Counterinsurgency Skepticism

We seem to be witnessing a bit of a harmonic convergence of counterinsurgency skepticism as Andrew links to Edward Luttwak's skeptical take in the February Harper's and Josh Marshall asks the ever-salient question: "At the risk of asking a really silly question, can we list off the successful counterinsurgency operations in history?"

And, indeed, it turns out that there are really, really few. What's more, those that do exist mostly seem to have lacked the counterinsurgent-as-foreigner dynamic that would be involved in essentially any US counterinsurgency campaign. I would recommend Jeffrey Record's book for even more counterinsurgency skepticism.

Comments

Take it one step further: how about a counterinsurgency that doesn't actually have a functioning government to be protecting/supporting? How about a counterinsurgency that is at least ostensibly imposing democracy, not an imperialist proxy?

Posted by Freddie | September 18, 2007 11:53 AM

This has been the argument of folks like Lt. Gen Robert Gard and John Johns from the beginning...the United States has never "won" a counterinsurgency. Period. There may be cases in which we've had some success but bottom line, success over the long term is impossible without...wait for it...a political solution.

Posted by mdub12 | September 18, 2007 11:56 AM

We got rid of those dozen communists in Grenada.

That was pretty sweet.

Posted by Jeffrey Davis | September 18, 2007 12:03 PM

The current tactics in Baghdad seem to involve
walling off each neighborhood behind concrete blast
walls, with few heavily guarded exit points.
That might appear to make sense as a military
measure: but surely it stifles economic activity
and destroys any common cultural identity. Can
a city like Baghdad survive such treatment ?
"We had to destroy the city in order to save it"
seems to be the idea, even if 35 years of progress
in counter-insurgency theory has led us to kill
the city by strangulation rather than raw firepower.

But in general, you're right: counter-insurgency
is long, dirty, and doesn't work very well,
especially when managed by foreigners. On the
bright side, I'd like to observe that insurgency
also doesn't work very well - guerrilla/terrorist/
partisan operations can make an occupier bleed,
but rarely achieve their specific political
goals. It's usually a stalemate.

Posted by Richard Cownie | September 18, 2007 12:06 PM

Re Edward Luttwak

Is this the same Edward Luttwak who once wrote that Saudi Arabia could produce 18 million barrels of oil per day?

Posted by SLC | September 18, 2007 12:09 PM

At the risk of asking a really silly question, can we list off the successful counterinsurgency operations in history?"
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1. Boer War
2. Philippine Insurrection
3. British suppression of Iraqi insurrection in 1920s
4. British suppression of Iraqi insurrection during WW II
5. US intervention in Nicaragua 1920s
6. Rif War
7. Ukranian revolt against Soviets 1945-46
8. Huk rebellion in Philippines
9. Tibetan revolt against China 1950s
10. Mau Mau Rebellion in Kenya
11. Malayan Insurgency
12. Hungarian Revolt

Posted by Campesino | September 18, 2007 12:18 PM

13. Katangan Separatist revolt in Congo 1960s
14. Nigerian suppression of Biafran separatist movement 1960s

Posted by Campesino | September 18, 2007 12:24 PM

Let me be the first one to mention the classic neocon legend of the Philippines, just to get it out of the way before the nuts show up.

Of course, there are any number of reasons why this is a terrible analogy to the type of counterinsurgency we're facing in Iraq, not the least of which being that we were slaughtering lightly armed guerrillas on remote islands.

But it's their one historical precedent, and they're very proud of it.

Posted by LaFollette Progressive | September 18, 2007 12:25 PM

Campesino's list was right, but I would restrict things to "since WWII", since I think there was a fundamental shift in imperial/native relations then, due to both politics and the spread of modern weaponry. (Although the Boer War is more "modern" in the sense that the Boer locals had European levels of armament and organization). But anyway, post-WWII is when you really see the increasing success of native nationalist movements.

Note too the British left Kenya and Malaysia, although I think you can also chalk those up as semi-successful counterinsurgencies if you want.

Finally, I think it's pretty clear that if you're willing to roll out near-genocidal levels of violence you can defeat an insurgency. This is relevant to Russia in Ukraine, perhaps China in Tibet (?), and even the British in Kenya (see "Imperial Reckoning").

Posted by mq | September 18, 2007 12:36 PM

15. Vietnamese suppression of Khmer Rouge
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This meme of "there have been no successful counterinsurgencies" is pernicious. It's absolutely NOT true. Actually I just limited myself to 20th century. There are lots more if you go further back.
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Campesino's list was right, but I would restrict things to "since WWII"
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Every time I trot out this list people start wanting to restrict it in time so they can get the result they want. Note that 9 of 15 I have listed are post WW II.

Posted by Campesino | September 18, 2007 12:51 PM

Whether or not we want to see an Iraqi government based on the rule of law or one based on strongman rule brings up the question of how much violence is needed. The British suppression of the Mau Mau insurgency was brutal, with some people arguing it may constitute genocide, and thus helped to cement a long line of strongman rule in Kenyan politics once the British left. Non-Kikuyu (wow, that's in my crappy Firefox spell checker) in Kenya often refer to Kenyotto, for example, as The Butcher. Even then, the possibility of what happened in Rwanda - where the military unleashed massive and rapid amounts of anti-Tutsi genocidal force and still lost and had to escape to the former Zaire - can still occur when following the gloves-off genocidal approach to counterinsurgency. This means it's generally the smart and moral thing to do to try to not get into counterinsurgency campaigns when possible unless you are going to have local support of the general population.

Posted by Reality Man | September 18, 2007 12:54 PM

Alas, it seems that I wasn't quick enough. The nuts beat me to the punch.

Let's take a look at Campesino's list, shall we?

1. Boer War
Ah, yes. The classic example of how an imperial conqueror can quell a rebellion by herding women and children into concentration camps and then slaughtering the menfolk. Gosh, if only the President had named this "Operation Iraqi Terror" instead of "Operation Iraqi Freedom" that might still be an option.

2. Philippine Insurrection
If only we could put all the insurgents on islands in the South Pacific and give them all typhus!

3. British suppression of Iraqi insurrection in 1920s
Oddly enough, the Brits cut and ran from that one. Local strongman did the dirty work.

4. British suppression of Iraqi insurrection during WW II
Oddly enough, that was a conventional war, not a counterinsurgency.

5. US intervention in Nicaragua 1920s
"After the US Marines withdrew from Nicaragua in January 1933, Sandino and the newly-elected Sacasa government reached an agreement by which he would cease his guerrilla activities in return for amnesty, a grant of land for an agricultural colony, and retention of an armed band of 100 men for a year." -- Link

6. Rif War
More of a conventional war than a true insurgency. You should also google "Chemical weapons in the Rif War." Maybe if the US used some WMDs in Baghdad, it might help advance our goal of building a stable democracy.

7. Ukranian revolt against Soviets 1945-46
Starve 'em out! Old Joe Stalin-- master of democratic nation building. We could all learn a few lessons from him. I notice, though, that you didn't mention either of the Warsaw Uprisings in your list of successful counterinsurgencies. If Stalin's a kosher role model in your book, why not the Big Guy himself?

8. Huk rebellion in Philippines
This was a local revolt, put down locally. And it never really went away until after communism did.

9. Tibetan revolt against China 1950s
If Petraeus were commanding a totalitarian war machine against Buddhist monks, his job would be a tad easier.

10. Mau Mau Rebellion in Kenya
I've noticed that Kenya isn't part of the British Empire anymore. I wonder why that is?

11. Malayan Insurgency
Josh Marshall addressed that one rather well, I thought.

12. Hungarian Revolt
Are you actually listing the day the tanks rolled into Budapest in 1956 as a "successful counterinsurgency?" Exactly how much intellectual dishonesty are you capable of mustering?

13 and 14... Post-colonial African civil wars? Is that the best you can do?

Posted by LaFollette Progressive | September 18, 2007 12:58 PM

16. East German Revolt 1953

Posted by Campesino | September 18, 2007 1:07 PM

LOL! As they say. Great post, LaFollette. You should add Nazi success against the French resistance too.

Look, I think LaFollette and Campesino are both right. You can defeat an insurgency with enough violence and destruction, or else by allying with native forces that are hostile enough to the insurgents, if such forces exist. But the questions are A) are you morally prepared to do that, and B) what kind of polity are you left with afterwards.

Bottom line, "counterinsurgency" can never be treated as a question of military tactics, it's a political question of goals and whether available tactics can get you to those goals. The conquest of North America by European settlers counts as successful counterinsurgency too if your goal is simply to take land from native populations.

I think it's safe to say that the history of counterinsurgency shows that it is highly unlikely that we can use the military to create a peaceful, free, democratic Iraq whose government willingly allies with U.S policy goals, allows bases, etc.

Posted by mq | September 18, 2007 1:07 PM

15. Vietnamese suppression of Khmer Rouge

The Khmer Rouge are still around.

Posted by mq | September 18, 2007 1:08 PM

Campesino, your's is a fair list - but Luttwack makes the point that horrific levels of force will win a countersurgency, in the sense of restoring full control day-to-day control to the insurgents.

Your list only has two examples of liberal democracies winning a counterinsurgency (GB in Malaya and Kenya) and both are tricky examples in the sense that by the time both ended the British were on their way out. Also, the Malayan insurgency had a very narrow base, and the Mau Mau achieved many of their original political demands regarding improved rights and representation. So the statement should perhaps be 'non-utterly brutal counterinsurgency has a poor record of success since WWII'.

Posted by Athlon | September 18, 2007 1:10 PM

Oops. Lutwack of course actually says that horrific use of force can restore control to counterinsurgents

Posted by Athlon | September 18, 2007 1:13 PM

Yeah, Campesino, check out the final section of Luttwak's article, with the nice title of "THE EASY AND RELIABLE WAY OF DEFEATING ALL INSURGENCIES EVERYWHERE". Most of your example used that method, which as Athlon points out is problematic.

Posted by mq | September 18, 2007 1:14 PM

Not such a good post, given it leads, logically, to the Bush solution.

"What's more, those that do exist mostly seem to have lacked the counterinsurgent-as-foreigner dynamic."

So, logically, we would want the Iraqis to take over the counterinsurgency? Which is exactly what we're trying to do?

Interestingly enough, if you follow the Link to the recommended book, you find that Jeffrey Record doesn't agree with MY...

"Jeffrey Record reviews eleven insurgent wars from 1775 to the present and determines why the seemingly weaker side won. He concludes that external assistance correlates more consistently with insurgent success than any other explanation."

Hmmm, it appears the solution according to Record would be to go after the Iranians.

So which is it? To win we've either got to support the Bush/Petraeus strategy (according to MY), or go after the Iranians (according to Record)? Is that really where you were going with this post?

Sk

Posted by Sk | September 18, 2007 1:15 PM

So, logically, we would want the Iraqis to take over the counterinsurgency? Which is exactly what we're trying to do?

So long as you're occupying a country, natives who "take over" your counterinsurgency are seen as puppets and collaborators.

"Foreign assistance" is a shibboleth that gets hauled out every time an occupier can't handle the natives. The people love me, but those nasty foreigners are egging them on!

Posted by mq | September 18, 2007 1:19 PM

5. US intervention in Nicaragua 1920s
"After the US Marines withdrew from Nicaragua in January 1933, Sandino and the newly-elected Sacasa government reached an agreement by which he would cease his guerrilla activities in return for amnesty, a grant of land for an agricultural colony, and retention of an armed band of 100 men for a year." -- Link

*************************************************

"However, Sandino, who regarded the National Guard as unconstitutional because of its ties to the United States military, insisted on the guard's dissolution. His attitude made him very unpopular with Somoza Garcia and his guards. Without consulting the president, Somoza Garcia gave orders for Sandino's assassination, hoping that this action would help him win the loyalty of senior guard officers. On February 21, 1934, while leaving the presidential palace after a dinner with President Sacasa, Sandino and two of his generals were arrested by National Guard officers acting under Somoza García's instructions. They were then taken to the airfield, executed, and buried in unmarked graves. Despite Sacasa's strong disapproval of Somoza García's action, the Nicaraguan president was too weak to contain the National Guard director. After Sandino's execution, the National Guard launched a ruthless campaign against Sandino's supporters. In less than a month, Sandino's army was totally destroyed."
*************************************************
Somoza was American educated and the National Guard was trained by USMC before mostly withdrawing. Sound familiar?

Posted by Campesino | September 18, 2007 1:19 PM

15. Vietnamese suppression of Khmer Rouge

The Khmer Rouge are still around.

Posted by mq | September 18, 2007 1:08 PM

*************************************************That's news

After a decade of inconclusive conflict, all Cambodian political factions signed a treaty in 1991 calling for elections and disarmament. In 1992, however, the Khmer Rouge resumed fighting, and, in the following year, rejected the election results. There was a mass defection in 1996, when around half the remaining soldiers (about 4,000) left. Factional fighting in 1997 led to Pol Pot's trial and imprisonment by the Khmer Rouge. Pol Pot died in April 1998. Khieu Samphan surrendered in December. On December 29, 1998, the remaining leaders of the Khmer Rouge apologised for the 1970s genocide. By 1999, most members had surrendered or been captured. In December 1999, Ta Mok and the remaining leaders surrendered, and the Khmer Rouge effectively ceased to exist. Most of the surviving Khmer Rouge leaders live in the Pailin area or are hidden in Phnom Penh.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Khmer_Rouge

Posted by Campesino | September 18, 2007 1:26 PM

Alas, it seems that I wasn't quick enough. The nuts beat me to the punch.

Let's take a look at Campesino's list, shall we?

*************************************************

I love this!! Every time I see one of these silly assertions that there are hardly any examples of successful counterinsurgencies and I produce a list everybody starts trying to finess it because they can't refute it.

"You can only count after WW II"
"That doesn't count because the (Soviets, British, Chinese etc) were BRUTAL"
"That doesn't count because it was in Africa"

And for the record I'm not saying that I'm in favor of using brutal methods or poison gas or concentration camps. I'm just asserting that it is historically inaccurate to say that insurrections usually win.

Posted by Campesino | September 18, 2007 1:36 PM

Oh, OK, 22 years after the Vietnamese invasion the Khmer Rouge ceased to exist because their leaders died of old age. The hinterlands of Cambodia are still pretty much lawless. Successful "counterinsurgency" there all right.

But anyway, Campesino, I agree with you on saying it's definitely historically inaccurate that insurrections always win ("usually" is too vague to do much good here), but I don't think that has much real relevance for Iraq. Again, I recommend Luttwak's article.

Posted by mq | September 18, 2007 1:42 PM

"That doesn't count because it was in Africa"

I never said that. Your African examples fail because they were civil wars with minimal outside involvement.

Insofar as your argument boils down to "There are too examples of successful counterinsurgencies!" then you are correct.

Your list, however, contains many items that weren't successful counterinsurgency campaigns at all. It also contains precisely zero examples of a successful strategy similar to the one being employed by the Bush Administration.

The reason why people keep criticizing the relevance of your examples is not because we're trying to "refute" the existence of successful counterinsurgencies, but because we're trying to force you to confront the fact that successful counterinsurgencies tend to involve concentration camps, poison gas, mass murder, and genocide. (Or worse still, appeasement!)

But really, by all means, keep digging.

Posted by LaFollette Progressive | September 18, 2007 2:28 PM

3. British suppression of Iraqi insurrection in 1920s
Oddly enough, the Brits cut and ran from that one. Local strongman did the dirty work.
*************************************************
Really?

1920

In the post-war carve up of the spoils of conquest between the victorious imperialist powers, Britain gets Iraq (as well as Palestine), France gets Syria and Lebanon. The borders of the new state of Iraq are set by the great powers, setting the scene for a century of border conflicts (e.g the Iran/Iraq war).

The British authorities impose tight controls, collecting taxes more rigorously than their predecessors and operating forced labour schemes. In June 1920 an armed revolt against British rule ("the Revolution of 1920") spreads across southern and central Iraq. For three months Britain loses control of large areas of the countryside. British military posts are overrun, and 450 British troops are killed (1500 are injured).

1921

By February the rebellion has been crushed, with 9000 rebels killed or wounded by British forces. Whole villages are destroyed by British artillery, and suspected rebels shot without trial. The air power of the RAF plays a major role; what this involves is shown by one report of "an air raid in which men, women and children had been machine gunned as they fled from a village".

Britain decides to replace direct colonial rule with an Arab administration which it hopes will serve British interests. At the head of the new state structure, Britain creates a monarchy with Faysal as Iraq's first King. Although senior positions are now filled by Iraqis, ultimate control remains with their British advisers'.

http://www.geocities.com/pract_history/iraq.html

Posted by Campesino | September 18, 2007 2:34 PM

Back in 1968, Edward Luttwak --a "consultant for the Us Government" wrote a neat little book called "Coup d'État: A Practical Handbook".

In it he argued that only morons try to overthrow countries via grubby little guerrilla wars -- that it was more elegant to simply mount a coup.
He included directions for how to do so.

This was a cottage industry within the CIA during the Cold War -- and still has some devotees in the office charged with dismantling the Soviet Union's soft underbelly in Georgia, Ukraine, Chechyna,etc.

It is sad to think that we could have saved a lot of money by simply having Bob Baer talk with a few Baathist generals and shift a $100 million or so into some Swiss bank accounts.

By the same token, it might be a lot cheaper for us to simply let Iraq have a nice brisk civil war and then buy off the winner or winners.

Re successful counterinsurgencies, the US government , of course, had several. It found that the way to break the spirit of brave enemy warriors was to plunge them into a deep depression -- by killing their women, children and parents. Modern-day Corporate America labor relations are based on similar principles.

The US government subdued bands of elusive Indian warriors , for example, by simply raiding Indian villages in the fall and burning the harvest -- causing mass starvation of women, children, and the elderly.

It PREEMPTED a massive insurgency on the Japanese islands at the end of WWII via killing about 100,000 women and children with napalm strikes on Japanese cities and then killing another 100,000 with the atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki.

All the time, wearing the White cowboy hat, of course.

Posted by Don Williams | September 18, 2007 2:47 PM

That doesn't count because it was in Africa"

I never said that. Your African examples fail because they were civil wars with minimal outside involvement.

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Not really.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Katanga

After Congo was granted independence in June 1960, Katanga became an autonomous province. On 11 July 1960 Katanga broke away from the new Congolese government of Patrice Lumumba in July, declaring independence under Moise Tshombe leader of the local CONAKAT party. Despite this the new Katangese government did not enjoy the support throughout the province, especially in the northern Baluba areas.

The declaration of independence was made with the support of Belgian business interests and over 6000 Belgian troops. Tshombe was known to be close to the Belgian industrial companies which mined the rich resources of copper, gold and uranium. Katanga was one of the richest and most developed areas of the Congo. Without Katanga, Congo would lose a large part of its mineral assets and consequently government income. The view of Congolese central government and a large section of international opinion was that this was an attempt to create a Belgian-controlled puppet-state run for the benefit of the mining interests. Paradoxically not even Belgium officially recognised the new state despite providing it with military assistance.

In September, Prime minister Lumumba was replaced in a coup d'état by Joseph Mobutu. On 17 January 1961 Mobutu sent Lumumba to Lubumbashi, capital of Katanga, where he was tortured and executed shortly after arrival. Belgian officers, under Katangan command, were present at the execution.

The UN Security Council met in the wake of Lumumba's death in a highly emotional atmosphere charged with anti-colonial feeling and rhetoric. On 21 February 1961 the Security Council adopted resolution 161, which authorised 'all appropriate measures' to 'prevent the occurrence of civil war in the Congo, including ... the use of force, if necessary, in the last resort'. This resolution demanded the expulsion from the Congo of all Belgian troops and foreign mercenaries, but did not explicitly mandate the UN to conduct offensive operations. This resolution was ultimately interpreted by the local UN forces justify military operations to end the secession of Katanga. Despite this new resolution during the next six months the UN undertook no major military operations instead concentrating on facilitating several rounds of political negotiations.

In June, Tshombe signed a pledge to reunite Katanga with rest of the country however, by August it was clear he had no intention to implement this agreement. In August and September the UN conducted two operations to arrest and repatriate the mercenaries and political advisors by force. The second operation was resisted by Katangan Gendarmerie and resulted in casualties on both sides.

Peace negotiations ensued, in the course of which, UN secretary-general Dag Hammarskjöld died in uncertain circumstances in a plane crash near Ndola, Northern Rhodesia (now Zambia).

Under UN pressure, Tshombe later agreed to a three-stage plan from the acting Secretary General, U Thant, that would have reunited Katanga with Congo. However, this remained an agreement on paper only.

Urged on by Congo leader Cyrille Adola, UN forces launched a decisive attack on Katanga in December 1962. The capital, Elisabethville (now Lubumbashi), fell in January 1963, and Tshombe fled to Kolwezi, where he surrendered on January 15, 1963. The Katangan secession was formally ended by the National Conciliation Plan.
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I'll just echo your line - keep digging

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The reason why people keep criticizing the relevance of your examples is not because we're trying to "refute" the existence of successful counterinsurgencies, but because we're trying to force you to confront the fact that successful counterinsurgencies tend to involve concentration camps, poison gas, mass murder, and genocide. (Or worse still, appeasement!)
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Go back to Josh Marshall's original post

"At the risk of asking a really silly question, can we list off the successful counterinsurgency operations in history?"

So I make a list and all you can do is spin. It's obvious from the tone of the rest of his post that he assumes that there aren't any - except may some British ones and those don't count because the British granted most of them independence years later. He's just wrong.

And he didn't qualify his "really silly question" with qualifiers like only after WW II, or that didn't use brutal measures, etc. That's your spin

Posted by Campesino | September 18, 2007 2:49 PM

And for the record I'm not saying that I'm in favor of using brutal methods or poison gas or concentration camps. I'm just asserting that it is historically inaccurate to say that insurrections usually win.

Yes, but what you're saying has little to nothing to offer about the contemporary situation.

Posted by Freddie | September 18, 2007 2:49 PM

And for the record I'm not saying that I'm in favor of using brutal methods or poison gas or concentration camps. I'm just asserting that it is historically inaccurate to say that insurrections usually win.

Yes, but what you're saying has little to nothing to offer about the contemporary situation.

Posted by Freddie | September 18, 2007 2:49 PM

*************************************************

Go back to Marshall's post:

"This post was meant to start a discussion, not advance a theory. And we seem to be having this debate on the basis of a highly theoretical model of how a successful counter-insurgency works, rather than taking a more historical view. But putting all the examples together, the one loose pattern I can see is the distinction between ideologically based insurgencies and ones fought against foreign occupation, with the former often being susceptible to successful counter-insurgency and the latter much less frequently so."

So I help make a list and get snarked at for my efforts.

Posted by Campesino | September 18, 2007 2:57 PM

Re Freddie's comment "Yes, but what you're saying has little to nothing to offer about the contemporary situation."
----------
I disagree. Some of Campesino's historical examples may be more relevant to today than post-WWII examples -- because the Soviet Union has fallen.

The Cold War greatly hampered US counterinsurgency ops in places like Vietnam -- partly because Russia and China were often aiding the enemy in major ways and we wanted to avoid having the conflict blow up into another Cuban blockade --finger on the launch button -situation.

But also because the global ideological struggle forced us to avoid bad behavior in one area because it would be hyped around the globe by Russian propagandists.

Posted by Don Williams | September 18, 2007 2:58 PM

You want "successful counterinsurgencies " -- look at Genghis Khan and the Mongols. And his policies are EXTREMELY relevent to Iraq today,

Here, for example, is the notice his grandson sent to residents of Baghdad:

"When I lead my army against Baghdad in anger, whether you hide in heaven or in earth, I will bring you down from the spinning spheres. I will toss you in the air like a lion. I will leave no one alive in your realm. I will burn your city, your land, your self. If you wish to spare yourself and your venerable family, give heed to my advice with the ear of intelligence. If you do not, you will see what God has willed."
Ref: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Genghis_Khan#Casualties

Posted by Don Williams | September 18, 2007 3:08 PM

Let's keep reading the rest of Campesino's authoritative source on how the British "crushed" the Iraqi insurgency in 1921 before pulling their ground troops out of the country, shall we?

1924

Britain's Labour Government sanctions the use of the RAF against the Kurds, dropping bombs and gas, including on Sulliemania in December. The effects are described by Lord Thompson as "appalling" with panic stricken tribespeople fleeing "into the desert where hundreds more must have perished of thirst".

---------------------------

The standard historical view is that the Brits bombed the hell out of Iraq, declared victory, and pulled out most of their ground troops. They installed an Iraqi king and supplied his armed forces. They maintained two permanent bases and kept the RAF around to bomb the place when the natives got unruly, which they frequently did. By 1932 Iraq was independent, and their government was still dealing with frequent uprisings in the Shiite and Kurdish regions.

If you want to call that a "successful counterinsurgency," you go right ahead.

As for the Congo example, do you even read your own sources? I seem to have been wrong about the level of foreign involvement... but your source clearly describes a fairly conventional civil war waged by a secessionist region, not a guerrilla insurgency. You might as well add the American Civil War to your list if you're going to play that fast and loose with your definitions.

But seriously, keep digging. It's fun to watch your case for counterinsurgency fall apart at the seams.

Posted by LaFollette Progressive | September 18, 2007 3:18 PM

But seriously, keep digging. It's fun to watch your case for counterinsurgency fall apart at the seams.

Posted by LaFollette Progressive | September 18, 2007 3:18 PM

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My case? What case - I was making a list to show that Matt's assertion:

"And, indeed, it turns out that there are really, really few."

isn't really true. As I said earlier, it is a pernicious meme running among the left in the last year or so. I even saw that Bill Clinton had said something like it in an interview a while back. You know the old saying about what happens to those who are ignorant of history.

As you said in an earlier comment:

"Insofar as your argument boils down to "There are too examples of successful counterinsurgencies!" then you are correct."

you agree with me. Thanks!

But keep working on that straw man, it seems to make you happy

Posted by Campesino | September 18, 2007 3:51 PM

This has been a pretty informative discussion, for me at least. Sk was your standard troll pulling out some tired talking points, but I think Campesino really added something. Thanks.

Posted by mq | September 18, 2007 4:08 PM

You're welcome

Posted by Campesino | September 18, 2007 4:28 PM

Campesino, good list and good rebuttals to the "yes, but...." crowd trying to spin each successful counterinsurgency into the "invincible freedom fighters actually won".

I would add that before 1900, few insurgencies won because conventional militaries dealt with insurgents in a brutal, but effective manner. That includes "enlightened nations" of the day. As well as the Carthages, the barbarian hordes...where the "no enemy people left, no insurgency" model was applied.

I don't believe, for example, the Mongols ever faced a "successful insurgency". Likely it wasn't even in their vocabulary.

It is true that after WWII, that the Geneva and other humanitarian "rules" meant to cover conventional militaries fighting other uniformed state armies began to fail miserably - when "enlightened elites" insisted that those conventional armies fight guerilla fighters by the same rules - while the guerillas were "rule-free".

When nations had the "balls" to say that insugents and their enemy civilian population backers were outside those "rules" - in communist and in 3rd world dictatorships, those insurgencies were usually quashed.
The Soviets lost in Afghanistan in part because they were trying to be accepted as part of the global economy, the "nicer" Soviets that did follow Helsinki and all the international "law" baggage - and thus treated the Afghans far better than they did the "enemy civilians" in the unsuccessful East German and Hungarian revolts.

The "rules" that self-righteous Lefty, Progressive secular Jewish lawyers, and wealthy Euro-elites insist the rest of the world follow, including their Geneva II meant to make it even easier to topple "oppressive conventional militaries" become more problematic when the guerillas and Jihadis can not only avoid all the rules, but can use global communications and modern weapons to match the lethality of conventional armies. That insistance that "rules" be unilaterally followed by law-abiding nations but not their foes adds perverse incentives for any foe to break all rules of combat that give them an edge if they are not "punished" for doing so.

It will end when modern nations admit the rules the activists created and they accepted back when the stakes were lower - if blindly followed without a reciprocity requirement - ensure their defeat in conflicts. When the conflict rises to truly existiential - where they are not just bagging out of some inconsequential 3rd World shithole and giving it to freedom fighters to make into a bigger shithole, but in conflicts absolutely critical to their vital interests - then they must change the rules or insist on reciprocity. No matter how much Kenneth Roth of HRW wails or UN lifetime bureaucrats "deplore it".
Basically, that would end the idea of "innocent enemy civilian" in many conflicts, end the idea that enemy civilian lives are more valuable than your own soldiers, and permit conventional armies to once again use collective consequences to enforce their military will on a conquered population. The Lefties will howl...but that is where we are headed. You cannot defeat insurgencies while holding their supporters sacrosanct from consequence, except in exceptionally rare cases where you have a real shot at "winning hearts and minds".

Posted by Chris Ford | September 18, 2007 5:11 PM

Campesino lists mostly dicatorial repressions which are not what Petraeus describes as counter insurgency. The successes he and other American military theorists refer to are only two, Malay and Viet Nam, with Viet Nam being the never-to-be-spoken-aloud primary.
Oh yeah, I know we seem to have lost there but that was never a conclusion the US military establish accepted.

Posted by Roger Tompkins | September 18, 2007 5:18 PM

Chris Ford, are you seriously suggesting that Stalin, Genghis Khan, and others who slaughtered enemy civilians had the right approach, whereas the pansy Jew liberals who object to these practices are in the wrong?

Don't hold back... let your moral clarity shine through. Help us clear up our confusion.

Posted by LaFollette Progressive | September 18, 2007 6:06 PM

Chris Ford appears to be forthrightly advocating genocide.

Posted by rea | September 18, 2007 7:02 PM

Has General Petraeus been informed of these intelligent observations that if only a much, much higher percentage, and perhaps a totality of the Iraqi population were targeted and killed that the insurgency would decrease in strength?

I'm almost on the edge of remembering that there really was a period of colonialism in which natives were slaughtered freely, but then it gets all hazy, something apparently happened to all those paradises and it had something to do with "Jewish lawyers".

Posted by El Cid | September 18, 2007 7:51 PM

Chris Ford appears to be forthrightly advocating genocide.
Posted by rea

No, Chris Ford is suggesting that enemy civilian life and property in an insurgency should not be sacrosanct, except in rare cases where you honestly expect a defeated enemy to learn to love their occupier. Post-WWII rules designed to spare enemy civilians caught between the lethal kinetics of conventional armies and rules that let nations blast and burn down cities were supposed to prevent, along with the Mighty UN - further war.

They were not intended to add perverse incentives for Jihadis and insurgents to shed all rules - but they did.

An example was that the American South had deep hatred of the Yankee invader and tried numerous insurgent tactics, including civilians bushwacking troops. The Union Army response to that, which was effective, was to chase down bushwhackers and interrogate them. Then take them one at a time to their houses, to watch as all the livestock was killed and all property and the house burned then have the family watch as the bushwhacker was hanged. Then march the temporarily surviving bushwhackers on to their next house. When the bushwhackers got away, sometimes the Union Army just burned the nearest farm, as a cluestick to other Rebs that letting insurgents operate on their lands resulted in rerprisals.

It was quite effective.

Right now, Lefties, and yes, secular Jewish progressive lawyers, think the restraints their activist vanguard have slapped on war based on Cold War dynamics that only democratic nations somehow are obligated to obey make conventional armies "impotent" in the face of noble terrorists and freedom fighters. That their restraints are now Eternal Law, forever immutable. And now, the 4Gen War figting Jihadi terrorist and rules making his property and family "off-limits", while the Jihadi has no limits and may attack anyone and anything - now give the Jihadi the equal odds for victory - that they see as "fair" of enlightened democracies.

I suggest the "triumph" of the Left in setting "New rules" will be very short-lived. As will their crusade for terrorist civil liberties. Dumb laws get scrapped.

Posted by Chris Ford | September 18, 2007 9:08 PM

Exactly. Why aren't we killing more Iraqis? Why are those liberals and Jewish lawyers making us fight with one hand behind our back?

Why don't we for once show those foul sub-humans that Saddam Hussein had absolutely nothing on us in our capacity to mow them down in chilling numbers and make the Tigris and Euphrates run red with blood?

Good lord, we came there to give them democracy and to kill the evildoers and if we have to burn their crops and destroy more of their infrastructure and obliterate their remaining shreds of their economy to do, then By God, bold neo-Confederate cowards sitting on their asses here will be more than willing to advocate it!!!

Posted by El Cid | September 18, 2007 9:21 PM

Nitwits.

Who gives a shit if some insurgencies succeed and some don't?

The point of interest is that Iraq is NOT succeeding and there is NO ONE in either the US military or the blogosphere who has a fucking clue how to win it.

So STFU about some nasty little African war with some morons with machetes. Iraq is not a bunch of Tutsis - they have serious military ability and serious hardware and serious support. The ex-Iraqi army is mostly on the side of the Sunnis and they have adequate training, adequate supplies - and more importantly, the motivation - to continue this insurgency for another ten years.

The Shia have the population and ALSO the motivation - revenge for generations of oppression - to continue their side of it for another ten years. And they can count on Iranian support if nobody else. And when Bush bombs Iran, they'll be shooting US troops right along with the Sunnis.

The Kurds aren't even relevant - they've also been fighting for generations but not against us - so far. But get in the way of their keeping the Kirkuk oil and see how long we last.

Your history lesson is bullshit and meaningless.

Clowns.

Posted by Richard Steven Hack | September 19, 2007 12:54 AM

We've already killed about half a million Iraqis while around 2-3 million - including the very educated elites we would need to stay in Iraq, put forth a pluralistic nationalist Iraqi identity narrative and run the country - have left for Jordan and other nations. We are supposed to kill more Iraqis to what end? To kill off support for the local Sunni Arab insurgents? That would only make helping Sunnis more of a cause celebre among the hundreds of millions of Sunnis in the world. To kill off the Shi'ite support for the likes of al-Sadr? Well, those same Shi'ites support the Iraqi government we claim to be backing. Killing them off will only make Iran side more overtly with the Shi'ites. In the end, it would mean that Iran would support the democratically elected government in Iraq that we created while we undermined it and thus undermined our credibility and our commitment to democracy. Both tracks would mean the end of political reconciliation in Iraq that was supposed to be the whole point of the surge. The British and the French Empires reached the point where their populaces started to realize that beating up the locals just to maintain the Empires was pointless, unethical and wasteful in blood and treasure.

Posted by Reality Man | September 19, 2007 4:09 AM

I don't believe, for example, the Mongols ever faced a "successful insurgency". Likely it wasn't even in their vocabulary.

If it was not in their vocabulary before the Vietnamese defeated them in the 13th century, then they probably should have added it.

Posted by brooksfoe | September 19, 2007 9:36 AM

Your history lesson is bullshit and meaningless.

Clowns.

Posted by Richard Steven Hack | September 19, 2007 12:54 AM
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That's right tough guy, history can teach us NOTHING!

Posted by Campesino | September 19, 2007 11:46 AM