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John Nagl and the Futility of Counterinsurgency

17 Jan 2008 09:53 am

Lt. Col. John Nagl's excellent book, Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife: Counterinsurgency Lessons from Malaya and Vietnam, which came out several years ago was sufficiently well-regarded in military circles that it got him tapped to work on the Counterinsurgency Field Manual that David Petraeus was working on pre-surge. But now he's retiring to go work instead at the centrist CNAS think tank where Hillary Clinton's future assistant secretaries are cooling their heels. This, in turn, has produced a lot of interesting commentary. James Fallows remarks:

Petraeus, as is obvious, has been greeted as a savior by politicians of both parties. The striking thing that Nagl's resignation illustrates is that younger officers in the Petraeus model and, like Nagl, around Petraeus himself are faring nowhere near as well. The other most famous case, too resonant and complicated to do more than mention at the moment, involves Col. H.R. McMaster: author of Dereliction of Duty, a book that has had tremendous influence within the military. (More on McMaster here.) He has been a successful combat leader in Iraq but, as every serving officer knows, he has twice been "passed over" for promotion to general. Unfortunately there are a lot of other examples, involving not just Petraeus's own coterie but promising-yet-stifled officers more generally.

Fred Kaplan puts this in the context of a larger retention problem the Army is having with its mid-level officers, an issue explored in even more depth by Andrew Tilgman here.

All of which makes me curious to see what, exactly, Nagl will wind up saying and doing once he's at CNAS free and clear of the obligations of active duty service. In my view, the smart counterinsurgency set -- Petraeus, Nagl, McMaster, T.X. Hammes, David Kilcullen, and all the rest (guys who, unlike seemingly everyone else who writes about these issues I've never met) -- tend to outline the requirements for successful counterinsurgency in terms that make it clear to me that successful counterinsurgency is almost never going to happen and almost never going to be worth the cost. But they themselves don't see it that way. Instead, you get analysis that very much reflects the "can-do" spirit of America in general and the Army in particular.

And of course a can-do spirit is precisely what you want from a soldier. But from an analytic perspective, there's a real issue here: Who's going to do the kind of stuff Nagl says the military needs to be doing? Kaplan concludes:

The Army is so desperate to retain good captains that it's offering $35,000 bonuses if they stay in the service for another term. For many officers, that's not enough; money isn't really the issue, and if it were, they could make much more on the outside. Can't the Army come up with another incentive to officers like John Nagl—maybe offer them the lure of a stable life?

Presumably the Army could to more to offer the lure of a stable life to key officers. But conducting the counterinsurgency warfare pretty clearly isn't compatible with all officers having stable lives. Someone needs to rotate in-and-out of Iraq and Afghanistan. And, presumably, one would want our top counterinsurgency people doing that rotating. But nobody really wants, personally, to engage in a multi-decade counterinsurgency operation in Iraq. And yet that's what the COIN people seem to think would be necessary to get the job done.

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Comments (11)

Knowing nothing about the specific cases of McMasters and Nagl, I'd be very hesitant to read too much into specific cases of colonels not getting a star. That's a very narrow gate to pass through, and qualifications rightly involve more than just being an expert on either the theory or practice of counterinsurgency.

I's aolso say that just getting to full colonel is pretty tough, so the fact that these two guys made it that far indicates the Army isn't being somehow hostile to their ideas or unappreciative of their accomplishments.

As a last note, the promotion process is very different at different levels, and having good O-6's retiring is a completely different issue from struggles to keep qualified junior officers in the service.

Counter-insurgency doesn't fit well into the American system. It requires a deep knowledge of the region involved, a different mindset among officers than is used in fighting conventional wars, and a mix of the diplomatic and military spheres that American leaders never get quite right. Half the time, our system doesn't know why we're fighting or what our primary goals are.

Iraq is a perfect example. We're there because Bush and the republican party wanted a stick with which they could beat up the democrats on national security for a couple of generations. Ever since it became clear that wasn't going to happen, we're ambling around trying to figure out what the hell the endgame is.

We may need to rotate people in-and-out of Afghanistan, though as the Russians and Brits could, and probably did, tell us, installing a government in Kabul is one thing, keeping it there and in charge of the country is quite another.

But what we need in Iraq is for people to rotate out and stay that way.

Matt hits on a point that's really struck me about this COIN issue. Andrew Krepinovich wrote a book in the 80's criticizing the Army's failure post-Vietnam to prepare for COIN in a serious way and the lesson it drew from Vietnam, which was stay out of COIN situations. He then made a lot of good, common-sense suggestions about COIN, but those suggestions are very labor-intensive and require a degree of knowledge about, and immersion in, local conditions (including knowing the language!) that Americans historically have been unable to demonstrate. Which made me wonder whether Army leaders post-Vietnam were as dumb as Krepinovich evidently thought they were: if you looked at what a SUCCESSFUL COIN strategy would cost you in terms of resources, why wouldn't it be sensible to prefer avoiding situations requiring that strategy? Just saying.

"...if you looked at what a SUCCESSFUL COIN strategy would cost you in terms of resources, why wouldn't it be sensible to prefer avoiding situations requiring that strategy? Just saying."

That might be true, but should the military have assumed political leaders would always be wise enough to know that? The military routinely devotes enormous resources towards preparing for unlikely scenarios, they certainly could have done more to prepare for insurgency warfare.

My feeling is they avoided it because the nature of that investment bucks the system. How politically popular would it be to take money from Lockheed and give it to UC Berkeley?

Didn't the Army have guys who spoke the local language for Iraq? Didn't they fire them? Why was that anyway? Sheesh.

Matt, are you aware of who the head of the latest promotion board was?

It seems a relevant point.

In response to BJC, I agree that the institutional incentives were certainly stacked in favor of the Army building more and better guns than studying different cultures as a means of understanding and dealing with them better. Which brings up another related point: maybe we should have invested in a better, bigger State Department with more diplomats and country experts as a way of dealing with these issues better. Nah, much better to deal with foreigners by overawing and/or killing them than talking to them.

The Army's difficulty retaining good people has been known for over a decade. There were seven major studies about this just between 2000 and 2001. It surfaces every year or so, when some esp. well-known officer leaves -- then goes down the memory hole.

For more about this see (also goes to links of the 00-02 studies):

"The Army is losing good people. That is only a symptom of a more serious problem."
http://fabiusmaximus.wordpress.com/2008/01/18/army-nagl/

William Lind on what is really going on:

Scott Horton Interviews William S. Lind
http://antiwar.com/radio/2008/01/17/william-s-lind/

MP3 link:
http://dissentradio.com/radio/08_01_16_lind.mp3

Bottom line: We're losing and we're going to continue to lose until Washington stops living in a fairy tale that the US military can do everything - or even anything outside of getting a draw.

The army is incapable of supporting counterinsurgency, it just goes against the grain of its institutional fiber. But the army also recognize Nagl's selling a load of crap.

Nagl, Kilcullin are all "moving on" because they know their psyop dreams will never be fulfilled--thank god for that, these are crazy dreams because (as Yglesias tells us) "successful counterinsurgency is almost never going to happen and almost never going to be worth the cost." Nagl and his salesmen are huckster con artists pretending that they can use smoke and mirrors to make the natives dance. He's leaving because he hasn't produced anything of value.


Comments closed January 31, 2008.

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