It's a bit odd that Pakistan's security services are warning Musharraf about the spreading Taliban problem when, to the best of my understanding, Pakistan has gone back to its previous policy of seeking "strategic depth" in Afghanistan by backing Taliban forces. I should also add, though, that at least some people I've communicated with who are familiar with Afghanistan object to characterizing the forces in question -- ethnically Pashto, strongly traditionalist -- as "the Taliban," arguing that Pashto nationalism is a larger and longer-lasting phenomenon than the specific institutions and individuals we came to know by that name.
« Uh-Oh | Main | Stay Calm »
Taliban Spreading
30 Jun 2007 08:59 am
Comments (11)
And they seem to be banned dancing boys.
Strange that a number of our fundamentalists are apparently pro dancing boy.
Pakistan contunes to hold up its promise to be the real Islamic loose cannon just after Saudi Arabia.
It's a bit odd that Pakistan's security services are warning Musharraf about the spreading Taliban problem when, to the best of my understanding, Pakistan has gone back to its previous policy of seeking "strategic depth" in Afghanistan by backing Taliban forces.
It's a bit odd to discover that not everybody in a government agrees on this policy? Or that maybe everybody does agree on the policy, but nonetheless sees risks? What's so strange about either of those possibilities?
"The warning came in a document from the Interior Ministry, which said Pakistan’s security forces in North-West Frontier Province abutting the tribal areas were outgunned and outnumbered and had forfeited authority to the Taliban and their allies."
Given the recent bout of editorials questioning the legitimacy of Musharaf's government, I find it curious that the document should be produced by his own Interior Ministry and introduced to the world with much aplomb.
The current group of insurgents aren't just the ideologically motivated group of religious students (proper Taliban) but any mal-content from your run of the mill drug runner to thieves and brigands. The wedding of Pushtoon nationalism with the Taliban agenda came about very early on when exacerbated by Hekmatyar's failure nationalist elements began making common cause with the Taliban.
That being said, some tensions remain within the ranks and can be exploited.
Small quibble, Matt: Pashto is a language. Pashtun is the equivalent ethnicity. It's kind of an important distinction, since not all Pashtuns speak Pashto.
Pashtun nationalism, though, has usually been the card Afghanistan has tried to play. The issue of the Durand Line dividing "Pashtunistan" is a key part of this.
My impression is that Pushtun support for the fundamentalist Taliban is tied into a vague feeling among tribe members that they have a dysfunctional culture which they hope could be improved by stricter obedience to the Koran. For example, one of the precipitating events of the Taliban's rise to power in the mid-1990s was a small civil war between two non-Taliban warlords over a young boy they both fancied. A Taliban squad rescued the boy, which helped their reputation.
Ah, the Pashtuns ...
Pashtun proverb: "I against my brother, my brother and I against our cousin, the three of us against the world."
Here are some more Pukhtun (=Pashtun = Pathan = Pushtun) proverbs:
The Pukhtun is never at peace, except when he is at war.
Women belong in the house or in the grave.
Women have no noses. They will eat s***.
One’s own mother and sister are disgusting.
Where there is the sound of a blow, there is respect.
When the floodwaters reach your chin, put your son beneath your feet.
God, grant me a true friend who, without urging, will show me his love.
From Winston Churchill's account of fighting in a "butcher-and-bolt" punitive expedition against Pushtuns in 1897 in his "My Early Life:"
Except at harvest time, when self-preservation enjoins a temporary truce, the Pathan tribes are always engaged in private or public war. Every man is a warrior, a politician, and a theologian. Every large house is a real feudal fortress made, it is true, only of sunbaked clay, but with battlements, turrets, loopholes, flanking towers, drawbridges, etc., complete. Every village has its defense. Every family cultivates its vendetta; every clan, its feud. The numerous tribes and combination of tribes all have their accounts to settle with one another. Nothing is ever forgotten and very few debts are left unpaid… The life of the Pathan is thus full of interest…
Into this happy world the nineteenth century brought two new facts; the breech-loading rifle and the British Government. The first was an enormous luxury and blessing; the second, an unmitigated nuisance. The convenience of the breech-loading, and still more of the magazine, rifle was nowhere more appreciated than in the Indian highlands. A weapon which could kill with accuracy at fifteen hundred yards opened a whole new vista of delights to every family or clan which could acquire it. One could actually remain in one's own house and fire at one's neighbor nearly a mile away.
I'm sure Winston Churchill's account from over 100 years ago is the most valuable resource for understanding the current situation in the region. Nothing much has occured around there in the intervening years.
This "Pashtun Nationalism" Matt talks about is something that has been heavily cultivated and supported in Afghanistan largely by the Pakistanis. For the last 1000 years, Persian (Farsi or Dari, in the local language) served as the lingua franca of the region. Even though there were countless local tribes and languages (Pashto and Pashtun being one of them), all the government and official organizations agreed to use Persian as the official language. Hence, every Pashtun king or leader since the founding of Afghanistan in 1747 spoke Persian in the court and in all official communications.
In the 1950s, Afghanistan was formally under the rule of King Zahir Shah, but since he was very young, the country was effectively ruled by his uncles (the Musahiban) and his cousin Daud. Given Afghanistan's land-locked status and the fact that the Durand Line was a nebulous treaty signed with the British, Afghans never fully accepted it, for doing so would mean not only splitting the Pashtun regions into 2, but more importantly, Afghanistan would not have a viable access to the sea. For this reason, Daud, as Prime Minister during the 1950s, pursued a policy of "Pashtunistan" or Pashtun nationalism, where he agitated against the Durand Line, antagonized Pakistan, and created a lot of ethnic hostility WITHIN Afghanistan.
Once the King became old enough and politically fortified his position, he ousted Daud from power and introduced the Constitutional Era in 1963. The King also went a long way to reduce the ethnic tensions in Afghan society by reasserting Persian as the main language, distancing himself from the Pashtunistan policies of Daud, and worked hard to maintain his membership in the Non-Aligned Movement.
When the King was ousted from power in 1973, by his cousin Daud, the Pashtunistan issue came back to the center. However, it became clear that Daud was using this largely as a bargaining chip to guarantee Afghanistan's access to the sea via both Pakistan and Iran. The evidence for this is the fact that Daud and his family, almost exclusively spoke Persian at home, and were never seen as traditional Pashtuns in Kabul society. Moreover, in 1977, Daud had inked a deal with the Shah of Iran and Pakistan's Bhutto (the father, not the daughter) over sea access rights and the Durand Line. Furthermore, Daud had sought to brake off his long dependence on Soviet aid, by signing an economic development pact with the Shah of Iran and Saudi Arabia. The Soviets were obviously upset at losing a border "ally", with whom they invested 20 years of economic and political support. That's why in 1978 Soviet-backed Afghan communists staged a coup against Daud and killed him.
Since then, the Pashtunistan issue has been allowed to fester, as Pakistan has had an increasingly greater role in Afghan affairs, as it was the conduit through which the West could support anti-Soviet resistance within Afghanistan.
One must also note that a large portion of the Pakistani military, especially the ISI (their CIA and MI-6, rolled into one), are comprised of ethnic Pashtuns. The most famous being, Hamid Gul, a notorious leader of the ISI, whose historic support for the Taliban in the 1990's and currently is well known within Pakistani society. Hamid Gul is also part-Pashtun.
In short, this Pashtun-nationalism stuff is garbage and largely pushed by Pakistan, largely though Pashtun Afghans who were refugees in Pakistan for the last 25 years.
Comments closed July 14, 2007.
| 
Heads in the Sand
Well the Pakistanis did not mind seeing the Taliban in power in Afghanistan. That is not the same as seeing them in power in Pakistan as well. This is what Blowback really looks like.
I don't think it is odd. The Islamophobic argument would go that Pakistan has a long history of playing both ends at the same time. So they will give money to the Taliban while demanding money from America for their vital role in fighting the Taliban. This is just more of the same. I am not entirely adverse to that argument but this time I think it is more complex. Pakistan is a fractured country. It is possible that half the Army opposes the Taliban and so warns the government while the other half funds and trains the Taliban.
As for the Pashtun nationalism, I don't see it. The Taliban is violently opposed to most forms of Pashtun culture. So the question to ask is what they do. If they ban, for instance, dancing boys they are likely to be Islamists not Pashtun nationalists. And they seem to be banned dancing boys.
Posted by HeiGou | June 30, 2007 9:17 AM