What Price Bluster?

I completely agree with Tom Friedman that merely because Iran doesn't have an active nuclear weapons program doesn't mean we shouldn't be concerned with their enrichment activities. Friedman focuses this on the issues surrounding enrichment itself, but I'd say a better way of putting it is that there's a big difference between a nuclear weapons program that's on ice (what we think Iran has) and a nuclear weapons program that's verifiably shut down (what would give Gulf Arabs and Israelis peace of mind) and that it's well worth continuing to work toward getting ourselves where we want to be. That said, Friedman's notion that it makes sense to condemn the Intelligence Community for releasing accurate information is ridiculous.

Friedman offers two concerns. One is that people may misunderstand the significance of these findings. That's true -- misunderstanding happens. That's why I try on my blog to clarify the meaning of things for readers. If I had a New York Times column, I'd do the same. Still, for the Intelligence Community to not use the proper analytic categories would be perverse -- we in the press just need to explain what they mean. His second concern is that he quotes Gary Samore as saying that the NIE "has given the Russians and Chinese a good excuse to make sanctions even weaker."

The implicit model of international relations here is pretty odd. Russia's not a seven year-old. China's not a wayward dog. These are countries. Countries that have people who understand the technical meaning of American intelligence assessments and countries that have intelligence assessments of their own. Their Iran policy is going to be guided by their assessments of the objective situation and what it is they want to do about it. Sure, they might come up with an excuse or two to do something, but the availability of excuses isn't the core consideration. By contrast, their assessment of what American policy is all about might effect their decision-making. If we look like a country whose concerns about Iranian nuclear activities are grounded in honest assessments of the facts -- a country governed by rational people in touch with the world around them -- then that makes cooperation more likely. Inevitable? No. But more likely.

If, by contrast, we seem (as we did seem to many just a few months ago) like a country whose leadership was invested in offering a distorted view of the situation in pursuit of an unsound agenda, then cooperation becomes less likely. The idea that we could somehow trick Russia into adopting policies it doesn't want to adopt by refusing to release accurate information or by insisting on the use of improper analytic categories is silly.

Comments

Friedman works on the "It's last call so say whatever it takes to get laid" theory of diplomacy.

Posted by steve duncan | December 12, 2007 12:00 PM

In effect, he's making an argument for war, while trying to pretend he's making some sort of argument against it (if the cops know the dealer's growing poppies, don't they have an obligation to bust down the dealer's door right about now?)

Posted by Gil Smart | December 12, 2007 12:06 PM

I'm confused. I thought Tom Friedman was the stuffed animal.

Posted by Don Williams | December 12, 2007 12:16 PM

I don't know if the NIE report is good, bad or indifferent. How can you tell? The intelligence, at least as analyzed by the "intelligence community", has been persistently and disturbingly wrong for several decades. That doesn't mean we shouldn't read it. It might be right.

Having stated the obvious, lets move to why you should never believe anything Tom Friedman ever says. It's not that his words are false, wrong, or intentionally misleading (although they may be all three.) It's because Friedman does not have the intellect to be reliable. Aristotle posited that intelligence is the ability to examine an idea without adopting it. Friedman can't look at the report without adopting it. So, he says, don't examine it, you might get the wrong idea. Just reject it. The man is a dunce.

Posted by Peter Driscoll | December 12, 2007 12:40 PM

On the other hand, it just might have be incredibly fucking responsible for the intelligence community to [force the] release [of] the NIE so that we might avoid another shit-all stupid war. Perhaps Friedman hadn't thought of that angle.

Posted by ed | December 12, 2007 12:44 PM

OMG, this is a total QED for your posting of yesterday morning ("Sanctions"). Little Tommie, getting denser by the moment, does his tough-liberal act and Monday-morning QBs the NIE release...and comes off looking like a total dupe of the Krauthammer kommissariat. Plus, his opium-poppy analogy (his second stupid--or third stupid?--one in the column) is totally bogus: Iraq was the neighbor who was TRYING to make drugs out of poppies; the drug dealer in the neighborhood was our pal. Pakistan, and A.Q. Khan....

Posted by elle loco | December 12, 2007 12:54 PM

Agreed. The conventional wisdom after the NIE was released was that America had lost credibility for once again rattling the saber at a paper tiger. But that credibility was lost after Iraq and WMD. My take is that the NIE helped us gain credibility with the rest of the world by showing that the US government will push back if the madmen in the White House bang the drums for another unprovoked war.

Posted by Ted Frier | December 12, 2007 1:35 PM

merely because Iran doesn't have an active nuclear weapons program doesn't mean we shouldn't be concerned with their enrichment activities.

How about the fact that the U.S. and Iran have both signed a treaty saying that Iran is entitled to a peaceful nuclear program? Does that mean we shouldn't be concerned with their peaceful nuclear program?

Posted by neil | December 12, 2007 1:37 PM

The idea that we could somehow trick Russia into adopting policies it doesn't want to adopt by refusing to release accurate information or by insisting on the use of improper analytic categories is silly.

As is the idea that China and Russia don't have their own intelligence agencies making similar reports about the Middle East. And that the more their assessments diverged from ours, the more likely they are to assume we're doing something shady and ginning up a fake threat.

The only thing I can come up with is that Friedman really does think that China and Russia are, in fact, four year old children who will believe in whatever you tell them. That's the only explanation for that line of argument that comes remotely close to working.

Posted by NonyNony | December 12, 2007 1:47 PM

An additional consideration is that if Iran sees the reward for its not pursuing a nuclear weapons program is that its pursuit of a nuclear program is used as an excuse for punishing sanctions, then it doesn't really have much incentive to not pursue nuclear weapons.

Since ultimately the point, even in Freidman's account, is to be able to negotiate with the Iranians, it does not seem to be a bad thing to appear to the Iranians to be people who occassionally get things right.

Posted by Lon | December 12, 2007 1:54 PM

I think the Mustache of Truth believes that only the elites, of which he is a fully paid-up member, are entitled to know real facts about the world. They then consider these facts in private, without oversight, before discarding them and acting on their own obsessions without reference to whether these obesessions make sense. I don't think TF is afraid we'll get the wrong idea once the rest of us get these facts, it's that we'll get the right idea and prevent his friends from implementing those cool strategies they perfected while playing endless games of Risk. Repeat after me: Tom Friedman is not our friend and ain't the friend of anyone outside his little club. (I think he probably hates the cab driver too, although he is useful for those anecdotes!)

Posted by scott | December 12, 2007 2:54 PM

One aspect is if USA has a sound agenda. The other aspect is if such an agenda has any meaning to Russians and Chinese.

Suppose that the bad thing about a "weapon program on ice" is that it does not give Israel and Gulf Arabs a peace of mind. How is Russia and China affected by that? Is it an attractive policy goal for them "to give a total peace of mind to Israel, Gulf Arabs and, by extension, to USA"?

It is not even obvious why the peace of mind of Gulf Arabs affects our peace of mind. Perhaps it is outright good if they have a reason to worry and search for a big brother who could defend them if worst come to worse. If so, then our interests requires to go through motions of "being very concerned", and the interest of Russia and China requires absolutely nothing.

The meta-question is: should foreign policy challenges be solved, or coped with/endured? Solving can be atractive, but if not attainable, we can cope. The second meta-question is: in what circumstances we should expect cooperation of countries like China, Russia or India. (a) if it would give us peace of mind, even if it costs them money, (b) if we offer a favor of larger value to them than the cost of cooperation.

For example, we try to block Iranian export of natural gas, and India tries to secure a pipeline through Pakistan to get such imports, and Pakistan would get 10-20% cut in the proceedings, potentially more than the aid we can reasonably offer. What is the long-term perspective for our success? How does China, Russia and India view our influence on that matter? Mind you, those are not potential risks, but potential tens of billions of dollars per year.

I suspect that if we overplay our hand we can get some huge "get out of here". Here meaning Pakistan, Afghanistan and Iraq.

Posted by piotr | December 12, 2007 3:48 PM

Right now there is a silly debate: Should we negotiate with Iran “conditionally” or “unconditionally” on this issue. Wrong question. The right question is should we enter such negotiations with or without leverage.

Here Friedman states that a non-silly debate should be had over whether or not to the U.S. should have leverage in negotiations. Really? What is the anti-side going to say? "We want to make as many concessions as possible and decrease the chances of achieving positive results?"

we’ll end up holding a stuffed animal

If you follow his metaphor, isn't this a good thing?

Posted by washerdreyer | December 12, 2007 4:18 PM

as I wrote yesterday, America's Banker has effectively given the Little Tommy Friedman's of the world a very simple, easy to understand message, vis a vi uranium enmrichment by the Islamic Republic of Iran:

Suck.On.This.

as signatories of the NPT, Iran has the legal right to enrich all the uranium they want and need to complete the fuel cycle for their nuclear power program.

Why should there be in Dimona a fully functional nuclear reactor and not one in Natanz?

too funny.

Posted by mrs. ibrahim al-jafaari | December 12, 2007 4:47 PM

Friedman likes to play at being the recalcitrent Zionist, Norman Podhoretz-lite. But, in reality, everything he says is in bad faith. Who's really disappointed that we can't nuke Iran tomorrow? I-S-R-A-E-L. And its friends.

Posted by Trevor | December 12, 2007 5:24 PM

Friedman paraphrases Gulf Arabs in a very strange way, and he quotes extensively Gary Samore, who as an expert co-authored a relatively sober "Iraq's weapon of mass destructions: A net assesment" This summary was produced in September 2002: "...no nuclear weapons but it could build one quickly if acquired sufficient fissile materials. It has extensive biological weapons capabilities and a smaller chemical weapons stockpile. It has a small force of ballistic missiles with range 650 km that are capable of delivering CBW warheads, and has prepared other delivery methods fo CBW including manned aircraft and UAVs. Sooner or later, it seems likely the current Iraqi regime will achieve its objectives. [...] Wait and the threat will grow, strike and the threat will be used...."

Now back to "Gulf Arabs". Friedman, ever intrepid servant of the public's right to know attented a conference in Bahrein. Bahrein is justifiedly afraid of Iran in the account of being a dictatorship with Sunni rulers and 2/3 Shia majority. They are not afraid of nukes, poppies or puppies but their own subjects. Other Gulf mini-states are basically sweatshops, in which 10% of the population are the natives and the rest are aliens, without any rights, doing actual work. Again, good reason to be paranoid. Saudis have a lot of similar reasons to worry.

If only the fact finding mission would bring Friedman to Pakistan, our ally who supplied Iran with the centrifuge technology. And which functions by the dint of work of its own citizens and thus no peculiar Gulf reasons to be paranoid. Pakistani opinions could nicely expand our perspective on "regional concerns". Then he could continue the tour of Iran's neighbors through Turkmenistan, Armenia and Turkey.

Without listing them all, the countries of the region can be classified into those that could not care less and those that have a huge class of woefully mistreated inhabitants and resulting paranoid attitude, and clinging to our "protection".

Posted by piotr | December 12, 2007 7:18 PM

Matt once again wanders off into total cluelessness on the issue of Iran. Pathetically so.

"I completely agree with Tom Friedman that merely because Iran doesn't have an active nuclear weapons program doesn't mean we shouldn't be concerned with their enrichment activities."

Why? Because Matt has bought into the NIE conclusions totally - which is exactly what Cheney, Rudy, and the rest of the neocon and Zionist bozos want him to do.

And Matt is always accommodating when someone throws him a bone, as I've said before.

He would never answer my question - and he still hasn't made a definitive answer - as to whether he believed Iran had a nuclear weapons program, or whether a military option was correct if they DID.

Now the NIE has said they did, but don't now, so Matt feels safe to agree with that assessment, since it's six of one and a half dozen of the other, so he can flip-flop in the future any way he wants, thus avoiding his embarrassment over Iraq.

Which also happens to be what the NIE was designed to do - allow people to flip-flop or emphasize one conclusion over the other - which is exactly what Bush, Britain, the Israelis and the M.E.K. are doing, on cue.

Matt is in such illustrious company.

"Friedman focuses this on the issues surrounding enrichment itself, but I'd say a better way of putting it is that there's a big difference between a nuclear weapons program that's on ice (what we think Iran has) and a nuclear weapons program that's verifiably shut down (what would give Gulf Arabs and Israelis peace of mind) and that it's well worth continuing to work toward getting ourselves where we want to be."

The inanities here are numerous.

First of all, there IS NO evidence that Iran ever HAD a nuclear weapons program other than some ambiguous files on a suspect-sourced laptop.

Read my lips, Matt. NONE. NADA. ZIP. ZERO.

See Gareth Porter's interview with Scott Horton on Antiwar Radio MP3 here for some details about the history of the "secret program" crap:

http://www.antiwar.com/blog/2007/12/11/gareth-porter-20/

Or read about it here:

White House Fought NIE Over an Old Charge
http://www.antiwar.com/porter/

Second, how do you "verify" a nonexistent program to be "shut down"? For years, the Bushies and the Israelis have argued that the mere fact that there IS NO evidence of a Iranian weapons program merely proves that they're so good at hiding it that we can't see it.

"But we know it's there! It has to be! Israel and the US are threatening them with nukes, so they HAVE to have a nuclear weapons program!"

Never mind that the supreme religious and political authority in the country - in fact, several of them - has definitely said that nukes are "un-Islamic" and that Iran will never have nuclear weapons. The presumption of the West is, "Well, he's lying, since Muslims are allowed to lie for religious reasons" - which is bullshit (not that I trust religious figures to consistently interpret their own religion myself), but leave that aside.

The reality is that Iran has no need of nukes. They are under no threat that THEY COULD COUNTER if they HAD nukes - except the threat of regime change. If they had ONE DELIVERABLE nuke, they could threaten Israel if they were guaranteed to be under the immediate threat of regime change. That's it. That's the SOLE scenario under which nukes would do Iran ANY good at all.

And in fact, it is clear from the West's reaction to even the bogus threat is that having nukes wouldn't do them any good in THAT situation - since if they did threaten or even had the capability to nuke Israel to pre-empt or during the early stages of a US attack on Iran, they'd be nuked out of existence anyway BEFORE they could do so. That's what regime change is all about.

That is WHY we are having this so-called "crisis". (That and the desire of Dick Cheney to get the oil and the Israelis to remove Iran as a regional power and supporter of Hizballah.)

Beyond that, Iran will never be able to threaten anybody with nukes, and they will never be able to match either Israel or the US or Pakistan with their nuke arsenals or a second-strike capability (the latter certainly not in less than twenty years or so). So what good are nukes to them?

As for Iran's enrichment capabilities, while it may be possible that they chose the technologies they did in order to acquire the capability of producing nukes some day should they decide to do so (possibly under a different religious leader who might interpret Islamism differently), as it stands not only is there no evidence that they can do so given the level of technology they have, the fact remains that they have the legal right under the NPT to do so.

The legal right, Matt. What part of that don't you get?

Not to mention that they an ironclad requirement to develop nuclear energy in order to preserve their future oil revenues.

Sure, you say, they can get their nuclear fuel from consortiums in other countries, as many other countries do. Given Iran's history with the US pressuring other countries not to deal with them, one can sympathize with their reluctance to go along with that idea. Iran is not a small European or South American country with a history of decent relations with their neighbors, no oil and no bellicose world powers trying to destroy them.

Next, "give the Israelis peace of mind"? Tell me another one, Matt. That one was one of the funnier remarks you're made recently. The Israelis already KNOW that Iran doesn't have a nuclear weapons program. They are A-LYING to you. So where do you imagine they're going to get some "peace of mind" once it's "verified" that Iran has shut down this nonexistent program?

The Israelis have FOR YEARS insisted that the IAEA is wrong. They are insisting TODAY that the NIE is wrong, that Iran has a "secret" weapons program that neither the US nor the IAEA has detected. That ONLY Israel has the intelligence wherewithal to discern this critical fact.

So now you come along and say that once the Israelis are proved wrong, they'll shut up?

Are you completely incapable of reasoning, Matt?

"That's why I try on my blog to clarify the meaning of things for readers."

You're doing one piss poor job of it here. Your analysis of where Friedman is wrong is excellent. The problem is that you contribute to an incorrect analysis by buying into Friedman's basic premises.

Posted by Richard Steven Hack | December 12, 2007 8:35 PM