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A Meddle Too Far

07 Nov 2007 03:17 pm

I think David Ignatius' column on Pakistan today is pretty insightful. He makes the Iran analogy, and also makes the point that even with 20/20 hindsight it's really not clear how Jimmy Carter should have handled that situation. Similarly, "changing Pakistan is a job for Pakistanis, and history suggests that the more we meddle, the more likely we are to get things wrong."

The trouble, though, is that while it would be easy for us to not "meddle" if political protests started to rock Laos or Belarus, we're already eye-deep in Pakistan-related meddling in the form of our huge post-9/11 aid packages. To pull the aid carpet out from under Musharraf would be a kind of meddling. To continue the unconditional aid policy, however, is a different kind of meddling. And to continue the aid but attach more strings to it -- to make it clear that a violent crackdown on peaceful demonstrators would result in aid cuts, say -- would also constitute a kind of meddling. Similarly, if Pakistani officials ask American diplomats what they think about the situation and they don't say anything, that'll likely be read as a green light for harsh measures.

Basically, we're in a position where "don't meddle" doesn't mean anything. In the medium-term, what we need to do is shift our overall posture to one where we're doing less meddling in other countries' internal political problems (as Ignatius says, we don't seem very good at it) but we've meddled so much in Pakistan that there's no non-meddling option for the short-run.

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Bottom line is that the Bushies don't want to deal with something as muddle as Pakistan. They prefer clear cut bad guys.

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Note that if we had never started giving Pakistan the aid in the first place, then it would be easy to maintain a "no meddle" position. I think there's a lesson in there somewhere.

Basically, we're in a position where "don't meddle" doesn't mean anything. In the medium-term, what we need to do is shift our overall posture to one where we're doing less meddling in other countries' internal political problems (as Ignatius says, we don't seem very good at it) but we've meddled so much in Pakistan that there's no non-meddling option for the short-run.

Replace "Pakistan" with "Iraq" in the above and we can see the lesson unlearned.

The one benefit of when we finally get out of Iraq is that we will actually be free of all those pre-war entanglements in enforcing sanctions, no-fly zones, etc that made getting into Iraq seem inevitable. If we hadn't gone in, we'd almost certainly still be continuing the Clinton-era policy of sanctions and the occasional cruise missile, which had relatively little impact but assured we were villified in the Middle East for interfering in Iraq at the cost of civilian lives.

Cutting off aid could be characterized as "meddling", but it would be a single act of meddling that would stop future meddling. As long as we continue to the aid, the meddling will only continue and intensify. The "medium term" is just an excuse for not solving the problem - there is always a short term and it will always be meddling in that short term to cut off the aid.

Matt makes another pointless argument and immediately falls into the problem that the same argument can be - and has been - used to justify staying in Iraq.

Matt presumably thinks that meddling in Pakistan is more important than meddling in Iraq because Pakistan supposedly IS the "war on terror" main battlefield - when he's not assuming Afghanistan is.

Actually, neither is true. There is no requirement to "meddle" in any of these nations in order to deal with Al Qaeda.

The only nation that needs to be meddled with to deal with Al Qaeda is THIS nation. Alter US foreign policy and Al Qaeda will become a non-issue for the US, if not for the Saudis and other corrupt ME governments.

"Note that if we had never started giving Pakistan the aid in the first place" or given the aid based upon some kind of measurable outcome...like where is Osama.


Basically, we're in a position where "don't meddle" doesn't mean anything. ... but we've meddled so much in Pakistan that there's no non-meddling option for the short-run.

Okay, so what's the least meddling option?

You've given three options - pull the aid carpet out from under Mussharef, continue unconditional aid to Mussharef, and put more conditions on the aid to Mussharef.

Given what you've outlined above, the option that skews closest to "don't meddle" is to cut off aid and let the Pakistanis sort out their problems. To the extent that these are problems that we've caused, we should start setting up a fund to pay reparations once things have been sorted out. But more meddling is only going to make the outcome worse.

Since we can't not meddle, I think the obvious solution is to turn the meddle up to 11. If you are going to meddle, then meddle like you mean it.

Unless the US is going to withdraw from the world -- something which would certainly be an understandable, but I think misguided, reaction to Bush's neocon policies -- then "not meddling" will never be an option. We're always going to be giving aid -- financial, military, rhetorical -- of some kind to various countries around the world. Our problem in Pakistan stems from the fact that, once again, we didn't stick to our principles and instead rewarded a dictator -- and let's face it, that's all Musharraf has ever been -- because we thought it expedient.

Why don't we just make the Palmerstonian point that America has no permanent friends, just permanent interests, and that we will aid whatever Pakistani government cooperates with our interests, but who makes up the government of Pakistan is for the Pakistanis to decide?

Of course "meddle" doesn't mean anything, when you push its meaning that far. So if you shake someone's hand you're meddling, whether or not you decide to keep shaking until kingdom come? Between countries, haggling is a totally accepted form of "meddling". (Making threats at election time is not.)

And let's not exaggerate US aid to Pakistan. Almost all of it was military, destined neither to fight terrorism nor to prop up the regime, far less to benefit the people, but to buy US-made hardware for use against India. And almost all of that "aid" - 3 billion for the purchase of F16's alone - was offset by similar supplies to India, leaving the regional balance of power unchanged.

Less visible aid - in "counter-terrorism" - should obviously be stopped, because to offer counter-insurgency training and arms when it is clear that the recipient will use it to oppress his people, is indeed Meddling with a capital M.

Unless the US is going to withdraw from the world -- something which would certainly be an understandable, but I think misguided, reaction to Bush's neocon policies -- then "not meddling" will never be an option.

I feel this was the subtext of MY's post above. The false choice of isolationism or engagement has been around a long time, and it's usually used to encourage the U.S. not to be a pantywaist afraid of blowing shit up when necessary. The centrality of this false choice to Kissinger's seminal work "Diplomacy" should be a clue that there's deviousness involved.

This seems like as good an opportunity as any to start selling Pakistan fewer weapons. In fact, that's a good way to frame "not meddling"--we're simply going to start selling them fewer F16s. How many people know we're selling them fighter planes, anyway? And to maintain balance on the subcontinent, we can start selling India fewer weapons while we're at it.

Of course this discussion is only so much wankery until there's someone else in the White House.

"Less visible aid - in "counter-terrorism" - should obviously be stopped, because to offer counter-insurgency training and arms when it is clear that the recipient will use it to oppress his people, is indeed Meddling with a capital M."

Uhm, I'm not sure there HAS been any COIN equipment. I've read a couple articles saying that the Pakistani military forces engaging in the FATA are poorly equipped. One problem was night vision devices that have to be accounted for TO THE US at regular intervals - which means they are frequently not available to the actual troops! This is simply bizarre.

The US hands the Pakistani military $100 million in cash per month, then demands accounting for a few thousand pairs of NVD devices?

What's wrong with this picture?

No doubt a good deal of whatever less expensive weapons and equipment the US supplies to Pakistan probably is used against its own people. But I suspect a good deal of it is simply sold on the black market. The expensive stuff of course is to threaten India.

"To pull the aid carpet out from under Musharraf would be a kind of meddling."

I understand the logic of this statement. And I understand how it relates to Ignatius' point that meddling usually gets us in trouble (basically restating the concept of unintended consequences).

However. When one stops to consider the idea that we are (or would or will) continue to bankroll a military dictator in his efforts to violently attack peaceful protesters agitating for the rule of law, one must conclude that this is just flat wrong. We need to stop this immediately. Call it "meddling" or attach any other name you like to it, but the principle here is too important to allow any extraneous considerations to impinge upon it.

Stop funding fascists. If we can take that step, it will move us away (albeit almost imperceptibly) from our own incipient fascism.

I should think that greater transparency about what we're actually doing and why (as in less secrecy and more straight talk) is necessary.

Continued meddling of any variety will continue to breed anti-American sentiment within Pakistan and increased distrust within India.

Neither is in our national interest.

If our Pakistani military support is considered essential to the protection of the nuclear arsenal from violence promoting extremists, let's say that and explain why democratic elections threaten the control of that arsenal.

I don't think that argument holds water, but if there's another rationale that does, let's make that case, before we piss off Pakistan's moderates who are likely to be the majority and therefore our most critical allies.

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http://www.spartacus.schoolnet.co.uk/PRcruikshankIS.htm >Isaac Cruikshank
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Comments closed November 21, 2007.

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