Meanwhile, In Kurdistan

One thing our continued presence in Iraq does, of course, is dissuade other regional actors from direct military intervention in Iraq. Except, of course, on days when (as Eric Martin points out), the Iraqi government says "Turkish artillery and warplanes bombarded areas of northern Iraq on Wednesday."

There are at least two shoes that haven't quite dropped yet in Iraq. One is the Kurd-Turk situation, involving both Turkish military action in northern Iraq, and Kurdish guerillas moving back-and-forth across the Turkey-Iraq border. The other is that Iraq's constitution schedules a plebiscite to determine the status of the Kirkuk region (i.e., in Kurdistan or out) and there's little reason to think the losing side will accept the outcome of the vote peacefully.

Photo courtesy of Kurdistan4All.

Comments

Eric Martin's post is pretty dumb. The level of violence across the Kurd-Turk border is actually much lower than it was in the 90s, when the Turks launched several large scale invasions of Kurdistan even though we were actively protecting the Kurds at the time. Indeed tensions are much lower now than they were in the 90s. Eric Martin seems not to understand these things.

Posted by Al | July 19, 2007 10:19 AM

Al,

Although engaging you is a fool's errand, I'm feeling zany today.

Your point is a non-sequitur. My post does not say that the situation right now is worse than the 1990s. Hell, there were periods of even more violence before the 1990s. I also didn't say right now was worse than those periods.

What I said was, the fighting is escalating. Which it is. What I said was, the region is poised to erupt. Which it is. Thus far, we don't appear able to alter this path.

We should not simply ignore these escalations because a decade ago, things were worse.

Although such an attitude could make you an attractive candidate for the Bush national security team. Submit a resume my good man.

Posted by Eric Martin | July 19, 2007 11:35 AM

Embrace the zaniness, Eric. In any case, my point in bring up the 90s is to refute your contention the it is "poised to erupt". It didn't "erupt" in the 90s when the Turks took far, far more aggressive actions inside Kurdistan, and there's no reason to think that we will have any different reaction today. Hell, in the 90s, the Turks invaded Kurdistan with tens of thousands of troops and hundreds of tanks. And, guess what, no "eruption"! Maybe I'd take your contention a bit more seriously if you explained why the far less provacative Turkish actions these days would produce a different reaction.

Posted by Al | July 19, 2007 11:43 AM

This can't be the usual Al. Because that would spoil the usual Al's one hundred percent wrong record.

Wow. In any case, I'm with Al on this one. There's more to the story, too, than the Turkish invasion. There was the little matter of the civil war fought between two sides, the two warlords that now rule "democratic" Kurdistan. A civil war that seems oddly neglected, since the upshot of it seems to be that there are internal forces in Iraq that would drag on and resolve civil conflict. And that was serious civil conflict, since in the few months it took place it took about 6,000 lives. Taking that lesson to heart means that the U.S. withdrawal, which should have started in January and might phase in in September if the Dems hold firm, should look back on that conflict and its resolution as a template for trying to get all Iraqi factions unconditionally to the negotiating table. Plus, of course, the U.S. should stop interfering by threatening partition, or pressing to pass kleptocratic oil bills, or training favored militia. One of the things that can change for the better in Iraq is the removal of that element that has screwed things up there for the past four years - the Americans! And just as the Turkish intervention and withdrawal did not cause an eruption, while the two Kurdish warlords came to an accord, the withdrawal of the Americans won't necessarily lead to any eruption either.

If this is the new Al's new line, this will be welcome evidence that addiction to false beliefs can be overcome over time. Amazing.

Posted by roger | July 19, 2007 12:03 PM

It didn't "erupt" in the 90s when the Turks took far, far more aggressive actions inside Kurdistan, and there's no reason to think that we will have any different reaction today.

Jesus Al, the last time Turkey crossed the border, thousands of people died from those actions, and the resulting/associated destabilizing violence in Turkey and Iraqi Kurdistan that led to the deaths of almost 40,000 people.

I don't know what criteria you're using to define an "eruption" but I sure as hell would use it to describe such massive carnage.

Maybe I'd take your contention a bit more seriously if you explained why the far less provacative Turkish actions these days would produce a different reaction.

Al, the point of my post is that things are escalating. Meaning getting worse as time progresses. Which means that the actions might not stay in the "less provocative" realm for much longer. Regardless, that is a curiously static view of history.

War and armed conflict is not a neat and tidy business that leads to predictable results. Again, though, you're brandishing your Bush administration credentials. Seriously, submit a resume.

[/zaniness]

Posted by Eric Martin | July 19, 2007 12:14 PM

I don't know Roger. The violence in the region occurred in Iraqi Kurdistan and Turkish Kurdistan. Tens of thousands died.

And as I mentioned above, the thought that history is static and predictable, such that the outcome of armed conflicts can be assumed based on prior conflicts is a shaky science.

Posted by Eric Martin | July 19, 2007 12:18 PM

The situation now is more serious than it was in the 1990's. Then, the target of the cross-border incursions wasn't Kurdistan, it was the PKK. In fact, Turkey got cooperation from the PUK and KDP against the PKK.

Now, as Matt alluded to in his post, Turkey faces two threats. First is the PKK, the ostensible target of these movements, which has ramped up its attacks recently. (Two Turkish soldiers were killed yesterday, for instance.) The second threat Turkey feels is from a potentially independent Kurdistan. I have no doubt that if cross-border raids are happening (and this news has yet to be confirmed here in Turkey, as far as I know), they are in part designed to send a strong signal to Talabani/Barzani, especially as regards Kirkuk.

In other words, in the 90's the target was PKK terrorism; now the target is bigger, and thus so is the possiblility for widespread military conflict.

Don't forget Turkey elects a new parliament on Sunday. The outcome of that election will have a pretty big impact on the way this shakes out, I believe.

Posted by Andrew | July 19, 2007 12:55 PM

Eric, we already are in that conflict, one in which hundreds of thousands of Iraqis have died. So the question isn't whether a conflict in Iraq is going to be deadly - the question is, can we learn anything from the recent history of Iraq itself about mitigating conflict. I totally agree with you that the idea that history gives us a bunch of set situations out of which we can allegorize into predictive scenarios is a pseudo-science. But if we add parameters to the set we are using - for instance, the parameter of recent history in the Iraq area - then we have a better data base, surely. Surely a recent conflict in which outside forces - Saddam Hussein and the Turks - withdrew, followed by the winding up and peaceful resolution of the conflict should at least be considered - but you will notice that it is a gap, an absolute blank, in the punditry about Iraq. Rather, scenarios are extrapolated from Rwanda or Sri Lanka. Could it be that the moral of the Kurdish civil war is not one the powers that be in D.C. want to hear?

Posted by roger | July 19, 2007 1:59 PM

Eric, we already are in that conflict, one in which hundreds of thousands of Iraqis have died. So the question isn't whether a conflict in Iraq is going to be deadly - the question is, can we learn anything from the recent history of Iraq itself about mitigating conflict.

I agree 100%. But, what exactly are you getting at here? Are you sure you read my argument correctly?

For example, I never denied that the US is involved in the conflict in Iraq. Nor did I deny that this conflict has already been, and will continue to be deadly. Nor did I deny that history has no lessons on conflict mitigation.

I said that the tensions on the Iraqi Kurdistan/Turkish border are escalating. I said that this conflict could erupt. Andrew provides very cogent analysis on why we could expect this eruption to be worse than the last. But even if it it isn't worse, it would still be bad.

Could it be that the moral of the Kurdish civil war is not one the powers that be in D.C. want to hear?

My argument is that what will happen between the Iraqi Kurds and Turks will happen regardless of our troop presence in Iraq. Specifically, relocating large numbers of troops to Kurdistan would be a big mistake. Aside from our inability to alter the conflict between Turks and Kurds by our presence in Kurdistatn, we would be in an untenable situation in terms of picking sides, and re-supply.

I favor a complete withdrawal of troops, with none left in any part of Iraq - including Kurdistan.

The thought that the conflict between the Kurds and Turks might turn out to be less than feared would be welcomed by me. But that doesn't change my analysis. I wouldn't want to make big plans like troop relocation based on best-case-scenario predictions.

Or am I misinterpreting your point?

Posted by Eric Martin | July 19, 2007 2:21 PM

Eric, I think you are misinterpreting my attitude. I'm not opposing you. I know that comments sections tend to devolve into for and against, like the office of argument in the Monty Python sketch. I am simply trying to extend this argument from the Kurdish case to the scenarios about what happens if the U.S. withdraws from Iraq. The idea that such withdrawal is going to result in a completely terrible outcome has become boilerplate. But if one looks at the recent history of Iraq, the boilerplate story looks less like a sure thing and more like a biased reading of the Iraqi situation.

Oh, and I completely agree with you about not stationing U.S. troops in Northern Iraq. I'd even go further and say that the U.S. troops doing their surging in Baghdad and Anbar and thus spreading the violence to Northern Iraq are causing a lot more damage than any American Media-head wants to admit.

Posted by roger | July 19, 2007 2:38 PM

Ahhh.

I see. Makes more sense now. Pardon the defensiveness, if any.

Posted by Eric Martin | July 19, 2007 2:46 PM