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Divide and Rule

18 Sep 2007 02:36 pm

Noah Schactman reports on Bush administration efforts to lay the groundwork for massive bloodshed in Iraq:

Sunni political and tribal leaders are increasingly throwing in their lot with U.S. forces here against Al-Qaeda in Iraq and other insurgent types. But, to get them to come over to our side, the American military has fed them a steady diet of anti-Shi'ite propaganda.

Arrests and killings of Shi'ite militants are announced from loudspeaker blasts; President Bush's bellicose rhetoric towards Shi'a Iran is reported on friendly radio programs. But the majority of this country is Shi'ite. Are we setting ourselves up as the enemies of the majority here? Are we priming the pump for an all-in sectarian battle royale? It seems like a possibility.

Robert Farley and Kevin Drum make some smart comments. I think this supports my view that our policy may, on some level, be deliberately aimed at fostering sectarian conflict in order to keep both sides friendly to the idea of an open-ended American military presence. Eric Martin has his doubts about that.

I'm reminded, however, of Alex Cooley's commentary on Daniel Nexon and Thomas Wright (PDF) "What's at Stake in the American Empire Debate?" from the May issue of The American Political Science Review:

In fact, the extreme implication of the Nexon/Wright model for U.S. policymakers would be to more vigorously pursue “divide-and-rule” policies in Iraq instead of its contradictory nation-building policies of “unite and rule.”

I don't think one need necessarily see this as an incredibly deliberate development. Rather, the top political leadership in the country, from Bush and Cheney on down, has consistently failed to articulate meaningful objectives in Iraq beyond a stubborn refusal to answer calls for withdrawal. Under the circumstances, we shouldn't be surprised that this priority filtered down over time and has, increasingly, led our strategy to evolve in a divide and rule direction rather than a nation-building one.

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Comments (20)

For the last year, Shia extremists have been trying to expel all of the Sunnis from Baghdad, with a great deal of success. Anti-Shia and anti-Iran appeals have been central to Sunni Islamist propaganda since the start of the occupation. Iraq is already in the middle of massive bloodshed, with about 15% of the population having already become internal or external refugees.

In such an environment, to seriously think that a few American radio and loudspeaker broadcasts will be determinative of anything is pretty ludicrous. The battle lines have already been drawn, and there’s no going back. How violent Iraq becomes will be determined by the balance of power on the ground.

Divide and Rule is how to rule. Not much else works well for an imperial power. You pick a minority that is somewhat better organized and more competent than the majority, typically the former rulers (e.g., the Tutsi in Rwanda-Burundi), and put them in charge, then remind them all the time of how much the majority hates them and will come after them with machetes if ever us imperialists aren't around to protect them.

Semi-agree with RC. One of the paradoxes we seem to be dealing with is that we're staying in Iraq in good part so that the Shiites don't wipe out the Sunnis in a genocide, yet the Sunnis are still bitter over the invasion and likely to attack US forces. I'd say they're just clumsily trying to endear us to the Sunnis. (Not that this is a good idea of course, but I really doubt they're intentionally encouraging sectarianism.)

You read the Nexon/Wright? I don't remember you mentioning it. I have it on my hard disk, and recommend the original very hightly, which Cooley links. It is not long or difficult.

"In fact, the extreme implication of the Nexon/Wright model for U.S. policymakers would be to more vigorously pursue “divide-and-rule” policies in Iraq instead of its contradictory nation-building policies of “unite and rule.” This would mean, practically, to empower or even openly arm Shiite and Kurdish factions against the Sunni minority and to license such action in exchange for American patronage."

...Cooley, my emphasis. Somebody has something wrong here.

If you look at diagram four in the Cooley review, the Imperial strategy would be to set up a Sunni client area, a Shia client area (a Colombian client area, etc). Financing actual proxy wars would be too expensive, and actual localized anarchies too unproductive. You might encourage Shia-Sunni rivalries short of war, but you would also encourage Shia unity or Sunni unity.

"Client areas" are not "client states."

Somebody somewhere said this week that Republicans are about ten years ahead of Democrats in understanding the upcoming post-nationstate environment. Is Iran really much of a state or nation? Do we need to negotiate with such a weak and volatile fiction? Who really is going to get whatever nukes may or not be produced?

Does "Kurdistan" need a seat at the UN to pump oil? Does Basra?

I've been assuming since Nov 28, 2006 that Dick Cheney and the Saudis agreed that the only acceptable outcome was getting a new Saddam to run Iraq.

I think that is what this is about.

I've been assuming since Nov 28, 2006 that Dick Cheney and the Saudis agreed that the only acceptable outcome was getting a new Saddam to run Iraq.

Actually, at the time press reports suggested that people Cheney’s office were advocating a policy that was the exact opposite of divide-and-rule. Instead, they were arguing that we should just pick a side in the civil war, let them win and be done with it. ‘Unleash the Shia’, the policy was called. The Saudis reacted with alarm, and responded letting the U.S. know (via an op-ed in the Washington Post, and probably also in that November meeting with Cheney) that if this happened, the Saudis would start backing the Sunnis on their own.

Alex Cooley forgot 'blunder-and-rule'.

And of course, the whole conflict with radical Islam could be seen as blowback for previous Cold War alliances of convenience.

The United States has a long, bipartisan history of choosing our friends poorly, based on whichever faction seems to oppose the enemy du jour.

Sadly, the vision to end this practice is lacking everywhere. It seems to be the only thing the VSP's know how to do.

Matt's closing paragraph operates on the same dynamic that causes Americans to refer to Vietnam as a "tragic mistake" when, in fact, the scurrilous motives for that war were fully achieved- the armaments industry boomed, Cheney and Rumsfeld made hay while the sun shined, and the uppity Vietnamese were taught a lesson they still haven't forgotten. They may have independence, but they also have more amputees and poisoned land than anywhere else in the world.

Matt's fallacy is to assume that because Bush and his cronies are morons, there can't be an underlying dynamic. In reality, the dispatch of Death Squad Negroponte to Iraq was the clue. Negroponte is no Harriet Miers- he's a senior member of the conspiracies against America.

And it was during Negroponte's term that the Sunnis were first emboldened to believe that they might reclaim their privileged status in Iraq. Naturally the American public were not informed that Sunni death squads in south Iraq were being tolerated or assisted by Negroponte's men, but if you watched carefully the news did leak out.

There was, in fact, no initial assumption that Shiite or Sunni must emerge victorious in the new Iraq- that assumption took root and grew while Negroponte enabled the Sunni in the south and the Iranian-trained Shiite Badr Brigade.

This is not a "tragic mistake" or a huge "blunder". This is part of a deep dynamic intended to make money for war mongers at home while ensuring troops in the mideast to protect "our" oil for decades to come. From the Negroponte point of view there's no downside- only the average American feels the pain.

And that's no accident.

From what I understand our policy is to be a life-line to the quiet majorities who are tired of being pushed around by religious radicals and AK-wielding teenagers. This life line extends to Sunni and Shia alike.

See here for non-Anbar examples:

To adjust to the growing, grass roots movement spurred by the Anbar Awakening, Multinational Division Central, under the command of Major General Rick Lynch, established a Reconciliation and Engagement Cell in early May. The cell is tasked with devising strategies to get the local communities to provide for their security and become part of the reconciliation process, then to see these strategies through at the tactical level.

The mix of Sunni and Shia enclaves and the interrelations between the tribes and sects created a complex problem set than the homogenous Sunni Anbar province. The Concerned Citizens groups were not centrally formed, as the Anbar Salvation Council was. The groups in southern Baghdad and northern Babil provinces popped up in local communities, and while tribal leaders reached out to their neighbors, there is no governing council to provide central direction. The reconciliation cell is also tasked with building these relationships.

As the process of establishing the Concerned Citizens groups unfolded, there was resistance among the military officers. Many were skeptical about the effectiveness of these groups, their ability to provide security, and the inherent dangers in establishing armed groups outside the purview of the Iraqi Security Forces. “Now 99.9 percent of the officers are on board,” Waldron said.

Military leaders were looking for guidance on “establishing left and right boundaries” on dealing with the Concerned Citizens. Those with “blood on their hands” must be arrested and prosecuted. A screening process was put in place and biometric data was gathered. This gave the military to identify past insurgents, as well as the added benefit of gathering date for any potential future attackers.

The red lines are clear. The military can not provide weapons or ammunition to the local groups. Rewards are issued for “non-lethal assistance,” which includes identifying the location of IEDs and weapons caches, Waldron said. Weapons buyback programs are strictly prohibited. The Concerned Citizens could not be used as paid vigilante groups. “We do not unleash them to target insurgents,” Waldron said. “We vet the intelligence they bring to us with our own intelligence, then either act or pass.”

This sounds like, ahem, "bottom-up" stability, not "laying the groundwork for massive bloodshed."

Matt, while I agree with you that our responses have evolved organically, I disagree with your conclusion that divide-and-rule is what has emerged -- simply because we're not trying to actually, you know, "rule Iraq". We have no mandate to rule to rule Iraq, and we gain nothing from the intervening chaos except the vague, Dr. Evil-ish benefits of indefinite military presence to secure an oil supply that would be better (and more cheaply) secured by a stable Iraqi government and Navy-protected shipping lanes

"Matt, while I agree with you that our responses have evolved organically"

O c'mon, was there ever an intention or plan to have a Kurdistan re-integrated into Greater Iraq?
Quasi-independence seemed not only the most likely outcome, but one that little real effort was made to prevent.

How infinitely charming it is to see JA explain that in Iraq we are simply shouldering "the white man's burden".

Like we've never heard that before.

Serial Catowner,

Yes, it would be much better for the Iraqis if we shrugged that burden off. Good, helpful insight. Charming, even.

It's worth considering that the strategy might eventually evolve into a full fledged tilt to the Sunni's. If we attack Iran, the most unknown of unknown possibilities, then we will be in a defacto war with Shiites and the enemy of my enemy thing will kick in.

This is all the cheapest sort of conjecture I know. I've always thought the Sunni position was beyond helpless but now a sliver of doubt about that has slipped into my mind. Well I guess the numbers seem hopeless for a unified Iraq under Sunni rule again but some portion of the former Iraq being nominally ally seems like a strategic option which could be left open.

"Matt's fallacy is to assume that because Bush and his cronies are morons, there can't be an underlying dynamic."

Got that right.

See, the problem with Matt is that he has ambitions to be a "Deeply Serious Person" (as opposed to merely a "Very Serious Person.") (A "Deeply Serious Person" is a "Very Serious Person" who criticizes other "Very Serious Persons.")

And "Deeply Serious Persons" - like "Very Serious Persons - do not accuse the leaders of the country of being fucking conscious criminals who do not give a rat's ass about the US population, let alone the populations of the rest of the world.

Only "loons" like me do that.

So Matt doesn't take us seriously.

And the war goes on, the war profiteers get rich - and someday Matt will be on some President's staff or an advisor to Obama, or some other idiot.

And Matt will be doing what the Republicans have done for the last six years - blaming the last Administration for everything that has happened since his Administration got in power...

And he will never once question any opinion he uttered on this blog since time immemorial...

The Conservative movement, in or out of office, will only support withdrawal from Iraq when the interests that it services decide either (a) there is no more money to be made, or (b) there is more money to be made elsewhere. Maybe invading Canada to take over the Arctic. Who knows?

Imperial Entropy

"Divide and rule", as in the case of the Roman Empire original, is what happens to an occupied country when there's no policy direction from the leadership of the occupying power to their soldiers on the ground. The folks on the ground want to stop getting shot at, and they are forced into some acquaintance with the local violence brokers, so they have both motive and opportunity to co-opt those violence brokers. This co-optation may make no sense in terms of any conceivable overall strategy for the occupying power that meets any of their strategic needs, but that's alright. The co-optation happens anyway because there is no overall strategy being enforced from above. Tactics ends up dictating strategy, which ends up dictating national policy. Bottoms up! Indeed.

Well, Bush has always been very open about his opposition to nation-building. We got who we voted for.


Comments closed October 02, 2007.

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