Back in the day, as you'll recall, the reason we couldn't leave
Iraq was that if we did, the (Sunni) insurgents would overthrow the
(Shiite) government. These days, though, the reason we can't leave Iraq
is that (government-backed) Shiite militias will kill Sunni civilians. Does anyone recall when this switch happened? Any guess as to how long before our new wonderful Anbar policy causes the worry to switch back?
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Switcheroo
12 Sep 2007 03:18 pm
Comments (24)
hasn't Eastasia always been at war with Oceania?
I thought it happened when the Golden Mosque bombing happened. If I remember correctly (which I may not), Shia-on-Sunni violence really jumped after that.
It happened the same day that the main reason not to go to war (it will be a quagmire that we won't be able to leave without mass slaughter resulting) became the main reason to stay at war. It will switch back when we need another reason to stay.
hasn't EastasiaEurasia always been at war with Oceania?
Kind of like going into Kosovo to protect the ethnic Albanians and then having to post guards at every Serbian church and neighborhood to protect the ethnic Serbs from the ethnic Albanians.
If we further assume that the risk function f(t) (whose value is risk to Shiite when positive and risk to Sunni when negative -- it was positive before and is negative now) is continuous, then we can prove mathematically that there was a moment when we could have left, the risks being perfectly balanced and f(t) equaled 0!
All this Iraq testimony and fudging around with facts and figures makes the "what the meaning of is is" nonsense with Clinton seem rather quaint.
Well, if you ever find out, post a followup.
As a short answer, I'd say that lucas above has it right.
A longer explanation is that from the time Grand Ayatollah Sistani hijacked our government-transition plans by insisting on real elections (which he then used to push the current Shiite-led coalition into power), the Bushites have been freaking out over their increasingly apparent disinterest in sharing power with Sunnis. So really, from early 2005 you had pressure for re-Baathification, particularly in the army/police, which escalated gradually as it was clear Team Shiite wasn't giving in.
One escalation point was when the second elections were held at the end of 2005, and we started our campaign to oust Jaafari in favor of (it turned out) Maliki. In January '06 Zalmay Khalilzad admitted we were trying to negotiate with Sunni insurgents, and I joked at that time that "contrary to our delusion of the Sunni insurgents being lured into joining an American-sponsored, unified Iraqi government and fighting al-Qaeda, they think they can flip us into joining them to resist Team Shiite. And their wishful thinking may actually have a stronger base in reality than ours does."
The Golden Mosque bombing happened during this time, and much of the rest of 2006 was spent with the Shiite militias that had been built up in 2005 flexing their muscles. Later in the year, Dick Cheney got called on the carpet by the Saudis, and I think the new policy became quietly official sometime soon thereafter.
Kind of like going into Kosovo to protect the ethnic Albanians and then having to post guards at every Serbian church and neighborhood to protect the ethnic Serbs from the ethnic Albanians.
Except not so much, because in the Kosovo case the massacres were already happening *before* the US intervened to stop them, whereas in Iraq, the US intervention *started* the whole mess. (And yes, Saddam was bad, but we're talking about widespread sectarian killing, and that wasn't happening under him.)
I think this occurred shortly after Dick Cheney flew to Saudi Arabia to meet with King Abdullah (2005). Word is that Dick got an earful about the situation in Iraq. Perhaps Abdullah's threat to openly support Sunni insurgents in Iraq got the point across.
I suspect that at some point, it penetrated even the adminstration's thick skulls that installing a pro-Iranian Shiite government in Baghdad is somewhat inconsistent with their policy of confrontation with Iran . . .
It's also probably not unrelated to all that money, time and effort we put into training up the (Shi'ite) army and police. Glad to see that it's had some effect after all. Only not a really helpful one
Fostert wins the prize -- the Saudis woodshedding of Cheney.
This reminds me of the US policy of keeping Iran and Iraq at each other, but tilting in favor of whichever side was in danger of losing. It's like we've just moved the dividing line a ways to the west.
The Samarra bombing is probably a useful marker, though it was more about locking in place the tensions that were already present. It's certainly one of the bigger markers after the April 2004 Sadrist revolt, which came after Viceroy Jerry shut down the Sadrist newspaper, and the late 2005 political wranglings.
It's also important to recognise the way those much-vaunted elections cemented sectarianism. That's perhaps one of the few areas where Northern Ireland offers an precedent: when the main organised parties are essentially the political wings of sectarian militias, then you end up with sectarian party identification and sectarian politics. Every purple finger meant an Iraqi picking a side, not just in politics.
In more stable countries, there's a compelling rationale for graduated transition to democracy. Why? Because a non-militant polity needs time to emerge in an environment where the dominant political forces are ones that survived persecution and hardened as a result.
That sounds unfair to those who led the internal resistance to Saddam and suffered greatly as a result. But internal resistance groups generally make bad replacement governments.
Oh yes. It started in then beginning of the year when the White House fired Phil Zelikow, replacing him with Elliot Cohen and Cheney held secret talks with the Saudis. Then we started hearing about the Iranian IEDs. That's when Bush changed sides and decided to send 5 combat brigades to Iraq to reduce Sadr City to flaming ruin and, in general, harsh on the Shi'ites.
Now Bush is using the Georgian to militarize the Iranian border with Iraq, which was de-militarized by the invasion.
Barry makes a good point. I think the Saudis just want to make sure the dividing line isn't on the Saudi border.
"Kind of like going into Kosovo to protect the ethnic Albanians and then having to post guards at every Serbian church and neighborhood to protect the ethnic Serbs from the ethnic Albanians.
Posted by danceswithgoats | September 12, 2007 4:06 PM"
Groups like the KLA ended up killing 1,500 ethnic Serbs in Kosovo. We also didn't lose troops in Kosovo. How many Sunnis and Shi'ites have killed each other in Iraq?
Does anyone recall when this switch happened? Any guess as to how long before our new wonderful Anbar policy causes the worry to switch back?
There's no switch. These two arguments are going on simultaneously. It's a product of the administration's habit of using vague definitions to describe the conflict. We're fighting with the Iraqis against the enemy/insurgents/al Qaeda/terrorists/dead-enders/people who hate us for our freedoms/...etc..
Even the latest success is contradictory. The good news from Anbar is proof of the success of the surge, despite the fact that the Sunni leaders we're giving aid to are directly hostile to the central government that the surge was meant to reinforce.
This has always been a P.R. campaign. They're trying to win on points, but they aren't really fighting for or against anything. That's why our soldiers consider all Iraqis hostile and most Iraqis would just like us gone.
Reality Man - so your point is that all the historical analogies on this page are useless? I think it accurate to say that the tactics and strategy on the ground during the Kosovo intervention changed rapidly upon arriving there. If you want to do a historical comparison of losses I will be forced to trot out my data on KIA in one day at Antietam or the fact that we are at about D+3 in Normandy casualty rates with a roughly equal sized force in Iraq after four + years.
"Now Bush is using the Georgian to militarize the Iranian border with Iraq, which was de-militarized by the invasion."
You're right. And I forgot about the Georgian troops.
Right now, the US is building a military base for 300-odd US troops four miles from the Iranian border and a set of fortified checkpoints.
The Brits are also sending an estimated 300 troops to the Iranian border.
Next up: firefights with "IRFC infiltrators", "Iranian border guards", "artillery exchanges", "cross-border incursions" by both sides, then air strikes into Iran - and then full-scale war.
This is the new Bush-Cheney plan to start a war with Iran. No longer is the Iranian (non-existent) "nuclear weapons program" relevant. The Iranians won that by diplomacy by agreeing with the IAEA to clear up remaining issues - because they, too, can see that Bush intends to attack them, and they intend to deprive him of any reasons associated with their nuclear energy program.
So Bush and Cheney switched reasons.
It's that simple.
And, yet, ninety percent of the so-called "progressive" bloggers and Democrats can't see that.
They completely ignored Petraeus's testimony the other day about how Iran was creating a "Hezbollah-like force" in Iraq to "attack the Iraqi government" - you know, the government whose current leader went to Iran and praised them for their assistance in stabilizing Iraq...
If you can't see where this is going, you have glaucoma and should see an eye specialist immediately.
danceswithgoats: "If you want to do a historical comparison of losses I will be forced to trot out my data on KIA in one day at Antietam or the fact that we are at about D+3 in Normandy casualty rates with a roughly equal sized force in Iraq after four + years. "
I think that your screen name is well-selected.
Comments closed September 26, 2007.
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Heads in the Sand
A AND (NOT A) = TRUE
Posted by Jeffrey Davis | September 12, 2007 3:30 PM