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Chilly!

31 May 2007 01:29 pm

Not to just be all Jon Cohn, all the time here, but his article on Barack Obama's health care plan says it would be change for the better, but criticizes Obama for being too timid:

By contrast, jumping in the deep end involves a little more risk: You might feel really cold for a few seconds. But you'll probably get comfortable pretty quickly. And, once you've made the decision to jump, you're guaranteed to be in the water. You can't get un-wet.

When it comes to achieving universal health care, Obama wants to wade into it: He doesn't want to move everybody into universal coverage until the arrangements are all in place and people feel totally comfortable with it. Yes, he's promising to cover everybody. But the promise is only as good as his word, sincere though it may be.

Those who prefer mandates--a category that, again, happens to include rival John Edwards--prefer to jump in the deep end. They want to seize this opportunity and get the mandate on the books from day one (even if, as practical matter, it's phased in so it becomes fully effective only after a few years). In so doing, they are offering what is, in effect, a stronger guarantee.

The trouble, of course, is that fundamental health care reform isn't a swimming pool. Not only that, but we don't have an especially clear thermometer to assure us that the water's safe. We do have a historical record indicating that everyone who's ever jumped in the pool has wound up on life support. Under the circumstances, I think people who believe that jumping is likely to produce good results have a lot of convincing to do.

My argument for caution, meanwhile, would just be based on the experience of 1993-94. There you had unified Democratic control of the House, Senate, and White House. A plan was introduced. The plan was overwhelmingly popular.

Many Republicans, under the circumstances, were naturally inclined to seek a compromise with the administration. They were, however, persuaded to take a huge risk and rigidly oppose the plan. The risk paid off massively. Opposing the overwhelmingly popular Clinton health care plan didn't damage GOP popularity at all. Instead, it helped produce a GOP landslide win in 1994.

Unless the Democrats have 60 Senate seats in 2009, I think it's overwhelmingly likely that this is going to happen again.

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Comments (48)

"We do have a historical record indicating that everyone who's ever jumped in the pool has wound up on life support."

The historical record consists of one event.

"Unless the Democrats have 60 Senate seats in 2009, I think it's overwhelmingly likely that this is going to happen again."

You're a moron.

Seriously. If you don't understand how 2009 is different from 1993 at this point after it's been laid out for you repeatedly, you're a moron.

Yeah, Petey makes an excellent case, in that he's used the word "moron" and offered nothing else. I eagerly await the daily deployment of "nescient."

"Yeah, Petey makes an excellent case, in that he's used the word "moron" and offered nothing else"

I've made the fuller case previously in these virtual pages.

At a certain point, what else can you say?

I'm not quite as strident as Petey, but things are different: Richard Shelby and Billy Tauzin were Democrats in 1993. John Breaux was still in office. So were Dan Boren, Sam Nunn, Wyche Fowler, etc. The party, in both the Senate and the House, is far more unified than it was in 1993. In addition, an actual majority victory will clarify the electoral strength of the Democrats at the Presidential level.

That said, I tend to think there's more consensus around global warming than health care, and more pro-environment Republicans than pro-middle class Republicans, so Democrats would be better off pushing global warming in '09 (with the white house or not), then using votes against it and James Inhofe to win seats in the midterms. Then go for health care in '11.

But we're getting way ahead of ourselves.

Well, it might not be so much that he's a moron as that he didn't find your reasoning persuasive. You could recognize that possibility instead of making an ass of yourself.

I think the biggest change is you now have corporate America lining up in favor of national health care. It is a trickle now, within the next few years it will be a flood.

Yeah you still need to take on the insurance industry, but having GM, United Airlines, Walmart and so on lined up with you and only the insurance industry and the small government Andrew Sullivan types against you is a lot different situation than '93.

Nick,

The Boren who was in the Senate in 1993 is David. Dan, currently in the House (OK-2) is his nephew.

Democrats would be better off pushing global warming in '09 (with the white house or not), then using votes against it and James Inhofe to win seats in the midterms. Then go for health care in '11.

The more I think about that strategy, the more sense it makes. The Sooners might just give 51% of the vote to someone like David Walters next time around.

"Well, it might not be so much that he's a moron as that he didn't find your reasoning persuasive."

Or, maybe he's just a moron on this particular topic.

"I'm not quite as strident as Petey, but things are different: Richard Shelby and Billy Tauzin were Democrats in 1993. John Breaux was still in office. So were Dan Boren, Sam Nunn, Wyche Fowler, etc. The party, in both the Senate and the House, is far more unified than it was in 1993. In addition, an actual majority victory will clarify the electoral strength of the Democrats at the Presidential level."

While this is all true, it goes far deeper than just that.

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One way of understanding this is that we're likely to have a free shot in 2009.

You take your legislative opportunities when they come. The Iraq fiasco has created an opening for Democratic lawmaking that we can use or let slip by. If you've got something ambitious to pass from the left, this is the moment.

In the wake of 9/11, the Bush WH had a free shot. They used that free shot to get their war resolution. In the wake of the Iraq fiasco, we're going to have a free shot in the '09-'10 Congress, and to not use it would be unconscionable.

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Another way of understanding this is to imagine the scene after the inauguration.

Imagine a January '09 where Edwards wins the general election with 52% of the vote, carrying (conservatively) 3 more Dem Senators with him, getting us to 54.

He's run on his plan, been attacked on its details, refuted the attacks, and been validated by the electorate. The plan is moderate and reasonable.

In the political climate of January '09 that I'm describing, Edwards will hold the entire D Senate caucus for the plan. That's 54. A few R Senators from blue and purple states that Edwards won come along immediately. That's 57.

Suddenly, you can see cloture.

How is this scene different from 1993?

- You have a plan that's been vetted by the electorate.
- You don't have a messy and secret planning process to get attacked for months, letting opposition mobilize.
- You have a President with an actual mandate, for himself and his plan.
- You have a Democratic caucus that is capable of holding together.
- You have the self-interested willingness of fringe Republicans to peel off.

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None of this is rocket science. If you think health care is impossible in 2009 because it didn't work in 1993, you're really not paying attention.

Well, it might not be so much that he's a moron as that he didn't find your reasoning persuasive.

Yglesias would look better on this score if he offered a single counterargument to the many, many arguments being put forward - by not just Petey, but by Neil and Ezra a lot of other people - that this will actually be doable by the Democratic Congress in 2009-2010. Yglesias isn't offering an argument; he's offering an assertion.

My recollection is that in 1993 we were coming off of/in the midst of a recession that, while substantially less severe than that of the early 80s, had effects on white collar workers. And for that reason (among others), people thought that healthcare reform had a real shot. I seriously and devoutly hope that we're not working with that advantage in '09. Furthermore, people get worried when you plan to tinker with one sixth of the economy. They just do. We won't know the nature of the opposition to a plan until there's a Democratic President with a fairly specific plan being worked out.

Personally, I think healthcare reform is going to have to be done piecemeal.

I don't especially think Matty is a moron, but I do think Petey is right to believe 2009 will not be 1993.

Health care costs are spiraling out of control for companies (who are passing on those costs to employees, and at least in some cases openly supporting the idea that something must be done about this issue), for the government (as in Medicare and Medicaid), and for individuals who can't (to an even greater extent than in 1993) afford to insure themselves. To say nothing of the millions of new uninsured, a pervasive sense that the HMO system has failed, and the general tilt toward a more populist political and policy environment than in the 1990s.

The one thing I don't think that has changed is the middle class aversion to new taxes (which was what allowed the GOP to kill Clinton's bill in the first place; note to Democrats in Congress: you weren't elected last year to raise taxes on the middle class). And I also don't think that taxing the rich is going to be sufficient to pay for universal health care in this country. There is going to have to be a very serious discussion about priorities, and some significant cuts in bureaucracy, pork, and hopefully - ultimately - Pentagon spending to cover the bill.

If you're suggesting that healthcare costs weren't "spiraling out of control" for companies and individuals in 1993, you're just wrong. I want to say increases were on the order of 17% per year for several years (and perhaps for a longer period than the one we're in now--I seem to recall that increases slowed or briefly paused in the mid-90s), but I may not be remembering that properly.

One additional important reason why 2009 is not the same as 1993:

The right was able to move public opinion about the Clinton plan because they went up on the air with an unopposed TV ad buy.

If someone on the left had spent a mere $20 million on an ad buy in 1993, public opinion could have likely been saved, despite all the political mistakes the Clinton team made.

Does anyone think we won't have the resources to avoid an unopposed ad buy this time around?

Tim is basically saying what I've been thinking, which makes me feel better about the basic claim I would make, which is that while I ultimately hope people at least *try* audacity with the whole healthcare thing, I also suspect that, ultimately, Matthew may be right.

Insecurity and high prices are good reasons to want change, after all, but they're also pretty compelling reasons to be really afraid of it. After all, things could get worse.

And finally, it's worth noting that universal health care is coming in the not too distant future.

If it's not done by the '09-'10 Congress with a Democratic President, it'll be done by a future Congress with very possibly a Republican President.

If both the policy and political implications of Republican UHC legislation don't send shivers down your spine, you're really not paying attention.

If you want a left-leaning bill, 2009 is the time.

Petey wrote, "In the wake of 9/11, the Bush WH had a free shot. They used that free shot to get their war resolution. In the wake of the Iraq fiasco, we're going to have a free shot in the '09-'10 Congress, and to not use it would be unconscionable."

This analogy is the weakest part of Petey's argument. The Bush WH was able to utilize the post 9/11 atmosphere of fear and anger to get their war resolution. But it wasn't a "free shot" that he could have used in anyway he chose (for example he wouldn't have been successful if instead he had decided to gut Social Security or Medicare). Similarly, the Iraq fiasco should give the Democrats an opportunity to push forward more dovish policies than otherwise -- but there's no reason to think it will make it especially easier to pass universal healthcare.

"Opposing the overwhelmingly popular Clinton health care plan didn't damage GOP popularity at all."

This is something Dems don't understand.

The conventional wisdom today is that the Clinton plan was unpopular and cost Dems the 1994 election. This is simply not true.

The GOP sabotaged passage of any kind of health care plan to create the impression of an impotent presidency. It paid off for them politically.

This is similar to the 1998 impeachment. Clinton was very popular. The public was overwhelmingly against impeachment. The GOP ignored the polls and went ahead with impeachment anyway and it paid off for them politically. They paid no price in subsequent elections.

With the health care plan as well as impeachment the GOP ignored the polls, derailed Dems and paid no political price.

Compare that to Dem approach. They are afraid to challenge the GOP and an unpopular president even when the polls are on their side.

This stuff about the relative decline in the number of rightwing Democrats is irrelevant. The GOP will still have the votes to filibuster, and there will still be more than zero rightwing Democrats.

The "messy and secret planning process to get attacked for months, letting opposition mobilize" is a red herring. Notwithstanding those factors, the Clinton plan was still popular on the day it was released; that didn't save it.

What it really comes down to, I think, is that Petey thinks (like Jon Cohn) that the possession of an electoral mandate will alter the legislative dynamics. That goes against everything I've ever been taught about how American political institutions actually work.

We'll get universal health care if and when some non-trivial faction of Republicans wants us to have it, and I don't think the resulting plan is one I'm going to like very much.

I'm not up on my Senate rules, but since a large part of any universal health plan will be the levying of taxes to pay for it, why couldn't it be passed as a revenue bill (which are exempt from filibusters)?

Or if you really want to take things to the next level, there's always the nuclear option. A new president could pile everything he wants legislatively into one bill. And then when the GOP starts a filibuster have the Vice President and (presumably Democratic) Senate majority could throw out the filibuster rule either temporarily or permanently.

I know in Washington when a majority thwarts the minority, its considered "undemocratic", but its by no means unconstitutional.

"This analogy is the weakest part of Petey's argument. The Bush WH was able to utilize the post 9/11 atmosphere of fear and anger to get their war resolution. But it wasn't a "free shot" that he could have used in anyway he chose (for example he wouldn't have been successful if instead he had decided to gut Social Security or Medicare)."

I'd disagree.

If Bush had moved from Afghanistan to gutting Social Security rather than to Iraq in late 2002, he'd have had a decent shot at success.

Similarly, the bulk of Democratic legislation passed in the past 60 years came in the wake of the JFK assassination.

Sometimes, you just get the political winds at your back for whatever reason. How you take advantage of those winds is up to you. The Iraq fiasco and New Orleans set up health care, odd though it may be.

"We'll get universal health care if and when some non-trivial faction of Republicans wants us to have it,"

We'll get a universal health care bill in the '09-'10 Congress when a very trivial faction of Republicans wants us to have it.

To be precise, we'll need around 10% of the GOP Senate caucus to vote for cloture.

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"What it really comes down to, I think, is that Petey thinks (like Jon Cohn) that the possession of an electoral mandate will alter the legislative dynamics. That goes against everything I've ever been taught about how American political institutions actually work."

You've been taught very, very badly.

Petey I'm sympathetic to the underlying idea of your argument (political winds at one's back, etc.) even if I'm not sure it's right, but you are over-reaching unbelievably in suggesting Bush could have gutted Social Security or Medicare because of 9/11. There's having the wind at your back and then there's total insanity. I'm having trouble imagining a scenario where the electorate is like, "Yeah, I'm terrified about 9/11, but that social safety net I've always been so attached to in the past? Sure, pull that right out from under me. Because I'm so scared about 9/11."

America can be stupid but that's beyond stupid.

The Bush WH was able to utilize the post 9/11 atmosphere of fear and anger to get their war resolution.

I think people are understating the scope of healthcare reform, which would effect everyone in a specific, personal way. The analogue would have been Bush getting the war resolution with a draft as part of the process. And that would have been a very tough sell.

"you are over-reaching unbelievably in suggesting Bush could have gutted Social Security or Medicare because of 9/11."

I'm not saying it would've been a slam dunk.

But if Bush had parlayed his 9/11 approval rates to say we were in a generation long struggle against Islamic extremists, and that we had to restructure our entitlements budget to be up to the struggle, he'd have had a reasonable shot at pulling it off.

High Presidential approval rates are a powerful weapon.

And, of course, unlike gutting Social Security, universal healthcare actually polls well. It's a much lower-hanging piece of fruit.

Combine a popular initiative in the abstract, a plan that's been vetted by a national election, a popular President, and holding the D Senate caucus while peeling off a few R Senators becomes the likely scenario.

Matt wrote, "What it really comes down to, I think, is that Petey thinks (like Jon Cohn) that the possession of an electoral mandate will alter the legislative dynamics. That goes against everything I've ever been taught about how American political institutions actually work."

Really? Don't you think that Johnson's landslide in 1964 altered the legislative dynamic so that Medicare and Medicaid could become law? And didn't Roosevelt's landslide in 1932 alter the legislative dynamics enough to allow the New Deal?

I think I'm liking Matt's argument even less than Petey's.

We'll get universal health care if and when some non-trivial faction of Republicans wants us to have it, and I don't think the resulting plan is one I'm going to like very much.

True. There are a few ways to get there.

(1) you can elect 60 Democratic Senators who will vote for your UHC plan.
(2) you can elect 57 Democrats who will vote for your plan, and get Snowe, Collins and Specter to vote for it.
(3) you can get the business lobby to go to Republicans and lobby for your health care bill, in exchange for which you give the business lobby something else it wants. But of course, nothing you give the business lobby will match this, so it's not clear what you'd have to offer.
(4) you can hope that some new breed of fiscally-liberal, socially conservative brand of Republican -- think Mike Huckabee without the flat tax -- starts showing up in the Senate.
(5) you can win enough elections that some Republicans fear re-election unless they support your UHC plan.

My preferred strategy is (5). You pass the global warming bill and campaign on the ostrich-in-the-sand attitude of the conservative wing of the party. Then you win some elections in 2010. Then you walk into the next bipartisan leadership meeting and say "look, your party's brand is in the toilet. Do you want to keep going? Or do you want to face reality and vote for a bipartisan health care plan?"

Part of the reason the "mandate" stuff makes a difference in comparison to 1993 is that the GOP more clearly saw a path to an electoral majority. With gen-Y skewing heavily towards Democrats, it's not going to be so easy to see a way forward this time.

"Really? Don't you think that Johnson's landslide in 1964 altered the legislative dynamic so that Medicare and Medicaid could become law? And didn't Roosevelt's landslide in 1932 alter the legislative dynamics enough to allow the New Deal?"

Matthew would likely answer that in both cases, Dems had filibuster proof majorities after those elections.

And while he'd be right, he'd still not be understanding how mandates can translate to legislative success in less extreme cases.

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To move back to 1993, Bob Dole repeatedly claimed that in obstructing Clinton legislation, he was representing the 57% who had voted against Clinton. It may have been a false argument, but it's one of the ways that mandate, or lack thereof, can affect legislative success.

"We'll get universal health care if and when some non-trivial faction of Republicans wants us to have it, and I don't think the resulting plan is one I'm going to like very much."

There's something to be said for that view. Nonetheless, the reason that Hillarycare was a debacle was not because the right-wing Democrats revolted and the bill failed to pass, but because the public sided with the Republicans, Right-Wing Democrats, and TNR "liberals" who characterized it as an unwieldy bureaucratic boondoggle.

Given a better plan, with a better spokesman, and some support from the business community, things might turn out very differently. If the Republicans are forced to filibuster a popular plan, rather than just allowing an unpopular plan to fall apart in committee, the political fallout will be very different.

Which is to say, don't strangle universal health care in the cradle. We've got enough expensive, inefficient band-aids on our health care crisis as it is.

Part of the reason the "mandate" stuff makes a difference in comparison to 1993 is that the GOP more clearly saw a path to an electoral majority.

It's not clear that this is true either. My recollection is that a lot of people retired, etc., the South realigned towards its more natural party, and there was a lot of corruption in the House. There a lots of Dem politicos (inc., I think, Schmitt) who argue that Gingrich's 5 Year Plan (whatever it was called) had nothing to do with the unexpected results.

"True. There are a few ways to get there."

You left off:

(6) don't take advantage of the opportunity in the '09-'10 Congress, wait until a Republican Presidential candidate gets elected on a UHC plan, watch a horrible plan get enacted, and suffer devastating long-term political consequences for the left.

"Nonetheless, the reason that Hillarycare was a debacle was not because the right-wing Democrats revolted and the bill failed to pass, but because the public sided with the Republicans, Right-Wing Democrats, and TNR "liberals" who characterized it as an unwieldy bureaucratic boondoggle."

While this is all true, I'll reiterate that public opinion only turned against the plan after the right went up with an unopposed national TV ad buy attacking the plan.

Hillarycare, despite the manifold political errors made, could very possibly have been rescued with a rather modest replying TV ad buy from the left. But in 1993, the infrastructure wasn't in place for the left to get on the air. Obviously, things have changed.

Matt's argument against trying for universal healthcare is similar to the perennial hawk argument against appeasement --- it didn't work once.

Petey,

The historical record consists of one event.

That's right. Things like the massive defeat of single-payer health care by popular vote in two of the bluest states in the nation, Oregon and California, are just a figment of our imagination.

I'll reiterate that public opinion only turned against the plan after the right went up with an unopposed national TV ad buy attacking the plan.

Yawn. Right, it was all just a matter of bad marketing. Couldn't possibly be because HillaryCare was just fundamentally inconsistent with the will of the American people. Martha Derthick, professor of Government at the University of Virginia, wrote in the Washington Post (that famously conservative rag) of HillaryCare:

In many years of studying American social policy, I have never read an official document that seemed so suffused with coercion and political naivete . . . with its drastic prescriptions for controlling the conduct of state governments, employers, drug manufacturers, doctors, hospitals and you and me.

e: We do have a historical record indicating that everyone who's ever jumped in the pool has wound up on life support.

Huh? Whatever did Richard Nixon in (hint: Starts with "W":) it wasn't his universal healthcare plan. Ditto for Harry Truman. And even ditto for Bill Clinton, who was never on political "life support", not even during the worst of Monicagate.

Re: The GOP ignored the polls and went ahead with impeachment anyway and it paid off for them politically.

It did? How? They LOST seats in the 1998 election, largely because of pushing ahead with impeachment. And their 2000 presidential candidate was someone with no connection to the debacle and even spoke with mild disapproval of the fiasco-- and still lost the popular vote.

"Petey I'm sympathetic to the underlying idea of your argument (political winds at one's back, etc.) even if I'm not sure it's right, but you are over-reaching unbelievably in suggesting Bush could have gutted Social Security or Medicare because of 9/11."

Maybe not Medicare, but maybe Social Security - *if* the Iraq War had been a success. Wars are often started for domestic reasons; I don't think this one is an exception.

The best health care systems are simple ones (e.g. VA health care, Kaiser Permanente, etc. - wholly inclusive payers and providers).

Legislation (as opposed to adjudication or constitutional changes) invariably complicates matters because consensus/compromises need to be struck to satisfy a critical threshold of stakeholders.

Therefore, any legislative attempt will suck.


Re: If Bush had moved from Afghanistan to gutting Social Security rather than to Iraq in late 2002, he'd have had a decent shot at success.

Even presidents at the height of their popularity cannot push unpopular proposals. See: FDR and "Court packing". If what you suggest were true then why didn't Bush and the Right push Social Security "reform" in 2002? I think it's obvious that they knew how dangerous that would be to them, that it would damage their prospects in the election of 2002 and that it might even imperil the hoped for Iraq adventure if it tarnished Bush's popularity. So the waited until just after the 2004 election when (they must have thought) they had enough of a mandate to maybe do it, when Bush would not have to worry about running again, and when the public cwould have nearly two years to forget about it before 2006 if it fell like a lead balloon (as of course it did).

Re: But of course, nothing you give the business lobby will match this, so it's not clear what you'd have to offer.

No more paying for employee healthcare? That's a heckuva a lot of money you know.

Re: But of course, nothing you give the business lobby will match this, so it's not clear what you'd have to offer.

Dole did not obstruct the Clinton healthcare proposal. It never even got to the point where it could have been obstructed in Congress. (And Dole, a healthcare reform supporter, is on record as stating that he was ready to start wheeling and dealing in 1993 but the phone call never came). The administration and the congressional Democratic leadership sank Clinton's proposal by doing nothing to turn it from a mere proposal to an actual bill attempting to become law.

What it really comes down to, I think, is that Petey thinks (like Jon Cohn) that the possession of an electoral mandate will alter the legislative dynamics. That goes against everything I've ever been taught about how American political institutions actually work.

This is 100% correct. "Mandate" is a Latin word meaning "bullshit." (Cf. Bush on Social Security.) You either have the votes, or you don't. "Mandates" had very little to do with either the Great Society or the New Deal (indeed, FDR in '32 rather conspicuously did not run on an activist liberal platform.) The halo effect LBJ benefited from was certainly relevant, but that has nothing to do with a "mandate," and any "mandate" would have meant jack shit in terms of passing the CRA had a less adriot legilsative manipulator been in the White House.

We don't know what will be able to pass in '09 until we see the legislative climate. But having a "mandate" or getting a "vetting" from the electorate is utterly trivial. If marginal Republican Senators don't perceive it in their interests to vote against cloture--and given what a massive victory they would be handing a Democratic President, the pressures will be intense--the fact that health care was part of the winning President's platform will mean nothing.

"We don't know what will be able to pass in '09 until we see the legislative climate. But having a "mandate" or getting a "vetting" from the electorate is utterly trivial."

But, of course, the '08 election will play a huge part in determining the legislative climate in '09.

Imagine two different scenarios:

1) A Democratic President that ran on a healthcare plan and won 53% - 46% carrying 32 states while gaining 4 net Senators.

2) A Democratic President that didn't run on a healthcare plan and won 50% - 49% carrying 20 states while gaining 1 net Senator.

Do you really think that the difference between these two scenarios in '09 in both holding together the D caucus and in peeling off R Senators for a healthcare plan would be trivial?

If so, I'd politely suggest that you're nuts.

"If marginal Republican Senators don't perceive it in their interests to vote against cloture--and given what a massive victory they would be handing a Democratic President, the pressures will be intense--the fact that health care was part of the winning President's platform will mean nothing."

Your condition here is correct. What will matter is what marginal Republican Senators perceive as being in their interest. But then you go off track.

How a Democratic President did in any particular state is highly relevant to that state's Senators.

How the two parties are more generally perceived by pollsters in '09 will also be highly relevant to larger Republican calculations.

And if the President didn't run on a plan, the introduction of the plan will provide a far better opportunity for Republicans to cast doubt on the plan as being unsound. Having run on a particular plan and having had it validated by the electorate removes an enormous amount of the opposition arsenal. The disadvantage of not having taken a plan to the electorate is one of the main lessons folks should have taken from the '93-'94 experience.

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Having a personal mandate, a party mandate, and a specific mandate for a plan doesn't magically make Senators vote for cloture.

But it sets up the atmosphere in which the various decisions will be made. It doesn't ensure you'll win the game, but it makes sure you're playing a game with far more favorable rules.

And finally, it's useful to remember that passing a plan isn't the only way to win the game. If the plan is popular, and if the D caucus is unified in support, even if you can't get cloture, you can make the Republicans pay a price for obstruction. But none of this happens if you don't create an electoral mandate for your plan first.

Or to put things another way:

The Edwards plan has what I think to be a very clever way of putting single payer into the healthcare mix without generating "we'll fight you to the death" type intensity from the entrenched interests it threatens.

If you'd like a left-leaning element like that to be part of whatever healthcare plan eventually passes Congress, there are only two conceivable scenarios.

1) Get 60 Democratic Senators who'll hold firm. (Remember to hold your breath while waiting.)
2) Get a popular mandate for a plan to pressure the Republican Party with the club of electoral politics.

Without one of those two scenarios being in place, you can utterly abandon all hope of including anything more left-leaning in the legislation than Schwarzenegger type center-right provisions.

Do you really think that the difference between these two scenarios in '09 in both holding together the D caucus and in peeling off R Senators for a healthcare plan would be trivial?

The problem here is that you're conflating the essentially meaningless term "mandate" with stuff that actually matters. Picking up votes in the Senate is hugely, hugely important to passing a good plan but has nothing to do with a "mandate" per se. Whether the President wins by 1 or three points, on the other hand, is trivial. (Compare Bush on tax cuts after a narrow "victory" and Bush on Social Security after a bigger victory.)

"The problem here is that you're conflating the essentially meaningless term "mandate" with stuff that actually matters. Picking up votes in the Senate is hugely, hugely important to passing a good plan but has nothing to do with a "mandate" per se. Whether the President wins by 1 or three points, on the other hand, is trivial."

OK. Minor and correctable point. Try the thought experiment this way - imagine these two scenarios:

1) A Democratic President that ran on a healthcare plan and won 53% - 46% carrying 32 states while gaining 4 net Senators to go from 51 to 55.

2) A Democratic President that didn't run on a healthcare plan and won 50% - 49% carrying 20 states while gaining 1 net Senator to go from 54 to 55.

Now we have the same 55 D Senators in January '09 in both scenarios.

Do you really think the chances of getting cloture for a left-leaning healthcare plan are about the same under both scenarios?

If so, I'd suggest that you haven't thought through the situation fully.

"Compare Bush on tax cuts after a narrow "victory" and Bush on Social Security after a bigger victory."

Of course, that's apples and oranges in multiple ways, not least of which is that you don't need 60 votes for cloture on the budget.

In fact, I'd argue that Bush's SS experience is of a piece with Bill Clinton's healthcare experience in that not bringing a plan to the electorate and getting it vetted allowed opposition to mobilize while the plan was being introduced. And having won an election with a plan provides an administration with cover on a wide variety of other fronts.

If Bush had been serious about gutting SS in 2005, he needed to bring a plan to the voters in 2004 to have a realistic shot at getting cloture.

Due to a transatlantic flight, I'm a bit late to the party here (and you know I love this kind of party!) Let me just say that my preferred option on Nick's menu was close to number 2: "you can elect 57 Democrats who will vote for your plan, and get Snowe, Collins and Specter to vote for it." Though all you have to do is get them to vote for cloture. And even if we have some red-state Dems in the Senate, I don't see Ben Nelson filibustering a Democratic UHC bill. The New Parliamentarians are right, and the four-party system is dead.

I'd be willing to bet even money that we'll be at 57 D's in 2011. In fact, we have an outside shot at getting there in 2009. There's a 21R-12D split in the 2008 Senate races, with the GOP having locked themselves into another 2006-style pounding on the Iraq War, and all sorts of nasty goodness that Democratic subpoenas can dig up. Then there's a 19R-15D split in 2010. Even without winning most of the next four years' Senate races, we can still be at 57 in '11.

"Then there's a 19R-15D split in 2010. Even without winning most of the next four years' Senate races, we can still be at 57 in '11."

Two warning notes about 2010:

- Despite the oddity of '98 and '02, I think there are still powerful forces working against the party of the President in off-year elections.

- You have to go waaaaaaaaay back in history to find a party making significant gains in three consecutive Senate elections. I'd say the last time it happened was for the Republicans in the '38, '40, and '42 elections. And worth noting that this was all a dead-cat bounce in a sense, as the GOP was starting from only 16 Senators prior to '38.

In other words, there are some powerful historical reasons not to be counting on pickups in 2010, no matter what the matchups look like.

Well, regarding three-year sequences, the toughest year, schedule-wise, is already behind us. We picked up 6 seats in the face of an 18D-15R split!

Back to points of likely Petey-Neil agreement, the issue mix for 2008 is shaping up similarly to the issue mix for 2006. It's early, but Iraq and GOP scandal dominate the news and I don't see them going away. If we could get 6 out of 15 in this kind of environment last time, optimism about 2008 when we're attacking 21 is definitely warranted.


Comments closed June 14, 2007.

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