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The Ross Plan

10 Apr 2007 09:27 am

This is really much more Dennis Ross' field than mine, so I'd be interested to hear what others have to say about it, but I think the Israel-Palestine agenda he outlined in a column yesterday is a little insane. Check it out:

Priority number one should be a comprehensive ceasefire between Israelis and Palestinians (as opposed to complete resolution of the conflict). This is one area in which even Hamas is likely to share an interest with Israel, in no small part because it could use the respite. Even though this would involve negotiation between Olmert and Abbas (and Abbas would have to ensure that Hamas implements its terms), an effort that forged specific understandings--the Palestinian Authority would halt attacks against Israelis and stop weapons-smugglers; Israel would make no further incursions or arrests--might work.

But a ceasefire is a diplomatic means, not an end in itself. A second priority should be to foster a dialogue between Israelis, Palestinians, and the larger Arab world about the responsibilities of a Palestinian state once it is finally created. How will it interact with Israel and the outside world? The dialogue could hammer out specifics about how normalized Israel-Palestine relations could evolve in stages--and not exist merely at the end of the rainbow.

A third priority--and ultimately the one that will determine the legacy of the Bush administration's statecraft in the Middle East--should be to ensure that Fatah gains strength against Hamas. Fatah must clean up its act, and the Unites States should help. Make no mistake about it, if Hamas wins the next elections in two years (for president and legislative council), the conflict will be transformed from a national conflict into a religious conflict. If that happens, we'll be out of the peace-making business for a long time, and Islamists will be able to dominate the most evocative issue in the region.

This seems badly, badly flawed to me and indeed, overwhelmingly likely to produce the following outcome:

  1. Olmert and Abbas make a cease-fire agreement.
  2. Someone from Hamas violates the cease-fire agreement.
  3. Israel re-occupies the territories.
  4. This discredits Abbas an ineffective in improving the condition of Palestinians.
  5. Hamas wins the election.
  6. Dennis Ross proclaims that conflict has been "transformed between a national conflict into a religious conflict" and America must get "out of the peace-making business for a long time.
As Ross says, the upshot of this will be that "Islamists will be able to dominate the most evocative issue in the region." A great victory for Iran, al-Qaeda, Hamas, Israeli settlers, etc., unfortunate for Israel, bad for the United States, and terrible for the Palestinians. But so why is Ross proposing it?

Any conflict-resolution scenario needs to cope with potential spoilers, which is an intrinsically difficult task. The one thing you really can't do, however, is signal to the spoilers in advance that a single provocation is likely to derail implementation and derail it in a manner likely to bring the spoilers to power. You're just setting yourself up for failure.

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Comments (50)

It sounds like a rehash of the Clinton policy. During the 90's, the peace process had enough momentum and people with vested interests in it, that it survived innumerable acts of spoilage by Hamas.

You're right that the same same approach has no chance of working now. What we need wrt this issue is to place the responsibility with the parties involved, and let them figure it out themselves. We can provide guidance, of course, and even rewards if they succeed, but I don't think there's much else we can do to help.

In order for rewards to mean anything, though, that means we need to take away the noncontingent rewards that we regularly provide them now (huge amounts of aid to Israel, a smattering to the Palestinians, I think?). The problem with our policy particularly with regard to Israel, is that we are taking away their incentive for peace.

Ross can always be counted on for ways to avoid making a deal and blame it on the Palestinians.

You're just setting yourself up for failure.

Unless, of course, "failure" isn't a clearly undesirable outcome. And if Al doesn't use some of this--"The one thing you really can't do, however, is signal to the spoilers in advance that a single provocation is likely to derail implementation and derail it in a manner likely to bring the spoilers to power"--as a jumping off point to discuss Iraq, benchmarks, etc., we should maybe start worrying about his health.

The purpose here isn't "peace." The purpose is a public relations victory for Greater Israel.

Rather we need to focus now - before ceasefires etc - on what the Palestinians will actually get if they do in fact make a deal, not a 'dialogue', but a specific description of the final settlement. Then that deal, if attractive enough to the Palestinians, can be used to drive all the procedural issues.

I also find Ross's analysis startlingly simplistic. We talks vaguely about how "Arab leaders" should step in and resolve the "existential" issues at the heart of the matter - like Jerusalem - but doesn't say how they could possibly do such a thing.

What really needs to happen here - and this is something I think the US as well as other countries in the region could help with - is that Hamas needs to recognize Israel. I think this has to be the first step. Perhaps if the US would agree to recognize Hamas as a legitimately elected political party and begin to help them economicaly then Hamas would agree to recognize (a pre-'67) Israel?

Also - what's up with Bob Novak? (I'm sure Chris Smith would have prefered he be left out of all this!)

It is weird for Ross to say that another Hamas election win would mean that "we'll be out of the peace-making business for a long time." He's never advocated "staying out" of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, and he's been critical of Bush from the beginning for not being more involved. I can't imagine he would ever advocate throwing up our hands and not even trying to do anything about it.

Ross seems stuck with a compromise/Oslo-lite interim approach because he's always been against any idea of "imposing" an agreement, with the (not unreasonable) justification that an imposed or forced resolution doesn't stand a chance of actually holding. It is a precarious thing to advocate for, but I don't think it's realistic anymore to propose interim steps of the type that he's advocating. Packaging the Clinton parameters and the Saudi plan into a comprehensive final-status proposal at the outset of a new process, with that as the way to jump-start progress towards implementation, is the best option that hasn't been tried yet. It would require tons of effort from any U.S. administration (and obviously stands no chance of being attempted by Bush), but the best idea for now is probably to help advocate for that with the hope that the next administration will be sensible enough to give it a shot.

I agree with Haggai. Except about the part where Haggai says he "can't imagine [Ross] would ever advocate throwing up our hands and not even trying to do anything about it." I can imagine it. He says he would right there in the article!

Well, I think I'm a little more familiar with his record on the issue...my guess is that he was just being a bit hyperbolic about the consequences of another Hamas win, and possibly somewhat imprecise. Obviously a stronger grip on power for Hamas would make peace-making even more difficult. R

Ross has made distinctions in the past between "conflict resolution" and "crisis management" when it comes to this issue, and I think he's saying that another Hamas win would shut off any prospects of conflict resolution (i.e. "the peace-making business") and leave the U.S. with no hope of anything beyond trying to put out the fire whenever violence flares up again. The proposals he's making are his attempt to get things on track to an eventual conflict resolution stage (though we agree that his ideas aren't the best way to proceed), with the "we'll be out of the peace-making business" as his way of saying that things will get worse if no real attempts are made to get more progress on the ground.

Seriously, if Hamas wins again, you think Ross would advise the U.S. president not to get involved at all? I certainly don't think that's what he would do.

Since last summer, I've more and more frequently heard American Jews invoke this "it's a religious conflict now" talking point to explain to me why negotiations are pointless, peace is hopeless, and only an iron fist, a giant wall, and airstrikes on Iranian nuclear facilities can secure peace and justice along the banks of the Jordan. So that terminology's a red flag to me. It seems to me to have become the key rhetorical plank of the "Peace at Some Indeterminate Point in the Far-Distant Future" crowd.

Ross is just saying that, should Hamas win the next election, that American (or any other) peacemaking efforts, such that they are, will be useless.

That's slightly different than saying he's advocating we do nothing about that eventuality - although I understand where there might be some confusion, since he's simultaneoulsy attempting to make the case that everything should be done to avoid that result.

Berger writes: Perhaps if the US would agree to recognize Hamas as a legitimately elected political party and begin to help them economicaly then Hamas would agree to recognize (a pre-'67) Israel?

Very doubtful, which is why Ross has a point about the consequences of the next Palestinian election.

Here's Khaled Meshaal last friday (Hamas chief vows no compromise ):

Speaking from Damascus by telephone, Meshaal addressed thousands of Hamas supporters who had gathered in the West Bank city of Ramallah to mark the third anniversary of the deaths of former Hamas leaders Abdel Aziz Rantissi and Ahmed Yassin, who were killed by Israel within weeks of each other in 2004.

"Hamas will not back down. We will not give up on a single metre of our homeland," Meshaal said to thunderous applause.

"We will and we must continue in the path of resistance," he added.

He says similar stuff fairly regularly. Hoping they will change reminds me of Atrios' mocking of Republicans' quest for a pony in Iraq.

Having said that, I'm with otto here, on this particular point.

The Saudis have a plan, the Israelis should put out a counter plan, or they're guilty of what they accused Arafat of not doing at Camp David and Taba.

I would like to see the counter offer - there does not need to be a summit for them to put forward a plan. After that, everyone can see where they stand. "Confidence building measures" aren't going to happen.

I would like to see the counter offer - there does not need to be a summit for them to put forward a plan. After that, everyone can see where they stand. "Confidence building measures" aren't going to happen.

This seems fairly reasonable to me. At least get everyone to agree what it is they're officially fighting over.

Since last summer, I've more and more frequently heard American Jews invoke this "it's a religious conflict now" talking point to explain to me why negotiations are pointless, peace is hopeless, and only an iron fist, a giant wall, and airstrikes on Iranian nuclear facilities can secure peace and justice along the banks of the Jordan. So that terminology's a red flag to me. It seems to me to have become the key rhetorical plank of the "Peace at Some Indeterminate Point in the Far-Distant Future" crowd.

I can understand that (and you're right about the real motivations of most people who use that terminology), but Ross isn't quite in that camp. He's been urging the Bush administration to stay involved ever since it first took office, unlike the "peace sometime in the nebulous future, or whenever the Palestinians give up" crowd. That's certainly made clear in his book, and in almost all of the articles he's written in the last few years.

Ross's record strongly suggests to me that when he warns about the "national conflict" becoming a "religious one," he means that the U.S. would only be able to help insofar as playing a role in managing the level of violence, and that the path to resolving the conflict will have been shut off. But that's different from saying that the U.S. should withdraw from peace efforts entirely and just let the Israelis do whatever they want. Some other people think that, sure, and some of them use similar terminology as his most recent article, but it doesn't mean that Ross is one of them.

Dennis Ross is old enough (let's say seven years) to know that there have been probably over a dozen ceasefires since the breakdown of negotiations and the start of the intifada in 2000. None of the worked except in the extreme short term and even some of those were masked by the fact that Israel got a lot better at stopping suicide bombers from getting in as the conflict continued (a lot of attacks they stop do not get reported on in the news media, even sometimes in the Israeli news media).

The only way a ceasefire is even a remote possibility as a precursor to further success is if someone has a monopoly on violence in Palestinian society. Otherwise it doesn't matter if Hamas agrees and the Israelis can negotiate with some seemingly friendly statesman like Abbas, any negotiations will fall apart the second a proposal Hamas doesn't like is aired. We've seen this play out WAY too many times before to take proposals like this seriously.

The Saudis have a plan, the Israelis should put out a counter plan, or they're guilty of what they accused Arafat of not doing at Camp David and Taba. I would like to see the counter offer - there does not need to be a summit for them to put forward a plan. After that, everyone can see where they stand. "Confidence building measures" aren't going to happen.

That is a reasonable approach, but realistically, let's remember that we're stuck with an administration that's been bashing Pelosi and warning the Israelis about anything even resembling negotiations with Syria. This is not an administration that's going to listen to anything along these lines, vis-a-vis the Palestinians.

I think the best thing to focus on is how to build support for a U.S.-led effort to present a comprehensive framework for a final status agreement and work backwards from there to implementation. It will involve getting down into the weeds of some the key issues, inevitably, because that's where the differences between the sides are the most difficult to overcome. It would be a good idea to focus on how to reach public opinion on both sides for an approach like this--as I blogged about here, there's reason to believe that such an approach could appeal to the Israeli public over the heads of the currently weak and ineffective (and perhaps not much longer in office) government.

It also suggests that talk of "imposing" a settlement, or withholding aid as a big stick in the process, isn't so obvious an answer (at least on the Israeli side). People are willing to be convinced of a way out, if there's strong leadership that they trust behind it.

The problem here, which all the commentators have failed to address themselves to is the issue of what the Palestinians actually want. Not what I or Mr. Yglesias or Mr. Ross or Mr. Otto think that they want. Its' what their leaders say that they want. They have made is perfectly clear that their bottom line is that all Palestinians now in refugee camps must be given to option of relocating to what is now Israel. I challenge anyone to provide the name of any Palestinian leader who is not demanding this. By the way, the Saudi so-called peace plan also insists that Israel must agree to such a demand. An Israeli acquiescence to such a demand is an agreement by the Government of Israel to go out of business. Period, end of story. No Israeli Government will agree to such a demand and there is no pressure which the US can place upon it to force acquiescence to it.

A link in my previous post didn't go through...I was just referring to the most recent post I did at AmericanFootprints.

As for refugees, the Saudi plan does say that there should be an "agreed" solution to the refugee issue, which is their way of acknowledging that Israel would have to acquiesce to it as well. As I understand it, the Arab League summit where the Saudi plan was first passed went on to pass several other resolutions specifically demanding right of return, so the concession about an "agreed" solution might not be worth much. Certainly the Palestinians have given little or no inclination towards compromise on that issue.

But, faced with a united international effort to implement a detailed comprehensive resolution to the conflict, the Palestinians will be left with no choice but to compromise on that issue, or else not participate in the effort at all. The U.S. obviously won't impose refugee return on Israel, and the Palestinians are in for an unpleasant surprise if they expect their European friends to go along with that either.

The problem here, which all the commentators have failed to address themselves to is the issue of what the Palestinians actually want.

Pale-homicid-ians.

This is not an administration that's going to listen to anything along these lines, vis-a-vis the Palestinians.

True enough, but I'm not even sure an Obama/Edwards/Clinton/Richardson administration would push the Israelis towards making a counter proposal unless they were inclined to do it themselves. We will likely be back to half steps and confidence building measures anyway, because of the levels of intransigence and distrust on both sides.

Maybe since the current Arab plan is not a Palestinian plan but a Saudi/Arab Summit plan, the initial counter proposal should not come from the Israelis but from the U.S./U.K./UNSC - that's both a step backwards and comes with the unfortunate possibility of being perceived as an "imposed" peace - but really we're just looking at two frameworks, and then there can be discussions and internal referenda based on that - just as a starting point. But something to move the ball forward.

But at any rate, I was just talking about the realm of what I'd like to see, not the realm of what is possible - given the current American/Israeli/Palestinian political realities - or likely to happen.

However, it's become cliche to say both sides know what the eventual two-state solution will look like.

The Saudi Plan combined with the Camp David agreement, with small but equitable land swaps, East Jerusalem can be the Palestinian capital with some sort of shared responsibility for security and agreement on treatment of holy sites, small number of refugees given the option of return to Israel proper, with the rest given the option of return to the newly created Palestine and/or some form of financial compensation.

Let Dennis Ross and others try to finalize that proposal in a detailed way - he has nothing better to do these days - and see if Abbas/P.A. and the Israelis can agree to it, or not.

Since last summer, I've more and more frequently heard American Jews invoke this "it's a religious conflict now" talking point to explain to me why negotiations are pointless, peace is hopeless, and only an iron fist, a giant wall, and airstrikes on Iranian nuclear facilities can secure peace and justice along the banks of the Jordan. So that terminology's a red flag to me. It seems to me to have become the key rhetorical plank of the "Peace at Some Indeterminate Point in the Far-Distant Future" crowd.



Note the critique here - its not that the shift from secular Palestinian nationalism to Palestinian Islamism isn't a problem towards reaching peace. Clearly the treatment of Palestine as a non-negotiable piece of Dar al Islam is an impediment to partition (just as the Greater Israel ideology of the settler movement is.) The real problem for Yglesias is that the rise of Islamism buttresses the hawkish narrative.

This highlights the standard problem the "progressive" analysis of this conflict. Because the hawks are a priori wrong, any facts that support their position have to be denied. This type of wishful thinking however is never going to actually lead to peace. The only way to actually move towards progress on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is by acknowledging the very real obstacles and divising ways of neutralizing them.

Hamas happens to be a very serious problem to which there are no good options at present. What Ross proposes is for the U.S. to work at chipping away Hamas' support, preventing it from consolidating power before it is too late. The idea that Hamas can be coopted into the peace process is a dangerous fallacy. It is no less fallacious simply because it is inconvenient. If Ross' ideas seem likely to fail, it is because Fatah may be spent as a functional political force. If that is the case, supporters of peace need to think of ways to work around the dysfunctionality and radicalism of Palestinian society, rather than ignoring them simply because they garner applause line in Bibi's speeches.

And just as in the end the Palestinians have to compromise on the implementation of the right of return (see the Geneva accords for example) so do the Israeli's on their various hot button issues. Like accepting that East-Jerusalem will be the capital of Palestine, and that to break the ring around Jerusalem, some of the larger settlements cannot be part of Israel.

But a good start would be that the governement and the Israeli High court finally accept that the occupied territories are occupied. That might be a good trade with Hamas' recognition of Israel.

Yeah, I mostly agree, SCJ. The key thing is that neither government is at all likely to agree to a comprehensive final status proposal if they think they have a choice of getting around it--they'll be too afraid of being left holding the bag (and losing power) if the process breaks down for any reason.

I think some of what Ross said in his book contributes to the logic of putting everything on the table first, even though he doesn't reach the same conclusion about trying to implement a solution that way. He talked about how the Barak government's main concern wasn't so much what the Clinton parameters were asking them to give up, but whether the Palestinians would actually accept those terms. And the Palestinians were concerned about a perpetuation of what they saw as the main problem with Oslo, that they were being asked to give things up without being assured that the Israelis would actually withdraw from the territories.

So the key to a comprehensive-proposal-first approach is not so much getting the sides to agree to key concessions at the outset, which they aren't willingly going to do, but to convince them that the international effort is for real, and that they're better off going along with it than resisting.

Dayenu! A negotiated two state solution has been talked about to death. Round and round we go. 40+ years is too long to oppress another people.

The Israeli government, complicit in creating settlements, have made a greater Israel, from the Mediterranean Sea to the Jordan River, a reality. What needs to happen now is that all affected by that reality be given the right to vote for the government that controls their land and livelihood (not some government made impotent by larger Israeli control) and participate in the shining democracy Israel claims to be.

SoCal - I agree with you and Otto generally but I think you greatly misrepresent Mashaal. He has said on several occasions (for instance: http://www.guardian.co.uk/israel/Story/0,,1987305,00.html) that he/Hamas would recognize Israel.

Re berger

I am quite sure that Mashaal and the other leaders of Hamas would be more then happy to recognize the State of Israel if it would only agree to allow all Palestinians now living in refugee camps to relocate in Israel. Why wouldn't he agree to such a proposal? Since that would satisfy his desire that the State of Israel go out of business, he would have no reason to reject it.

berger,

Occassionally acknowledging reality, while admittedly novel for Meshaal, is not all that interesting, especially in light of what he just said on Friday, and even more so when you consider Hamas' reaction after the story you linked to was published: Hamas denies Meshal said group would consider recognizing Israel.

If people want to be hopeful he'll come around, fine (still, it's "pony" fine, but whatever) - but to say that I "greatly misrepresent" Meshaal based on one interview which was immediately disavowed by him and his spokesman - as his words being "twisted and distorted" - against a long and documented body of anti-recognition (and worse) statements, the latest coming just this Friday, is pretty unfair.

SoCal - I think the "rebuttal" you refer to illustrates my point pretty well. Hamad and Meshal go out of the way here to say that Meshal did not officially recognize Israel ("There was no change in our stance that Hamas does not recognize Israel," he [Hamad] said). Why? While the title of this Haaretz piece obviously implies that Meshal would never consider such recognition, the actual content of the piece implies a much different conclusion:

"Senior Hamas officials have already made similar statements over the past year, saying Israel's existence is an undeniable reality, but this is the first time that such statements are emanating from the group's Syria-based leadership.
This is also the first time that a Hamas official has raised the possibility of full and official recognition of Israel in the future. To date the group's official position, which Meshal had repeatedly reiterated, was that Hamas will never recognize Israel.
"'The distant future will have its own circumstances and positions could be determined then," he said. Past concessions to Israel by Palestinian negotiators went unrewarded, he argued, and his Islamist group would drive hard bargains over key issues such as recognition."

Such a position - while obviously unreasonable and extreme - is premised around the idea of bargaining. The Yahoo article you link to suggests that Hamas won't stop til they achieve a 'greater Palestine' - though they give no quote by Meshal saying as much. These are pretty distinct positions - no?

If this is true Dan Panorama, then how do you know about it?

"(a lot of attacks they stop do not get reported on in the news media, even sometimes in the Israeli news media)."

Parsing Hamas leaders' comments for some inkling of recognizing Israel is pointless. "Just talk to Hamas" is not a solution. Talking to Arafat didn't work, for various reasons, and even the more "moderate" positions one could ascribe to Hamas are clearly much more extreme than where he was coming from. Direct talks with them of the sort that were held with Arafat would obviously fail to produce a final status agreement, and anyone who believes otherwise is truly in pony-land.

So the question is, what do you do instead? If there's a U.S.-led international effort to get both sides to agree to a Clinton-parameters/Saudi-plan arrangement, then Hamas' participation in the process is contingent on whether or not they accept that framework. If they would agree to participate in that, which would have to involve an arrangement where they subordinate or at least integrate their para-military capabilities into a central Palestinian government, then fine. If not, then the Palestinians either have to make them do it, or find some new leadership. But absent some general framework like that, theorizing about whether Hamas might kind of/maybe/sort of accept Israel in the future is pointless.

Ohiomeister-

They're not state secrets or something and there's no ideological conspiracy to keep them out of the press, they just don't get a lot of attention at this point since no violence is involved. There have been so many attacks that it's no longer the news story it once was. Organizations that focus specifically on terrorism often link to reports of them.

And if Al doesn't use some of this--"The one thing you really can't do, however, is signal to the spoilers in advance that a single provocation is likely to derail implementation and derail it in a manner likely to bring the spoilers to power"--as a jumping off point to discuss Iraq, benchmarks, etc., we should maybe start worrying about his health.

Heh. No reason to worry about my health, SCMT.

On this post, Matthew is right and Ross wrong. We should hope that Hamas comes to power in Palestine; Fatah is spent and can't deliver anything. Only Hamas will be able to negotiate a genuine peace with Israel (just as only Nixon could go to China). Now, we have to wait until Hamas is ready to do that. Who knows when that will be. In the meantime, we ought to be doing what we can to get Hamas to come to the realization that Israel isn't going to be pushed into the sea so Hamas might as well begin negotiating.

"Direct talks with them of the sort that were held with Arafat would obviously fail to produce a final status agreement, and anyone who believes otherwise is truly in pony-land."

As per Haggai.

"Direct talks with them of the sort that were held with Barak would obviously fail to produce a final status agreement, and anyone who believes otherwise is truly in pony-land."

As per anyone not supporting Israel.

But Haggai is apparently squarely in "blame Arafat" land. What is the point of that? The fact that Peretz and Olmert, both continue to approve settlement expansion in occupied territory, despite all the talks, doesn't mean you should stop talking. And if you think the plans should have a different form, which has some logic to it, since the previous ones failed, shure.

But Haggai portraits the same illogic as Ross, by blaming Arafat for whatever was wrong in the past, and then wishing two ponies for thinking that just changing tactics and form would make attaining their goals any more likely. It is not. Any plan should engage any Israeli or Palestinian government on equal terms. Clinton was prepared to do that. Ross apparently had to be told, and currently doesn't seem to be in that camp anymore.

berger,

SoCal - I think the "rebuttal" you refer to illustrates my point pretty well.

I don't.

From my - as you put it - "rebuttal":

Salah Bardawil, head of Hamas's parliamentary faction, told Haaretz that after checking with Meshal, it seems to be that his words were twisted and distorted.

"He didn't speak about any recognition of Israel, only a cease-fire with Israel," Bardawil said.

The part of the article you quote is describing the very interview in which Meshaal claims his words were twisted and distorted, and not the post-interview denial position/mindset of Hamas or Meshaal.

If you still think I "greatly misrepresent" Meshaal, based on one published interview in which Meshaal's own next-day account is that he never said what Reuters' wrote he said, then so be it.

You write: The Yahoo article you link to suggests that Hamas won't stop til they achieve a 'greater Palestine' - though they give no quote by Meshal saying as much.

Um, it has Meshaal saying, "Hamas will not back down. We will not give up on a single metre of our homeland," and "We will and we must continue in the path of resistance," he added.

I know what I think he means by that. What do you think he means by that?

As for this: These are pretty distinct positions - no?

Yes, they are distinct. What Reuters claims that Meshaal said (the part about the "distant future") and what Meshaal himself and Salah Bardawil on Meshaal's behalf claim Meshaal said are in fact pretty distinct positions - that tends to happen after a public denial.

I'm not sure what the point of this is - Meshaal and Hamas are pretty clear on the fact that they do not stand behind the January 10th Reuters story and how they quoted him. Numerous past and subsequent statements seem to bear that out.

Maybe one day they will change their position. Hopefully they will. But I haven't seen any real evidence, unless a media account in which the subject of the story immediately denies the quotes ascribed to him counts as evidence.

I'm not squarely in "blame Arafat" land. I blame him for a lot, sure, but the Oslo process failed for a number of reasons. Settlement expansion was one of them, Arafat's unreliability was another. When it comes to direct negotiations, Hamas is clearly coming from a more extreme position than Arafat was, making it even less likely that direct final status talks with them will work. And as a matter of fact, I don't think direct talks with Olmert would work either (his political weakness being one obvious reason for that). You disagree with any of this?

And if you think the plans should have a different form, which has some logic to it, since the previous ones failed, shure.

Um, yes. I've explained that in some detail in several comments on this thread, and yet you choose to provide only one sentence of agreement amidst several paragraphs of non-sequitirs. Why you insist on entering into a sideshow about whether I'm just "blaming Arafat" (at the same time that you're "blaming Ross," as if he was solely responsible for what happened) is beyond me.

Here's Reuters on March 12, 2007, Two months after Meshaal claimed he was misquoted by Reuters:

The Palestinian Islamist group Hamas rejected on Monday criticism by al Qaeda's second-in-command and said it was still committed to Israel's destruction despite a power-sharing deal with the Fatah faction.

"We will not betray promises we made to God to continue the path of Jihad and resistance until the liberation of Palestine, all of Palestine," Hamas said in a statement, in a clear reference to Israel as well as to the occupied West Bank.

[...]

In its statement Hamas said it continued to be a "movement of resistance, seekers of martyrdom" and that its "principles will never be changed."

"Zawahri's recent statements were wrong ... Resistance is our strategy. How and when? This depends on the reality at the time and our corresponding view of things," Hamas said.

"So be assured doctor Ayman, and all those who love Palestine like yourself, that Hamas is still the group you knew when it was founded and it will never abandon its path."

That was just about one month ago.

Parsing Hamas leaders' comments for some inkling of recognizing Israel is pointless. "Just talk to Hamas" is not a solution. Talking to Arafat didn't work, for various reasons, and even the more "moderate" positions one could ascribe to Hamas are clearly much more extreme than where he was coming from. Direct talks with them of the sort that were held with Arafat would obviously fail to produce a final status agreement, and anyone who believes otherwise is truly in pony-land.

So the question is, what do you do instead?


Finally, somebody is asking the right question.

We should promote the Saudi plan (noting American support for compensation rather than "return" for Palestinian refugees). What makes the Saudi plan attractive is that has the possibility of committing the conservative Arab states to resolution of the conflict. We've reached the point that Palestinian independence is best served by placing responsibility for securing the West Bank and Gaza out of the hands of Palestinian organizations. I don't see any better option on the horizon for ensuring Israeli withdrawal does not result in Palestinian terror(and therefore a reversal of Israeli withdrawal) than Egyptian and Jordanian forces, backed by Saudi funds.

I don't see any better option on the horizon for ensuring Israeli withdrawal does not result in Palestinian terror(and therefore a reversal of Israeli withdrawal) than Egyptian and Jordanian forces, backed by Saudi funds.

I really want this to be the solution. Unfortunately, even if you assume the relevant people would be willing to do this, I'm not sure that the Egyptian and Jordanian security forces are actually capable of pulling off the job. The Arab states' militaries are legendarily inept.

"I'm not sure that the Egyptian and Jordanian security forces are actually capable of pulling off the job. The Arab states' militaries are legendarily inept."

Well, the last time the Jordanian military battled Palestinian militants, the Jordanian military prevailed...

SoCal,
I certainly don't - and never did - claim that Hamas wasn't committed to terrorist attacks against Israel. The March 12th Reuters story you link to is interesting and disheartening, but it doesn't address anything I've argued here. Hamas is a violent, reprehensible organization but I still hold out some hope that they can make *some progress towards peace.
As I understand it - and please correct me if I'm wrong - Mashaal (or Bardawil) said that he was misquoted in reference to his statments about recognizing Israel. They didn't claim that the whole interview was contrived, they just wanted to make sure that they weren't seen to be recognizing Israel. They had no objections about his comments on the prospect of future negotiations (they part I quoted), simply because Meshaal has said this sort of stuff on numerous occasions. Of course, you can dismiss this as disengenuous, and would have many, many good reasons to do so- but I hope that it is an opening for some negotiation.

You read the line: ""Hamas will not back down. We will not give up on a single metre of our homeland," and "We will and we must continue in the path of resistance," he added." as a call for Israel's destruction. I obviously don't see it that way, as there's nothing in these quotes that says 'Israel must be destroyed'. It seems to me that what Hamas wants is its own state - along side Israel - along with other unrealistic and dangerous elements like the right of return. Hamas has not denied or retracted any of these goals. I certainly couldn't live with something like the right of return, but it's on precisely issues like this that I think the US could be of some help.

Haggai asked "You disagree with any of this?"

Yes, if you don't talk to any of the parties involved, you're going nowhere. And more importantly if you're not going to engage Hamas or Kadima, then who? I don't see much in the route proposed by Ross of trying to engineer a Fatah election win. It's neither democratic, nor workable if coming from the US.

And Olmert is weak but he's still prime minister. The outsiders perception of any Israeli PM in the forseable future will either be weak or negative on the peace issue. And the same holds for the Palestinian side. Fatah is weak, Hamas is strong but opposed. The previous peace process took years and more than one Israeli PM. And now that Palestinians have regular elections they will also change PM's once in a while.

It is not just some single point. It the basic attitude of Palestinians have to do this or that before they are acceptable to us.

"then Hamas' participation in the process is contingent on ..."

Hamas participation should be contingent on whether they are part of the Palestinian government. Nothing more, nothing less.

There can be blockades before certain steps are taken. But negotiations towards an outcome cannot exclude a party, which has made itself essential by winning an election.

And I didn't blame Ross for the past, I mentioned the fact that it looks like he now behaves differently as during the Clinton period, which I even sort of praised for engaging both parties on somewhat equal terms during those negotiations.

I blame him for his opinions now. He just analyses Israel's opponents and prescribes all kinds of thing they should or shouldn't do. And they are silly. From the fact that the UN should recognize Israels withdrawal from Gaza, to his idea that there should have been an emergency PA government without Hamas and Fatah. On 19 dec 2006 he wrote "While there are some who believe that Fatah and Hamas will yet reconcile, don't count on it." His analysis tends to be more wishful thinking than reality.

Oh, and if you don't want to look as being in the blame Arafat camp you should mention his name less and mention Barak's a bit more often.

Link to one of the mentioned ramblings of Dennis Ross here.

berger,

The March 12th Reuters story you link to is interesting and disheartening, but it doesn't address anything I've argued here.

It does - unless you willfully decide to ignore what's being said.

You claimed that I "greatly misrepresented" Khaled Mishaal - and as evidence of that you linked to an article of an interview with him in which he - and his organization - claim he was misquoted, and that his words were twisted and distorted. They say he was talking about a cease fire and not about recognition of Israel.

I'm saying that I didn't greatly misrepresent anyone, but that I've actually quoted Mishaal and Hamas - in their own recent words which they have not denied or disavowed.

You write:

Hamas is a violent, reprehensible organization but I still hold out some hope that they can make *some progress towards peace.

I think it is that very hope that, for whatever reason, is making you cling to your position that I've misrepresented Mishaal and Hamas, despite all the evidence to the contrary.

I too have "hope" that one day Hamas will change - but I haven't seen any evidence of it, and I'm not going to let an interview in which Khaled Meshaal and Hamas claim they were misquoted count for anything, especially since there's much more recent evidence - and promises on their part to Al Qaeda no less! - that they have in fact not changed.

You write: You read the line: ""Hamas will not back down. We will not give up on a single metre of our homeland," and "We will and we must continue in the path of resistance," he added." as a call for Israel's destruction.

Yes, I do. As does everyone who has taken the time to read their charter and listen to what they've said over the years, including Reuters - the very news service to which you originally linked.

Click on the link of the Reuters article I posted in my 5:17 pm post - and read the title of it.

It's a very clear headline. Please read it. And it's from less than a month ago.

As certain critics of our Iraq policy are fond - and correct - of saying: hope is not a plan.

You write: It seems to me that what Hamas wants is its own state - along side Israel.

That's just clearly wrong, berger. The first part of your sentence is correct, the second part - not so much.

It may be that one day they will be forced to accept that as their position - but they are nowhere near that now. Again, read the March 12 Reuters story in my 5:17 pm post. Along with Meshaal's words on Friday, they are just not "two state solution" organization.

I think that's pretty clear.

If you want to read their charter, have at it.

I strongly suggest reading Articles 11, but I'd read the whole thing.

I really want this to be the solution. Unfortunately, even if you assume the relevant people would be willing to do this, I'm not sure that the Egyptian and Jordanian security forces are actually capable of pulling off the job. The Arab states' militaries are legendarily inept.


The Jordanians, despite having a majority Palestinian population, have been very effective at preventing attacks across their border (as has Egypt)


I think the bigger problem is whether the Egyptian, Jordanian and Saudi regimes would want to take on this burden. It will be a pragmatic cost-benefit analysis. Up until now it has benefited the Saudis to have the Israel-Palestinian conflict as a distraction, the Egyptians to pocket their Camp David cash and interven intermittently to control their border with Gaza and for the Jordanians to make non-specific calls for peace.


The rise of Iran and the dangers of Islamism may have increased the costs of the status quo for these regimes of letting the Palestinian problem fester. On the other hand, the the U.S. and the E.U. to ensure that a "moderate" Arab "mandate" over a nascent Palestinian state reaps is rewarded sufficiently to worth the risks. Perhaps if these regimes were given credit for facilitating Israeli withdrawal, they might be able to whether the storm frm their Islamist opposition. Then again, the toppling of any of these regimes is likely to result in a new Arab-Israeli war.


As problematic as all of this is, it is more likely to lead to a peace in this generation than a fantasy of Hamas morphing into a Palestinian version of the Turkish Islamic values party.

I'm interested in a different aspect of Ross's piece: the idea that Fatah needs to "clean up its act".

I'm just curious as to whether any political organization in history has ever "cleaned up its act". As opposed to being wiped out by an organization with a cleaner act. And then dissolving, with some elements perhaps re-forming in a new and somewhat cleaner form. (See e.g. the Communist Parties of E. Europe.)


On a recent visit to the west bank I found that even moderate Palestinian opinion (eg: middle class Christians) was that Israel's end game is a bantusan style west bank with an eventual view to "natural" emigration reducing the number of Palestinians to a manageable (imprisonible) level and that any "negotiations" under the current power balance are thus pointless.

Every Palestinian is constantly aware of the possibility (or necessity) of becoming a refugee so the status of refugees and their right to return to Palestine is an issue they can not give up on. If they compromise on the return issue before they have a functioning state they could genuinely be left with nothing.

It is, as they say, an existential issue for them.

SoCal,
I've read the Hamas charter, it certainly calls for Israel's destruction. I do think, though, that Hamas has moved away this position - that's basically what I've been arguing, right? Hence, we had that whole unity government thing happen. There have also been several statments by Haniya lately about his desire to negotiate with Israel. And it's also worth pointing out that the differences between the charter (explicit call for eradication of Israel) and the articles you cite ("Hamas will not back down. We will not give up on a single metre of our homeland", etc.) would seem to support my interpretation.

You are quite right, though, to point out that I was five ways wrong to characterize your post as a "great misrepresentation." It wasn't a misrepresentation, much less a great one - I just wanted to point out that (at least as I see them) things are more complicated with Hamas than they are traditionally portrayed. I did that pretty poorly.

There are certainly all sorts of good reasons why Israel shouldn't negotiate with Hamas. I agree with them and this is why I thought that the US or Europeans might be able to give it a wack.

berger,

Hence, we had that whole unity government thing happen.

Ok. You won't listen to me. I understand. No big deal.

You won't listen to Khaled Meshaal. You won't listen to Salah Bardawil. You won't believe the Hamas statement from last month in response to Zawahiri. So you probably won't listen to Mahmoud Zahar either.

But here's his take on the unity government, from an Associated Press article published today:

Hamas hardliner Mahmoud Zahar seemed to confirm Israel's claim. "The current government program will last at most three years, but our program is to liberate Palestine, all of Palestine, in what we call the gradual solution," the former Hamas foreign minister said in remarks recently carried on a Web site linked to Hamas.

They say this stuff all the time. If you want to discount it all - fine. Whatever.

I disagree with your interpretation of Hamas' adaptation to recent events. I agree with you that things are more complicated than they seem. But if you read everything in totality - it is clear that they are making certain tactical decisions out of immediate political concerns (including maintaining local support and attempting - however clumsy and strained - to end the international boycott) but their message to their consituents (whether Palestinian or the larger Musilm world including Al-Qaeda) remains: they are committed to the liberation of every inch of historic Palestine.

You have Meshaal saying that on Friday, a communique to Al Qaeda saying that last month and Mahmoud Zahar saying basically : nevermind the whole unity gov't - it's part of our gradual plan to liberate it all - don't worry.

At the same time, they don't want a revolt over the loss of international aid for a period of years. They were on the verge of a civil war last month and they were losing a lot of support. Again, if you listen to Hamas people speak, it is very unlikely that those factors will change their positions over the long term - but it's not unlikely that they will make short term tactical decisions to better their position. They admit as much. Zahar just did.

I'm sure you remain unconvinced. That's fine. No worries.

Cheers.

SoCal - I'll listen to Zahar but I won't give him the last word. He's oviously the sort of hardliner that will never come around but obviously as Ap piece shows there's a good amount of light between his position and "reformers" like Barghouti.

I'm listening to you - god knows I'm sympathetic to your argument and share your concerns. This has been a very interesting - if unsettling - debate. Cheers.

berger,

Read the second paragraph of that AP piece. It describes the tactical reasons for what's going on with the cabinet.

Take Ziad Abu Amr, for example. He's the furthest available thing from Hamas in respected Palestinian political circles. Abu Amr even wrote a book slamming the Islamist movement. But he is a patriot, likely aghast at what the boycott has done to his country and wants back in Europe's good graces and are doing everything he can to achieve that.

And I don't blame him for it.

But the Abu Amrs and Salam Fayyads, for example, who are not Hamas and were added to the cabinet in an attempt to gain international legitimacy despite the PA's failure to live up to the Quartet's conditions - do not speak for Hamas.

Hamas speaks for Hamas.

Does Mohammed Barghouti speak for Hamas? Maybe, but doubtful. He's also, sadly, lying. He says, "No one among the Palestinians is calling for the elimination of Israel" No one is? Really? Please. Maybe that was another wire service misquote.

But even if you take him at face value, he's a lonely voice up against his bosses who are still singing a different tune.

When more Hamas officials sound like Barghouti and less like Meshaal and Zahar, then we'll see.

If they could have gotten Haniyeh to say what Barghouti said, that would be a positive sign. Ghazi Hamad in Gaza has shown major signs of introspection, but that has not led to any public statements on his part that deal with recognition and a renunciation of violence - they've all dealt with internal Palestinian issues, born out of the horrors of all the factional killings.

But maybe he - and his organization - will get there one day.


Comments closed April 24, 2007.

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