This is a subject I've written about several times before, but it continues to be mind-boggling that even our new Petreausified, hip-to-COIN version of MNF-Iraq keeps relying so heavily on air power as a combat tactic. This simply won't work. But it's also a key signal that "surge" or no "surge" there are nowhere near enough American soldiers in Iraq to make anything like a proper counterinsurgency strategy viable. Nor are there enough such soldiers anywhere in the US military. And on the list of things not worth doing unless you're able to do them right, fighting wars ranks pretty high.
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Adventures in Aerial Counterinsurgency
07 Oct 2007 10:18 am
Comments (12)
In this regard, go to Hullaballoo of two days ago and read the commentary on Andrew Bacevich's piece in the American Conservative on Patraeus.
The thesis: If Patreaus really thought the surge was working he would have used his September clout and political influence to have asked for more troops, not announced a withdrawl. Real generals always reenforce success, not pull back when they have the enemy on the run.
The obvious conclusion, Patraeus knows the strategy isn't working, so he did not ask for more, he went along with Bush's political agenda instead. And when things aren't working, air power is always the resort. Everyone killed by an air strike can be labeled an Al Queda member.
Jim
No one is counting the contractors either. 120,000 of them doubles the total in Iraq. How many more do we need to "win"? For comparison, after Tet, Westmoreland was supposed to have asked for another 200,000, which would have brought the total in Vietnam to about 800,000. Is that what they want in Iraq? Would it be enough? Where are they going to come from, a draft?
Remember, the game is to spin the war out so it becomes Hillary's war.
The alternative to CAS (close air support) is indirect fire support from mortars or artillery. They cause much more collateral damage than precision air dropped munition.
If we use no fire support at all we get a lot more dead maneuver troops when they run into "at least 25 Shiite militia fighters" armed with AKs and RPGs. Or we let them get away.
Or we pull out. I know you prefer that, but if we are going to make any attempt to kill insurgents in Iraq we're going to either accept air strikes and the ensuing collateral damage or much, much higher US casualties.
If we use no fire support at all we get a lot more dead maneuver troops when they run into "at least 25 Shiite militia fighters" armed with AKs and RPGs. Or we let them get away.
Or we pull out. I know you prefer that, but if we are going to make any attempt to kill insurgents in Iraq we're going to either accept air strikes and the ensuing collateral damage or much, much higher US casualties.
A few thoughts about this Dylan:
First, we don't know that they were "insurgents." Actually, given their Shiite identity, I don't think it likely, or even alleged. You seem to acknowledge this in the first cited paragraph above, but in the second, switch to insurgents.
Which gets to one of the points I was making: we are, ostensibly, adopting a COIN posture in the middle of a far more complex conflict that is actually better described in the plural. Because of the nature of the conflict - and the rampant lawlessness that has spawned local militias and vigilantism - we are bound to make many mistakes and take unnecessary military actions against groups that we don't necessarily need to confront. That may or may not have been the case in the article cited - depending on which side is describing the incident.
But the second paragraph aboves sums it up nicely - and was a point I was trying to make: we can't do successful COIN in Iraq unless we sacrifice many more soldiers.
But if we're not willing to make that sacrifice - and I don't think we should - why should we be engaging in military tactics that are doomed to ultimate failure because of their inherent flaws? Unless someone wants to explain to me how we can employ frequent air strikes that end up killing scores of civilians while simultaneously winning over those same civilians.
Having played my small role in the unpleasantness of CounterInsurgency (DaNang 66-67), I think I can say three simple things on the subject. 1. If you are using air strikes you are losing. 2. If you are calling in artillery you are losing. 3. If you are using body counts, you lost a long time ago and are grasping at straws to support your need to deny the facts. The definition of a VietCong: a dead VietNamese (and a fucking lifer who needed a 'good' body count).
And on the list of things not worth doing unless you're able to do them right, fighting wars ranks pretty high.
Here we must define what we mean by "fighting wars right."
If by this term, we mean in some broad or ordinary sense achieving some sort of tactical or strategic military victory in Iraq or in the so-called Global War on Terror, then Matthew may very well by correct.
However, if by this term, we instead mean using events in Iraq as an excuse to fund defense contractors, then Matthew is very wrong. Mere tactical or strategic futility would, under this alternative definition, be no barrier to funding these contractors and, conceivably, even constitute a basis for greater funding.
John Paul Vann:
This is a political war and it calls for discrimination in killing. The best weapon for killing would be a knife, but I'm afraid we can't do it that way. The worst is an airplane. The next worst is artillery. Barring a knife, the best is a rifle - you know who you're killing.
The biggest mistake this country ever made was creating an independent air force.
Combat missions are what make careers and that's why you are always, always, going to see air power overused. I really don't think you can change this dynamic without folding the USAF back into the army and firing all the top brass.
Jesus isn't generally a name one thinks of with respect to this subject, but (Luke 14:31-32):
Or suppose a king is about to go to war against another king. Will he not first sit down and consider whether he is able with ten thousand men to oppose the one coming against him with twenty thousand? If he is not able, he will send a delegation while the other is still a long way off and will ask for terms of peace.
"The alternative to CAS (close air support) is indirect fire support from mortars or artillery. They cause much more collateral damage than precision air dropped munition."
Yes - if you're fucking stupid enough to use them in an urban environment. Which happens to be the point here.
"If we use no fire support at all we get a lot more dead maneuver troops when they run into "at least 25 Shiite militia fighters" armed with AKs and RPGs. Or we let them get away."
Oh, gee - I guess our soldiers are only allowed to fight the enemy when we have overwhelming superiority so that the enemy just automatically surrenders to us without a shot being fired.
News flash to our "brave soldiers" - war is hell. People actually shoot at you in war. If you can't deal with that, get the fuck out of the military.
"Or we pull out. I know you prefer that, but if we are going to make any attempt to kill insurgents in Iraq we're going to either accept air strikes and the ensuing collateral damage or much, much higher US casualties."
You're a moron.
First of all, your entire argument boils down to: civilian lives are less valuable than US soldiers lives.
This attitude is called "war crimes" by the Geneva Convention. People get to go to jail and be executed by firing squad for that attitude.
Second, had a PROPER counterinsurgency been started BEFORE the INSURGENCY started - i.e., in April and May of 2003, it is just theoretically possible that today we wouldn't have 160,000 troops fighting maybe 50-75,000 insurgents, but far fewer.
And had proper counterinsurgency tactics been applied back then, US troops would have adopted an entirely different methodology than going around in full uniform kicking in doors and searching Muslim women and arresting anybody who looked at them cross-eyed.
I love these psuedo-informed "military experts" who weigh in and claim BULLSHIT as their military strategy.
Close air support is appropriate for combat in a jungle, in a desert, in open fields, etc. It is NOT appropriate - and thus is a WAR CRIME - conducted in an urban environment where people are actually living there. In a bombed out urban environment - which kinda presupposes it already WAS a war crime - maybe you could do it.
All your argument is is an excuse for the lame and malicious incompetents we call the US military.
No one is counting the contractors either. 120,000 of them doubles the total in Iraq. How many more do we need to "win"? For comparison, after Tet, Westmoreland was supposed to have asked for another 200,000, which would have brought the total in Vietnam to about 800,000. Is that what they want in Iraq? Would it be enough? Where are they going to come from, a draft?
Remember, the game is to spin the war out so it becomes Hillary's war.
Posted by John Bennett | October 7, 2007 11:19 AM
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Two thirds of those are logistic people cooking meals and repairing aircraft. Even the ones that are armed aren't undertaking offensive operations. Apples and oranges.
Comments closed October 21, 2007.
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Heads in the Sand
Just one quibble -- we're not fighting a war. A counterinsurgency against ever-shifting alliances in a country where the vast majority want US troops out and believe attacks on US troops are justified -- not a war.
Posted by Gore/Edwards 08 | October 7, 2007 10:57 AM