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Wars Within Wars

23 Nov 2007 10:21 am

Ann Scott Tyler had a little-noticed scoop about General David Petraeus being recalled for a brief trip back to DC to chair the board that's in charge of recommending who'll get promoted to one star general in the Army. Fred Kaplan did a column hailing the good news here, with the Army finally stepping away from some of its "big war" commitments and recognizing the need to reward expertise in counterinsurgency and stability ops in concrete ways.

One should note, though, that this good development is deeply tied in with a less-positive development, namely that the counterinsurgency advocates inside the military are increasingly deciding that the fate of their bureaucratic struggle against the "Big Army" crowd is intimately linked to the Iraq War. Whereas a couple of years ago, these people tended to be a major source of dissent on the war from inside the government, Petraeus' appointment and the GOP's thunderous political embrace of his all-encompassing genius have changed the calculus. And if he now has the opportunity to be a key patron for a new generation of senior counterinsurgency-focused officers, then Petraeus' standing, counterinsurgency's standing, and the war's standing all become more-and-more tightly entwined.

The trouble here is that though the counterinsurgency people are, I think, generally correct about the sort of scenarios we should be preparing our military for, Iraq is, at this point, completely lacking in strategic rationale. But the two ideas -- should we be fighting in Iraq, versus should we be preparing more for stability operations rather than big state-to-state warfare -- really ought to be considered separately.

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I think you're ignoring the point made by Lt. Col. Nagl, Ph.D., one of the members of Gen. Petraeus's brain trust. His point was that whether or not we like the asymmetric/insurgent warfare practiced against our troops in Iraq, we need to learn how to deal with it, because non-state actors aren't going to start fighting tank battles against us. This of course doesn't mean that there aren't states that might fight tank battles against us in the future. So our military needs to have a competency in conventional and asymmetric warfare.

It seems though that most of the big thinkers in the Army today are on the counterinsurgency side, and some have been unfairly stymied in their careers (e.g., Col. H.R. McMaster, Ph.D. -- another member of Petraeus's brain trust -- who has been twice passed over for promotion to Brigadier General). So the scoop about the Petraeus chairing the promotion committee is good news.

Wars that need a large counterinsurgency component are wars we shouldn't get into.

Of the two questions mentioned, the military is not supposed to have much say in the former (except in a heres-what-we-can-do sort of way). And besides, that one has already been settled: whether we should be or not, we are fighting in Iraq, and we'll be largely pulling out fairly soon 'cause we don't have enough soldiers to rotate in another shift.

But the two ideas -- should we be fighting in Iraq, versus should we be preparing more for stability operations rather than big state-to-state warfare -- really ought to be considered separately.

Oh, don't worry, Matt. I'm sure the bureaucratic political infighting described in your post will produce the optimum possible outcome.

Now an expert in Pentagon office politics. Who are these counterinsurgency experts? Or is MY just making this up because it might plausibly be happening?

So, the good news is that we're upgrading our institutional skills to match the real world better. And the bad news is... that this is directly applicable to, and surely largely a result of, the war we're actually fighting?

With all due respect to Field Marshal Yglesias' awesome grasp of grand strategy, "...Iraq is... completely lacking in strategic rationale", is a remark that's breathtaking in it's myopia.

With all due respect to Field Marshal Yglesias' awesome grasp of grand strategy, "...Iraq is... completely lacking in strategic rationale", is a remark that's breathtaking in it's myopia.

Oh there are rationales all right, just not any good ones. Like the military bases in Iraq, or the proposed oil law - that amounts to theft and extortion.

As for counterinsurgency, Eric has a great, deep, point in that you shouldn't get into wars that demand counterinsurgency in the first place.

So, in a way, the appointment of Petraeus is both smart and dumb.

On the other hand the Petraeus-trained people would be great as police in the world rule-of-law that I'm planning ;-) It would be dumb to train them for an Empire.

Change that last sentence: it would be bad to train them for an Empire.

Just to pick a nit, as Matt is doing, "stability operations" don't have to equate to "counterinsurgency operations". Sometimes the only "stabilization" you need to do is keep the criminal element in line, or keeping two factions separated who aren't interested in attacking you just each other, as opposed to a significant percentage of the population opposing your presence, as in Iraq.

However, the overall point Eric makes is correct - the US really shouldn't be involved in any other type of military operation except direct defense of the United States. Only in the case where the UN and the majority of the international community decides that a country's regime must be controlled because of direct threats to a region or the world should the US possibly be involved in "stabilization operations". And the only reason this would turn into "counterinsurgency" is if the "stabilization" is done incompetently.

You could, I suppose, get involved in counterinsurgency when the insurgency is very small, and has limited support from the population (for example, Guevara in Bolivia). But in those cases, basically, the US is not needed other than to perhaps "advise" the local forces not to murder the civilian population. There should never be a need to deploy thousands of US troops in such a scenario - you end up with Vietnam.

I'm with Eric: if a counter-insurgency orientation is the way our military thinking should go, what strategic interests do we foresee serving by getting ourselves stuck fighting insurgencies in the future?

As to Robert Powell's breath being stolen, it's easy to yell that something is myopic. The challenge, not met by Mr. Powell, is to explain why. Not taking up that challenge when the bald assertion begged for it suggests a succinct explanation that would meet even a generous laugh test was not yet at hand.

"As for counterinsurgency, Eric has a great, deep, point in that you shouldn't get into wars that demand counterinsurgency in the first place."

Whatever type of warfare you are desperate to avoid is the one your future enemies will try to make you fight. Best be prepared for it. We may have to go to war with Who's-next-istan in the future, and -- rather than fight us by Marquess of Queensberry rules, the armed forces of that country may fight as irregulars.

Ultimately, the decision to become adept at counterinsurgency is a humane one, compared to the historical alternatives. I'm sure Bengt Larsson's ancestors faced some asymmetric warfare in places like Norway and Germany in the past and dealt with it in a less humane, more wholesale fashion.

Whatever type of warfare you are desperate to avoid is the one your future enemies will try to make you fight. Best be prepared for it. We may have to go to war with Who's-next-istan in the future, and -- rather than fight us by Marquess of Queensberry rules, the armed forces of that country may fight as irregulars.

That's unusually stupid when talking about counterinsurgency since you're not fighting an insurgency unless you have invaded. That shouldn't be too hard to figure out.

Ultimately, the decision to become adept at counterinsurgency is a humane one, compared to the historical alternatives. I'm sure Bengt Larsson's ancestors faced some asymmetric warfare in places like Norway and Germany in the past and dealt with it in a less humane, more wholesale fashion.

I'm well aware of the history; the point is to not repeat Empires since they will fail. Your digs at my country and where I'm from are becoming stale. Not only is it weak to argue geography, it's weak to argue history as if it were something to slam people with rather than to learn from. I've not mentioned slavery in the U.S. yet, and perhaps I never will.

Have you considered that America revolted against the British Empire? I guess not. What have you learned from it? Nothing.

Mr. Larsson--it is incorrect to state that "you're not fighting an insurgency unless you have invaded". Leaving aside for now the issue of whether or not what's going on in Iraq could be accurately described as an "insurgency", counterinsurgency tactics are necessary when defending a UN member state from any of a variety of attacks. Such scenarios seem increasingly likely under current circumstances whether we wish this to be true or not.

We are a member of a number of multilateral organizations that call for mutual defense, as well as the UN itself which might, with luck, be prevented from going the way of the League of Nations if we're able to make meaningful reforms. It is my hope that other capable and wealthy members of the world community would take some responsibility for burden sharing for a change.

The fact that explaining this, and the reality of the interests of the entire civilized world in some kind of stability in the Greater Persian Gulf region, is seen by some as a "challenge", is curious.

Bengt Larsson,

"That's unusually stupid when talking about counterinsurgency since you're not fighting an insurgency unless you have invaded."

What if you are coming to the aid of an ally that his fighting an insurgency? American Special Forces have been active in allies like The Philippines that have had long-simmering Islamic insurgencies. The way things are going in Europe, your country may some day request our assistance in fighting irregulars targeting you.

"Your digs at my country and where I'm from are becoming stale."

You are familiar with the idiom "people in glass houses shouldn't throw stones"? You spend all your time on this site criticizing my country. My point isn't to make a dig at your country, but to prompt you to have some perspective. Your ancestors weren't atypically harsh in their methods of war; what is atypical is us, in the last few decades. No country in history has gone to the same lengths to attempt to spare non-combatants as the United States has.

The way things are going in Europe, your country may some day request our assistance in fighting irregulars targeting you.

Like I said, go back to VDARE.

It's this kind of throwaway line that is the bane of US Foreign policy advice apparatus.

What is Matt talking about here? There is no reason to plan for insurgency operations within the US. Our close allies with stable, elected governments, as in Europe, Japan or India are not in danger of any insurgency.

So all Matt can be talking about are insurgencies against autocrats and despots that the US supports.

If this is indeed the policy he advocates, then he should express it more clearly.

One of the results of the Iraq occupation is that it is much more difficult to claim that supporting a particular autocrat or a particular regime can be justified as an advance of democracy, or investment in freedom. The imperialist character of this occupation is as clear as day, and as stark as can be.

So, Matt, just when will the US be engaging in counter-insurgencies? In whose interests? Using which mercenaries?

You are familiar with the idiom "people in glass houses shouldn't throw stones"? You spend all your time on this site criticizing my country. My point isn't to make a dig at your country, but to prompt you to have some perspective. Your ancestors weren't atypically harsh in their methods of war; what is atypical is us, in the last few decades.

You seem to be missing the point. I'm talking about the present. I'm not denying the past, certainly not in Europe or in my country. The point is to not redo these atrocities from the past. Empire, for example, demands atrocity. Preventive war is a genuinely bad idea (like WWI). People don't like being dictated to and will rebel (against British and French Empires, including America's rebellion against the British Empire).

As for history, you don't inherit the guilt or credit for it. I don't see why you are obsessed with the history of my country. It's lame to suggest that I bear responsibility for it. I don't bear responsibility for Sweden's, nor Europe's, past and you don't bear responsibility for America's past.

Live in the present, be aware of the past.

I'm not sure that giving money to insurgents to keep them quiet qualifies as "counter-insurgency", however effective it may be in the short term. Maybe Petraeus really is doing a good job but I'm hedging my bets on the long-term outcome.

What bothers me however is that after Petraeus' appointment, the "news" coming out of Iraq immediately changed. Suddenly every insurgent, or even every dead Iraqi, was labelled "Al Qaeda" (the ones that changed sides aren't anymore, of course). That gave rise to many headlines stating "so many Al Qaeda fighters killed", which gave the impression of success while being pure nonsense: there are no Al Qaeda fighters in Iraq. There was also a policy of leaking things to right-wing blogs rather than traditional media. There was the preferential treatment of Fox News. There were the blatantly biased accusations against Iran. There were the fudged numbers in the Congress hearings. It's hard to qualify Petraeus' home-front policy otherwise than as deliberate misinformation for political ends.

He went way beyond what is acceptable politicization for a military commander. And him being the one who decides on promotions is not good news. It could mean that the US military will become politicized as it has never been in its history.

Hans B:
What fudged numbers? You mean the "people shot in front/back of the head getting counted differently, car bombings aren't counted" thing? Because that wasn't true. Link:
http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9B00EFDD1638F934A35753C1A9619C8B63
As for Al-Qaeda, they declared Iraq a major front in the war on terror back in 2005, so I don't think they were just sitting out the whole time. Linky:
http://www.heritage.org/Research/Iraq/wm1210.cfm
Meanwhile, Iran has all but admitted they were in Iraq, even making informal agreements to stop going in, so those accusations are true. If you're talking about the accusations over Iran's nuclear program, there's more than enough evidence for that one, too.

JayAckroyd:
Better to train for insurgency/counterinsurgency warfare and other types of asymmetric fighting than for types of warfare that aren't even being used anymore. What do you think would have happened if we'd gone into, say, Sudan? Even with China and Russia, the field of battle is generally proxy warfare (or was, anyway - but I doubt we're done with that), which requires the same sort of strategy.

Bengt Larsson:
WWI was preventive of what? It was two big gangs staring at each other until one gang member tried to pick on a weak member of the other gang, and then everybody joined in. Not too applicable to this discussion.

I'm afraid everyone is missing the point here. Petraeus is being brought back to make sure that the Pentagon is staffed by generals who toe the Cheney party line. This is a move designed to sabotage the next Administration and guarantee the continuation of our permanent war.

How do I know this? I don't, but I would argue that it is just as plausible as the speculation from Kaplan, et. al.


Comments closed December 07, 2007.

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