and Ahmadinejad in the category of "US media wants him dead, and so will lie about him", which is a counterempirical category. I'll assume that anything given as factual is a lie and/or mistranslation, rendering judgement useless.

So the folks who track those freedom index doo-hickies and say Russia is becoming less democratic, they're making it up?

Yep. Even a brief glance at Freedom House would show that this post is not very, um, reality-based.

what i like about this (and i'll be damned if i'm going to read fred hiatt his very own stupid self, so i'm assuming matthew's quote is accuate) is the way hiatt tells us something about his world: "the answer you increasingly hear." with whom does hiatt talk, one wonders?

or, in reality, one doesn't wonder: the egregious stupidity of hiatt-world long ago told us who fills his little brain with thoughts.

Didn't the shelling of Parliament come up here just a few weeks ago, and in a similar context? e.g., Yeltsin shelling Parliament is roughly analagous to, say, Bush shelling Congress. This struck me as odd at the time, and, sure enough, I rechecked my recollection, and Yeltsin shelled Parliament because Parliament was, um, fomenting violence in the streets, attempting a violent coup. Now, they had their reasons, but Yeltsin had just won a popular referendum in which his disagreements with Parliament were the central issue. IOW, Yelstin and Parliament had strong disagreements. The people picked Yeltsin, Yeltsin dissolved Parliament, and Parliament started a shooting war. How this translates to "Yeltsin was a dictator" is unclear to me.

This is not to say that Yeltsin was a great democrat, but please, Matt, either provide a post defending Parliament's actions in 1993, or stop using their failed coup as evidence against Yeltsin.

See:

Stephen Cohen, “The Breakup of the Soviet Union Ended Russia's March to Democracy,” Guardian, Dec 15, 2006, at:

http://www.guardian.co.uk/comment/story/0,,1970752,00.html

And:

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Russian_constitutional_crisis_of_1993

I think that the emerging consensus is that Yeltsin is the person who first began the process of turning Russian television back into a propaganda arm of the state during the 1996 re-election (when journalists, in Russia and overseas, were much more strongly pro-Yeltsin than the Russian people as a whole, who initially supported the Communist candidate. Putin's stranglehold on the media is probably the biggest impedement to fair and open elections at the moment, but he's the conclusion of a pre-existing trend.

In Soviet Russia, President elects you!

It's my impression that the Russians weren't ready for wide-open market economy so democracy led to bribed officials who turned a blind eye while Russia was stolen blind by the oligarchs who now live in London.

So Russians rationally think that they need to ease into democracy more slowly while a "strong man" gets back and safeguards their assets and while their judicial and civic society grows strong enough to resist robber barons.

It's not so bad if the oligarchs keep their money in the country leading to jobs for Russians. But if they put it in Swiss Banks and live in England and invest outside of Russia, then it's a dead loss to the Russians. The Russians have to put a stop to that.

Just as Iraq was not ready for wide open democracy, neither was, or is, Russia.

And US "advisors" did well by doing badly by the Russians; remember Larry Summers' Harvard economist friend and Mark Rich; both indicted by the US government for crimes related to the bilking of Russia. Why should the Russians trust us?

I don't care if Putin wants to run a nasty dictatorship in Russia. That's none of our business.

I do care a great deal when Putin starts murdering dissidents in England and America. No society can tolerate foreign invaders killing people on their own soil.

KH -- Stephen Cohen's piece in the Guardian is great -- glad you linked to it. One quibble: I don't think Cohen reckons enough with the forces of nationalism which were surging throughout Eastern Europe in 1989-92. The subjective factors he lists for the USSR's breakup -- Gorbachev's clumsy stop-start reforms, Yeltsin's grab for power, and the nomenklatura's desire to turn themselves into property-owning capitalists -- are all true. But I was in the USSR in the summer of '90 and the winter of '90-'91, and I remember the sense of inevitability about the dissolution being driven largely by the desire for national independence of the Baltics and Ukraine.

The ideology that held the USSR together had withered; almost nobody believed in it anymore. Even the residual pro-Leninists and pro-Stalinists were motivated not by Communist internationalism but by borderline racist Russian great-power nationalism -- hardly an ideology likely to keep Riga, Grozny or Almaty in the fold. What had replaced universalist Communism was nostalgic nationalism. People were flying the Romanov tricolor and double eagle, talking about the USSR as a stupid and tragic detour in Russian history -- indeed, even as treason to the Russian people (who had supposedly been discriminated against, in favor of all those swarthy Jews, central Asian and Caucasus types, as part of Soviet affirmative action). This nationalism was a rather brief dead-end of an ideology, but it was the only political thing going in 1991, and people grasped at it. The power of nationalism at that moment makes the USSR's collapse feel, to me, rather less "subjective" and more inevitable than Cohen pictures it -- though it would have been better and safer for the USSR to evolve in a more gradual fashion than the immediate dissolution which the cocky apostles of "shock therapy" were clamoring for.


Comments closed March 26, 2007.

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