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The Trouble With Polarization

22 Sep 2007 02:41 pm

Andrew posts an extended meditation from a reader on Marc Bloch's theory, outlined in Strange Defeat that, as the reader puts it, "the extreme polarization of the 1930s fatally weakened the Third Republic, sowing disunity when the Hitlerite threat demanded precisely its opposite." It's a fascinating book, and well-worth reading (as is Ernest May's counterpoint, Strange Defeat) but it's worth saying that there are some real failures of analogy here. Indeed, the reader himself concedes:

Now, I don't mean by this that Bin Laden or Ahmedinejad are comparable with Hitler, as all the Michael Ledeens of the world would have it; the NRO crowd is seemingly incapable of understanding the inherent subtlety of historical comparison, the necessary lack of a 1:1 correspondence between any two epochs -- this is why it's always 1938 for them. However, we would be remiss if we ignored the cautionary example of another great democracy undone by political polarization.

But on top of that, though there clearly is a sense in which current American politics is very polarized, there's another sense in which our levels of polarization are almost trivial compared to 1930s France. We don't have a substantial revolutionary Communist movement here in the United States, nor a monarchist movement, nor do we have an officer's corps that's generally skeptical of civilian command and republican governance. Indeed, even compared to the United States of forty years ago when you had a lot of votes going to George Wallace on a white supremacist platform and substantial intellectual support for the idea of convergence between the Soviet and American economic models, our politics is conducted across a pretty narrow ideological spectrum.

What's new in America isn't polarization in that sense, but the rise of partisan polarization organized around two fairly coherent political parties. The good news about this is that it's mostly an inevitable consequence of the decline of Jim Crow. The bad news is that the country has a set of political institutions that weren't designed with competition between two ideologically coherent parties in mind. That's creating a lot of problems, a lot of frustrations, and a lot of intra-party tensions. But it's not nearly the same thing as a society being ripped apart over the sort of profound ideological differences you saw in interwar Europe.

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Comments (33)

I wouldn't call either the Republican Party or Democratic Party "ideologically coherent", but otherwise point taken.

Every polarizing crisis is an opportunity to find a new identity and new confidence. This is not about left vs right or elephants vs donkey's but about the torn forces within every individual in America and in the West.

On one hand we're proud of our lives and America (the West) and on the other we acknowledge many shortcomings. But due to the polarization it always switches between blind arrogant euphoria and the worst kind of (self-)bashing? Not being perfect is normal - nobody is. A new balance will be found (as nobody can handle being too torn for long) and eventually will fade away again...

Still - the exercise of putting oneself in somebody else's position (or better, condition) should be mandatory in schools?

Geopolitical futurologists talk about a monopolar world, and in the US we have political monopolarization. One party is militant, extreme, ideological, and uncompromising, and the other party is run by weenie Stockholm-syndrome battered-wife accomodationists.

One notable point about Europe between the World Wars is the way that fear of Communism ultimately led many decent conservatives and centrists to cooperate with the authoritarians, thugs and Nazis. In the US a lot of conservatives have supported with Bush's multiply-disastrous program, knowing full well how bad it is, because they find it unthinkable to cooperate with liberals or Democrats. But there are no Communists lurking in the wings to take over; it's Hillary Clinton whom they hate.

They really have no excuse. They are sick puppies, and Sullivan may still be one of them. He certainly was one of them until two or three years ago.

It's not quite clear what you mean by "ideology" and how important you think it was to the rise of the Natzis, etc. There are, for example, people who point to economic conditions first when trying to explain the Thirties. Or injured nationalism. Or unsettled issues from WWI. And so on.

If forced to choose between Strange Defeat and Strange Defeat, I'll choose Strange Defeat every time.

The problem with striving to avoid some dangers is that, by doing so too hard or otherwise in the wrong way, one runs afoul of others that are as bad or worse. We avoid polarization by having no party that is in any meaningful sense 'left'. Among other things, this means we lose the broadening effect such a party would have on public discourse; as a result, the range of possibilities that are even open to public discussion is absurdly narrow. If our politics are less polarized than they seem, it's not because there is reasonable level of cooperation between opposed interests, a rational modus vivendi, though that may have been true of some parts of our history, but because all the polarizing is being done by from the right, by a party which is, or leading elements of which are, incipiently fascist. On the other side is a limp punching bag of a party that earns the conempt of both its supporters and opponents. To make matters more confusing, the right wing party--in a near perfect example of projection--is constantly accusing its opponents of occupying a crazy fringe position, selling the nation short to promote narrow sectional interests and so on, i.e., of being the source of the polarization for which it isitself responsible.

What we do not have is "partisanship" in the sense of "partisans."


This 'narrow band' you speak of is primarily artifical. It exists only among the elite and the media. In the general populace there is a lot more support for various 'extremes' than Matt thinks. They just don't have anyone to vote for. This doesn't make them any less hateful towards one another.

Matt: are you using "coherent" when you mean "congruent?" That is--are you saying Dems and Reps have basically the same goals?

I agree with your initial assertion--"our levels of polarization are almost trivial compared to 1930s France" but after that I'm totally lost--what exactly does "The bad news is that the country has a set of political institutions that weren't designed with competition between two ideologically coherent parties in mind" mean?


As long as we keep hearing about 1938, can I ask whether _Germany_ was "polarized" back then? In the sense the term seems to be used by those who long for "unity", I'm guessing Germany was _not_. Fat lot of good "unity" did for Germany, in the end.

The problem with our current "polarization" is not that there are two conflicting ideologies in America. It is that the adherents of each are roughly equally numerous. If the Dems win the White House, increase their margin in the House, and get a filibuster-proof majority in the Senate, next year, will the nation be less "polarized", or not?

-- TP

...the rise of partisan polarization organized around two fairly coherent political parties. The good news about this is that it's mostly an inevitable consequence of the decline of Jim Crow

Rather, I think, the continuation of Jim Crow by other means. There's a White Peoples' Party, and an Everything Else Party.

Canalizing racial and ethnic tensions into party politics has kept the body count down, but doesn't do much for civic cohesion.

Soullite is half right. There isn't much ideological polarization in this country, in the sense of people who desire revolutionary socialism or absolute monarchy, but there is a tremendous amount of political sentiment that the elite media would consider to be "extreme."

It's a "narrow band" of issues that divide us, but these are issues of tremendous cultural and moral significance. War vs. Peace, Sacred vs. Secular, Nationalism vs. Multiculturalism. These divisions can't be wished away with Broderesque bipartisan mumbling. They will be, and ought to be, contested forcefully.

Now, I don't mean by this that Bin Laden or Ahmedinejad are comparable with Hitler, blah blah blah

How about Ledeen, Andrew, his reader, and everyone pushing any variant of this argument get back to me when Bin Laden or Ahmedinejad control a country with major industrial capability and a war machine that rivals not just their neighbors' but the major world powers'.

The second book should be Strange Victory.

Matt: are you using "coherent" when you mean "congruent?"

I'm pretty sure he means "coherent". As in, imagine you are given a list of a random representative's positions on a few prominent issues. You could probably predict which party that representative was a member of to a very high degree of accuracy.

Re: Aaron S. Veenstra --

Well, as the "Reader" who wrote the letter to Sullivan, I should make clear that I was trying to undermine the Ledeen position, not shore it up. Perhaps I wasn't explicit enough.

My point was to show that extreme polarization is not so hot overall, and that it reduces our ability to respond to real threats. I think, for instance, global warming is orders of magnitude more of a threat than Al Qaeda, but polarization (and to be fair, I would entirely blame the American Right on this one) is making it impossible to move forward on it. What Obama gets is that we can do an end-run around the Right's us-vs.-them attitude not by developing a similar one on the Left, but by appealing to transcending notions of republicanism (small "r").

Moreover, as I said, anyone who takes historical analogy to a level of 1:1 comparison is not thinking seriously, so I wonder whether Matt and Aaron, while having good points about ways in which my analogy fails, are taking my point: of course we don't have Third Wave Feminists fighting in the streets with Right-to-Lifers, but I do think we can learn something from the example of interwar France.

I am surprised that the GOP's uber-partisan attempted neutering of the Clinton presidency has not been connected more to 9/11.

Assuming that the administration allows an election to take place in 2008, that a Democrat wins, and is allowed to take office, I can think of several ways to bring the polarization down to a dull roar, starting by destroying the Republican brand for a generation by opening the executive branch to investigation, and by purging all the Christianist sleeper cells, stay behind agents, and moles that Bush will have seeded the agencies with. Because a weak Republican party and a government much more immune to sabotage and looting by ideologues would decrease polarization, n'est c'est pas?

Unfortunately, that's unlikely to happen. What Matt would call polarization I would call variance of opinion within an extremely narrow band (vide: The Overton Window). A truly polarized debate would include broad-spectrum ideas like abolishing corporate personhood, a real discussion of America's imperial role, and some thought to the consequences of events like a melting polar ice cap.

One reason polarization so defined will continue is that it's in the interest of the Democrat consultant class to keep races close, since they make their money where margins are right. (This would explain why you don't see massive voter registration drives taking place, or drives to make low information voters higher information voters.) Why the Democrat Party itself -- show my something, guys, and I'll start calling you the Democratic Party again -- buys into the notion that they can't be America's natural governing majority for another generation I don't know, but they don't. Curious.

"Interwar Europe" is a bit of a stretch.

France invaded Germany in 1923.

It went about as well as America's invasion of Iraq.

The Ruhr Crisis, as the failed invasion is called, played a significant role in France and England's decisions on how to handle Hitler's rise.

So, maybe America today does have a lot in common with "Interwar" France.

The current situation in America is just like how the fans of the Blue chariot team and the fans of the Green chariot team started a civil war in ancient Constantinople.

It sounds stupid, but the fighting among the sports fans got so severe that the The Emperor Justinian was ready to flee, but his wife, the ex-prostitute Empress Theodora, told him "A throne makes a fine coffin," so he stopped melting down, sent his eunuch general and a few thousand loyal troops, and they slaughtered all the rioting sports fans.

Hmmhmmm ... Well, so maybe the current situation in America isn't just like the ancient Byzantine empire after all, but it was such a fun bit of history I had to bung it in there anyway even though it wrecks my analogy.

The current situation in America is just like how the fans of the Blue chariot team and the fans of the Green chariot team started a civil war in ancient Constantinople.

FYI: the "color" factions in Constantinople were associated with political parties as well as sports teams. So a more correct contemporary analogy would be the fans of the "Texas Elephants" battling it out post-game in the parking lot with the fans of the "New England Donkeys."

Ben, you write, "Or maybe we really are pretty screwed, and Obama gets this."

Actually, it's exactly the opposite. This type of "transcending" will always present itself as a viable strategy so long as two political parties remain legitimate contenders for power. In that dynamic, the Lorenz attractor is located at the floating middle, creating a centrifuge that tends to throw out the most extreme prescriptions even while our freedoms guarantee their preservation and accessibility, just in case.

Because this floating middle must continually be reconquered, the advantage always accrues to the politician who is smart enough to divine it and savvy enough to claim it. And, since the subsequent "message" is essentially a mirror, the image coming back is most marketable when displayed in a flattering light (we are a vain species). Thus, when the opportunity to claim the floating middle arrives -- as it does in generational cycles -- the message is almost always one of optimism and transcendence.

The net effect of this dynamic on the prescriptions of the political parties is an evolution toward the mean, at least in most cases. Only sudden injections of novel data into the system -- crises like economic collapse or war -- can stop, reverse, or destroy this behavior.

In other words, we are far from screwed.

What's new in America isn't polarization in that sense, but the rise of partisan polarization organized around two fairly coherent political parties.

Steve Sailer beat me too it. While I would never argue that there is not a "dime's worth of difference" between the two parties, I also wouldn't say they are particularly coherent ideologically. Each has a few core ideological units, but the units are bound in tenuous coalitions to other units by quirky historical contingencies, and the core units are embedded in a softer matrix of ideologically indistinct accretions, randomly added to the coalitions as they meander through history, breaking and recombining.

The intense partisan identification these days frequently resembles the "sportif" identification experienced by fans of sports teams. It is built out of social and community identifications that are not in themselves inherently ideological, and also out of a fundamentally groundless and arbitrary kind of identification that can attract people to the fan base of a sports team to which they have no other discernible ties. People just have a tendency to form and join teams. They are team-forming animals. If they have no team, they will find one and join it, and may even become quite devoted to it for no other reason than the fact that it is their team.

Bu people also seem to have a need to believe that their political and religious affiliations are fundamentally ideological in nature, so they rationalize their identification by hypostasizing or exaggerating vague ideological similarities and dissimilarities, and imagine yawning gulfs between their own group and the alter-group.

My impression is that the tendencies toward team-building and team-joining are intensified by conditions of social stress. Widespread, frustration, resentment, aggression, fear, insecurity, loss of control and forced competition will make people join teams and then identify competing teams as the causal sources of their dissatisfaction. If it is true that Americans are more partisan now than at other times in the past, I would look less for ideological coherence as a cause, and more at the broader social factors that are making people more eager to form passionate attachments to some team or other, and more prone to indulge in intense hatred toward competing teams.

There is also the magnification factor of the internet admixed with 24 hour cable news.

Most people I know are casual fans. They may dress up in their team's uniform on game day, but the rest of the week they are busy with their own dramatic lives.

And to take this metaphor even further, not very many believe that the game on Sunday will fix their problems.

Bush is right about one thing. History will judge him as one of the most important leaders in modern times— but not in a way he images in his cartoon-like delusions.

The great gift of George Bush is a collective lesson and wake up call regarding the threats of a democracy when its leader is a petty, indecent, unintelligent, narcissist.

The public is not all that polarized, but is relatively moderate, practical, forthright and non-ideological.

Bush on the other hand (and his core cadre of Kristols, AEI, Hyatts, and FOX), embodies a radical, anti-democratic, authoritarian view of power.

Like all despots and ideologues, their ends justify any means, including the rejection of traditional political norms and values—the public is to be deceived to serve their ends, not informed.

The “rule of law”-- the fundamental value that enables a pluralistic public to function as a democracy, and world powers to behave predictably and legitimately, has been obliterated by Bush Co. THIS IS NOT AMERICA.

The idea of convergence between the US and USSR economic models may seem quaint, but some facets of the current American political system sure look to be quite close the the Soviet system.

Ben--

I understand what you're saying, but my point is that there is simply no point in *any* comparison between these two and Hitler, unless you also want to spend time comparing them to Napoleon, Pol Pot, Genghis Khan, Cortes, and all the other would-be world-conquerors, not to mention the ones that never got off the ground in the first place. It's not just that Bin Laden and Hitler aren't 1:1 analogues, it's that Bin Laden and Hitler have nothing significant in common. Any would-be refutation of the neocon thinking on this issue that doesn't point this out doesn't go far enough.

Aaron: Respectfully, you're missing the point. What Ben was comparing is the polariziation, and how that polariziation can weaken a country's ability to respond to a threat. He wasn't comparing the threats.

Political polarization and foreign threats

The Weimar Republic is an even clearer example of a polity internally divided, and faced with foreign threats, than is the Third Republic. Is the US, in 2007, more likely to make the Third Republic's mistake, and underplay the signifigance of the foreign threat, or Weimar's mistake, and overplay the need for strong government untrammeled by the need to follow the rule of law, and the ruthless use of military force on foreign countries?

Insofar as we don't already have an empirical answer, consider two factors that would tell you that we would be more likely to make the second error than the first. For one thing, if you respnded to at all, it would be difficult to do anything but overplay the importance of the highly underwhelming threat posed by al Qaeda. They call it asymmetric warfare precisely because we have all the big battalions on our side. Perhaps more importantly, this military predominance of ours far exceeds the marginal advantage in some areas that the Third Reich enjoyed over its adversaries. We are under far greater temptation to turn to miltary solutions, because our military predominance is so great that its limitations are not evident to the casual observer or voter.

No, what I'm doing is saying that the point is null. The political atmosphere of 1930's France is of no more salience to our current situation than any other political climate selected at random from throughout history. The "undoing" of France noted by Ben, indirectly "due to political polarization," was directly caused by the Nazi regime. If Bin Laden is not the same as Hitler -- and as I've pointed out, they share no important characteristics -- then focusing on a domestic political status that was exploited by the Nazis makes no sense, not the least because France was actually at risk of being physical conquered and occupied, which the United States is not.

re: It's not just that Bin Laden and Hitler aren't 1:1 analogues, it's that Bin Laden and Hitler have nothing significant in common.

Not quite nothing. There's the anti-Semitism for one thing. Indeed, much of today's Muslim anti-Semitism is not the traditional anti-Judaism of the religion, but rather a direct Nazi import. And then of course there's the notion that any atrocity is justified in acheiving one's political goals.

I would submit that liberal democracy, as conventionally understood, is just as deeply in disrepute among the religious right in the US 2007 as it was among fascists and communists in Germany 1933.

The major difference is that in the US 2007, there is no corresponding movement on the left to fight them. Let's see how well that works out.

Not quite nothing. There's the anti-Semitism for one thing.

Sure -- they're also both men. Neither of those things has any bearing on their relative world-conquering abilities, particularly as relates to the United States.


Comments closed October 06, 2007.

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