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Kagan-O'Hanlon Prehistory

19 Nov 2007 08:23 am

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I was looking for some background on yesterday's ludicrous op-ed from Fred Kagan and Michael O'Hanlon about how we need to prepare to invade Pakistan, and I found this Charles Knight blog post from the spring. The post noted that Kagan and O'Hanlon collaborated on an essay for this book from the Stanley Foundation -- a collection of papers where one Republican and one Democrat team up to write something about US national security policy.

Well, what Pollack and O'Hanlon came up with was the need for a dramatic expansion in America's ground forces. And it turns out that one of the scenarios they canvassed to justify this troop build-up was precisely this sort of "stabilization" mission in Pakistan.

Mostly this goes to show how senseless it is to make "bridging the partisan divide" as such a goal of an intervention into the American political debate. There are lots of people with Republican Party backgrounds who have sensible things to say about aspects of US national security policy, and a person like Steve Clemons at New America who's gone to great lengths to try to find such people and get them networked with the progressives who've been leading the pushback against the Bush administration is a very valuable endeavor. But a Fred Kagan-O'Hanlon teamup, just like this teamup of Ivo Daalder and Robert Kagan makes things worth rather than better. A bad idea doesn't become better just because you can find some Democrat somewhere who supports it.

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Comments (21)

lithp.

While I agree that a broad peacekeeping or statebuilding mission in Pakistan would be a bad idea doomed to fail, we were attacked on 9/11 and Al Qaeda's leadership is there. These are facts that no one disputes. If Pakistan ends up supporting Al Qaeda the way the Taliban did, we don't have much of a choice but to a) topple that government and b) scour the country for bin Laden and Zawahiri, and then c) get out, regardless of the state of Pakistan's government and society.

We can't choose to stop pursuing bin Laden just because the task will be hard and bloody. Iraq was an elective war. The war against Al Qaeda and states that support them is not.

While I agree that a broad peacekeeping or statebuilding mission in Pakistan would be a bad idea doomed to fail, we were attacked on 9/11 and Al Qaeda's leadership is there. These are facts that no one disputes. If Pakistan ends up supporting Al Qaeda the way the Taliban did, we don't have much of a choice but to a) topple that government and b) scour the country for bin Laden and Zawahiri, and then c) get out, regardless of the state of Pakistan's government and society.

We can't choose to stop pursuing bin Laden just because the task will be hard and bloody. Iraq was an elective war. The war against Al Qaeda and states that support them is not.

We can't choose to stop pursuing bin Laden just because the task will be hard and bloody.

I don't think that's the issue. At the end of the day, we want US interests to have been better served than they were at the beginning. How Pakistani nukes--and, relatedly, governmental stability--are factored into our decisions isn't clear to me.

Well, what Pollack and O'Hanlon came up with was the need for a dramatic expansion in America's ground forces. And it turns out that one of the scenarios they canvassed to justify this troop build-up was precisely this sort of "stabilization" mission in Pakistan.

It makes you wonder whether they really want to expand our ground forces so that we can invade places like Pakistan, or if they are just floating harebrained schemes for invading Pakistan so as to drum up political support for expanding our ground forces.

What I find interesting is the disconnect between the Kagan republican hawk position and the Norquists cut taxes domestic position. Right now the difference is being bridged by debt financing, but there is a limit to this, since at some point foreigners will increase the cost of their savings to a point where the American government can no longer buy. The fall of the dollar so far is simply a priliminary warning, like a loan shark driving by your workplace at lunch, to what could come if the federal credit card keeps spending. The imperial project demands higher taxation, much higher taxation. This stress is slowly ripping the republican party apart. For the Democrats the opportunity to become the sound money party, first begun under Bill Clinton, is huge. But sound money means no imperial projects without taxation. My take is the imperial project will be scaled down in the next administration, as long as the next president is not Rudy Guliani. (the apocalypse candidate par excellence)

If Pakistan ends up supporting Al Qaeda the way the Taliban did, we don't have much of a choice but to a) topple that government and b) scour the country for bin Laden and Zawahiri, and then c) get out, regardless of the state of Pakistan's government and society.

How is toppling the government of Pakistan and then getting out going to make us the slightest bit more secure? What is going to replace the government we topple? What will the relationship be between Al Qaeda and whatever new regime or anarchic mess follows? What reason at all do we have for thinking that the result will be a net improvement in US security? And how is invading Pakistan just so as to scour the country for two freaking guys even remotely a sane use of expensive US assets?

The perspective in this comment comes out of an outdated conception of Al Qaeda and Islamist terrorism popular in the 90's, according to which the root of terrorist evil lies with "state sponsors of terror", and Bin Laden and/or al-Zawahiri are Mao-like dictatorial figures leading a disciplined and hierarchical revolutionary army, and vital to the movements continued existence and activity. But the Salafist jihadist movement is a broad, decentralized affair that has an organic life of its own, and cannot be by cutting off a few self-styled "heads". As far as I can tell, Bin Laden is now mainly a crank who spends his time reading left-wing blogs and books, and writing self-important missives to American audiences. From a security standpoint, I suspect nothing at all really hinges on whether we get him - although getting him may provide us with some self-indulgent emotional satisfaction.

The issue with Pakistan is Pakistani nukes.

Post-facto editing: is that 'Pollock' meant to be there? And 'worth' for 'worse', indeedth.

And Dan Kervick is right: whatever "al Qaeda" was in the late 90s, the venture capitalism model has gone, replaced by loose ideological affiliation to the BinLadenist cause.

In that respect, the issue with Pakistan is really the issue with Pakistan since the beginnings of the proxy war in Afghanistan in 1978: that's to say, the ISI's ties to the militia in the northern badlands. Having a military dictator in charge during the 1980s was expedient for the US, with long-term blowback. Same here.

Yes, Kervick is right.

And Pakistan, like Iran, is a huge, geographically and culturally complex nation the invasion and occupation of which is virtually unthinkable. Moreover, we have many potential allies in the actually-existing middle class there who are our best bet for future stability, and who an invasion would irretrievably alienate. In this respect, Pakistan and Iran also have a lot in common. That said, the argument for more infantry was obviously well-taken when it was made, and would have done a lot of good in Iraq.

Clue to Matt--foreign policy for the last half-century plus has been almost exclusively bi-partisan. It still is.

On foreign policy bi-partisanship, make that going on three-quarters of a century.

"But a Fred Kagan-O'Hanlon teamup, just like this teamup of Ivo Daalder and Robert Kagan makes things worth rather than better."

Matt, you're starting to lisp.

Invade Pakistan to go after al Qaeda and the Taliban? Good idea. It's still 2002, isn't it?

Oh that's right, it's 2007 and most US combat soldiers are still cleaning up the Wolfowitz/Cheney thought-experiment in Iraq.

U.S.A. is a country of high technology and expensive manpower. We do not excel at labor intensive tasks.

An occupation does not lend itself to high tech solutions. Yes, it helps a bit to have much spiffier toys than the locals, but at the end of the day, either you spend a lot of manpower, or a lot of money to bribe the bribable.

India is a country with a lot of manpower. They keep ca. 400k troops in Kashmir and they can do it forver. But even India could not seriously think about occupying Pakistan. Scaling up from Kashmir and West Bank, a force of many millions would be needed. Scaling up from Iraq, probably one million would suffice. Perhaps we could rent soldiers from a country that (a) has very numerous military, (b) a reputation for some military competence, (c) very bad off financially. Off the bat, I would think about North Korea and Erithrea. Say, get 250k from Erithrea, 750 from NK, pay, say, five k per soldier, plus our support for one pet cause that the leader of a country can choose. Erithrea needs some desolate border town, and North Korea could use some teams of American cheerleaders joining festivities on their stadia, and/or a movie deal.

For a fraction of Pentagon budget, I could be an evil overloard of the World. At least, my plan is 10% realistic, and Kagan's is 0%.

So the foreign policy establishment believes donkeys and elephants walk on the Atlantic?

There are lots of people with Republican Party backgrounds who have sensible things to say about aspects of US national security policy

I may be mistaken but if there really are "lots," they don't get their messages out very well. Just about all I hear or read seems to be talk radio blather.

Lots of folks, including most of the Democratic Presidential candidates, having been calling for an expansion of our ground forces. Why, are we planning on foolishly invading and occupying lots more countries we have no chance of helping? Cause that would be awesome.

Well, what Pollack and O'Hanlon came up with was the need for a dramatic expansion in America's ground forces.

You mean Kagan and O'Hanlon, not Pollack, right?

"teamup of Ivo Daalder and Robert Kagan"

Demonstrating once again that I was right when I called Daalder an idiot at TPM and got banned (The first time.)

BTW, Matt wasn't lisping, he was probably listing...

Also BTW, I still have my "good forever" deal going: Pay me one billion dollars in advance, and I'll deliver bin Laden alive or dead - your choice! but dead is easier - within ninety days (assuming he IS still alive or his burial place can be found.)

Still no takers.

Of course, that would have ZERO impact on Al Qaeda at this point, but it would do wonders for my solvency.

Clue to Matt--foreign policy for the last half-century plus has been almost exclusively bi-partisan. It still is.,/i>

really? still is?

seems to me that neo-cons hijacked our bi-partisan foreign policy consensus in 2001, and intentionally knocked the chess table over in pursuit of their theory of 'creative destruction'.

Likewise, the careful bi-partisan crafted Israel policy which existed prior to 2001 - one which positioned the US as a fair broker between Israel and Palestininans - has been tossed in the circular file in favor of all-out pro-Likudism.

We don't live in a time of bi-partisanship any longer, Dan. Haven't you noticed?

oops, my comment was meant to be addressed to Robert Powell. Though, I imagine that it might as well have been addressed to Dan, too.

rEnato-that's the media line alright, but it doesn't hold up outside the Echo Chamber. The 2004 election, which was the actual referendum on the invasion of Iraq with all the cards on the table (no wmd's, enormous Administration errors in occupation, etc.), was replete with examples of Democrats explaining why they voted to support the invasion. In the current campaign, none of the top three Democrats will guarantee a US pullout from Iraq by 2013.

Second, why would anyone expect the US to be a "fair broker" between a democracy closely allied with us in many significant ways, and a loosely-defined collection of competing tribal mafias who hate our guts? These folks were Saddam Hussein's greatest supporters, and launched into dancing in the streets on 9/11. We should be their advocates? Please.

Finally, I suggest it's long past time for "neocons" to be sent to the Scapegoat Hall of Shame to join the Welfare Queens, Jewish World Conspirators/Wall Street Bankers, and Commies in the State Department. This stuff just doesn't work in real life.


Comments closed December 03, 2007.

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