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Kahl on Reconciliation

09 Nov 2007 10:20 am

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Colin Kahl is a guy I'm pretty sure I'd never heard of until a week or so ago, but he's a real expert on Iraq and stability operations who seems to have emerged as a fairly influential backer in Democratic circles of commitments to a continued training mission in Iraq and other policies I tend to disagree with. Interestingly, the people I do tend to agree with all respect him a great deal (though they still don't agree) so Marc Lynch is hosting a guest post from Prof. Kahl laying out his views and I think there'll be responses later today from Lynch and others.

For now, I think Eric Martin makes some good points in response to Kahl.

I would also put giant red flags all around any policies whose own advocates say things like "This could work in theory -- although the probabilities are difficult to assess and are probably not particularly high." That suggests to me that we're not actually disagreeing about the merits of the sort of scheme Kahl's putting forward. I think his plan won't work and he thinks his plan won't work. He counters that not trying is even less likely to work. That's true, but of course there are costs (and opportunity costs) to staying and trying. As I said yesterday, the question of regional strategy is incredibly important here. The implicit calculus behind Kahl's thinking is that though his plan probably won't work, if it did work the gains would be very large and the costs of attempting it are very small.

I don't really see things that way. In order to outline goals that we probably can't achieve but could achieve "in theory," the bar has been set sufficiently low that the benefits of success aren't especially high. Meanwhile, the costs of continued involvement in Iraq seem quite high. This is starting to get some traction in the campaign as John Edwards lays out a strategy I agree with and points to the fact that Clinton's policies will keep us stuck in an occupation dymaic. The Obama campaign hasn't been clear on several of the points of contention which frustrates Chris Bowers (and me) but it's worth saying that my reporting indicates this is likely more the result of genuine indecision than calculated ambiguity -- Obama is hearing arguments from both sides and isn't sure who he agrees with.

U.S. Marine Corps photo by Lance Cpl. Julian Billma

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Comments (21)

Colin Kahl's post, and the respectful reception it has received (by Matt and others) are early indications that terms of the debate on Iraq policy are changing. The meme that Iraq is hopeless is fading, and the possibility of a light at the end of the tunnel (peaceful reconciliation in a pluralistic Iraq) is being seriously considered. If Iraq continues to stabilize, thanks to the heroic efforts of American soldiers and diplomats on the ground, this light at the end of the tunnel will become brighter.

One thing is certain: Harry Reid's claims of (hopes for?) failure were premature. Maybe more on the left will start rooting for America again?

Steve O.

You didn't actually read or think about Kahl's post, did you? Not only is he clear on the low probability of achieving the objectives he sets out, but even if those objectives are achieved, it is not a matter of success, it is a matter of the less bad management of failure. All thoughtful people - and I would include Team Petraeus here - recognize that Bush has failed in Iraq. And all thoughtful people - and I would include Steven Hadley and Robert Gates here - recognize that the entire war was a mistake. The aim now is to stave off the worst consequences of that mistake: not letting Iraq become a safe haven for al Qaeda, not letting Iraq cascade into a regional war or a platform for the projection of Iranian power, and not letting outright genocide or genocidal killing happen. Those are a very minimalist set of objectives, and Petraeus' strategy embodies Bush's failure, not its success.

Or more broadly, consider the motivations for the war. Amazingly enough, they remain still somewhat obscure, but it's safe to say that a central objective of the war was Iraq as a demonstration model - to show the world that America was the military hegemon who was not afraid to use its military might, even if in a somewhat crazy way even. America was not to be messed with. In fact, we have demonstrated almost the reverse: that for all its military might, the U.S. could be military tied down and messed with by a country with one one of the weakest militaries, with a scraggly insurgency and so forth.

I don't know Prof Kahl in particular either, but the fact that his solution is predicated on an enforceable oil revenue sharing plan makes the rest of it seem dubious.

Equally the training of the Iraqi Army presupposes a neutral non-sectarian force that does not actually exist, and one the current Iraqi government has no interest in creating.

The differences on the candidates on ending the occupation strike me as very important. Whether or not Obama is currently genuinely undecided or due to political calculations, both the political pressure and the advise he gets is likely to switch to the right after the Democratic primaries.

"You didn't actually read or think about Kahl's post, did you?"

Yes, I read his post. Did you read mine?

"Not only is he clear on the low probability of achieving the objectives he sets out"

Actually, these were his exact words:

"...the probabilities are difficult to assess and are probably not particularly high."

This is entirely consistent with my statement that

"the possibility of a light at the end of the tunnel (peaceful reconciliation in a pluralistic Iraq) is being seriously considered."

Note my cautious language there: "possibility", "considered". Compare it with this typical statement from your post:

"All thoughtful people - and I would include Team Petraeus here - recognize that Bush has failed in Iraq."

That's a little extreme for an unsubstantiated claim, no? Perhaps you are emotionally invested in failure in Iraq out of hatred or spite for President Bush? Reasonable people can disagree with what I have written, but to dismiss it out of hand, as you have, and assume I hadn't read the professor's post, suggests that you are not one of those reasonable people.

Kahl's essay is based on the assumption that US policy is primarily aimed at stability in Iraq and regional stability "to prevent a wider conflict". He can't be referring to the Bush administration, which has much more belligerent aims regionally. He is referring to a hypothetical Democratic administration, and he is saying: "Here is the justification, under a benevolent and stability-seeking Dem administration, for keeping US troops in Iraq". The "won't work anyway" argument is a good one, but the more important question is: Given what people are hearing in the campaign, what possible justification is there for thinking the Dems would be any less belligerent regionally, in Gaza, Hizbullah, Syria, Iran and so on than the Republicans. Iraq policy will continue to be part and parcel of a belligerent regional policy. And therefore what possible justification for nice assumption about a switch in Iraq to benevolent aims related only to stability and deterring a wider conflict and so on? What this is is a proposed Iraq-idelolgy for Democrats. I lay this argument out at my blog.

"I don't know Prof Kahl in particular either, but the fact that his solution is predicated on an enforceable oil revenue sharing plan makes the rest of it seem dubious."

One fact which makes it seem less dubious to me is that oil revenue is currently being shared now, despite the lack of a formal agreement.

"Equally the training of the Iraqi Army presupposes a neutral non-sectarian force that does not actually exist, and one the current Iraqi government has no interest in creating."

This is more problematic, but some alternatives to a "neutral non-sectarian force" are evolving: e.g., the less-sectarian Iraqi Army has replaced the sectarian police in some neighborhoods of Baghdad; also, local community volunteer groups have assuaged some fears of abuse by sectarian police. The plan seems to be to get these local groups on the central government payroll as police. A difficult issue, but perhaps not an insurmountable one. Perhaps the solution will be to phase out national police and replace them with local police.

Steve O.

1. Your characterization of the light at the end of the tunnel being seriously considered - peaceful reconciliation in a pluralistic Iraq - indicates you are operating with the old, Bush ideal of national reconciliation, which as Kahl indicates is dead. The notion that more minimalist objectives, less bright but more realistic lights at the end of the tunnel are not being seriously considered by many many people is your own self-serving caricature of those who disagree with you. In other words, you continue to hold the idea that recognition of Bush's failure in Iraq is equivalent to embrace of utterly devastating failure in Iraq. Not so. The question most people other than those dogmatically committed to salvaging Bush are addressing is how to salvage the least bad outcome in Iraq.

2. So I am not emotionally invested in failure in Iraq at all, out of hatred or spite for Bush or anything else. It seems to me rather you who are emotionally invested in salvaging Bush's reputation, rather than salvaging the least bad outcome in Iraq. I am actually quite invested in salvaging the least bad outcome in Iraq. Bush's failure is a done deal, and the smart strategy that Petraeus has devised in fact represents that.

3. If you want to save your point, tell me where in Kahl's post you see any indication that the achievement of the objectives he talks about would represent any kind of victory and achievement of the objectives the Bush administration has told us we were pursuing. I don't think you appreciate a)just how minimal the objectives Kahl - and Team Petraeus - are operating with are; b) to just what degree those objectives only exist as a consequence of the mistake of going into Iraq in the first place.

One fact which makes it seem less dubious to me is that oil revenue is currently being shared now, despite the lack of a formal agreement.

Steve, do you have a link to support this claim? Thank you in advance.

Kahl's post read like something that should have been done in 04/05, implememted in 06 and we should be on our way home starting in 07. I have no idea how we get our of Iraq. But this reconciliation thing. The word it is so Western...is it french or spanish?. I'm not saying the concept is foreign to Iraqis. There must be some arabic/farci/kurdish/muslim word that the everyday iraqi can identfy with. Reconciliation has become a bushism.

The U.S. can get out of Iraq, without the whole region falling apart, IF the U.S. is willing to cede hegemony in Iraq to Iran.

The balance of power in the region is multipolar and the poles are not created equal.

Bush thinks his mission in life is to protect Saudi power.

Saudi Arabia is one pole in the balance of power, and, frankly, of the major poles, the most de-stabilizing and least stable. Bush's Iraq policy has devolved into a desperate effort to prevent the outcome of America's adventure in Iraq being Iranian hegemony in Iraq and the Persian Gulf. Not because such an outcome would be particularly bad for the U.S. -- it wouldn't -- but because it would be bad for Saudi Arabia.

Saudi Arabia would acquiesce in Iranian hegemony, if they had to, because Saudi Arabia is too weak to field an Army in an open conflict. But, with American assistance and cover, the Saudi's are perfectly willing to fund the Sunni insurgency in Iraq indefinitely.

Hillary is trying to position herself as the candidate of the plutocracy, that she will not withdraw from American global committments, beyond Iraq, and will even hold the line in the Persian Gulf. This is meant to appeal to American business, which benefits from the American military hegemony in the Persian Gulf and elsewhere, and benefits from the relationships with local governments, like that in Saudi Arabia. This is war as a racket, and Hilary wants business to know that she is someone they can "work with".

A real American foreign policy aimed at stabilizing the dynamic development of the Middle East would focus on a detente with Iran, which would mean conceding that the outcome of the American occupation of Iraq must be good for Iran, and letting the Iranians collect their gains. And, screw the Saudis and their friends at Halliburton and the Carlyle Group.

training must not be working.

Guy on the back left corner, closest to the camera, is out of step.

"Steve, do you have a link to support this claim? Thank you in advance."

This was from Ambassador Crocker's Congressional testimony:

"Finally, we are seeing Iraqis come to terms with complex issues not by first providing a national framework, but instead by tackling immediate problems...

The oil and revenues sharing laws, for instance, deal with deeper issues than simply whether Iraqis in oil producing areas are willing to share their wealth with other Iraqis. What is difficult about the oil laws is that they take Iraq another step down the road toward a federal system that all Iraqis have not yet embraced. But once again, we see that even in the absence of legislation there is practical action as the central government shares oil revenues through budget allocations on an equitable basis with Iraq's provinces."

Obviously, with oil nearing 100 dollars a barrel, it concentrates the minds of all factions in Iraq wonderfully.

Let's hope that Kahl is not the Iraq savant the Dems are going to front - a milk and water O'hanlon. As Steve O.'s quote from Crocker shows, much of the basis for reconciliation is pure fantasy - the fantasy, for instance, that "budget allocations on an equitable basis with Iraq's provinces", which is of course a Green zone daydream that does not cohere with such reports as those by Michael Gordon (the NYT's most slavishly Bush-ist of reporters) on October 28th that the central government has not contributed any money to the security of Diyala province and has been trying to reduce Anbar's security force by 50 percent - with, in fact, the U.S. paying for Anbar's security. In other words, same old, same old: another lie before another Senate committee. http://www.nytimes.com/2007/10/28/world/
middleeast/28sunnis.html?pagewanted=print

For myself, my bush hatred is so hearty it definitely survive future developments in Iraq. There are no developments, however, that come any where close to the reasons Bush gave for occupying Iraq. The south is being Talibanized as the British withdraw; the refugee population of 2 million, many dispossessed from Baghdad and many of them the most educated people in Iraq, have grievances that will fuel war for years; the Kurds are surreptitiously encouraging the PKK; and the U.S. backed "let's go back to the fifties" oil law is as unpopular in Iraq's congress as Bush's let's privatize social security idea is with the U.S. congress.

Finding a light at the end of this tunnel is really an excuse for continuing an expensive, reckless and pointless policy of continuing to keep American troops on Iraqi soil in spite of polls that uniformly show the dislike for that idea on the part of all sides in Iraq. It would be nice to think that the lesser casualty numbers of American soldiers expressed a lesser tendency to violence and discord in Iraq, but there's no reason to make that inference. Myself, I believe the U.S. has essentially been irrelevant in Iraq since the spring 2004 offensive in Najaf. It is laughable that the D.C. honchos still think they can impose their will on Iraq. But you have to admire the fact that they can impose their bullshit on the American people.

Myself, I believe the U.S. has essentially been irrelevant in Iraq since the spring 2004 offensive in Najaf.

That's fine, but of course that's an empirical question, and it would certainly appear that there are indications from the pursuit of the present strategy that that's not the case. I'm curious why you think lesser casualty numbers of American soldiers - and also, I would add, of Iraqi civilians - since the new strategy has been implemented does not indicate a lesser tendency to violence and discord in Iraq, unless you mean that there is reason to think that when the surge dies its natural death come next spring, violence will ramp up again. Otherwise, I'm not sure why you wouldn't make the inference.

It is laughable that the D.C. honchos still think they can impose their will on Iraq.

But I take it it is key to the new strategy of Team Petraeus to spend lot less time and energy trying to impose their will on Iraq. Again, it seems to me Kahl is clearly indicating the way in which a much more minimal set of objectives paired with a set of tactics that consists much more in adapting to unchangeable facts on the ground by the Americans is key to what is going on in Iraq right now. To be sure, we are still trying to have some influence, on the central government in particular, but again it's much scaled back, and it's not clear to me it is so obviously unrealistic, the way, say, Bush's own strategy of national reconciliation and robust democratization on his model and so forth were.

Jeff, well, the connection between one death toll and another seems arguable. Today, for instance: go to Aswat Aliraq and you find:

"Seven people, including four al-Qaeda members, were killed and three more were injured on Friday in an attack by al-Qaeda-linked group on a village in Khalis district." Which seems to be a separate story from "Four people, including three policemen, were killed, and ten others, including seven policemen, were injured in three explosions in separate places in Diala, a police source said on Friday." Then there's "An Iraqi army officer was killed and three of his bodyguards were injured on Friday afternoon, when an explosive charge went off targeting his motorcade southwest of Kirkuk, an Iraqi army source said." And there is this obscure announcement: "Joint Iraqi-U.S. forces killed 14 gunmen and captured 44 others within Operation Iron Hammer carried out in different areas of the province of Ninewa since Monday, the U.S. army said on Thursday." So is this like an average week in 2004, or more like an average week in 2006? And is there any way to guess, from the 15 Americans killed this month so far what the casualty landscape is for the Iraqis? Generally, I'd say, the more Americans killed, the more Iraqis are probably killed - so that there has been a trend in the last month away from the horrendous toll at the beginning of the year is a good thing. On the other hand, it might be the effect of a number of variables that aren't good things. I actually think the U.S. surrender to the Sunni forces in Anbar, with whom the U.S. pointlessly fought in 2004, is a good thing, but let's see it for what it is: the practical end of the 'de-baathification' agenda.

If the right wanted to pursue an Aikens policy of declaring victory and leaving, I'd be happy about this phase of their delusiveness. We actually won everything we were going to win in May, 2003. Unfortunately, the right thinks declaring a defeat a victory means we stay, and not only stay, but continue to pursue a stupid strategy of hyperaggression. So it is important to point out that what works so far has been surrender. Perhaps we should try that in other areas of the Middle East, since the things we are fighting for are senseless, and we could have a sensible policy there. But this lull is simply being used to plunge back into the fight - and if that is the mood among the rabid American right, I'd take a good guess that it will be the mood among many factions in Iraq.

We have been militarily engaged in Iraq since 1991. The idea that after all this we should just run away because a few thousand terrorists have complicated an inevitable power struggle over the future shape of a geostrategically vital state, and it's just too hard, is pathetic. It's the kind of juvenile thinking that's encouraged by people like Yglesias, who really should retract his ridiculous characterization of why we came to fight a war in Iraq in the first place, in his "strategy" post below.

Fortunately, it's not a view shared by any of the responsible candidates in either party, and figures to retain the lunatic fringe status it's only recently managed to disguise after a four year 24/7 drumbeat from the left of "failure", "lies", and "fiasco" have begun to show up in the polls. Elections tend to be different--see 2004, which was the referendum on invading Iraq.

Oh, that was a brilliant post, Powell.

"We have been militarily engaged in Iraq since 1991. The idea that after all this we should just run away because a few thousand terrorists have complicated an inevitable power struggle over the future shape of a geostrategically vital state, and it's just too hard, is pathetic..."

What part of being "militarily engaged" for 16 years - and having ZIP to show for it - don't you get?

And those "few thousand terrorists" don't exist. What exists are somewhere around 80,000 insurgents, and scores of thousands of militia members, all of whom want the US OUT, and are supported by eighty percent of the Iraqi population - and another 14 percent are refugees or internally displaced.

And if you can't see the last four years as one of "fiasco", "lies" and "drumbeats", you're a complete moron.

We were dragged into a war in Iraq by an aggressive, genocidal totalitarianism and have spent going on two decades trying to bring it to a reasonable conclusion, in a mostly bi-partisan effort. I expect that we will find a way to do so, notwithstanding the sort of willful ignorance and adolescent egoism expressed in your rude but information-free posts, Hack. Democrats are at a disadvantage in this process because of the damage done to sensible discourse by sanctimonious ignoramuses such as yourself. Fortunately, having conclusively identified yourself as such, I can simple scroll past your posts in the future.

And everyone else will scroll past your ignorant, right wing nonsense as well.

"Dragged into a war"! Amazing...Talk about information free posts...

"Dragged into war"

Ain't it the truth. Well do I remember that chilling television spot, wherein Saddam held a gun to a dog's head and announced: "If you don't bomb my country, I will shoot this puppy!"

What choice did we have?

So, when you going to go over and volunteer, powell. What's a matter? Buck? Buck? Bacaw? Chicken?

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Comments closed November 23, 2007.

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