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The Ethical Hegemon

20 Jun 2007 08:02 am

Ezra Klein, talking about John Edwards' speech, made reference to John Edwards' "focus on humanitarian works as a centerpiece of foreign policy." I've sniffed around this subject a bit, and I think it's worth saying that this isn't quite what Edwards is talking about. The thing on his website about "restoring America's moral leadership" isn't just a throwaway line; there's a substantive idea there.

Roughly speaking, Bush's efforts to run American foreign policy in a robust, yet inept, neo-imperial manner has created a crisis of American hegemony. We're still (by far) the strongest country out there, but the world's become pretty unwilling to follow American direction on a wide variety of priorities. The result is John Ikenberry's "Security Trap" -- like quicksand, the harder we thrash around trying to accomplish things the more we alienate the world and the harder it becomes to do what we want, necessitating harder thrashing.

Ikenberry's solution to this (and mine, and Bob Wright's) is institutions. The problem, according to us, is structural. What we need to do is address problems through rules and demonstrate a willingness to abide by the rules and see them enforced even against our special friends in the world (I'm just sketching this out since I really want to talk about Edwards, follow the links for more details).

Edwards, by contrast, sees a non-structural problem here. Bush, on this view, has basically denuded the United States of what you might call the moral capital it built up during WWII and the Cold War era. We've become, in essence, bad guys on the world stage. What we need to do, therefore, is commit some overweening acts of goodness -- leading the struggle against global poverty and genocide -- to rebuild our moral capital. With that done, it'll then be possible to once again play a leadership role. Edwards' advisor, Michael Signer, wrote that if we act in Darfur "As it did in the past, the world would most likely reward us with loyalty in other emerging trouble spots." It seems to me that if President Edwards actually attempts to govern in this way, it's not going to work, but I'll save that for another day because I'd primarily like to focus on explaining (also: combating poverty and disease are good things to do even if you don't buy this theory). The other thing to say is that even though I'm skeptical of Edwards' solution here, he sees the same problem facing the country that I see -- Bush's policies have not only failed, but actually created a dynamic where it's now very difficult for the United States to achieve most of our core objectives; one of the first orders of business needs to be breaking out of that dynamic.

Photo by Flickr user Alex de Carvalho used under a Creative Commons License

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Comments (20)

I guess there's not much of a constituency, at least among Democratic presidential candidates and prominent bloggers, for the notion that hegemonic power will ultimately come to grief if it is exercised outside a narrow range. It would be nice to delude ourselves that our kick-ass military and foreign policy edifice could accomplish big things on the world stage, but if anything, the Iraq war has convinced me that state power can only ever be coercive in international relations. We might like to think that we're better than Rome, and we might come up with grand theories as to how a hegemon can be benevolent, but it ain't gonna happen, not in equilibrium.

So count me out of both sides of this distinction (if there really is a distinction there). If we want to do good, let's just give a large portion of the military budget to poor people here and abroad and be done with it.

Well, Edwards has been quite clear about the need for the US to rejoin the international community, to work with the ICC, to build alliances and work within accepted structures.

I understand your explanatory point, but I think that for Edwards, the structural and non-structural reforms go hand in hand, both utterly key to his foreign policy vision.

I think of myself as being primarily in the rule of law camp myself. However, I think moral leadership has a big roll to play too. One can easily draw a line betewwn the contrast in receptions for Presidents Clinton and Bush (outside of Albania) receive overseas to the ability of the US influence their leaders.

Also, from an electoral perspective, emphasizing the UN, the Hague and WTO seems like it would be a mistake everywhere further than fifty miles from the Altantic Ocean.

I agree with AJ about the electoral perspective. I'm a coastal liberal elitist, and I found John Kerry's insistent moan about institutions and the UN the most annoying part of his candidacy. He wasn't willing to say what he thought about the policy itself (Iraq). It is on that primary question, rather than the secondary process question, that I make my evaluation, and I don't give a shit what the UN thinks just because it's the UN. The content matters.

I think the most important question will be: "Will John Edwards attack Iran because Pat Robertson wants him to?" The answer, from what I've seen of JE so far, seems to be yes.

Edwards' advisor, Michael Signer, wrote that if we act in Darfur "As it did in the past, the world would most likely reward us with loyalty in other emerging trouble spots."

This, to me, is incredibly troubling. You see it over and over in liberal commentary-- the willingness to intervene in Darfur, by people who are opposed to the occupation in Iraq. It's even more distressing coming from a higher-up in a major Democratic Presidential campaign. The fact is that people making precisely the kind of naive assumptions that proved so disastrous in Iraq: that it will be fast, that it will be easy, that we will be welcomed by the native populace-- most importantly, that we are capable of the kind of massive undertaking of societal engineering that would be required to truly make the difference in the Sudan.

What's particularly galling is the fact that the many of the same people who want to intervene in Darfur complain about the way that Iraq inflames the Muslim world and makes us a target for terrorism. And invading the Sudan won't do that? Attacking a Muslim government and beginning, in whatever brief or limited capacity, an American occupation seems to me to be a truly crazy idea.

I know that most people will say, "The devil is in the details," and I'm sure that's true. The participation of the UN and other countries could provide a sense of legitimacy, we could go in with an explicit limit to American participation-- we could actually have some sort of basic fucking strategy, which we didn't have in Iraq. People sometimes say that for Darfur, the model is Kosovo, not Iraq. But of course, the model for Iraq II was Iraq I, and that didn't turn out too well. Models are like that. I do believe that if we commit the kind of forces necessary to actually solve the problem, we'll risk a quagmire. The other option is to go lightly but not actually solve the problem.

Of course, I could be pessimistic. But the last four years have demonstrated that perhaps it's impossible to be pessimistic when it comes to this kind of intervention.

Matt -- Nice photo of Edwards. The B/W quality and somewhat pensive/reflective downward looking face of Edwards makes me think of RFK.

Youngun -- Bullshit. If you're going to tar Edwards with that crap, show us some feathers.

I believe that a middle ground must be utilized by Edwards because of the audiences that each policy (structural and non-structural) is aimed at.

On the diplomatic stage, structural reform must be undertaken to show the individuals in power (within government, business, etc) that the US is reversing tack from the Bush unilateral years and working to rebuild the institutions that were so strong post-WWII. This will help with the rebuilding of alliances and coalitions for regimes beyond terrorism.

However, Edwards' plan is equally as important in today's climate, with terroristic actions being undertaken by non-state individuals. They won't respond to increased American institution-building the same way that increased aid and attention placed on a problem area might alter their actions.

You have to remember that the US has to speak to two separate groups of people here, not just the ones in power. And when these two audiences overlap, doing both can't hurt at all.

The model for Iraq II was Iraq I? How's that?

Iraq does not = Darfur because the latter would be sold as a humanitarian intervention, where the former was sold as a national security intervention and then morphed into a humanitarian cause because of the original incompetence/mendacity. And of course, the way to undertake a humanitarian intervention is never to lie and/or bungle your way into it in a constant state of denial.

Darfur WOULD be an international effort where Iraq was not. That, along with stopping an active outbreak of ethnic cleansing, should make all the difference.

Ikenberry's solution to this (and mine, and Bob Wright's) is institutions ... What we need to do is address problems through rules and demonstrate a willingness to abide by the rules ... Edwards, by contrast, sees a non-structural problem here... What we need to do, therefore, is commit some overweening acts of goodness -- leading the struggle against global poverty and genocide -- to rebuild our moral capital. With that done, it'll then be possible to once again play a leadership role.

Both of these are more-or-less missing the point. What the US needs is new policy objectives, not new institutions or 'acts of goodness'. If the objective is to keep Jewish colonists in East Jerusalem, maximise oil rents for US companies, and keep US military bases across the Middle East, there are no institutions or 'acts of goodness' which can make this sustainable. If the policies are different, which is to say can find some social basis of support in ME civil societies, then institutions may perhaps be able to sustain them.

Wow, that is a really nice haircut.

I might be inclined to agree with you, Bill, except the events of the past five years really leave us in no state to engage in even a Kosovo level conflict - aside from the cruelty it would be to subject our forces to yet another occupation, I seriously doubt the UN nations would be willing to make a serious commitment. Given the antipathy to America the Interventionist that runs through Europe alone, we'd face an uphill battle all the way.

And this assumes of course we begin to withdraw from Iraq at some point.

Is the faint image on the right a mirror image or some other dude? It doesn't really look like Edwards and it seems like the angle is all wrong.

Seconding Freddie - just as we're calling BS on the Iran hawks who call for unspecified "action" just as a means to discredit their domestic opponents, we should ask here: WTF does "if we act in Darfur" mean? There's already been a couple of rounds of peace talks, a UN Security Resolution, serious economic sanctions passed by Congress on the Sudanese, and there's a small African Union peacekeeping force in the region. If it means that we call for a stepped up diplomatic effort in conjunction with strengthening peacekeeping forces, then I'm all for it. But if it means that we ignore the existing process and barge in militarily, then it could easily turn out to be a disaster. I smell a bit of green lantern theory here: if we can't stop attacks on civilians in a civil war in Iraq with a massive occupation force, why would we be able to stop attacks on civilians in a civil war in Sudan with a smaller force?

I also, like many of the commenters, don't really see the distinction you're seeing between Edwards and Ikenberry etc. I mean, it's not like Edwards wants to break the rules, is it?

From Christopher Caldwell's great Financial Times column It is best to stay out of Darfur:

Some people seem to be nostalgic for the pre-September 11 days when the west could fight symbolic wars against marginal countries in the name of human rights. Others see a chance to restore the west’s humanitarian credentials, after the political quagmire in Iraq. This betrays a short memory and mistakes the war’s outcome for the war’s rationale. Iraq, too, was once a humanitarian cause.

But the lesson – not just of Iraq but also of the debacles in Somalia and Kosovo that made it possible – is that there is no such thing as a humanitarian invasion. The west can destroy the Sudanese government and punish its leaders, as in Iraq. It can support one group of brigands over another, as in Kosovo. It can feed people for a while, as in Somalia. However, humanitarian their motivations, though, military operations turn political the moment they are launched, with consequences that are wildly unpredictable.

Except that the results in both Iraq and Kosovo (Somalia I don't know so much about) were not only wildly predictable, they were in fact widely predicted.

Caldwell loses credibility when he calls Kosovo a "debacle." It's a messy situation, but it's quite a stretch to call it a debacle. The real test is whether we did more good than harm by intervening, and there is lots of evidence that we did more good.

Caldwell loses credibility when he calls Kosovo a "debacle." It's a messy situation, but it's quite a stretch to call it a debacle. The real test is whether we did more good than harm by intervening, and there is lots of evidence that we did more good.

The answer to that question is entirely dependent on who you ask. We achieved "success" in Kosovo by doing what we won't or can't do in Iraq, backing one faction against another. Kosovo has now been ethnically cleansed, so there's no conflict. The question is whether the moral imperative to prevent ethnic cleansing overwhelms the desire to promote peace and stability.

I find that I lean toward structure because no one, not Edwards -- not anyone can act with our power without restriction, but its not going to be easy. Certainly we can do good on a case by case basis, but what is good? Tsunami relief -- sure. Malaria prevention -- sure. AIDS relief -- well are you in South Africa or New York or Haiti or China? We haven't gotten very far along a contiuum that ends somewhere near the Palestine and there are already serious political questions. The structural approach using rules and international institutions seems to hold some promise, but its pretty far down the road. Look at the International Criminal Court. It seems to be a no brainer for the United States to endorse it, but will we hand over Jeffrey Miller and Paul Bremmer let alone Henry Kissinger and Donald Rumsfeld? Are there neutral principals that are widely accepted enough both here and abroad to allow us to rise from the mire in which we presently exist? I am not so sure. Is Putin right about the Chechnyans? Are the Turks right about the Kurds? Was Milosevic right about the Bosnians? How do you decide? I do not want to sit back and "let god sort them out" but I have a hard time seeing the United States abiding by rules that the rest of the world adopts any time soon.

I find Edwards' view on this a little pie in the sky. The fact is that humanitarian efforts in the past have been undertaken to advance a particular US interest...not in a bad way. Tsunami relief: that's a breeding ground for terrorists. Why not win support by feeding people when they need it so they don't kill us later? AIDS: the Clinton NSC made a very compelling case that this was undermining the stability of an entire continent, thereby requiring US attention.

It simply is not quanifiable to say that if we go into Darfur, the world will welcome us with open arms. There simply is nothing to justify this statement. Not to mention, there is a laundry list of things that have been so ignored for the past six years, that I'm not really sure the "that would be a really nice thing for us to do" category of international issues should get the first attention of any administration.

Regarding institutions, yes, I agree that it is rhetorically tiresome, but is needed. Is it better to speak of this in terms of the United States demonstrating to the world that it will be a team player on key issues in order to rebuild trust and good faith? That can be in institutions as well as in acts of good will around the world. I think it also makes sense to people in a way that conversations about the Hague and Kyoto simply do not.

Bottom line, I think the best thing the US can do is demonstrate to the world that it's going to get it's own house in order, and we're going to operate in good faith. Trust and predictability will be the greater long term investment.


Comments closed July 04, 2007.

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