In narrow military terms, the US had the capacity in 1972 to prevent South Vietnamese collapse, and in some sense the South Vietnamese position was stronger than it had been during parts of the 1960s. But these facts are almost irrelevant to the conclusion of the war; the North Vietnamese weren't going to give up, and knew that they could force the US to pay a higher price than it was willing to by continuing the fighting. Everyone on all sides of the conflict understood these basic points, and only someone who utterly refuses to acknowledge the political dimension of military conflict could misunderstand the situation as badly as Rodman.
I concur. I should add that I was taught this material by Stephen Peter Rosen who's something of a frothing right-winger. US military support for the Saigon regime had a fundamentally paradoxical quality to it. South Vietnamese forces had access to better equipment and training than did North Vietnamese forces, but they performed much worse than the North Vietnamese because their government lacked legitimacy. It lacked legitimacy because it was seen as a kind of corrupt quisling regime, a creature of French and then American imperialism. Massive external military support staved off military defeat, but made it completely impossible for Saigon to constitute itself as a politically legitimate alternative to unification under a nationalist regime in Hanoi.


Matt, I think you are mixing up your analysis here. The illegitimacy of the south Vietnamese regime was of great importance during the counter-insurgency phase of the war against the Viet-cong because this illegitimacy sustained the logistical and intelligence needs of the opposition. During this time the superior equipment and training of ARVN and other south Vietnamese forces was moot, because they were trained and equipped to fight a different kind of war. But there is a reason that everyone refers to Tet as a military defeat for the VC--in 1968 they got wiped out by American artillery. After 1968, the COIN part of the war was much smaller, and America arguably got better at it. By 1972, the VC had been more or less rolled up, and the war had become highly conventionalized. At this point, the superior arms and training of the South Vietnamese mattered more, and the legitimacy of the regime a lot less. There really is a case to be made that the withdraw of American air support ended an otherwise sustainable situation. Now, whether the Southern regime was worth sustaining, and whether the region as a whole mattered at all, are different questions. But in order to fight the right on this issue, don't confuse your trump card, which is the impossibility of political reconciliation, with situations of conventional war, which is the kind of problem America is pretty good at solving.
Posted by brendan green | August 24, 2007 3:45 PM