Goal Posts

Ross charges:

And I detect some goalpost-shifting here among the partisans of immediate withdrawal. Back in September, when Petraeus was testifying and the fur was flying, Matt was making roughly the same point that he and Julian and Brian Doherty are making now, except that he was saying things like "maybe Bush can change his line to the idea that if we just keep staying the course for 4 or 5 more years, casualties will drop massively because everyone will already be dead or displaced." Now it's less than two months later, the violence has continued to diminish, and Matt's response is: "After all, internecine violence in Iraq won't continue forever and since most ethnically mixed neighborhoods have already been cleansed, it's at least plausible that the worst is behind us." And he's right - it is at least plausible. But given that only six weeks ago he was throwing out "4 or 5 more years" as a timeline for when Iraq might start to settle down, I think it's also "at least plausible" that when we look back on the last year of American military operations in Iraq, we'll judge them to have played a major role in putting the worst behind us earlier than most people anticipated.

Well, okay, maybe I'm shifting the goal posts. Or maybe there's no inconsistency between the idea that "the worst" violence and ethnic cleansing are now behind us, but that it'll take "4 or 5 more years" are continued violence and ethnic cleansing for Iraq to really settle down. After all, my recollection is that most people regarded the level of violence prevailing in Iraq in late 2003 to be unacceptable and had high hopes that Saddam Hussein's capture would reduce it. Instead, things were worse in 2004 than they were in 2003. Then in 2005, things were worse than they were in 2004. And then in 2006 things were even worse than they'd been in 2005. Now 2007 looks set to be not-quite-as-bad on average as 2006 was. Maybe the downward trend will continue.

On the other hand, maybe things will get worse. Maybe Turkey will invade Kurdistan. Maybe you'll see an uptick in ethnic cleansing elsewhere. Either way, though, for the purposes of this debate the relevant goalposts aren't the timing of declines in violence but the causal mechanism by which they occur. If violence is declining because local areas have already been ethnically cleansed, then the reduction, while preferable to their being more violence, hardly shows that the US military deployment is accomplishing anything worthwhile.

Comments

"If violence is declining because local areas have already been ethnically cleansed,"

This argument might be pesuasive if you gave some evidence for it.

Posted by Dave | October 31, 2007 5:26 PM

iraq is settling down?
that's news, alright.

there is apparently less violence over there, and that's good.

but there's also a whole lot less iraq.

the prospects for a unified, multi-ethnic country--an "iraq" that one could plausibly call by that name--are dimmer than ever.

no progress on revenue sharing. major segments pulling out of parliament. the green-zone goverment paralyzed and powerless. the kurds on their own and up against turkey. the shiites consolidating power in the south, while the sunnis are killed door to door.

'iraq' isn't settling down. it's disintegrating entirely.

Posted by kid bitzer | October 31, 2007 5:33 PM

I don't really follow Douthat, but I if he's followed the standard pro-war conservative line throughout, shouldn't he be wary about making grand pronouncements about turning the corner?

Posted by Gus | October 31, 2007 5:39 PM

I think the technical term for where we're at right now is "waiting for the other shoe to drop".

Posted by serial catowner | October 31, 2007 6:36 PM

It must be such a drag to interact with us mere mortals.

Posted by mickslam | October 31, 2007 6:42 PM

One word: Kirkuk.

Posted by Happy Jack | October 31, 2007 6:56 PM

Kid Blitzer kind of gets it.

Its been clear for a while now - since say mid summer - that the surge has decreased violence in Iraq.

Two massive problems remain:

1) Violence is still very high - as high as it was in early 2006. In addition, a good degree of the decrease in violence is probably unsustainable. In places like Baghdad and Fallujah is predicated on ending normal economic/social life by erecting massive concrete walls around neighborhoods, important buildings, marketplaces, setting up numerous checkpoints, and in the case of Fallujah and some other places, banning automobile traffic. Clearly this is a situation that can't last for ever - and to some degree will not last beyond the middle of 2008, when the "surge" troops will have completely rotated out of theater.

This brings us to the second - and more fundamental - major problem which, of course, is the politics/state craft.

The rendering normal life unviable as a means of achieving security gains for a limited period of time is a perfectly legitimate tactic, and in a moral sense, is perhaps justifiable indefinitely. However, this very unviability is predicated on some sort of political settlement and the establishment of a truly legitimate Iraqi state.

The other clear trend this year - beyond the death reductions - is that the Shi'ite political/religious establishment has little interest in seriously including/negotiating with its adveraries. It is not an accident that they essentially - even so called "moderates" like Maliki - endorsed the massive ethnic cleansing of Baghdad and other places. The goal was to destroy the secular, generally Sunni (but not by any means entirely so) political class that made up the backbone of the former political order they see as the biggest threat to their power, something that has to some extent been achieved - although by no means entirely so. These people are all living in Syria, Jordan, and Sweden if they aren't lying dead in a ditch or a mass grave somewhere in Iraq.

It should be noted that this is kind of the fundamental problem of the whole American enterprise - that the people whose worldview/values most closely align with the American goals for the country are the very people that have lost the most since the invasion - ie the secular political class that was at the heart of the Baathist state. This is a huge irony and I think it is central to why this war/nation building exercise has been so woe-begotten. It should be noted that Ba'athism/Arab nationalism is/was BY NO MEANS an unpopular ideology/aspiration amongst this group, even if many of them may have hated Saddam Hussein. But Bremmer through the baby out with the bathwater - and the "baby" is now either dead or in exile.

Relatedly, another important point to make here is that the various "awakening" groups are not really attached to this secular/Baathist-era political class so integrally and are thus not really the primary target of the ethnic cleansing. Thus, the Anbar Salvation Council is not so threatening to the Shi'ite coalition. In the one sense, this is an optimistic observation. However, it should be noted that tribes like the Dulaim confederacy benefitted from Saddam's regime as well and are thus distrusted by Maliki et al.. There is more room for compromise here. However, a more fundamental problem exists - the US throwing its lot in with such groups is fundamentally antithetical to building a healthy modern state. Many of these tribes' primary loyalty is to their own members. Leaders are respected when they can deliver cash/goods to their members. Behavior we would regard as parasitic and very corrupt is thus seen as perfectly legitimate and perhaps even more honorable than "modern" economic activity. Indeed, many of thse tribes are involved in activities that essentially amount to organized crime - banditry, smuggling, etc. (in fact, this was part of the reason tribes turned against the ISI/Al Qaeda - because they were interfering with their various money-making "rackets" - this was the complete story by any means, but it was/is a factor).

What the current US strategy is doing, in a sense, then - absent any real interest in reconcilitation/power sharing on the part of the Shi'ites - is creating a parallel government (basically the US miltiary) through which the various awakening groups make their money (they aren't arming them for the most part, but they are giving these tribes lots and lots of money).

Yet even in a significant portion of predominantly Sunni areas - in Mosul (Iraq's second largest city, it should be pointed out), Tikrit, Samarra - the awakening strategy hasn't really caught on so much because tribalism is weaker in these areas and the Baathist class is much more intact than in Baghdad.

The South, at this point, is basically a carbon copy of Nigeria. A kleptocracy of rival Shi'ite parties/mafias where the "rule of law" is basically non-existent.

I write so much because I think the understanding of Iraq is poor in this country - at least the contours of the political debate. In sum, I think it is clear the surge has been successful in reducing casualties. The problem is that violence (more importantly) lawlessness is still pervasive and some of the gains have been achieved because of unsustainable tactics (however, I don't think we will see a return to the late 2006/early 2007 levels of violence again even when the surge troop levels go down again). The political problems have, however, remained as bad as they were. They might have even gotten worse if one's goal is creating a modern state, as the secular middle class has been destroyed by this war - partly as a result of disastorous decisions made in the first 12 to 24 months of the war (deBaathification, economic shock therapy, a misguided political process), partly as a result of a deliberate campaign of ethnic cleansing spearheaded by the Mahdi Army but bascially endorsed by the "moderate" religious Shi'ite political class.

Posted by BP | October 31, 2007 6:56 PM

Although Douthat is a pretty dim fellow, his post does reveal, inadvertantly, the deep inadequacy of mainstream withdrawal arguments, which, like occupation arguments, are premised on the idea that the United States is a neutral party, disinterestedly trying to achieve "what's best" for Iraq. And so long as this assumption is held, every decrease in violence--and violence will probably continue to decrease--will necessarily be interpreted as to the credit of the occupation. And how will mainstream withdrawal opponents respond? By prognosticating future calamity? But every calamity is reason for further occupation, for the continued presence of the "good guys" who must remain and mitigate the calamity.

Again, so long everyone continues to pretend that United States is a "neutral party"--and not the self-interested actor that it actually is--withdrawal proponents will remain an impotent force in mainstream debate.

Posted by Mark | October 31, 2007 6:57 PM

I wish you would get these proofread or subedited.

Posted by Ben | October 31, 2007 7:08 PM

I should also note that I think Ross gets at what pains/troubles so many folks about this whole mess.

Like Ross, I think this enetprise was from the start basically foolish and morally dubious, based on misleading demogogic rhetoric and incorrect theories about political development. That said, I think it is correct to say that if the US were to leave, the country would become a lot more violent. I have no "crystal ball" that lets me know this, but I do strongly suspect it is true.

But this said, the fundamental premise Bush wants to stay in Iraq is inoperative and, to my mind, laughable. I.e. that Iraq is going to serve as a sort of Japan that will revolutionize the region into modernity and pro-Americanism. I think when Bush leaves the White House - and especially if a Dem is elected, but even if a GOP candidate is elected - I think we can perhaps reach a bit more common ground on the issue. Bush is too tied to his vision of Iraq and what it means to his "legacy" for the country to have the kind of discussion about the situation we need to have. Well, only 400 days or so to go . . .

Posted by BP | October 31, 2007 7:11 PM

As I state in the thread above this one, the goal is to simply get something - anything - working, so the US forces can move on to Iran. The only reason the US isn't wholesale bombing everybody in Iraq from the air is that it would arouse further opposition from the rest of the world and complicate the intent to move on.

There is NO other "strategy". There is no interest whatsoever in doing anything "for" Iraq per se. The goal is to beat down anybody and everybody who opposes the US in the ME at any cost to civilians, infrastructure or anything else separate from the US intentions, then establish bases and control the oil.

That's the INTENTION. There is NO "strategy", merely INTENTION.

Whether the "surge" is "working" is fundamentally irrelevant. As Matt and Kid Blitzer both say, correctly, the situation is a complete collapse of the nation state of Iraq. This is more significant than whether the level of violence there is 10% or 25% less than at some indefinite point last year.

And it is more significant because it leads to one of two situations: the US can move on to Iran, or it can't. Or at least Cheney thinks it can or can't. Whether Cheney understands - or even cares - that an attack on Iran could mean the loss of US forces in Iraq I don't think is even relevant. The only thing that matters to him is, can we move on to Iran and Syria yet? If not, do something, anything, so we can.

Only the INTENTION counts. Drop Iraq. Fine, it's done. Drop Iran and Syria. That's next up.

That's all that is going on here. Everything else is an irrelevant side show which is dependent on random circumstances on the ground which Bush and Cheney will approach with no particular strategy.

These guys DON'T DO STRATEGY.

And they don't care about Iraqis or US soldiers or anybody else except themselves and their particular cronies and allies. Like the guy in the movie "Megaforce", they look on US soldiers and cry, "They are just numbers! Numbers!"

Anybody arguing over the "surge" is missing the "Big Picture" as Williams Burroughs would say.

Posted by Richard Steven Hack | October 31, 2007 7:13 PM

Solitudinem fecerunt, pacem appelunt - They made a desert and called it peace. (Tacitus)(the real one).

Posted by rea | October 31, 2007 7:21 PM

BP, who do you expect to read a 'comment' that friggin long? It's a comments section, not an essay contest.

Posted by Bill | October 31, 2007 7:23 PM

Richard,

The casualty level has dropped more than that - its more like 50%.

That said, you are right also that Iraq is a failed state.

The US is not fighting the kind of counter-insurgency Petraeus's manual describes, which assumes a coherent oppositional movement opposing and competing for loyalty against a coherent, functional state. Neither of these things exists.

The problem's root is significantly different: that the Iraqi state was destroyed by the US invasion and a series of disastorous decisions made between 2003-2005 - some of which were recognized as mistaken at the time (deBaathification, dismantling the Iraqi army), some of which were basically ignored by the US media (Bremer's radical economic "shock therapy" program), some of which were actually lauded as successes (the elections in 2005, the constitution writing process). In other words, there is no coherent/legitimate state to which to bind those who are not "coopted" by it. Essentially no one is "inside". In the current situation, the boundaries between legitimate actors and "insurgents" is extremely, extremely fluid. What the US has done is to coopt several elements that have grown up as a result of the state collapse that has occurred.

The problem with the current debate about Iraq in this country is that it is seen as purely a question of body counts and armies. The larger political, sociological, and economic context is largely ignored - or if it is addressed, it is only done so in a very superficial manner.

This is also true of the Middle East more generally. In this country, it is generally understood as some sort of "other space" that exists outside the realm of statecraft/economic policy (in terms of the Arab states themselves) and exists only as a realm of religiousity and violence. These, of course, are very important factors as well. But they will and cannot be properly understood if they are connected to a broader, deeper understanding of internal power dynamics, statecraft, political institutions, etc..

Posted by BP | October 31, 2007 7:34 PM

Bill,

Have some patience. You might find yourself enlightened.

Posted by BP | October 31, 2007 7:36 PM

How can anyone allege a "decline in violence", when a couple of dozen bodies are recovered every morning, IEDs are still wreaking havoc, insurgents regularly destroy power transmission towers and major bridges, Blackwater is still there, the Turks are pounding the Mounts Kudi and Kato, sheiks cooperating with "Anbar Awakening" are shot dead, It is Darfur magnified tenfold.

Posted by Nur al-Cubicle | October 31, 2007 8:09 PM

How is the surge supposed to have reduced civilian deaths? In Anbar the Sunni tribes decided to fight al Qaeda. In Baghdad it's possible that successful ethnic cleansing has cut the death rate down.

Though I'd add we don't really know what the death rate is and never have--aside from the Lancet surveys, there are various polls that suggest much larger numbers than are reported in the press, and there's no strong reason to believe that the real death rate is directly proportional to the reported one.

Posted by Donald Johnson | October 31, 2007 8:37 PM

I still maintain that Richard Steven Hack is batshit crazy.

All these people that say that Iraq is a "failed nation"; what the hell was it before we invaded? A cesspit of autocracy and repression. The Kurds had already split before we showed up. The infrastructure was a shambles before we showed up. The Baathist Party rat fucked Iraq long before we showed up. I would like to think that Iraq would have gradually come out of their coma upon the death of Saddam but his sons were as bad as he was. I think we are in the phase of breaking eggs to make omelets. It ain't pretty but it is what it is.

On the other hand, after invading Iraq:

1. Quaddafi (sp?) gave up his WMD program.
2. Saudi Arabia had municipal elections.
3. Kuwait gave women the right to vote.
4. The Lebanese kicked out the Syrians.
5. Al Quada has suffered a defeat in Iraq at the hands of their fellow believers.
6. Every dictator that has it out for the US is on notice that they could get drug out of a hole and hung.

I see all these things as improvements. We still need to muster the will to deal with Islamofascism in all its manifestations but getting it to self destruct is useful.

The ME needs to be reformed. It is not the West, it is them that has the problem. I had a great discussion with a Palistinian in Kuwait and his observations on the ME and Arabs wouldn't fit into the comfortable neo-con conspiracy model.

Posted by danceswithgoats | October 31, 2007 9:35 PM

danceswithgoats should have added, to his list of good things that happened "after invading Iraq":

7. The Red Sox won the World Series. Twice.

There. THAT clinches the argument.

-- TP

Posted by Tony P. | October 31, 2007 10:24 PM

Or maybe there's no inconsistency between the idea that "the worst" violence and ethnic cleansing are now behind us, but that it'll take "4 or 5 more years" are continued violence and ethnic cleansing for Iraq to really settle down.

No, there isn't any inconsistency. And will Iraq "settle down" in 4-5 years? Has the surge changed anything about the underlying and fundamental dynamic in Iraq, the conflict between the Sunnis and the Shiites? Hardly, except to bolster the Sunnis against the Shiite and entrench the Shiites in the national government into power.

Remember, Vietnam had its ups and downs too. The Viet Cong were destroyed for the most part by the Tet offensive, and yet were we any closer to victory? No.

Remember: the illusion of peace is not progress.

Posted by Xanthippas | October 31, 2007 10:27 PM

1. Quaddafi (sp?) gave up his WMD program.
2. Saudi Arabia had municipal elections.
3. Kuwait gave women the right to vote.
4. The Lebanese kicked out the Syrians.
5. Al Quada has suffered a defeat in Iraq at the hands of their fellow believers.
6. Every dictator that has it out for the US is on notice that they could get drug out of a hole and hung.

And this is why kids would do well to pay attention in class, so that they may understand the concept of causality.

Qaddafi was well on his way to giving up what little WMDs he had before Iraq.

Saudi Arabia is busy sending jihadists to Iraq.

I don't even understand what Kuwait has to do with it.

The Lebanese kicked out the Syrians, and were promptly bombed by Israel for their trouble. That actually IS related to Iraq, at least in the sense that the Bush administration thought the same thing would work in Lebanon that worked in Iraq. And that's gone about as well.

Al Qaeda has suffered a blow in a country they maintained no real presence in before the war, which puts us not quite back to square one. At the same time, al Qaeda has grown ever stronger in Pakistan and Afghanistan, a situation we have neither the forces nor the diplomatic energy to deal with.

Every dictator in the world knows that if they can get their hands on WMDs they'll get a deal out of us, like North Korea did. If they don't get them, we'll invade them. Now Iran is pushing for nukes. This was inevitable.

As for breaking a few eggs...well yes, that's a great point, if you're making a sectarian misery omelet.

Posted by Xanthippas | October 31, 2007 10:38 PM

BP: "The casualty level has dropped more than that - its more like 50%."

Which casualty level - ours or Iraqis?

Like I said before, if you follow the Antiwar.com daily listing of Iraqis killed, you don't see any significant drop.

Tuesday:

"Baghdad took the brunt of today’s violence with a number of bombings occurring throughout the city. Overall, 31 Iraqis were killed and 31 more were injured there and in other parts of Iraq. Three MND-C soldiers were killed during an IED attack southeast of the capital as well."

Monday:

Among the latest incidents in Iraq, a suicide bomber killed and wounded dozens of police recruits in Baquba. Another bombing left over 20 dead and injured in Siniya. Overall, at least 87 Iraqis were killed or found dead and 61 more were wounded. No Coalition troops were reported killed.

A U.S. general was injured along with another GI during a roadside bombing in Baghdad.

Sunday:

At least 43 Iraqis were killed or found dead and 61 more were wounded; another 13 people were kidnapped in separate incidents. No Coalition soldiers were reported killed.

Saturday:

As protesters in the U.S. called for an end to the war, at least 68 Iraqis were killed or found dead and 38 more were wounded in the latest round of violence. One U.S. servicemember was also killed in Salah ad Din province. Eight people, including a police chief, were kidnapped in Muqdadiya. Also, 100 Iraqi army servicemembers were poisoned during breakfast in Baghdad.

Meanwhile, here's the "official" tally:

"The statistics compiled by Baghdad's interior, defence and health ministries indicate that 285 Iraqis have been killed since the start of October, including both civilians and security personnel, the lowest since February 2006."

Really? Guess what? I just showed you nearly 220 in just the last FOUR DAYS! And that's from the public news links just on Antiwar.com, which everybody acknowledges isn't even close to the real total.

This 50% drop bullshit is just that.

Posted by Richard Steven Hack | October 31, 2007 11:53 PM

BP: "The US is not fighting the kind of counter-insurgency Petraeus's manual describes, which assumes a coherent oppositional movement opposing and competing for loyalty against a coherent, functional state. Neither of these things exists."

True, but irrelevant to what I said. The COIN manual is still not being followed by the US forces and never was. And the COIN manual itself does not reflect the fundamental flaw in the notion that foreign troops can even conduct an effective COIN program. Outside of one supposed British "success", there is no history for it at all.

The rest of your comment is also true, but not relevant to what I'm talking about.

The bottom line: if you don't understand what the REAL goal of this war was from day one, you can't understand why it went the way it did, and what the next step will be.

Posted by Richard Steven Hack | November 1, 2007 12:02 AM

Danceswithgoats (should be: goat fucked):

"The infrastructure was a shambles before we showed up."

This is utterly unbelievable.

Go anywhere, look up anything.

Iraq had one of the most progressive, modern, educated, developed Arabic infrastructures in the Middle East - before we bombed it in 1991, threw sanctions at it that killed half a million people, then totally destroyed it in 2003 - for no reason.

For anybody to suggest that Saddam had destroyed Iraq "before we showed up" is the height of fucking ignorance.

Saddam held on to his power for a reason. He deployed it carefully and had an organization that was reasonably effective at getting things done without unnecessary repression on the ordinary citizen (as opposed to his actual opponents, who he screwed royally.)

The notion that the US had made ANYTHING BETTER is just bizarre beyond belief. Just about every single Iraqi poll and individual Iraqi questioned has said the opposite.

It's this kind of utterly ignorant remark that characterizes the bozos who support this war. If they aren't outright lying, they're just insanely ignorant of the facts on the ground.

Posted by Richard Steven Hack | November 1, 2007 12:08 AM

Of course, when I stated above that pro-occupation arguments held the advantage over those advancing withdrawal, danceswithgoats's emenations were not what I had in mind.

Posted by Mark | November 1, 2007 12:17 AM

On dkos:

So far this year, 839 coalition soldiers have died in Iraq. Ten fewer than were killed in all of 2004, the year with the worst fatality tally so far.

and Iraq Body Count:

Iraq Body Count’s research shows that 27,000 civilian deaths from violence were reported in 2006. This represents a huge increase compared to preceding years: 14,000 killed in 2005, 10,500 in 2004 and just under 12,000 in 2003 (7,000 during the actual war/invasion, and another 5,000 during the ‘peace’ that followed).

Early indications are that roughly 20,000 violent civilian deaths will be recorded for the first 9 months of 2007. By year’s end, 2007 looks to be the second-worst calendar year for violence in Iraq since the 2003 invasion, trailing only behind 2006, and still almost twice as deadly for civilians as the first year.

Posted by Arun | November 1, 2007 5:48 AM

Wednesday's Antiwar.com count:

"At least 94 Iraqis were killed and 20 others were wounded during a mostly quiet Wednesday. Many of the dead were killed during security raids. No Coalition troops were reported killed.

In Basra, the British confirmed that the handover of security operations to the Iraqis will be completed by December. Troops have removed themselves from most of Basra already, even though they admit that the level of violence is unacceptable.

U.S. forces killed three Iraqi police officers and injured a fourth in Salman Pak during yet another air strike gone awry. The incident happened when helicopters were called into to support a joint U.S.-Iraqi operation that had received small arms fire."

94 Iraqis killed on a "quiet Wednesday". That's your "surge" working, I guess...Some idiot will point out that "most" of them were killed during security raids - including the "three family members...killed in a U.S. raid on their home."

Posted by Richard Steven Hack | November 1, 2007 5:52 AM

On the other hand, maybe things will get worse. Maybe Turkey will invade Kurdistan. Maybe you'll see an uptick in ethnic cleansing elsewhere.

Or maybe the Mosul Dam will collapse.

Posted by Lee | November 1, 2007 11:08 AM

while preferable to their being more violence
===============================================

Spell-check is not your friend, Matt.

Posted by Campesino | November 1, 2007 12:19 PM

And the COIN manual itself does not reflect the fundamental flaw in the notion that foreign troops can even conduct an effective COIN program. Outside of one supposed British "success", there is no history for it at all.
=================================================

You've repeated this myth so often you've convinced yourself it's true. How did that Philippine Insurrection work out? How about the Tibetan Insurrection against the Chinese? Or the Bismachi revolt against the Soviets in Turkestan in the 1920s?

I could list a bunch more, but then you seem stubbornly resistent to inconvenient facts.

Posted by Campesino | November 1, 2007 12:50 PM

Campesino,

Those are three interesting examples - and you citing them actually undercuts the larger point you think you're making.

They weren't successes in the manner that the 2007 COIN manual actually disgusses. In all cases, they involved a level of brutality the US simply isn't willing/can't be seen to inflict in a modern global environment.

If you are willing to kill hundreds of thousands of people, maybe millions of people, the US could control Iraq. The US can do whatever it wants to Iraq in sense - it could make it the 51st state, start a settler movement of Americans to the country, etc.. The point is that deciding to annex Iraq to the US, killing millions of Iraqis, using nuclear weapons would not achieve what the US supposedly is trying to achieve and in fact would have a tremendously negative impact on broader US goals - as they are currently defined by the national security establishment.

Posted by Ben P | November 1, 2007 3:31 PM

Campesino,

Those are three interesting examples - and you citing them actually undercuts the larger point you think you're making.

They weren't successes in the manner that the 2007 COIN manual actually disgusses. In all cases, they involved a level of brutality the US simply isn't willing/can't be seen to inflict in a modern global environment.
=================================================

Almost every time I confront the myth that "insurgencies always win" with an extensive list of failed insurgencies I get confronted with people trying to change the definition of insurgency, or say that particular examples don't count because they happened in Africa (that's rich) or other similar silly statements.

In this case I really wasn't trying to make a larger point - I just wanted to kill a myth. I appreciate your honesty in saying that an insurgency can be defeated but the cost may be unacceptable for humanitarian and political purposes. You may be correct.

It's depressing to see the large number of commenters that appear to be historically ignorant. People hyperventilate that Bush has shredded the constitution and thrown away habeas corpus, and abused his power in unprecedented manners. They seem blissfully unaware that John Adams used the Alien and Sedition Acts to jail political opponents. Or that Abraham Lincoln had 13 -17,000 people thrown in jail for resisting the draft, making "disloyal" statements, or advocating negotiations with the Confederacy. Not to mention ignoring the Supreme Court when it told him to stop.

Actually what I really find funny is that most of the time I bring up the Lincoln example someone who has been excoriating Bush says that Lincoln did exactly the right thing.

Posted by Campesino | November 1, 2007 4:17 PM

"People hyperventilate that Bush has shredded the constitution and thrown away habeas corpus, and abused his power in unprecedented manners. They seem blissfully unaware that John Adams used the Alien and Sedition Acts to jail political opponents."

I'm perfectly well aware of that, and of Lincoln's behavior.

None of which means a damn thing. Both of them were wrong, and Bush is wrong. The notion that because this stuff was done a hundred or two hundred years ago that it is thus justified today is simply stupid. It wasn't justified then - and various people, including Thomas Jefferson, said so then - and it's not justified now.

It's only useful for people who want to cherry pick situations where they can "justify" the shredding of the Constitution.

As for insurgencies, Tibet is hardly significant, given its size and the nature of the conflict. I'm not familiar with the one in the 1920's - which implies it wasn't worth knowing about in the history of insurgencies. Hardly a valid example comparable to the existing situation or the vast bulk of the situations in history.

More cherry picking, in other words.

Which adds up to intellectual dishonesty - a characteristic of the right wing nut.

Posted by Richard Steven Hack | November 2, 2007 1:03 AM

As for insurgencies, Tibet is hardly significant, given its size and the nature of the conflict. I'm not familiar with the one in the 1920's - which implies it wasn't worth knowing about in the history of insurgencies. Hardly a valid example comparable to the existing situation or the vast bulk of the situations in history.
================================================

Typical of YOUR cherry-picking. If it's something you're ignorant of, it couldn't be very important. Also typical goal-post moving - rule out every example you don't like as non-applicable, with no justification. Speaking of intellectual dishonesty!

================================================

My point with the example of Lincoln, or of Adams with the Alien & Sedition Acts, or even Roosevelt interning Japanese-Americans was that what Bush is doing isn't new or unique. We've been through far worse as a country in terms of violations of citizens rights and have always righted the ship.

I'm not excusing or justifying anything Bush is doing. I'm trying to give some perspective on what he has done to the young doom and gloomers who think this has never happened before. The pendulum will swing back. The "wrong" things Lincoln and Roosevelt did were actually pretty popular politically. Bush hasn't done anything on the scale they did and has taken unremitting fire for it. What does that say about where we have come as a country.

Posted by Campesino | November 2, 2007 1:43 PM

The "wrong" things Lincoln and Roosevelt did were actually pretty popular politically. Bush hasn't done anything on the scale they did and has taken unremitting fire for it. What does that say about where we have come as a country.

I think it says a couple of things. Most importantly, the current threat that we face pales in comparison to the Civil War. When there is an actual massive armed insurrection on U.S. soil, people will tend to give the President a little more leeway to manage the crisis. The situations then and now are so different as to make any comparison of the presidential actions pointless. The issue about the internment of the Japanese highlights something that actually has changed about the country (or large parts of it) -- we've learned from our mistakes and don't want to make them again. I think the fact that we are more jealous of people's rights notwithstanding their ethnic background or country of origin is a good thing, not a bad thing.

Posted by Led | November 2, 2007 3:57 PM