The Trouble With Hedge Funds

James Surowiecki notes that the performance bonuses for hedge fund managers have absurd results: "Fund managers get bonuses at the end of each year, and they keep those performance fees even if the fund eventually goes south. So if a billion-dollar hedge fund rises twenty per cent in its first year and falls twenty per cent in its second, its investors will have lost money, while the fund’s manager might earn forty million dollars in performance fees." Consequently, a strong incentive exists to take advantage of this quirk and of financial markets' general upward trajectory, by just investing the money in ways that generates more noise -- bigger up and down swings -- some of which can be translated into bonuses.

Tyler Cowen has more thoughts on this, conceding that the recent explosion of new investment schemes "has brought us new products" but "it all seems to be new mortgage products" whereas "the junk bond revolution of the 1980s involved some "excess" risk-taking, but I believe those risks were more closely connected to the real economy, and more likely to bring real economy benefits, than the recent spate of mortgage-related risks."

Photo by Flickr user Stoneflower used under a Creative Commonc license

Comments

So...don't invest in a hedge fund.

Posted by Dave | November 9, 2007 1:30 PM

Leave it to Tyler Cowen to characterize the explosion of predatory lending practices, as being less closely connected to the real economy and less likely to bring real economic benefits.

Posted by Bruce Wilder | November 9, 2007 1:32 PM

Hedge fund is too broad a term to use in this context. There are many funds with long performance track records whose sole goal is to match up stocks with non-correlated betas. Such a fund, a classic "hedge fund" in fact, theoretically eliminates volatility rather than encouraging it.

Posted by z adura | November 9, 2007 1:33 PM

To reverse Comment 2, leave it to Tyler Cowen to characterize the increased opportunities for home ownership by people who couldn't afford traditional mortgages, as being less closely connected to the real economy and less likely to bring real economic benefits.

Posted by old guy | November 9, 2007 1:34 PM

Matt:

Few points.

First, this is nothing unique to hedge fund managers. If you are a corporate executive, your bonus is substantially driven by that year's performance. That bonus doesn't get clawed back if next year's performance is lousy. If you're a Wall Street executive, that's true in spades. Meanwhile, most hedge fund investors expect the managers to reinvest the bulk of their bonuses in the fund itself. Most funds have provisions to force managers to do this whether they want to or not. That doesn't stop these guys from getting super-rich, but that has more to do with the huge amounts of fees we're talking about, and much less to do with some kind of incentive to pump and dump their own funds.

However, I'll agree with you that option-like payouts such as annual bonuses based on performance will encourage managers to seek risk in uneconomic ways in certain circumstances. If you're an executive, and your options are going to vest in a certain time-frame, you have a powerful incentive to make sure the stock goes up in that time-frame. By the same token, if you are a new manager of a troubled company, and your options are going to be struck based on the price over the next six months, you have a powerful incentive to depress the stock price in the short term, so that the subsequent recovery is more substantial and your payout larger.

Finally, it's not the case that these new investment schemes have all been new mortgage products. The early 2000s saw an explosion of corporate-based structured products that played an important role in cushioning the economy from the effects of the unqinding the huge corporate debt overhang from the late 1990s. And whether the new mortgage products turn out ultimately to be economically useful turns on the larger question of whether making it easier to extend credit to less-creditworthy clients is a good or a bad thing. There's no categorical answer to that question, anymore than there is a categorical answer to the question of whether extending credit to less-creditworthy companies is a good thing (which is what the junk bond revolution made possible).

The real issue is whether end-market investors had any idea of the risks they were taking. The answer appears to be, in many cases, no, and the reason has a great deal to do with the over-inflated role of the ratings agencies in blessing these products. The ratings agencies saying that this or that product was rated AAA was all it took to get it placed - rather like Milken in his heyday saying he was "highly confident" of his ability to raise debt, the difference being that Milken was not a public utility crucial to pension, insurance and banking regulations such as the ratings agencies are.

Posted by Noah Millman | November 9, 2007 1:36 PM

The junk bond revolution was about leveraged buyouts of sluggish companies, followed by massive asset stripping and layoffs, followed by cashing out by selling a leaner (and profitable) corporation. I guess it had some benefits, but not to the common worker or the government treasury. The private equity deals of today are doing the same thing a bit differently. In any case don’t hedge funds target rich or institutional investors who (at least in theory) have better financial advisors and greater capacity to tolerate risk?

Posted by 2cynicalbyhalf | November 9, 2007 1:39 PM

When I become a brilliant economist, I'll formalize the distinction between the "real economy" and everything else that vaguely involves money and prices going up and down and wealth, etc.

Posted by Marshall | November 9, 2007 1:41 PM

Aligning incentives is tough. Options don't make you long the company ... they make you long the volatility of the company. Stock grants at least make you long the company.

You might be able to "solve" the problem by making hedge funds publicly tradeable, and then giving your fund managers stock grants for bonuses.

Posted by Nicholas Beaudrot | November 9, 2007 1:42 PM

I have an idea for an alternative compensation scheme. Let all fund managers, at the beginning of the year, chose one of two ways of being compensated. The first option would be a flat fee or, at best, a percentage of funds being managed. The second would be a futures contract on all the assets currently held, to be executed in one year. The futures would be weighted according to the weight of the assets held by the fund, and designed so that if the over-all value of the futures increased by, let's say, LIBOR plus 20 basis points, the compensation for the manager would be equal to what the flat fee would be.

This would REALLY give a fund manager incentive to do well, because if he failed to beat a relatively conservative rate of return, he'd lose money. He'd really have skin in the game that way.

Posted by RWB | November 9, 2007 1:49 PM

You might also like this: http://uk.youtube.com/watch?v=SJ_qK4g6ntM

Very educational.

Posted by Noah Millman | November 9, 2007 1:51 PM

The article was somewhat naive. Hedge funds tend to require that the manager have some "skin in the game", typically 2-5%, meaning that in a down year, the manager does in fact lose money.

Secondly, hedge fund investors don't look solely at the returns a manager provides, they also look at the volatility of the fund as compared with other investments. A manager that tends toward excess volatility will not have the amount invested in the fund as compared to a manager that does not.

Finally, I think the article is missing the human aspect of the industry. Hedge fund managers have a lot invested in their reputation as good money managers. They don't show up out of nowhere; they need to have a track record of success before getting large investments. And they count on the continuation of that reputation for their ability to continue to get investors. A hedge fund manager that decides to push for excess volatility and then shuts down when the fund takes a turn for the worse is not going to continue to be a hedge fund manager. Now maybe you say "who cares, they already made X, they can go retire". That's fine, but I don't think you understand what motivates these people.

Posted by Al | November 9, 2007 1:55 PM

Damn, I bet 29 black!

Posted by Dilan Esper | November 9, 2007 2:31 PM

Since hedge fund managers are largely fucking rich people, why should we care?

(This assumes that the hedge fund casino doesn't spill over into the real economy. If it does, then fire every damm Member of Congress who fought against regulation of the hedge funds.
It would help us get our money back --but it feels good. )

Posted by Don Williams | November 9, 2007 3:02 PM

Correction: I meant to say "It WON'T help us get our money back -- but it will feel good"

Posted by Don Williams | November 9, 2007 3:05 PM

Uh, after spending now eight years in too many aspects of the investment management business, this:

"So if a billion-dollar hedge fund rises twenty per cent in its first year and falls twenty per cent in its second, its investors will have lost money, while the fund’s manager might earn forty million dollars in performance fees"

is often false - many funds have a clawback provision: the investment manager will only recieve the performance management fee when the fund makes back it's losses. I.E., until the fund recovered the second year's losses, the managers would only be making their 2% fee (which is usually too little to keep the fund operating for an extended period of time). Not all funds do this, but plenty do.

"Secondly, hedge fund investors don't look solely at the returns a manager provides, they also look at the volatility of the fund as compared with other investments. A manager that tends toward excess volatility will not have the amount invested in the fund as compared to a manager that does not."

Even at the simplest level of the most common databases (PerTrac, for example), comparative volatility measures are attached to every fund. As a fund manager, you're not going to get too much traction from simply boosting the more obvious risk levels - there are stupid investors out there, but you're not going to be running a multi-billion fund for a long time by doing that. (The more complex and difficult to see risks, of course, are a different issue).

"futures would be weighted according to the weight of the assets held by the fund, and designed so that if the over-all value of the futures increased by, let's say, LIBOR plus 20 basis points, the compensation for the manager would be equal to what the flat fee would be."

You don't need to do this - all you do is specify how the performance bonus is calculated. Lots of funds do not calculate performance based on simple profitability, but based on performance over indices or other measures.

Posted by burritoboy | November 9, 2007 3:12 PM

"Since hedge fund managers are largely fucking rich people, why should we care?"

Because their investors include many pension funds and other public entities (including union pension funds, among other things).

Posted by burritoboy | November 9, 2007 3:15 PM

these kinds of sentiments are pretty naive. for one thing, saying, "hedge funds are/do" anything is kind of like saying, "automobiles are ridiculous - look at how big those trucks are!" as they say in the finance world, that's comparing apples to oranges.

"hedge fund" is a fairly undefinable term nowadays. or rather the definition is so broad as to be meaningless. basically it means a private investment fund for wealthy individuals and other investment funds. and generally the funds themselves are at least somewhat narrowly focused. some of my friends work at hedge funds that invest in long equity positions. in other words, they're mutual funds. but they're called hedge funds because...well, because of where their money comes from and how they operate. rather than a million individuals with $10k each, they've got a hundred or less investors who are more flexible.

that said, compensation schemes are agreed to by investors who are looking for high risk, high reward investment opportunities. they recognize at the outset that the manager compensation may at times be out of whack with any given annual return or even lifetime returns. that's part of what makes it "high risk" and why the returns are (meant to be) higher than average. so feeling sorry for those guys as if they got fleeced is misplaced. you're talking about highly skilled/knowledgeable investors who many times are begging to get into a fund.

also, most funds - or at least most smart funds - are organized so that most compensation goes back into the fund. there's a lot of reasons for this but it mostly boils down to greed (if they're making money and hopefully the managers believe they will indeed make money, then they want to invest as much as possible of their own money) and as a solution to the principal agent problem by making the agents principals. i know people at hedge funds that get HUGE bonuses....that they literally aren't allowed to take as cash unless they're buying a primary residence or getting married. otherwise they're unofficially forced to leave the money in.

where investors in funds like these DO get fleeced is in "management fees" which range from 1.5% to 3% of total invested assets (which is probably calculated differently depending on type of fund). these fees are meant to pay salary, rent, office expenses, etc. in practice though they're a big time revenue generator.

and that's for the life of the fund. so say you're managing a "invest and hold" fund like a Collateralized Debt Obligation fund (CDO's - look for lots of these in the news going belly up). these funds invest close to 100% of their assets in 6 months then hold for 7 years (or whatever the term of the fund is). the hold period requires little work. during the interim, they raise new funds. all of it generates a couple percent management fees.

but again, investors ARE OKAY WITH THIS. sure, they may grumble but their desire to invest is more important to them.

last thing i'll mention is that these types of investors - those that invest in hedge funds - aren't married to the funds they invest in. if the fund does poorly, they're out. and if fund does just ok but the managers get tons of money anyway, they're out. it is a market and one made up primarily of very high information investors. and if a hedge fund doesn't have a solid long term track record, it's not going to get the high end of performance based fees (what they call "carry"). and if they start to do badly, investors will demand a change or will take their money out.

anyway, angst over hedge funds is silly. to the extent they can wreck the economy like Long Term Capital Management nearly did, sure they should have some oversight, but that's a really small risk.

the only thing we really should worry about is the ridiculous tax treatment for their income that allows them to claim much of it as capital gains, not ordinary income.

Posted by this guy | November 9, 2007 3:19 PM

here i am, in the 18th comment, circling back to the first comment: the question is why anyone invests in a hedge fund? yes, there are a handful who have achieved superior long term results, but after taxes and fees, i'm not sure there are any who have achieved results available to you simply by having invested in berkshire hathaway (i, for instance, bought my first berkshire share in 1991; it is now up 20x, and the only fee i ever paid was the commission on buying the share, and someday i'll pay 15% on my capital gain, and my most recent purchase of berkshire, shortly after 9/11, has doubled in the interim, again with only the minor cost of a stock commission).

as for what motivates hedge fund managers: making a pile of money is what motivates them. period. reputation, al, is for pro athletes....

Posted by howard | November 9, 2007 3:48 PM

Howard, the answer, as I mentioned above, is volatility. I don't know what the volatility of BRK-B is, but if you could get the same return, or nearly the same return, with a much lower volatility, you'd do it. Anyone looking solely at the return is only seeing half the picture.

Also, howard, in this case, as with athletes, reputation is closely linked to making piles of money. How do you expect to get anyone to invest in your new fund if your reputation is no good because you've screwed the investors in your last fund?

Posted by Al | November 9, 2007 3:58 PM

"where investors in funds like these DO get fleeced is in "management fees" which range from 1.5% to 3% of total invested assets (which is probably calculated differently depending on type of fund)."

The management fees are higher than, say, an actively managed mutual fund which usually charge around the 1-1.5% range, but not inordinately more so - if any fleecing is occurring, it's generally not in the management fee. It's nearly always 2% and I've seen higher than 2% only a few times. Managers tend to increase the carry up from 20%, rather than increase the management fee.

"last thing i'll mention is that these types of investors - those that invest in hedge funds - aren't married to the funds they invest in."

Not accurate. Usually you face a one-year lockup for liquid asset class managers, and up to 7 years for the private equity managers (both hedge funds and private equity managers are organized under the same regulations and aren't legally different). I did see a rolling three-year lockup on a long/short fund once though.

Posted by burritoboy | November 9, 2007 3:59 PM

"i'm not sure there are any who have achieved results available to you simply by having invested in berkshire hathaway"

Berkshire Hathaway is simply a macro hedge fund disguised as a corporation - Buffett will trade currencies, commodities and options as well as doing private equity deals. In fact, most of his activity in the past few years has been as a currency trader.

You need diversification away from Berkshire, unless you think that Warren is optimizing Berkshire for your own needs (which he isn't).

Posted by burritoboy | November 9, 2007 4:06 PM

burritoboy, that's simply not true about berkshire: it's a conglomerate, not a hedge fund disguised as a corporation, and it's equally not true that buffett's primary efforts the past few years have been in currency trading. you need to take a more careful look at the financials.

and i have no idea what you mean by warren not optimizing berkshire for "my" needs: "my" needs and buffett's needs are precisely the same (which is to say, we both want berkshire to increase its book and intrinsic value). he doesn't have any options, he doesn't take a management fee, he doesn't run up high trading expenses.

which is to say that even if berkshire were a hedge fund, it's a hedge fund without all the burdensome expenses that make bottom-line performance so mediocre for so many hedge fund investors. which takes me back to the first point: why does anyone invest in a hedge fund at all?

(fwiw, btw, i am diversified from berkshire, which amounts to about 1/4 of my holdings, but i can assure you that the rest of my holdings have not performed north of 20% annually, which is what 20x over 16 years means, and i'd be surprised if there were more than a tiny number of hedge funds who have offered that kind of return to their invstors.)

Al, the question you raised is what motivates hedge fund managers: the answer is making a shitpile of money. of course you can't ignore "reputation" in terms of harvesting new investors, but that ain't the driver. (and perhaps we should be clear about reputation: most athletes have no interest in being anonymous. the only people whom a hedge fund manager wants to be aware of him or her are the upper 2% of households by net worth.)

as for volatility, back when hedge funds were invented in the '60s (although buffett has noted that his mentor, ben graham, ran, in graham-newman, what today would be called a hedge fund), the term was, in fact, "hedged" funds, because that's what they tried to do, offset volatility through long and short positions. very, very few hedge funds today aspire to a truly "hedged" position: they aspire to leveraged bets.

Posted by howard | November 9, 2007 4:26 PM

Just want to second Burritoboy's point about the "clawback" provisions, aka high water marks, which eliminates performance fees during and following a down year until the losses are made up.

Hedge fund managers are incentivized to maximize the value of the fund, and yes, if people don't like the terms they are free not to invest in hedge funds.

Posted by lowellfield | November 9, 2007 4:46 PM

...also, a down 20% year can also be expected to prompt massive investor redemptions. The smaller the fund's assets under management, the smaller the management fee (usually a fixed 2% of AUM) and the smaller any future performance fees for the same percentage appreciation.

Posted by lowellfield | November 9, 2007 4:55 PM

"and i have no idea what you mean by warren not optimizing berkshire for "my" needs: "my" needs and buffett's needs are precisely the same (which is to say, we both want berkshire to increase its book and intrinsic value). he doesn't have any options, he doesn't take a management fee, he doesn't run up high trading expenses."

Berkshire, like any other conglomerate, is also an investment portfolio (from the viewpoint of a shareholder). The weightings within Berkshire are the best ideas and opportunities Warren can execute on. Those weightings probably aren't always necessarily the same as the best for you personally. Also, Warren, being an actual human being, simply doesn't play in every market space (no individual human could). Now, you can just decide for yourself that if Warren doesn't do it, it's not worth doing. That's fine, but it's not irrational for other people to decide otherwise.

"burritoboy, that's simply not true about berkshire: it's a conglomerate, not a hedge fund disguised as a corporation, and it's equally not true that buffett's primary efforts the past few years have been in currency trading."

No, really, it's not much of a conglomerate (numerous parts of the business have no synergy or significant relationships with the other parts) and is much more similar with being a hedge fund. Very few firms are operating a very large - indeed, at times the world's largest - macro derivatives trading operation unrelated to the underlying business (i.e., lots of firms will run derivatives trading desks to hedge out risks from their underlying businesses - very few will just trade any idea in any securities market solely to make investment gains - as Buffett does).

"as for volatility, back when hedge funds were invented in the '60s (although buffett has noted that his mentor, ben graham, ran, in graham-newman, what today would be called a hedge fund), the term was, in fact, "hedged" funds, because that's what they tried to do, offset volatility through long and short positions. very, very few hedge funds today aspire to a truly "hedged" position: they aspire to leveraged bets."

Nonsense: historically, very few funds were rigorously market neutral. They were long/short with biases long or short depending on conditions or portfolio manager decision. Long /short is still the predominant strategy. In fact, in the 1960s, the concept of hedging was very primitive (usually industry pairs, or just net long versus short). You can select from many more sophisticated types of hedging today, including the numerous types of short instruments that were simply entirely unavailable before recently.

Posted by burritoboy | November 9, 2007 6:22 PM

burritoboy: in terms of your first point, i wasn't telling anyone to only invest in berkshire. i was pointing out that from an investment return standpoint, there are very, very few (who knows? maybe there aren't any) hedge funds whose bottom line return to the investor has equalled a nice, simple, fee-free purchase of berkshire stock. if people would rather invest with, oh, james simons, or ken griffin, or eddie lampert, or george soros (and i'm simply picking the highest-compensated hedge fund managers from 2006) than buffett, they are, of course, welcome to; on the other hand, in the long term, they might do just as well by owning a vanguard s+p 500 index fund (see, we don't have to pick buffett!).

in terms of your second point, you are simply wrong. berkshire owns 100% of a wide variety of businesses - something that no hedge fund does - whose only characteristic in common is that they produce streams of free cash flow (indeed, total revenues for berkshire in 2006 were in the neighborhood of $100B - could you please tell us which hedge funds have that kind of business-generated revenue?). if that isn't a conglomerate, i don't know what is (synergy having nothing to do with conglomerates as the term is traditionally used).

the berkshire investment portfolio was, once upon a time, the major aspect of berkshire, but that's no longer true. now, it is true that berkshire owns a large investment portfolio, but most of that portfolio is pretty plain vanilla stock purchases, and most of that ownership is based on being in the insurance business (the berkshire insurance "float" at year end of 2006 was roughly $50B, which is a good percentage of the overall stock portfolio). now, if you'd like to say that berkshire is a mutual fund being financed by a diversified set of businesses, we wouldn't be having this exchange, but that's not what you said.

as for the third point, yes, yes, we all know that the '60s were rather simpler days on wall street than today. nonetheless, that kind of "simple" approach was the definition of a hedged fund in those days, and speaks to al's point concerning volatility.

the primary undertaking of hedge funds in recent years has been a leveraged bet on the carry trade, which, god knows, has earned enormous sums, but it's hardly taken volatility out of the equation. (now i, personally, don't much care about volatility: i care about long-term results. as buffet has said, "i'll take a lumpy 15% over a smooth 12%." but let's not pretend that hedge funds are taking volatility out of their investor's lives: that's just another '60s utopian dream, i guess....)

Posted by howard | November 9, 2007 7:10 PM

burritoboy, i did mean to make one other point: i don't deny for a second - hell, buffett makes it perfectly clear every year in the annual report - that berkshire owns businesses whose job it is to send capital to omaha for buffett to allocate. in the course of allocating that capital, there are many spaces in which he chooses to invest, although how you got from there to "the world's largest macro derivatives trading operation" is beyond me. For instance, as a rough guess from what buffett has told us, he probably put several billion into currency trades over the past few years (most of which he has now wound down).

how that makes berkshire a hedge fund i don't know....

Posted by howard | November 9, 2007 7:15 PM

ok, burritoboy, i promise to stop now (indeed, i have to: i have a plane to catch!), but i was just double-checking, and berkshire ranks 12th in the fortune 500 based on revenues.

12th highest revenues of any public corporation in america!

that's not a hedge fund, that's a business....

Posted by howard | November 9, 2007 7:46 PM

"in terms of your second point, you are simply wrong. berkshire owns 100% of a wide variety of businesses - something that no hedge fund does - whose only characteristic in common is that they produce streams of free cash flow (indeed, total revenues for berkshire in 2006 were in the neighborhood of $100B - could you please tell us which hedge funds have that kind of business-generated revenue?)."

Again, as other people mentioned, there's no legal distinction - and often, in practice, no effective difference between a hedge fund and a private equity firm. Carlyle's holdings make about 87 billion in revenues per year. Cerberus' holdings probably are running at about 50 billion revenues, and Eddie Lampert just through Sears alone is running at slightly over 50 billion. There are plenty of hedge funds - and many more private equity firms - that do own numerous companies outright. Both Steve Feinberg (Cerberus) and Eddie Lampert came out of the hedge fund world (and both of whom were actually traders not analysts), even if Carlyle originally was more strictly a private equity shop.

"but most of that portfolio is pretty plain vanilla stock purchases"

yes, warren hasn't done any of the more exotic private equity or private debt deals recently. But it was a staple of what he did for decades.

"if that isn't a conglomerate, i don't know what is"

Again, I've never seen a conglomerate where investors are buying the company at least partially because the Chair is good at trading currencies futures (among the many other things Buffett does well). I suppose some people historically bought Bear Stearns or Salomon Brothers for similar reasons in the past, but nobody was saying that Bear Stearns was not a financial firm (more specifically, a trading desk, which is the effective definition of a hedge fund). All of these are ultimately the same business: a small group of guys (predominately guys)sitting around trying to make investments. Whether you call that a hedge fund, the Morgan Stanley proprietary trading desk, Cargill's commodity traders or Berkshire Hathaway is probably a trivial question at the end of the day.

"we all know that the '60s were rather simpler days on wall street than today. nonetheless, that kind of "simple" approach was the definition of a hedged fund in those days, and speaks to al's point concerning volatility."

Numerous hedge funds are equally just as hedged today as hedge funds in the 1960s were (paired equities or net long or short). Long /short equity with net bias at the discretion of the portfolio manager (not strictly market neutral)was the predominate strategy at BOTH periods in time. There are literally hundreds of market neutral funds around today that are far more rigorous about being market neutral than almost anybody in the 1960s was. I'm not sure why you're complaining about hedge funds in aggregate being less market neutral now - since no-one compelled the investors to move in that trend, it's probably what the investors wanted.

Posted by burritoboy | November 9, 2007 7:55 PM

"For instance, as a rough guess from what buffett has told us, he probably put several billion into currency trades over the past few years (most of which he has now wound down).

how that makes berkshire a hedge fund i don't know.... "

Because people who personally direct trading in currencies on behalf of investors for absolute return are alternative investment managers (CTAs, technically). Typical CEOs do not work on a trading desk personally doing trades - except in instances where they are running a brokerage that's effectively centered on a trading desk. I.E. something that's much closer to a trader or pm of a hedge fund than being CEO of an archetypal Fortune 500 company.

"although how you got from there to "the world's largest macro derivatives trading operation" is beyond me. For instance, as a rough guess from what buffett has told us, he probably put several billion into currency trades over the past few years (most of which he has now wound down)."

I haven't looked at the currency traders recently, but as of a few years ago, the very largest currency/commodity trading shops had 2-4 billion aum, with the largest running just over 4 billion. Thus, Buffett, who used just as much leverage (and perhaps used even more leverage than many others) as the other guys, was well within running for the single largest currency trading operation (for absolute return, rather than a trading desk which primarily facilitates client's trades and takes a commission or spread) of the time. He was certainly very plausibly one of the ten biggest traders in the market.

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