Beinart and Biddle for Leaving

Peter Beinart was just talking about why he came to the view that we need to withdraw from Iraq, essentially without residual forces, and start working on damage control in other parts of the world including a rapprochement with Iran.. His basic argument is very similar to mine and should be familiar to readers, but he mentioned an important source of establishmentarian support for this view, Steven Biddle at the Council on Foreign Relations. Check out, for example, this bit of congressional testimony:

Public support for the President’s surge policy in Iraq is at a very low ebb. Yet many Americans remain reluctant to withdraw from Iraq altogether. The result has been growing interest in a variety of compromise proposals that would reduce US troop levels but stop short of total withdrawal. Are these sound choices for US policy?

The answer is no.

Quite so. I hope the presidential candidates can be made to see this before January 2009. It's depressing to think of the war lasting that long, but even more depressing to imagine it continuing, CNAS-style, for years and years after the election.

Comments

CNAS?

Posted by DrBB | August 3, 2007 12:23 PM

The problem with the "residual force" is that it puts a Democratic President on the hook to protect Big Oil's interests in Iraq.

Because it makes the Democrat responsible for "losing Iraq" if things turn bad in the civil conflicts.

The "residual force" is a tripwire (i.e. any attack on it will be used by Big Oil supporters as justification for another massive intervention ).

If the Democrat tries instead to pull out the residual force, the Republicans will claim that the Democratic President "stood by and let our troops be slaughtered without sending help" or that the Democrat "cut and run --and so lost Iraq.

Posted by Don Williams | August 3, 2007 12:23 PM

Well then, if Wizard Master Strategist Beinart thinks so, all I can say is -- who gives a fuck?

Andrew Bacevich had Beinart's opportunistic and ill-informed bullshit pegged long ago.

Posted by sglover | August 3, 2007 1:03 PM

i've mentioned before that young people like matthew are going to get a real-time education in why certain elements of the student/antiwar movement went crazy in the late '60s.

in the 1968 election, there were two "peace" candidates - nixon ("secret plan to end the war") and humphrey (through a negotiated outcome) - and one war candidate, george wallace, whose vp famously suggested bombing the north vietnamese back to the "stone age."

the "peace candidates" won, what, 85 - 86% of the vote.

by the next presidential election we still had two "peace" candidates, nixon on "peace with honor" and mcgovern favoring withdrawal now. they won roughly 100% of the vote.

and by 1975, we were actually out of vietname.

so a mere 7 years after the vast majority of americans thought they were voting for an end of the war, and a mere 15+ years after our very first troop involvement, we were done.

on that time scale, the iraq war is still in its infancy, and yes, it did make some once-reasonable people completely nuts in the process.

Posted by howard | August 3, 2007 1:05 PM

No way are we leaving entirely. We will maintain at least one of those giant airbases till the oil runs out. plus. Not only to maintain influence in the Gulf but to the north too in the assorted Sans bordering Russia with their own oil wealth and then extending all the way to China and South Asia. The strategic value of an airbase there with land enough to keep vast quantities of stores from tanks to bullets is simply incalculable.

What do I base this on? It's pure deduction. No collection of Joint Chiefs will ever sit still for giving up this beach head in the Gulf. The Pentagon will squawk and the politicians will bend. It will be the one thing they will be able to hold onto as a positive for all the bodies sacrificed.

In fact the bases were one of the objectives of the whole adventure, unstated of course.

Posted by rapier | August 3, 2007 1:27 PM

What do I base this on? It's pure deduction. No collection of Joint Chiefs will ever sit still for giving up this beach head in the Gulf. The Pentagon will squawk and the politicians will bend. It will be the one thing they will be able to hold onto as a positive for all the bodies sacrificed.

Long-term (as in "forever") bases are surely one of the unstated goals of the whole fucked-up adventure, but don't forget that Cam_Rahn_Bay was supposed to be flying the U.S. flag forever, too. Also, it's hard to judge what's in store from the engineering of the bases themselves. American military facilities are always pretty bloated. Just because we piss a billion or so into their construction doesn't mean that we can't write it all off some day.....

Posted by sglover | August 3, 2007 2:36 PM

Col. Patrick Lang, former head of DIA human intelligence for the MidEast, on withdrawal from Iraq:

What will happen in an American withdrawal of forces from Iraq?

- The first question to be asked is whether or not the withdrawal will be under hostile pressure. The two kinds of withdrawal would be radically different.

* A withdrawal conducted under non-hostile conditions would very much resemble the manner in which US forces left the Canal Zone after the return of the territory to Panamanian sovereignty or the withdrawal of coalition forces from Saudi Arabia after the First Gulf War. For this kind of withdrawal to occur a general political settlement would have to have been reached or a complete pacification of the country would have to have been achieved. Under either of those conditions, it could be assumed for planning purposes that there would be no serious indigenous interference with the departure of American forces. This kind of withdrawal would be an exercise in logistical planning in which the force would be taken out in an “administrative” (non-combat) mode. Departure would be arranged on the basis of the most efficient use of transportation as well as its availability. Most units would be returned to their permanent posts across the world without their heavy equipment, (tanks, infantry fighting vehicles, artillery, etc.) because it is more efficient to send the troops home in passenger aircraft and the equipment in separate transportation (sea usually) in the care of drivers. A withdrawal of this kind would take a long time. Large sized logistical capabilities would have to be kept in Iraq until the end of the departure to conduct the shipments. The removal of larger US Forces from Saudi Arabia after the First Gulf War took around a year and a half.

* A withdrawal under combat conditions would be very different and in the light of present political circumstances in Iraq seems more likely. During such a withdrawal there would be continuing combat operations designed to defend the force from enemies that are increasingly emboldened by American withdrawal and the prospect of “settling scores” with sectarian, political and ethnic adversaries. In that kind of departure, the force would have to be withdrawn in “slices” (tranches in French). The withdrawal from VN conducted by the Nixon Administration was of this kind. The phased departures of these “slices” would be designed to gradually “uncover” the regions of the country in a logical order as American forces move away from areas that are more easily abandoned. At the same time, the remaining forces in Iraq would have to retain a balanced combat capability that could continue to carry out force protection defensive actions as well as “spoiling” attacks against detected preparations for assaults against the ever weakening US military presence in the country. Infantry, armor, artillery and particularly aerial forces (both Army and Air Force) would be needed to protect the course of the withdrawal. The routes of withdrawal would have to be outposted and protected to keep them open while the withdrawal takes place. At the same time, the remaining force in Iraq would continue to be re-supplied over the same routes. There would likely be a lot of fighting in the course of the withdrawal. In VN, 20,000 US soldiers were killed during the several years of the withdrawal. This would be a “last chance” for the enemy forces to exact a price for the US presence in Iraq. They would be likely to take that opportunity. The logic of the present logistical situation would point to a withdrawal in phases (tranches) down the existing Main supply Route (MSR) to Kuwait where the forces could be received in prepared camps prior to departure by sea and air. The improved situation in Anbar Governorate might also make possible a smaller withdrawal to the west and into Jordan. A small percentage of the withdrawal would be conducted using air force heavy lift assets. The units withdrawn by air are likely to be air force.

- A “residual” military presence in Iraq is another major issue.

In a withdrawal conducted under administrative conditions, it will be possible to position a “force” of trainers, suppliers, SOF jihadi hunters and force protection people wherever they are needed. The force protection element of this force might be a reinforced heavy brigade. Altogether the benign atmosphere presence might be 20,000.

In a “contested” withdrawal, the existence of these forces will be problematic from the beginning. A “residual” force with less than a reinforced heavy division and appropriate air support as the basis of its security would be a very risky venture over the long run. This force would number something in the area of 35,000 to 40,000 people. The logistical problems involved in supplying this force or any sized force overland would be enormous.

Posted by Flugwug | August 3, 2007 5:54 PM

The idea of leaving a residual force in Iraq is nearly as insane as invading in the first place.

Absolutely no purpose would be served.

Chase down jihadis?

When they've oulived their usefulness Sunnis will kill all of them.

Training?

We've been training for years. Training assumes that there would be in place a solid Iraqi government with the wherewithal to govern. Not a chance.

Residual force = Joke

Posted by cal1942 | August 3, 2007 11:32 PM

I also posted this comment today on the "Residual Debate" thread, but since the CNAS report is taken to task here too, and this is a more recent discussion, I'm re-posting my comments here. The portions that read "Yglesias says" refer to the substantive critique of the CNAS report made at: http://matthewyglesias.theatlantic.com/archives/2007/07/the_residuals_debate.php#more

Yglesias says: Now, CNAS has estimates for the quantity of troops this will entail, but the estimates are completely worthless. The Bush administration, after all was planning back in 2003 to draw down troop levels by 2005, the problem was that at the intersection of their goals and the reality on the ground, they've needed to keep a huge presence on the ground.

CK: First, the CNAS estimates are rooted in extensive consultation with military planners and are driven both by explicitly stated national interests and the required military missions to advance them. Second, the CNAS goals are much more limited than Bush’s goals – they are not utopian ideals for a Jeffersonian democracy on the Tigris that produce open-ended commitments. Third, there is a declared timetable for the removal of all troops, which, if embraced, would be nearly impossible (politically) for the next president to back down from – so, again, the fear of the slippery slope to an open-ended occupation is misplaced. Finally, unlike Bush, there is are contingency plans for a more rapid withdrawal if things get worse (i.e., CNAS’s plans B and C would put in place Yglesias’s preferred option after there is actual evidence that the plan would fail to advance our interests rather than based on a prediction that it will fail).

Yglesias says: What Marshall and CNAS are saying is that "instead of" staying in Iraq until a stable, unified government emerges, we should stay until we're sure leaving won't result in genocide, won't leave a safe haven for al-Qaeda, and won't prompt a regional war. One problem, though, is that there's no way to be sure that civil strife in Iraq won't degenerate into genocide or suck the other regional powers in unless the civil strife comes to an end. The war aims, in short, remain to stay in Iraq until a stable, unified government emerges. Which is to say that the centrist alternative to Bush's Iraq policy is . . . Bush's Iraq policy except they'll intone the words "withdraw combat troops" and instead leave behind only forces for "training" (which to be done properly requires the trainers to embed with Iraqi combat units), "counter-terrorism" (i.e., combat), and "force protection" (i.e., combat).

CK: See above – The CNAS troop levels were carefully arrived at and there is a timetable for a complete withdrawal, so the commitment is not open-ended. Moreover, and this is really important, stretching the withdrawal out over several years and embedding with Iraqi forces at the national and local level during this transition, as the CNAS proposal recommends, dramatically increases the chances that the current evolution of Iraq toward a highly decentralized state will result in a more stable, less violent equilibrium. If communities have self-separated (which they are doing and will continue to do) and are convinced they can defend themselves against their enemies at the local level, yet remain too weak to take over the whole country, this may generate a Bosnia-style equilibrium at a level of violence far below what we see today. This will take careful calibration -- but such calibration is impossible if we are not present with leverage and influence on all sides. The CNAS report persausively demonstrates that this is the best of our bad options to advance enduring U.S. national interests and our moral obligations in Iraq.

Yglesias says: Except I don't think centrists really mean this. The trouble is that they're engaging in wishful thinking. If you're a member of the Democratic Party counter-elite -- the way these CNAS people and various Brookings and CSIS people are -- it's naturally tempting to believe that replacing the current GOP policy elite with, well, you is going to have magical impacts on the situation. Realistically, though, their plans are unlikely to work and they'll just be left with the same choice we're facing today -- indefinite involvement in a civil conflict that may or may not end and that our presence is probably fueling, or else leaving.

CK: This conclusion is only correct if one assess U.S. interests and obligations in Iraq as low (in which case it is not worth trying an alternative to withdrawal at lower troop levels regardless of the prospects for success) or if one assesses the probability of advancing these interests as very low no matter what we do (so that it is not worth trying even if our interest in the outcome is high). Both types of claims require arguments and evidence, rather than mere assertions such as "their plans are unlikely to work." After all, it was claims rooted in poor evidence that convinced so many to support the war to begin with. If, however, the stakes are high and the prospects for advancing these interests COMPARED TO THE PROBABILITIES ASSOCIATED WITH OTHER AVAILABLE OPTIONS are reasonable, as the CNAS report demonstrates, then this "centrist" alternative is the best we have.

Yglesias says: Now, as it happens, of the three "no"s, one of them -- no al-Qaeda haven -- is genuinely vital to American interests. The good is that there's no al-Qaeda safe haven in Iraq right now, many Sunni Arabs who live in the main AQI area of operations are taking up arms against AQI, none of the Shiite factions are friendly toward AQI, and none of Iraq's neighbors are well-disposed toward AQI. That's a fundamentally favorable dynamic, and means we should be able to make the "no safe havens" point a priority without keeping US forces on the ground in Iraq. We will continue to have the capability of putting special forces on the ground in Western Iraq or dropping bombs or firing cruise missiles (this isn't a specific policy initiative -- it's just that our military is capable of doing that stuff) and we need to make it clear to Iraqis that if a safe haven emerges, we'll do it. We can also probably be helpful to people who are fighting AQI in terms of certain kinds of intelligence, and even weapons or money if there's a good reason to think that's necessary.

CK: First, this represents a fundamental misunderstanding of the dynamics driving the tribes and some “nationalist” insurgent groups into cooperative relations with U.S. forces, and a fundamental misunderstanding of the enemy-of-my-enemy logic that drives alliances during civil wars in general. The wedge between the tribes and al Qaeda is the result of long-standing engagement efforts by the U.S. military and, most importantly, significant missteps by al Qaeda (not, as the administration claims, the result of surge). Enemy-of-my-enemy logic is the driving dynamic. The Sunni tribes increasing see al Qaeda as the number one near-term threat (in large part because the Shia are being restrained by the U.S.); the sheiks fear that al Qaeda and its self-declared “Islamic State in Iraq” is consolidating too much political and economic power, and they are no longer willing to tolerate the jihadists’ brutal efforts at intimidation. After al Qaeda, however, the Sunni tribes view the Shia-dominated government and Iran as the greatest medium- and long-term threats. In the current environment working with the U.S. helps destroy al Qaeda and provides a check against threats from the Shia and Iran. However, if the United States abandons the Sunnis altogether before they are capable of providing local security, we risk pushing the tribes back to al Qaeda through the same enemy-is-my-enemy logic. They will judge, perhaps reasonably, that making common cause with al Qaeda again is needed to battle the Shia and their Iranian patrons.

Second, at the same time, as Sunni-Shia violence escalates, al Qaeda recruitment is likely to go up. Significant evidence suggests the foreign fighters are now entering Iraq to fight the “dual occupiers” (the U.S. and the Shia/Iran), and that the latter threat (Shia/Iran) is seen as the bigger one. A total withdrawal without providing Sunni groups any assurances of greater local security will likely magnify incentives to enter Iraq to fight the Shia. Together, these dynamics suggest that Yglesias cannot accomplish what he admits is a core national interest via a total and immediate withdrawal. The better alternative is to use a robust residual force to maintain and solidify the momentum toward bottom-up security and a less violent equilibrium in a highly decentralized Iraq.

Third, abandoning the Sunnis to the Shia in Iraq also risks inflaming regional opinion in Sunni majority countries and expanding external involvement in Iraq’s civil war by encouraging “moderate” Arab states like Saudi Arabia and Jordan to ratchet up their support to Sunni insurgents. They too may become more tolerant of indirect support to salafist jihadis affiliated with al Qaeda (as they were during the 1980s in Afghanistan) to combat growing Iranian influence.

Finally, the notion that al Qaeda in Iraq can be destroyed, especially in the context described above, with only small numbers of special forces and air power is unrealistic. This is not working in Afghanistan, where Democrats rightly call for increasing U.S. forces on the ground to compensate for this shortfall. Moreover, the trick to targeting al Qaeda in Iraq is quality intelligence, which is only possible if we maintain good relations with Sunni tribal groups and others on the ground.

Yglesias says: On the second "no," preventing a regional war isn't genuinely crucial to American security interests. A wider war would, however, be bad and we should do what we can to stop it. This can happen on two levels.

One way to stop it is, of course, to police the sectarian conflicts in Iraq and try to prevent them from becoming sufficiently severe that other powers intervene. This is, however, at odds with Marshall's view that his plan will "get U.S. troops out of the business of mediating Iraq’s sectarian conflicts and focus those who remain on protecting essential American security interests." The problem is that the main method by which the US military can prevent foreign involvement in Iraq is precisely by mediating the conflict. But, of course, we're not succeeding at mediating it. Nor are we succeeding in in preventing foreign involvement -- both Turkey and Iran have been increasing their activities in Iraq.

CK: This represents some pretty significant confusion over the nature of the proposed CNAS mission. Yglesias is correct that the major trigger for regional war is a dramatic escalation of sectarian strife, but he is wrong on the inability to avoid this trigger with a smaller force. First, the CNAS proposal would phase the U.S. out of population security, which would instead be conducted by national and local security forces, but in homogenous areas, like Anbar, this would not increase sectarian tensions – and, as self-separation inevitably continues across Iraq, this becomes true elsewhere.

Second, in mixed areas, the presence of American advisors (which would be significantly increased under the CNAS plan to allow greater force protection and better monitoring at the Company-level of Iraqi operations and below), is likely to have an important impact. Substantial anecdotal evidence suggests that Iraqi Security Forces behave much more responsibly in the presence of American advisors.

Third, a residual force committed to intervene to stop preparations for genocide – which would be large organized effort that could be detectable if the U.S. maintains and advisory presence within the ISF, MoD, and MoI – could limit the risks that a major attempt by a group associated with the Iraqi government would engage in genocidal violence deep within predominantly Sunni areas, the most likely trigger for regional intervention by Sunni states.

Finally a residual presence serves some deterrence function against both the Turks and the Iranians, and lowers the incentives for the Kurds to declare independence (triggering Turkish intervention) and for the Shia government to seek Iranian assistance in the wake of total abandonment.

Yglesias says: The only course that's left to us is diplomacy -- to try to do what we can to get Turkey, Iran, Saudi Arabia, and whoever else (Israel? Syria?) that their interests are best served by everybody staying out of Iraq. I have no idea whether or not that will work (it sounds, frankly, like a good job for Special Envoy Bill Richardson after he doesn't get on the national ticket) but the only other thing to do is precisely to mediate sectarian conflicts.

CK: Diplomacy is necessary and consistently undervalued by the Bush administration, but it may not be sufficient, especially if the U.S. is seen by Sunni Arab states as abandoning their brethren or seen by the Iranians and Turks as producing a power vacuum they can exploit. It is not at all clear, as Yglesias suggests, that most of Iraq’s neighbors have a clear interest in “staying out of Iraq.” Indeed, in the near-term following a U.S. withdrawal, the incentives become more involved in the Iraqi conflict to affect the dynamics there, which are perceived as having a profound impact on the geopolitical balance in the region and potential ripple effects for the internal dynamics of minority groups in almost all the surrounding countries, will likely increase. The CNAS report recommends aggressive diplomacy, but recognizes that it is a necessary but not wholly sufficient part of a strategy aimed at limiting regional war.

Yglesias says: With genocide, the case gets even clearer. It doesn't make sense to say that we'll have 60,000 troops wandering around Iraq in the middle of a sectarian conflict that we're not mediating telling people "remember, kids, no genocide!" If a genocide breaks out, and foreign troops go in to stop it, those troops will need to mediate the sectarian conflict. And, again, the only meaningful way to ensure that genocide doesn't take place would be to mediate the sectarian conflict. The risk of genocide and the sectarian conflict aren't two different things.

CK: I addressed most of this above. However, it is worth repeating that actual genocide does not “just happen” – it is planned and organized. The ability of the Iraqi government or affiliated militias to carry out actual genocide in predominantly Sunni parts of Iraq (as opposed to low level sectarian cleansing of mixed neighborhoods in Baghdad, Diyala, etc.) would both be detectable and potentially preventable if U.S. forces were present and embedded with ISF units, and therefore capable of monitoring them.

Second, the CNAS report calls for the development of explicit metrics on human rights performance and sectarian loyalties within the ISF, and calls on assistance to both national and local forces to be made conditional on avoiding this type of violence. Since both national and local forces desire and need U.S. support (training, logistics, air, etc.), this potentially provides substantial leverage.

Third, by assisting local security forces and furthering accommodation from the bottom-up, the balance of forces and interests are tipped against genocide.

Yglesias says: It's worth saying that the specter of genocide here is purely hypothetical. There's every reason to think that in the six months after we leave Iraq, a lot of people will die, but a lot of people have died in the past six months. There's no particular reason to believe that there's some incipient genocide over and above the current levels of violence.

CK: Perhaps. Let’s hope this is true. But, remember, in Rwanda in 1994, 800,000 people (out of a total population of 7 million) were killed in 100 days with machetes. Iraq is a country of 25 million people where every household has an automatic weapon. People who think things can’t get worse, reveal their ignorance of how bad things were in Rwanda, Bosnia, etc. on a per capita basis compared to Iraq. A rapid and total withdrawal in Iraq will likely increase the violence, perhaps substantially. This may not be reason enough for the U.S. to stay, but we shouldn’t try to wish away the possibility by saying “how can things possibly get worse?” just to make us feel better about leaving. We are chiefly responsible for creating the security situation that has imperiled hundreds of thousands of innocent Iraqis. Leaving won’t solve that problem. People who were opposed to the war at the outset (as I was) should not pretend that a total U.S. withdrawal will “end the war” – it won’t. It will simply change our participation in the war. For the Iraqis, the war will rage on, and probably get worse . . . and we will have some moral responsibility for that too if we don’t exit Iraq with more thought than we entered.

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