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Listening to Sunni Arabs

13 Sep 2007 07:19 pm

Marc Lynch deploys his preferred analytic trick of listening to what Arabs are actually saying about things rather than indulging in convenient fantasies. In this edition, Sunni Arab insurgents:

General Petraeus worked creatively and effectively to encourage this trend, and soldiers and diplomats on the ground seem to be aware of the complexities of the new "cooperative" mission. The same can't be said for surge cheerleaders in the United States. Much of the conventional wisdom about the Sunni areas now seems to come from the impressions formed by politicians and journalists on stage-managed visits to Iraq, or by carefully crafted press interviews with "former insurgents" hand-picked by American military handlers. But we don't need such a mediated view. Leaders of the major Iraqi Sunni groups actually speak quite often and quite candidly to their own people, though: in open letters, in official statements posted on internet forums, in the Arab and Iraqi press, and in statements released on al-Jazeera and other satellite television stations. What they say in such statements, in Arabic, when addressing their own constituencies, might be considered a more reliable guide to their strategy and thinking. So what are the major Iraqi Sunni leaders saying?

In their literature and public rhetoric, the Sunni insurgency has already defeated the American occupation -- which is why the Americans stopped fighting them and came to them for help in fighting al-Qaeda. One discovers virtually nothing in this literature of the American conceit that our forces wore them out or forced them to come to the table. During his meeting with President Bush in Anbar last week, Abu Risha, reportedly joked that his people had achieved in four months what the American military could not achieve in four years. It was one of the few claims made by Abu Risha with which most Iraqi Sunnis would agree, and one which should probably have infuriated more Americans than it seems to have. [...]

Partition, soft or hard, has far fewer fans in Anbar than in Washington. Most Sunnis continue to support a unified Iraqi state, and have exaggerated expectations about the role they should play in such a state. A recent letter from the "Amir" of the Islamic Army of Iraq claimed that Sunnis made up 60 percent of the population of Iraq, and few Sunnis seem ready to accept the status of "tolerated minority" within a Shia-dominated state. [...]

Rather, 72 percent of Sunnis say that the US forces should leave immediately, 95 percent say that the presence of U.S. troops makes security worse, and 93 percent still see attacks on coalition forces as acceptable. Such results should make obvious the vacuity of claims that the turn against al-Qaeda was a victory for American diplomacy.

No reconciliation here.

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Comments (33)

Hey, don't minize the significance of the Anbar Awakening.

Rather than nitpicking on the details of the most fantastic phenomenon observed in the Middle East since the eighth century, you should be in awe of the wonderful achievment of the our dear leader's Great Move Forward that will lead to Return on Success.

The people who have killed at least 2500 or our forces, and who are still killing them, are now our new best friends? Of all the monumental propaganda achievements perpetrated by our elites this one takes the cake.

Well that and the one about the credit market problems being contained and of little systematic importance.

I hear crickets chirping outside my window.

But I don't hear any credible responses to Mark's piece from the surge-o-sphere.

Are you guys serious? Do have any idea how petty you sound? Do any of you know anything about Arabs, anything at all?

A "Sunni Victory" against the mighty US is a needful fiction, as is Al'Qaeda being the main threat in Anbar. I mean, Jesus Fucking Christ. We're trying to stabilize an Honor Culture, a Tribal Culture, an Arab Culture. We are not interested in self-serving propaganda victories over the Tribal Leaders in Iraq.

For Christ's sake, guys, I'm sure your piousness for Truth Uber Alles plays well in your peer-groups, but in the real world, this is how success in Iraq will have to look. Wake the fuck up.

What happens now that Abu Risha is dead? Does the Anbar Salvation Council continue on with him martyred? Or does it fracture, with all the tribes fighting each other for that big $10 billion bonus prize?

JA, the point is that the longer we stay, the worse it is for us. If we leave now, we're golden and we save lives and treasure. Both sides can "declare victory" and move on. If we stay, the insurgents have more ability and reason to recruit more people and keep attacking us.

Matt is in mighty silly territory. Yeah, the Sunnis that we rolled over in 3 weeks, chucked out of (too many jobs) and wiped the floor with in Fallujah and Ramadi are "victorious". Yeah, sure.

They are an honor culture. They can no more admit defeat and say their ratty little insurgency achieved victory than defeated Confederates could admit loss to nigger-loving Yankees, or how "they really won".
Yeah, sure.

The way it is with Arab tribes, they will do as needed as long as we grant them honor...

The people who have killed at least 2500 or our forces, and who are still killing them, are now our new best friends? Of all the monumental propaganda achievements perpetrated by our elites this one takes the cake.

Reconciliation means working with former foes. Mortal enemies cooperate. The 140,000 Americans killed by the Japs, the 2.8 million we whacked become yesterday's sunk costs....Standard conduct in human history.

We shook hands with the bloody hands of Stalin and the Jewish Bolsheviks, ignoring their millions of slaughters to fight Facists together, instead... Many American tourists go right past the site in Canada where our now-friendly Canadian and Brit forces butchered 200 American militia in 1813, don't even know it exists.

2500 is very light casualties by any war's standard, and being in partnership with former foes does not dishonor their memory anymore than Germans, French, Americans drinking together in honor of fallen countrymen of 60 years ago dishonors them. What dishonors the fallen is seeing them as victimized, but sadistic little children on their way to Abu Ghraib..

"Sunni Victory" a fiction, JA? I don't think so - it seems like a reasonably accurate characterization to me. Or, at the very least, a more plausible one than the storyline that the Anbar Awakening proponents have been peddling in the US.

The US has sacrificed massive amounts of money and life trying to force the Sunni insurgents to accept the current Iraqi government. Having completely failed to do that, it appears that we're now supplying them with money and arms, and leaving them alone, in return for not killing additional American troops. And despite all the talk about the friendly Sunnis vs. al-Qaeda, their real enemy remains the government that the US has spent the past few years establishing.

That said, it's not just a matter of the US giving up - the American leadership has increasingly leaned toward the conclusion that the people we've been fighting might tend be more congenial allies than the Iraqi leaders that we helped install (despite the fact that the vast majority of the Sunni population still likes the idea of killing Americans). Still, it's pretty clear which side has gotten more of what they wanted thus far from the battle between US forces and Sunni insurgents.

Of course, while a belief in a Sunni insurgent victory is reasonable, the belief that the Sunni Arabs' percentage of the population in Iraq is anywhere near that of the Shia is bizarrely wrong. That means the Sunni nationalists' next goal - retaking a central role in a unified Iraqi state -is probably not realistic without significant outside help.

Shame on him! Basing analysis on facts. Shameless terrorist sympathizer. How dare him base his argument on the facts.

"Are you guys serious? Do have any idea how petty you sound? Do any of you know anything about Arabs, anything at all?"

You make them sound like a different species...

I suspect the "Arabs" political motives are not unlike certain "petty" American politicians whose sole aim appears to be "fuck the truth, as long as I can save face".

Well, so be it, let the Sunnis have their version of reality and let's all let President Puddin' Head have his "victory" and be remembered "long after we're all dead" as the "decider" that saved us all from ourselves. If that, at the end of things, gets us out of there until saner heads prevail (please, dear God, let saner heads prevail), well, then we'll all be smelling purty, 'cept for those of us who don't live in the real world. We'll just hang our heads in shame, never to be heard from again. To quote Congressman Boehner, "It seems like a small price to pay..."

"Mortal enemies cooperate.",,/i>

Wow, ..., I mean, wow! That's a cool trick. I've never been able to argue out of both sides of my mouth. Mom always said if I tried it it'd make me go cross-eyed.

But, I believe nowadays we're calling the "Japs" "Slanty-eyed Americans".

It seriously needs to be emphasized that the chief aspect of success in Iraq - the tribal revolt against Al-Qaeda - is a result of the chief aspect of failure: the creation of a Sunni/Shi'ia conflict.

The Sunni's know that America has essentially lost trust in Maliki, and that the public is leaning towards withdrawl - which will likely initiate a full-scale civil war. So of course they are trying to win our favor by rebelling against Al-Qaeda, whom they consider to be dead weight now too. The want us to assist them with the dastardly Shi'ia, whom we empowered by our invasion and subsequent state-building. (welcome to Middle East interventions)

Bush is putting his chips on both red and black now, so that he idiotically thinks hes a winner everytime. One on hand he is quoting Maliki about the need for the United States to help the (Shi'ia dominated) Central government to stand up; one the other, he is citing the success in Anbar working with the (anti-Maliki) tribal leaders.

My reading is that Iraq is a sectarian society now, with a low-level Civil War that is merely being suppressed, contained and delayed - not stopped - by US Forces. Under such a situation, you have three options really. You either pick a side and stay; pick no sides and leave; or pick a side (by selling armaments) and leave. Don't pick both sides and stay.

My opinion, anyway. Say what you like.

Chris Ford makes with teh Scary.

Arabs are the same species, but they have drastically different cultures -- i.e., they have the same distribution of genetically preconditioned personalities, but unrecognizably different environments and pressures in which to act.

Or hadn't you noticed?

Anyway, this will be absolutely useless, I'm sure, but let me try to explain.

Let's say you're a big wig in the military in charge of "ending the insurgency in Anbar," a near goal of our much broader strategy to leave behind a secure and stable Iraq that can be a viable member of the international community (if you dispute this then you might as well stop reading -- not merely this post, but period. Seriously. Stop reading. Facts have no sway over you).

Let's say you still have all of your misgivings about the entire enterprise, but fuck it: this is your job, and hey, this is your job. You have to pacify the Sunni Fucking Triangle.

Now, let's pause to think about those words,'leave behind' and think about how that might affect your approach. It's inarguable that we'll eventually leave Iraq, right? I mean, either we'll leave because Congress pulls us out, a new President pulls us out, International opinion pulls us out, or a more pressing threat somehow materializes -- or combinations of these and other factors. Whichever, we're eventually not going to be occupying Iraq. We agree on that?

So what kind of constraints does that put on your strategy? Well, I think that if I were a Sunni tribal leader, for instance, that kind of knowledge might create an urge to hedge against doing anything that might be subsequently seized upon by another man in my family, say an envious brother or uncle, and used as coup-enabling propaganda. Think about how easy we make it for anybody in that region to score political points by branding a man, who "everybody knows" gave material cooperation to the unholy, imperialistic, Muslim-hating infidel materialist aggressor devil United States of America, with the giant scarlet letter A for Apostate. Well, Tribal Leader knows this too. He knows what will happen if he's perceived as groveling before the Americans out of defeat, out of exhaustion, or out of greed. But he's also a realist, and he knows what happens when the US decides your tribe is causing trouble ("A Fallujah" has entered the Iraqi parlance as a word that means "someone got pwned." ) And he's pretty sure we know that his tribe has been aiding the insurgency.

(Please stop here to consult your Arab text book, the chapter that explains how...dexterous...Arab's can be in changing direction when they perceive a shift in their fortune. Of course, you don't have to believe it!)

So where are we? That's right, we need this guy's cooperation if we are ever going to stabilize his little corner of Iraq -- i.e. we need him to stop hosting a hot-bed of insurrection. We need this at the very least, or none of our other goals (remember them?) can possibly be attained.

So...how are we going to change his mind? How are we going to turn an active enemy into at worst an inactive enemy?

One way (perhaps the only way given constraints on what we will and will not do) we can do this is to affect his perception of risk/reward, and one way we can do this is to change one of our propaganda strategies, and enable one for him. One place we can have an effect is in the risk that he will perceived as groveling to victorious Americans. We know that even if he didn't fear reprisal, his tribe's honor could not permit it without first sufficiently bleeding itself out. Not after the promises he's given his people of his inevitable victory over the infidels. No way.

So we have to figure out a way to get him to cooperate with us, but the only way he'll ever consent is if he defeats us. (That's what you call a Catch-22 -- "It's the best they have.") Well, not quite. Look again at what we know: the risk is that he'll be perceived as collaborating, not that he is actually, you know, collaborating. I bet we might be able to do something about that perception.

We give him a "reality" that he can sell, a "reality" that tickles his pride and that of his people, a "reality" that not only protects but increases the honor of his tribe (we drove them away; they could not grab a hold of us!). Sure his lieutenants will smell the truth of the matter, but Arabs, of all peoples, know that narrative is power, and that self-inflating stories, once spoken, cannot be defeated. (You don't have to believe this either!)

Luckily, all the Americans ask in return is for Tribal Leader to exert control over territory he already considers his own, and to turn in some guys that competed against him for control of the insurgency and/or are currently challenging his authority.

Of course, he still has one giant problem. America won't just disappear after the agreement. Every day his people will see Americans conducting raids on TV, and maybe even raids in his territory. Every day they will see the evidence of this lie on the TV, hear it on the radio. It's unavoidable.

So how does Tribal Leader account for that?

I'll tell you a time tested way: he can tack onto his proclamations of victory that "the Americans begged like the effeminate cunts they are for us to help them in fighting al-Qaeda," and he'll cooperate as a condition precedent of our final, humiliating withdrawal. (This is an easy slight of hand, since the Al'Qaeda is perceived as predominantly a foreign force, and, additionally, all the religious fanatics in the insurgency have typically been...excessive...in their enforcements of strict observance; they have turned many people against them.) 'Al'Qaeda', of course, can then be used to refer to anybody who goes against the wishes of the Tribal leader and continues the fight -- a dynamic he'll buy into, because if it is used tactfully, it can help him entrench his power even further.

And then, for the coup de grace, he can be seen on TV demanding -- demanding -- bounty from the Americans in the form of aid, money and infrastructure.

America gets a "bottom-up" local stabilizing agent and a tenuous but effective ally -- shaky gains but far better than the previous chaos -- and Tribal Leader gets to write off the risk of American violence, finally put an end to this horrible affair and restore to his people some much needed normality, and, incidentally (of course), reaffirm his power in the process. As for the risk of his being accused, either by his own tribesman or by an emergent government, of being a collaborator, that particular problem has been nipped in the bud.

But you guys are probably right. It's much better to just get the hell out and pretend that in no way -- in no way!-- was success ever possible.

"My reading is that Iraq is a sectarian society now, with a low-level Civil War that is merely being suppressed, contained and delayed - not stopped - by US Forces. Under such a situation, you have three options really. You either pick a side and stay; pick no sides and leave; or pick a side (by selling armaments) and leave. Don't pick both sides and stay."

So naturally Bush picks the last option...

Typical human response - pick the option least likely to achieve that the human claims to desire most.

And picking a side by selling armaments won't do any good either, since both sides have plenty of guns and ammo and can get more from external sources if they really need to - but Iraq has enough guns and ammo for a civil war lasting ten years or more.

Picking a side and staying won't work either - unless the US either agrees to genocidally eliminate the Sunni, or joins with the Sunni to at least reduce the power imbalance between the Sunni and the Shia. And that latter would only last until some sort of government got set up, at which point both sides would have to kick out the US - and then the power imbalance would be back again.

So that option is a non-starter.

So pick no sides and leave is the only rational option. It doesn't matter what the "moral" question is, or the consequences are, or anything else. It's the ONLY WORKING option. Period.

Iraq is a failed state and will remain a failed state until such time as either one side decisively dominates (which may or may not be delayed by the intervention of external actors like Saudi Arabia or Iran), or exhaustion sets in on both sides - which is more likely to occur first.

The Shia have the upper hand, so they have no reason to negotiate. The Sunnis have the lower hand, so they have no alternative but to try to win.

It's that simple.

The US has no credibility or capacity to alter that situation.

As for the Sunni insurgency having won, well, that's so obvious it shouldn't even be discussed. They're still around, still operating. And any guerrilla movement that doesn't have its last dozen or so members killed - like Che Guevara in Bolivia - is a success - as long as they have the option of rebuilding. And in Iraq, since the Sunni polls show massive support for the insurgency, you have to be a Chris Ford-like delusionist to not see that the Sunni insurgency is victorious.

Maybe not against the Shia, but definitely against the US forces, the Sunni insurgency has won. Big time. Biggest US defeat since Vietnam. Bigger even than the Israeli defeat at the hands of Hizballah last year.

But not as big as the one the US will experience in Iran over the next ten years.

Of course, nothing in JA's long-winded sermon established any of that as actually true.

Neither did it establish that any of that would have any effect on either the Sunni-Shia divide, or whether AQI was in any way significant in Iraq, or whether any of that would in any significant way help to establish a stable Iraq that could function in the international community.

All of that was merely a given - or at least JA assumes that at least it was the best possible plan the morons in the US military could come up to TRY to achieve any of those goals.

Occam's Razor, however, suggests the simpler approach: Bribes.

The Arab world runs on bribes. Our Tribal Leader doesn't need to worry about being considered a collaborator as long as he can establish (and remember, this guy that got assassinated was running a bunch of HIGHWAY BANDITS!) that he is soaking the US forces for a bundle of money, and conning them into thinking that he is "fighting Al Qaeda: - while at the same time denouncing his various local enemies as "Al Qaeda" and using his money from the US to knock them off.

This is a lot simpler to understand than complicated Arab psychology lessons.

And again, none of this does one whit to solve the basic problems in Iraq. It never had a hope in hell of being a "success" as JA claims it is.

So why tout it as "the bottom up solution" and "the Anwar Miracle"?

It's bullshit.

Look, over there! It's a shiny distracting object called the Anbar Awakening! Killing every military age male in Fallujah and banning vehicle traffic has made Anbar a happy and peaceful place.

America has mastered REALITY CONTROL. Anything the Government says is believed, because the alternative would be to disagree with the TV. With REALITY CONTROL technology you can win a war, despite actually losing it. You can have prosperity during a market meltdown, and you can have unlimited petroleum while fossil fuel has peaked.

Because it is habit forming and mind altering, REALITY CONTROL technology recruits cultists who preach the RC mission without requiring pay or signed photos of the Commander Guy. This is truly amazing technology. Our conquest of Mars will be announced soon after victory in Iran.

Josh Marshall basically makes my same point above over at TPM, based on what Juan Cole said:

"I did an interview yesterday with Juan Cole -- which we're going to try to bring you soon on TPMtv -- and his take was broadly similar to Lynch's. There really is something changing in al Anbar. Attacks are down substantially. But the 'turning against al Qaeda' storyline is at best deeply misleading. More accurate would be to say that we're getting a bit more savvy about using patronage/bribery to recruit a tribal clientage willing to act as our proxies in the region. And in itself that's probably a very shrewd move. Cole makes the point that a lot of these tribes tried to do business with us years ago, only to get sent packing after a quick pat-down and weapons search. And it is worth keeping in mind that some of what we're calling 'tribes' here are more aptly termed gangs."

BTW, I have no objection to quoting Marshall - and especially by extension Juan Cole - when he's right. I just don't like the hypocritical way he runs his blog and his "crypto-Zionism".

This LA Times article I found linked from Juan Cole's site pretty much lays it out:

Looking to Anbar for Iraq's future
http://www.latimes.com/news/nationworld/world/la-fg-anbar10sep10,1,6028485.story?track=crosspromo&coll=la-headlines-world&ctrack=1&cset=true

Money quotes:

"The next big step is when the same kind of cooperation occurs between the Sunnis and the Shiites," he said wryly as cheeks were kissed and fingers were plunged into communal platters of rice and roasted meat. "That's a different story."

"It's harder for them to buy into the idea of working with the coalition in other areas because they have other threats: Shiite threats, Kurdish influence," said Maj. Ed Sullivan, who is on his second deployment in Anbar. He was first here in 2004-05.

"A lot of people look for a cookie-cutter theory -- the Anbar model. There is no Anbar model," Sullivan said. Rather, a unique combination of events ushered in change.

In 2004-05, the province was the heart of the Sunni-led insurgency and one of the deadliest for U.S. forces in Iraq. Locals were more supportive of the militants than the foreign forces. That changed in 2006, when Islamic militants declared the province part of their self-proclaimed Islamic State of Iraq, and began imposing harsh laws and brutal punishment for violators and opponents of their rule.

This drove the sheiks, who saw their local economies dying and their influence waning, to reject the Al Qaeda-linked militants and cooperate with U.S. and Iraqi forces.

"If it weren't for that, we would've been forcing them," Sullivan said. "It wouldn't have worked."

"A U.S. diplomat who has worked with some of the groups said they had proved valuable at offering tips to troops about weapons caches, bombs and insurgent activities. But the diplomat said most appeared to be acting on behalf of local interests and were not guided by national or exiled leadership."

"The U.S. ambassador to Iraq, Ryan Crocker, has called it "an essential prerequisite for reconciliation," but insufficient to stabilize the entire country."

JA:

Look - I am all for defeating the insurgency, if only on the grounds that it would prevent more of our guys from coming home limbless or lifeless.

But theres the rub. The insurgency is the main problem for the safety of our military; its not the main problem for the long-term security or stability of Iraq. Historically, an insurgency is the obstacle to (1) Colonial powers wishing to maintain their presence in foreign territory or (2) International powers wishing to prop up and defend a loyal - but typically unpopular - government.

Iraq does not fit this model exactly. Well, it can fit this model, but only if you cheerfully trim out THE MASSIVE SECTARIAN FIGHTING that is taking place. So the idea of success in Iraq - which Bush has defined as a stable, democratic government - is not really forwarded by defeating the insurgency alone. Its forwarded by political reconciliation by power-wielding Sunni's and Shi'ias.

Iraq is in a civil war, and the only way the civil war will end, frankly, is if we step out and let it officially begin.

Richard:

Thanks for the reply.

The options I referenced gave off an implication I did not intend. My point was that having troops in a country marred with sectarian conflict has by definition four possible courses of action, but only three of them are coherent or at least not self-contradictory.

In the context of Iraq, I would agree that your quite right in denouncing "pick a side and stay", because it is either completely senseless or seriously immoral. If you side with the Sunni you are fighting Shi'ia militias, who are the dominant power force in Iraq and bear not even a superficial connection to Al-Qaeda. On the other hand, if you side with the Shi'ia then you are essentially reducing your nation's moral standards to the gangsterish level of Sadr. So thats a no-go.

However, I am torn on the idea of us basically financing/supporting/arming the Sunnis a post-withdrawal Civil War. My hope is that such a position would:

1) Encourage some kind of power balance in Iraq, leading to a de facto soft partition.

2) Send a message to the Sunnis that it is profitable to turn against al-Qaeda and other jihadists. My fear here is that, were we not to support the Sunnis, then they would recruit al-Qaeda in assisting with them against the Shi'ia.

Obviously, backing a side in a Middle-East Civil war has all sorts of downsides, seen and unforeseen.

A recent letter from the "Amir" of the Islamic Army of Iraq claimed that Sunnis made up 60 percent of the population of Iraq, and few Sunnis seem ready to accept the status of "tolerated minority" within a Shia-dominated state.

Minor point, but the Sunni population of Iraq probably isn't far off that. Don't forget all the Kurds are Sunni, not Shia.

Many American tourists go right past the site in Canada where our now-friendly Canadian and Brit forces butchered 200 American militia in 1813

They probably shouldn't have tried to invade, occupy and annexe Canada, then.

The quoted excerpt from lynch says absolutely nothing about political reconcilliation in iraq. If matt would actually task himself with finding out whats going on in iraq, rather than frantically googling around for any crap which fits with his desire for withdrawal, he'd know that there has been a great deal of co-operation between the maliki government and the tribes.

Just to add to the above...

"...know that narrative is power, and that self-inflating stories, once spoken, cannot be defeated..."

Ah, yes, the Karl Rove stratagem... Of course, those of us igonorant of how the world works would have to admit that the scenario you present of using bribes to gain a a tenuous but effective ally might work (that's a BIG might) and I won't go into the details of why that strategy is the antithesis of "Bringun' democracy to thuz the Arabs peoples".

Heck, we've used the "bribe and arm the local thugs" strategy so effectively in the past in places like Iran (the Shah, Iran Contra), Vietnam, and "pick any" South or Central American country. Boy, after such success, I'm suprised we even have to discuss it and I think Bush and Dick "not in the face" Cheney should just go for it.

Those silly turn of the century British who got "the hell out and pretend that in no way -- in no way!-- was success ever possible" could've learned a thing or two from our "grand new plan". Too bad our understanding of human psychology back then wasn't as sophisticated as it is today.

Of course, I would have to go and forget the best example of the "bribe, arm and train" strategy which occurred in the 1980's in Afghanistan.

I haven't checked in on how the Afghanis are doing for a while, but I'm certain that Afghanistan must be a stable, thriving democracy and a staunch US ally by now. The local "leaders" (one of them was called Osmamna, Okenabna, or something or other) are probably eternally grateful for our assistance in ridding their war torn country of the "red menace".

I'm quite certain the same strategy will work wonders in the Sunni region of Iraq as we jointly purge the area of those dastardly terrorists infiltrating the country from Afghanistan. It's a no brainer, people!

BTW, I'm not an anthropologist (I just play one on the internet), but if you visit your local college campus and track a down a for-real anthropologist (you know, one of the pointy-headed professor types), gently push him/her to the ground and tickle him/her until they can't stand it anymore, they'd probably eventually concede that someone who believes that tribalism, duplicity, susceptibility to bribes, "acting in one's own self interest", and blindly following the "I have it on God's authority" edicts issued by their designated leader, are attributes that are unique to "Arab Culture" and the "Arab Environment" might not just be deluding themselves but may also be subscribing to a behavioral philosophy that smells just the tiniest bit like eugenics.

And, I'm spent...

Part of the problem with Matt and Lynch's critique here is that they fail to acknowledge the spectacular cruelty of Qaeda when it controlled Anbar. There is a lot dissembling from the netleft on AQI, preferring to play a shell game with numbers and not acknowledging that the Islamic State of Iraq and Mujahadin Shura Council gave AQI foreign leadership effective control of most of the Sunni insurgency in 2006. Thus an outfit like Ansar al Sunna, which calls itself al Qaeda in Kurdistan, is not counted as AQI and is instead just Sunni insurgents.

Anyway, let's just call them Islamosadists. The Islamosadists ran Ramadi, Fallujah and most of Anbar in 2006. This is based on the Marine Corps memo in August of that year cited by Ricks and others at the time. I remember those arguing for precipitous withdrawal citing the Anbar situation as one of the reasons we should leave. Well life under the Islamosadists was a form of slavery. Reporters who have been there, not to mention the soldiers who served there and sheikhs who have led the rebellion, report unspeakable cruelties--joy divisions, mutilation as punishment for mild heresies, child murder etc.. In the early days of the rebellion, the Islamosadists for example delivered a cooler full of the severed heads belonging to the children of tribal sheikhs who opposed them and dumped them in front of the Ramadi hospital. The triumph over this evil and America's role in aiding the rebellion against the child decapitators is one of the most moral applications of American force in the nation's history.

For Mark Lynch, Matt Yglesias, Juan Cole etc... it's just more warlord proxies. After all didn't Abu-Risha used to run some smuggling routes, and hey there are some rumors that he stole some money, and there is this sheikh in Amman who doesn't like him and whoah did you see what Harith al Dhari said. For Yglesias this analysis, which leaves out the unspeakable cruelty part and the triumph of the human spirit over pure evil, is more accurate because you know Mark Lynch talks to Sunnis.

I like Matt even though I disagree with him. I think he and Eric Martin are probably the best the left has at this point. But to ignore and gloss over the fact that Sunni Arabs are actively opposing and killing those who seek to impose Taliban rule in Iraq, that we have found sheikhs who owe a blood debt to what is now our common enemy, is sadly emblematic of the deficient moral reasoning of the anti-war left.


is sadly emblematic of the deficient moral reasoning of the anti-war left.

yes, it's a deep moral failing to celebrate the glorious victory of our deciding to stop using the word "terrorist" to describe one murderous criminal gang so that we can play them against another murderous criminal gang. glory to America! no downside is possible!

And, I'm not spent...

Let's add sadism to that list, n'kay?

"...it's just more warlord proxies". I don't think you stated anything to suggest otherwise.

Oh, and there's this other rumor going around that Abu-Risha may have been one of the ones involved in planning and financing Sunni insurgent operations, brutally suppressing the non-AQI locals (which probably led to his murder by non-AQI locals), and attacking and killing American troops in Anbar before Bush looked into his "soul" and decided "why can't we all just get along". Thank goodness we've been able to stop those AQI sadists by allying ourselves with such righteous upstanding citizens.

Listen, if you want to "win" this unwinnable military blunder by any means necessary, fine, let's get a draft in place and start bombing the shit out of everybody. But can we please drop this conceit that we are somehow doing the Iraqis a favor by propping up the "good guys".

This is based on the Marine Corps memo in August of that year cited by Ricks and others at the time.

The Marine Corps memo groups these various groups together under the rubric of "Islamofascists"? If that's true, that's pretty interesting.

Reconciliation means working with former foes. Mortal enemies cooperate. The 140,000 Americans killed by the Japs... [yadda yadda]

You're arguing that their propagandistic claims of having beaten the Americans make honorable cooperation with those Americans possible. But you're conveniently ignoring the evidence presented by Matt in his final paragraph that that's NOT their objective. They don't want to cooperate with us! Huge majorities want us to leave. Huge majorities think we're making things worse. Huge majorities think it's fine to attack us.

Meanwhile,

Canadian and Brit forces butchered 200 American militia in 1813

Uh, I believe the term is "killed in battle". Or is every American death a butchery?

not to mention, cleek, that the US military is basically just another murderous criminal gang in Iraq, just the one with the biggest guns.

Nothing Eli Lake says is even relevant.

The Anbar chiefs did definitely not like AQI and their increasing influence on the locals.

So maybe they did take SOME action against them - especially if they were being paid to by the US.

This says absolutely nothing about whether they will then turn against the US once they see the need again.

"the triumph of the human spirit over pure evil,"

Oh, please, stupid hyperbole. Like these Iraqi bandits have any such...

Whatever they did, they did it for the money, the influence, and probably a certain amount for revenge.

Ridiculous comments like that are why nobody takes the war supporters even remotely seriously any more. They're more deluded than Scientologists.


Comments closed September 27, 2007.

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