Yes. What Kevin said. I think some of these residual force ideas about Iraq make a little bit of sense in a vacuum, but when you think about how things play in the real world, I think it's obvious that to secure the benefits of withdrawal from Iraq the United States needs to withdraw from Iraq in a really complete way. If there's a need to blow up some al-Qaeda installation in Anbar Province (frankly, I doubt that'll be the case, but this seems to be the main practical worry) that can be done by people who are stationed outside of Iraq and who leave Iraq really, really quickly once the blowing up is done.
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The Zero Option
04 Jun 2007 01:34 pm
Comments (23)
So, when you say "stationed outside of Iraq" - where are you talking about? And, won't that type of activity lead to explosive condemnation from the international community?
I personally have wanted us out of Iraq for a long time, but I'm not sure a complete withdraw makes the most sense. Also, what are we going to do with the American Vatican in Baghdad?
I don't imagine it would be incredibly difficult to infiltrate Iraq with special forces from either Kurdistan, Kuwait or Turkey, MDtoMN; on the other hand, I'm not so sure that's either desirable, or as MY pointed out, likely to be necessary.
While I agree that we need to get out of Iraq, I think there are two place where we either need to keep troops, or are welcome to keep them: The embassy and Kurdistan.
First, the embassy: We need a force big enough there to hold off a mob long enough to evacuate State Dept. Personnel. I don't know the layout of the place, but that means we need a fairly large barracks there, as well a large helipad and support apperatus for the hypothetical evacuation.
As for Kurdistand, Andrew Sullivan posted a link a while ago documenting all the growth that is going on in that area. If we withdraw, leaving a large force there means we have a fairly welcoming society, and it helps keep Kurdistan on the path to development. Are the Kurds perfect? Far from it, but they're closer than just about anybody in the area.
Why not move the U.S. embassy to Kurdistan? We don't have an embassy in Jerusalem, so why do we need to keep one in Baghdad?
Why not move the U.S. embassy to Kurdistan?
Why not just move it back to the Ar Rasafah district and quit trying to play Masters of The Universe in Iraq? The problem isn't an embassy, it's one masquerading as a colonial office.
I would think it would be much harder for our troops to respond to incidents in Iraq if they were outside the country. Also, while we want to make clear that we are withdrawing from Iraq, we also want to make clear that we are not abandoning the Iraqis.
I don't like the idea of pulling out all our troops immediately, sticking some of them in the surrounding region, and hoping for the best. By the time we respond, things may already be out of control. What we need to do is gradually pull out our troops step by step, making sure the situation is stable at each step, before finally withdrawing for good.
Why not move the U.S. embassy to Kurdistan?
Short answer: Turkey.
If we stations ourselves in Kurdistan, it would place the U.S. in an impossible position.
It is likely that some form of confrontation is coming between the Kurds and the Turks. Neither side is backing down enough, or abstaining from inflammatory policies. Thus, with our embassy and military basing in Kurdistan, we'll either be expected to defend the Kurds from the Turks (which could lead the Kurds to overreach in their interference in Turkey to start with) or we'll defer to our NATO ally (which has a modern military) and stay neutral as the Turks pound the Kurds.
At which point, I imagine, our Kurdish hosts will be decidedly less amenable to our presence.
What we need to do is gradually pull out our troops step by step, making sure the situation is stable at each step, before finally withdrawing for good.
That's supposedly (well, kinda sorta) been the plan for five years now. It's not working.
"Short answer: Turkey."
The Kurdish situation in Turkey is one of those bigger problems that have been ignored for years with the smaller Palestinian-Israeli problem sucking in all the oxygen. We definitely need to play an active role in resolving this, but we have plenty of leverage with the Kurds and Turks to do so. It shouldn't keep us from stationing a quick reaction force in Kurdistan, with Kurdish approval, to react to potential Jihadist threats in the rest of Iraq.
Fred, with all due respect, what does that mean? Nice sounding words, gestures in the direction of vague platitudes, but how does that govern policy?
Define: active role in resolving this.
Define: plenty of leverage
Explain: why the problems I brought up wouldn't be problems.
More meat please.
I would think it would be much harder for our troops to respond to incidents in Iraq if they were outside the country.
What incidents would be big enough to warrant our response, but still so fast-evolving that we couldn't respond from Kuwait, Turkey and Jordan?
What is the likelihood of such incidents, and what are the prospects for us to intervene successfully? Do those odds justify the enormous costs of keeping troops in Iraq?
What we need to do is gradually pull out our troops step by step, making sure the situation is stable at each step, before finally withdrawing for good.
Define gradual? I'm all for a staggered 10-14 month pullout, but we can't stay tied to ensuring stability a priori. If that's the standard, we're not going anywhere for a decade at least.
eric, haven't you caught on that Fred's just a troll? or maybe your questions are designed to demonstrate that.
anyhow--Matt, you know when you said you agreed with nearly everything FZ said? I asked you whether you agreed with the "leave 50k troops in Iraq" part, and you *DIDN'T ANSWER*!
don't you realize, your main job is to create an interactive dialogue with your commenters?
Matt? Matt?
damn. line went dead.
Eric Martin:
By "active role in resolving this" I mean that high level American diplomats initiate and mediate negotiations between Iraqi Kurds (not the PKK) and the Turks. As an ally to both, we are uniquely positioned to be an honest broker. By "plenty of leverage" -- you do understand what leverage means, right? So let me give you a couple of examples:
1) We are the only major power backing the Kurds and acting as the de facto guarantor for their de facto independence and rising prosperity over the last decade and a half. That counts as leverage, no?
2) We are an important ally to Turkey, and we are allies with countries in the EU, which Turkey would like to eventually join as part of its desired increased integration with the West. Fighting a major war in Kurdistan isn't going to further the Turks' goals of further integrating with the West or getting closer to an EU berth.
A reasonable solution to the Kurdish-Turkish situation, WRT Iraqi Kurdistan, would be for Iraqi Kurdistan to deny sanctuary to PKK militants and for Turkey to stay out of Iraqi Kurdistan.
By "active role in resolving this" I mean that high level American diplomats initiate and mediate negotiations between Iraqi Kurds (not the PKK) and the Turks.
But shouldn't this PRECEDE our garrisoning troops up north? Seeing as that particular "fact on the ground" can alter the behavior/risk calculus of the various parties involved.
We are the only major power backing the Kurds and acting as the de facto guarantor for their de facto independence and rising prosperity over the last decade and a half. That counts as leverage, no?
Yes and no. The Kurds have also sought and received support from the Israelis and, at times, the Iranians. Further, with Saddam out of the picture, we're not really needed as "guarantor" in the same way (the pesh merga are one of the more capable fighting forces in Iraq). For example, despite our requests to the contrary, the PKK activity has actually picked up lately - and the Kurds have NOT cracked down. Which may indicate that the Kurds put other interests ahead of our own. Funny thing about that leverage.
We are an important ally to Turkey, and we are allies with countries in the EU, which Turkey would like to eventually join as part of its desired increased integration with the West. Fighting a major war in Kurdistan isn't going to further the Turks' goals of further integrating with the West or getting closer to an EU berth.
True, yet, again, they don't seem to place the same priority on EU membership as we might hope. That is not an immovable position, but thus far the Turks seem to be indicating that there are lines in the sand that if crossed would induce action (EU be damned). Those would be the lines that the Kurds seem intent on testing.
A reasonable solution to the Kurdish-Turkish situation, WRT Iraqi Kurdistan, would be for Iraqi Kurdistan to deny sanctuary to PKK militants and for Turkey to stay out of Iraqi Kurdistan.
Sounds good to me and you, and yet, the other two parties seem less convinced. There's also the matter of Kirkuk which needs to be addressed.
Altogether, easier said than done. Funny thing about that whole "leverage" stuff. But I support the initiative. Only I would make such a resolution a precondition to our moving northward. Otherwise, we'll get caught in the middle of yet another conflict.
"But shouldn't this PRECEDE our garrisoning troops up north?"
Sure. It should have started already (assuming it hasn't, on the QT).
"True, yet, again, they don't seem to place the same priority on EU membership as we might hope."
I think the Turks want it badly. They even commuted the death sentence of a PKK militant they wanted to execute to appease the Europeans. Anyhow, if they want to find a war with arguably the most secular national group in the Middle East, it will just show they are not ready to join modern Europe, even 100 years after Ataturk tried to drag the Turks into modernity.
"The Kurds have also sought and received support from the Israelis and, at times, the Iranians. Further, with Saddam out of the picture, we're not really needed as "guarantor" in the same way (the pesh merga are one of the more capable fighting forces in Iraq)."
The Kurds don't need us to defend against the Sunni and Shiite militias in Iraq, that's true. They do need us to keep the Syrians, Turks, and Iranians from encroaching on Iraqi Kurdistan. The Israelis aren't in much of a position to do that, and the Iranians have recently been trading rounds with Kurds in Iranian Kurdistan.
"There's also the matter of Kirkuk which needs to be addressed."
If Turkey wants to expand negotiations into the status of Turkic ethnic groups inside Iraq, than it may prompt the Iraqi Kurds to bring up similar concerns about their fellow ethnics in Turkish Kurdistan. If I were the American diplomat in charge, I would try to keep the Kurds and Turks focussed on the main issue of Turks staying out of Iraqi Kurdistan and Iraqi Kurds denying sanctuary to the PKK. If the Turks' concern is really about getting a taste of the oil business in Kurdistan, this is where another kind of leverage comes into play: the economic prospects of stability. As Kurdistan continues to grow its economy in relative stability, the Turks will increasingly benefit as neighbors. If they turn the place into a war zone, not so much.
In any case, based on our existing relationships with the Kurds and Turks, we are already involved, even if we don't have significant forces in Iraqi Kurdistan.
OMG. Matt, how can you be missing the big picture on this. The residual forces have little if anything to do with troops engaged in whatever the hell they are engaged in with the Iraqi population. It's all about those big remote airbases.
Those airbases are permanent forward bases. Stand alone bases from which air power can be projected beyond even the Gulf, all the way to Russia and China. They will also be storehouses for everything from Tanks to bandages. A logistical nirvana for the next century.
Never again probably will our military be able to establish such bases in the region, if not anywhere else on the globe, for two reasons. Finding a willing government to accept such and convincing the congress to allow such a thing and fund it. The costs of building the bases and establishing the stores of supplies has been staggering. The money has now been spent. No Pentagon leader civilian or military will ever allow them to be given up no that we have them. Their strategic value is incomparable.
Strategic not for this conflict mind you. Rather for any theoretical one in comming decades.
These bases were the only ligitimate military strategic object of this whole exercise. Legit to the extent that we intend to maintain absolute and total military superiority worldwide, forever. Which we do of course.
Now if Iraq has some say in these bases remaining in the future is I suppose open to question. But that's another question.
Sure. It should have started already (assuming it hasn't, on the QT).
Well, the fighting has started already. So if the diplomatic effort has started, they need more of it and better. Also, faster please.
The Kurds don't need us to defend against the Sunni and Shiite militias in Iraq, that's true. They do need us to keep the Syrians, Turks, and Iranians from encroaching on Iraqi Kurdistan. The Israelis aren't in much of a position to do that, and the Iranians have recently been trading rounds with Kurds in Iranian Kurdistan.
True about the Iranians, but they had been supporting the Kurds previously. Just a historical note that we haven't been the sole guarantor of their quasi-sovereignty.
Also, I don't think the Kurds really need us to keep the Syrians out. The Turks and Iranians? Perhaps, though our ability to stop either is severely constrained at the moment. The Kurds know this. Their existence depends on them having an astute eye for such dynamics.
In any case, based on our existing relationships with the Kurds and Turks, we are already involved, even if we don't have significant forces in Iraqi Kurdistan.
As I said, I'm 100% in favor of trying to broker a diplomatic solution. The terms you set forth sound solid to me. We agree (hey, it happens!)
My point is, and always has been, that talking about moving to Kurdistan now (without a comprehensive settlement of the various open issues) would be a big mistake. Or at best, a move that only nominally betters our situation.
that can be done by people who are stationed outside of Iraq and who leave Iraq really, really quickly once the blowing up is done.
And those people are going to know about what they're supposed to go in and blow up how exactly? With what intel?
I think this is about right: "Iraq the United States needs to withdraw from Iraq in a really complete way. If there's a need to blow up some al-Qaeda installation in Anbar Province (frankly, I doubt that'll be the case, but this seems to be the main practical worry) that can be done by people who are stationed outside of Iraq and who leave Iraq really, really quickly once the blowing up is done." So far, the U.S. seems pretty unbothered by al-Qaeda and Taleban bases in Pakistan - nobody is worried that we don't have forces in Pakistan, even though, merely a couple of days ago, the new Taleban commander led a rally of some 12,000 people in Pakistan: "A man described as the Taliban's new top field commander has vowed to liberate Afghanistan from "American slavery." Dadullah Mansoor made the remarks in an audiotape played June 1 at a rally at Killi Nalai, a village about 75 kilometers west of Quetta near the Afghan border.
Abdul Sattar Chishti, the cleric who organized the event said more than 12,000 people listened to the speech." - according to Radio Free Europe.
It might be the case that the U.S. will have to use other than military means (gasp) to get what it wants and will have to compromise (never!) with the nations in the Gulf region that just happened to be permanently stationed there. Imagine that. Negotiation even. And paramilitary fighting in Iraq without the U.S. intervening - just as it hasn't intervened in the wars in the Congo, which have been twice as bloody.
However, this is all an argument for making the next year the withdrawal from Iraq year, where the U.S. gives up trying to impose a structure on Iraq and starts encouraging peace talks, say, between the Sadrists and the Sunnis.
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Comments closed June 18, 2007.
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Heads in the Sand
I'd put it this way: a state can leave a residual force in a foreign territory if it is in complete control of the place, the meagerness of the force demonstrating the confidence in the political sources of influence.
But when the political sources of influence are weak or damaged, the residual force is just a target for the people who've made the maintenance of a more-than-residual force impractical. The British tried leaving a residual force in Egypt after most had evacuated, they were continually shot at, including by the Egyptian police, and when they returned fire it caused massive riots.
Posted by otto | June 4, 2007 2:03 PM