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Putting Humpty-Dumpty Together Again

24 Aug 2007 01:21 pm

Brian Beutler asks:

Here's a question that goes out to basically everybody--from liberals who think that the United States can't possibly create political reconciliation in Iraq to conservatives who think Maliki (and Iran and Democrats) are standing in the way. Is political reconciliation really enough?

I'm pessimistic. In Ending Civil Wars Stephen Stedman, Donald Rothchild, and Elizabeth Cousens conclude that "Three factors are most commonly associated with a difficult environment" in stabilizing a country in the wake of a political agreement to end a civil war. Those are "Spoilers -- leaders or factions hostile to a peace agreement and willing to use violence to undermine it; neighboring states that are hostile to the agreement; and spoils -- valuable, easily tradable commodities."

Internally, I see a high likelihood of spoiling. Even if you had a political accord uniting the two major Kurdish parties, the Sadrist, Dawa, SCIRI, and a sufficient number of Sunnis, the sheer quantity of factions would be a problem. If one Shiite faction felt others were ascending at its expense, it would have an incentive to deploy Shiite maximalism to undercut its rivals' positions. Similarly if one Kurdish party saw the other gaining the upper hand. Nobody even knows what the deal is with the Sunnis.

Similarly, on the international front while it's certainly possible that pro-Western Arabs, Syria, Iran, Turkey, and Israel would all loyally support a reconciliation accord it would require a substantial change in the regional diplomatic situation. At the moment, it seems inevitable that somebody would see events evolving in an unfavorable direction and seek to disrupt the accords. Last, Iraq is one of the most spoils-having countries on the planet. 20th century Iraqi history is chock-a-block with coups and attempted coups simply because a successful coup can make you very rich.

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Comments (9)

Also, the Iraqi state has no functioning institutions to enforce any reconciliation agreement. In such a situation, any reconciliation agreement would be nothing but a piece of paper signed by some folks in the Green Zone... it probably wouldn't mean much.

Donald Rothchild

Yay, Professor Rothchild! He taught my "Ethnic Conflicts" class at UC Davis. Great guy, wonderful teacher. I've still got my copy of "Managing Ethnic Conflict in Africa." He died this past January.

I think one thing that needs to be said is that there are really two goals for Iraq that are often conflated into one: first, establishing a secure, functioning state; second, establishing a free and meaningful democracy. There were a lot of bad assumptions made by the neocons about this-- that number one would lead to the second, or worse, that number one amounted to the second-- but we haven't really had to engage that question because we've never had the functioning state in the first place. Democracy, or meaningful democracy, anyway, can't just happen anywhere. There has to be a fundamental social, economic and governmental infrastructure that makes the democratic apparatus possible. The world is littered with countries, from South America to East Asia to Africa and elsewhere, that have the trappings of democracy, but no actual democracy taking place.

Sadly, I think that whenever this country becomes functional again (which may take decades), it's likely to do so in the form of a strong man regime run by a dictator or oligarchy. That's the way it's worked in many other countries in the past, after all.

Also, the Iraqi state has no functioning institutions to enforce any reconciliation agreement.

But if there were, magically, a reconciliation agreement, the US military is currently available to enforce the established order against the remaining holdouts. The problem is that we can't wait forever for a reconciliation to occur.

Compare the current situation in Iraq with the horrifying civil war in Sri Lanka. The blood bath in Sri Lanka has been going on -- give or take a few years while the parties licked their respective wounds -- 20 years. At not too fine a level, the political situations in the two countries aren't very similar, but just as potentially intractable horror shows, Iraq, due to its big bonus prize of oil, could keep the bad blood simmering until well past Peak Oil. President Not Jenna Bush, with the proper corrupt rhetoric, could keep hostilities going indefinitely.


I'd point out in re: regional players under-cutting a reconciliation, what incentive does Iran have to a stable Iraq? They have enormous influence with the ruling Shiite factions, and in order to reach political reconciliation, the Shiites will have to cede some of that power and share it with the Sunnis.

I fail to see how Iran could ever see empowering Sunnis and disempowering Shiites, even minorly so, as to their advantage in Iraq. No? Am I missing something here? If so, someone enlighten me.

Steve -

In theory, using the US military to "enforce the established order against the remaining holdouts" might sound like fine strategy.

In practice, it's a good way to get folks in your tenuous coalition to turn against you, for fear that you're a tool of an outside occupier trying to setup a puppet state.

Even if there were a magical reconciliation agreement, you'd have to hope for a magical change to human behavior to get the plan to work using the US military as your enforcement tool. You really would need a strong native security force to stand against the dissenters.

"Compare the current situation in Iraq with the horrifying civil war in Sri Lanka. The blood bath in Sri Lanka has been going on -- give or take a few years while the parties licked their respective wounds -- 20 years. At not too fine a level, the political situations in the two countries aren't very similar, but just as potentially intractable horror shows, Iraq, due to its big bonus prize of oil, could keep the bad blood simmering until well past Peak Oil. President Not Jenna Bush, with the proper corrupt rhetoric, could keep hostilities going indefinitely."

Ironically, the only time that there was real cooperation between the Tamil Tigers and the government was during the 1980's occupation by the Indian Peace-Keeping Force. The IPKF, nicknamed the Innocent People-Killing Force, became so brutal and raped so many innocent women that the very Sri Lankan government that had agreed to have the IPKF in Sri Lanka ended up covertly arming the Tamil Tigers to fight against the IPKF. This does not bode well us for in Iraq. David Brooks, of all people, said a few years ago that national reconciliation and the national myth of a unified Iraqi people would likely grow out of any unified attempt to throw us out of Iraq. Seems like he forgot about that. In fact, it is the most likely way that the different factions in Iraq will ever end up working together.

I'd say the question is posed too narrowly. The question should be: can Iraq's various states assume enough economic power to significantly diminish unemployment, start repair of the infrastructure, and lure back some of the professional class, now fled? This is not only about the central government, but the often opposing provincial governments, which are themselves often controlled by minorities - as is the case in Ninevah province, for instance. Iraq will never "work" unless we look beyond the rather easy notion that Saddam Hussein held the place together by way of terror and start looking at how he and his predecessors created a system in which an oppressed Shi'ite minority nevertheless felt invested in Iraq. The answer to that is pretty simple, since the Ba'athists used institutions and methods common throughout the Middle East - which comes down to a heavy state sector controlling much of the economic life of the nation. In a rich, primary product exporting country, this can work, although it is by no means optimal. Unfortunately, the American project is to stubbornly impose another system upon Iraq, replacing a system that offends the Americans. I am skeptical the American viewpoint will ever change, but one can fantasize that the Americans actually do let the Iraqis start restoring those things that worked about the previous system - in effect, recreating a patronage state. That would, I think, give factions an incentive to invest in that system - as long as they controlled their local share of it. This to my mind is the framework that could bring about negotiation in Iraq, which begins by getting the militias to self-police. If militias could purge the criminals in their midst, it would be a huge step towards violence mitigation.


Comments closed September 07, 2007.

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