Alan Greenspan accepts no responsibility for the current situation:
Demand in those days was driven by the expectation of rising prices--the dynamic that fuels most asset-price bubbles. If low adjustable-rate financing had not been available, most of the demand would have been financed with fixed rate, long-term mortgages. In fact, home prices continued to rise for two years subsequent to the peak of ARM originations (seasonally adjusted).
Felix Salmon critiques this on the grounds that "the main reason why the housing bust seems to be much worse in the US than elsewhere is surely those ARMs – which, as Greenspan concedes, were a function of low short-term interest rates." There seems to me to be a more fundamental problem here. Greenspan had what he thought were good reasons to put interest rates very low. One consequence of that was to make ARMs look more appealing to a lot of people. Greenspan could have responded to that in one of three ways. He could have ignored the ARM issue. He didn't do that. He could have tried to warn people about the risks of ARMs. He didn't do that. Instead, Greenspan encouraged people to get ARMs. I think it's never really been clear why he did that, but it was pretty bad advice and he just doesn't mention it at all during his retrospective.


It seems to me that an ARM can be a good deal for you if you don't expect to own your house for more than 5-7 years. Then you can lock in a low interest rate for the duration that you need it. But does that make sense? Why would you plan to buy and sell so frequently? And wouldn't you expect housing prices to peak when interest rates are low and underperform as they go up? Maybe this strategy could work for individual investors. But when there is a large trend in the market in this direction- the result will not be favorable. I can't imagine any justification for encouraging ARMs for the general public while rates are low and it looks like a housing bubble could be developing.
Posted by mpowell | December 12, 2007 1:34 PM