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Feeling Impatient

22 Feb 2008 05:35 pm

Since Charles Krauthammer is citing Anthony Cordesman's report on the situation in Iraq to make the point that the surge has worked, I trust nobody on the right will be upset if I quote from a different part of the same report. He says, basically, a lot of good things have happened but a lot more needs to be done. We need, he says, strategic patience. Under the circumstances, it's worth taking a look at what he says we need to do going forward to succeed.

His report is full of things like "consolidate progress in Iraq forces: Independent for internal security by 2012; create ability to defend against foreign threats by 2018." He outlines goals like "Create effective criminal justice system and local rule of law (2008-2010)" and "revive national infrastructure in terms of water, power, roads, rail, petroleum exports, financial institutions, communications, etc (2009-2011)." On the security front, we're also supposed to "resolve the problem of National Police, local forces, ethnic and sectarian militias and integrate into ISF or civil economy (2009-2011)." We also need to "revise constitution to meet needs of all major factions (2008-2009)."

To me, rather than an endless continuation of the debate over whether (or in what sense) the "surge" has or hasn't "worked" it would be highly preferable to focus instead on whether or not strategic patience of the sort Cordesman is talking about is a reasonable policy going forward. My view is that it isn't. If you look at these kind of agenda items that lurk near the back of the report, you'll see a bunch of things where the prospects for success aren't particularly good, the costs are high, the time frame is both vague and long, and the benefits don't seem particularly clear. I'm also fairly confident that if Charles Krauthammer and John McCain just put the choice between Cordesman's approach and leaving expeditiously on the table, that most people would agree with me. Thus you've seen a consistent effort starting in 2002, then continuing into 2003, 2004, 2005, 2006, 2007, and now 2008 to mislead people about the question at hand into thinking that "success" is something that might come soon and thus that the cut-and-run crowd should be ignored. But if Bush had told people in 2004 that four years in the future his Iraq policy would be so successful that people would be talking about Iraq taking responsibility for its own internal security in 2012 then he never would have been re-elected.

As an intellectual exercise, this sort of thing Cordesman has done strikes me as pretty useful and interesting. I'd like to see more of it. What would Cordesman do to fix Haiti's deeply entrenched problem if we were willing to commit 120,000+ U.S. troops and $100 billion a year to the problem for an indefinite period of time? Or maybe the federal government wants to dedicate that kind of personnel (though not active duty soldiers) and money to reducing the crime rate in Washington, DC? I'm not at all sure that a forward-looking agenda that has "deal with the issue of federalism in ways that resolve Kurd-Arab-Turcoman tensions; Shi’ite power struggle in south, Sunni concerns in west, mixed areas in center, and create a stable Baghdad and Basra (2008-2010)" can possibly succeed, but I am pretty sure that I'd rather not find out.

In short, I lack strategic patience.

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Comments (78)

2018?!?

I'm not at all sure that a forward-looking agenda that has "deal with the issue of federalism in ways that resolve Kurd-Arab-Turcoman tensions; Shi’ite power struggle in south, Sunni concerns in west, mixed areas in center, and create a stable Baghdad and Basra (2008-2010)" can possibly succeed, but I am pretty sure that I'd rather not find out.

This is a sound enough point, but it is a flawed political argument. If McCain embraces Cordesman's Iraq agenda, it won't be too popular initially. But it is a detailed and (as Matt more or less concedes) facially plausible plan for the next 4 years. It offers a degree of certainty (real or imagined) about the future that plans for withdrawal, at this point, do not.

I do not want to have a situation where John McCain has this thing to wave around and Barack Obama is saying, "Here's my withdrawal plan, and we'll just have to see what happens next in the region." That scenario plays directly into McCain's hands w/r/t to the alleged emptiness of Obama's message.

In short, I think it's a mistake to assume that the voters are going to rebel against a costly and tenuous plan when the alternative can be credibly characterized as no plan at all.

[/contrarianism]

Tom Coburn doesn't lack strategic patience, but he knows it's wrong:

During a town hall meeting in Muskogee, Oklahoma this past weekend, Sen. Tom Coburn (R-OK) admitted that it was “a mistake” for the United States to invade Iraq in 2003. “I will tell you personally that I think it was probably a mistake going to Iraq,” Coburn told the crowd.

I suspect the screaming Malkin Brigades are going to find out the capacity of Coburn's bathtub any time now.

You took up a lot of space to say Krauthammer is full of shit.

The question that has to be answered is, "What's in it for me?" ie, the American people, to stick around through 2018. If letting the place go to hell doesn't cost much then there's not much argument for it. However the history of "letting go" isn't that encouraging. We "let go" of Iran in the 1970s and now the place is run by mad mullahs building A-bombs to threaten the rest of the Middile East if not the whole world. We "let go" in Afghanistan and the place got overrun by the Taleban who then hosted al Qaeda and indirectly at least this resulted in 9/11.

Probably the best example of not "letting go" too soon is the Phillipines, which we annexed by conquest in 1905 and held as a colony until 1946. The insurgency there cost thousands of US lives and millions of dollars before it was finally quelled and we lost an entire army there in the opening days of WWII trying to defend the place. Yet arguably had we "let go" of the Phillipines early on the Japanese or some other power would have moved in and our first line of defense against Pacific invasion would have been the West Coast instead of the Phillipines. Furthermore we've had a long and profitable relationhip with the Phillipines even after graning them independence in 1946.

Iraq is on the frontlines of the War on Terrorism. Thousands of al Qaeda soldiers and dozens of their leaders have been exterminated there. We have a solid forward base against Iran. The international oil supply (and hence the worlds' economy) is secured against global terrorism because of our involvement in Iraq. The jihadists have learned to think twice about starting a conflict with us. Staying through 2012 or 2018 in at least an advisory role doesn't seem to be too much to ask of the American people considering the alternatives.

Wait, does the report just list those goals and their complementary vague timeframes or give suggestions as to how to achieve them?

And yes I can't be blown to read it.

Furthermore we've had a long and profitable relationhip with the Phillipines even after graning them independence in 1946.

Well, that's one way to put it..

"In short, I lack strategic patience."

Then you shouldn't have supported the invasion of Iraq in the first place. But since you did -- and since the new strategy is yielding undeniable progress, as Krauthammer's essay details -- why are you in such a rush to snatch failure from the jaws of success?

I don't know how much more success I can handle.

Y'know, I'm thinking that, instead of spending hundreds of billions "fixing" Haiti, we should just stop kidnapping and overthrowing their elected leaders and let them fix themselves.

Cordesman's last bullet point: "And a pony."

The surge is undeniable success. Before the surge, we could not accomplish anything. Now, we can accomplish 10 times more.

Basically, after amazingly long time, we learned how to survive in Iraq indefinitely without accomplishing anything. With smaller numbers of dead and wounded and absolutely amazing amount of money being spent. A million dollars per year per soldier. In fact, this grossly underestimates the true cost.

The true cost is that in the world in which no country, and no coalition of countries can threaten us in a remote way, we spend MANY TIMES MORE than are putative opponents combined. Not counting the cost of this misbegotten war, but because we are "at war", no expense can be spared.

There are other disturbing aspects of this situation, like the fact the Persians invented the game of chess, and the fact that we seem to stabilize the board does not mean that one that shit will not hit the fan. Relatively speaking, we manage to spend 120 billion with hardly any opposition (compared with, say, Vietnam). And the opposition may well increase, given the shitty state of affair.

Fred, in case you hadn't realized: Bush's big Iraq adventure is already a failure. Too many dead people, too many refugees, too much chaos - all of that cannot be undone by a nice handover parade in the distant future. But by all means, the US should pay through the nose for the next decade or two in order to get Iraq back on its feet - be my guest.

I agree that the costs in Iraq are too high, but only because our goals are wrong and would be wrong even for free. The successful establishment of an effective American garrison and puppet government in Iraq would not improve my life or any Americans' lives except maybe some DC and corporate elite. It would instead make my life worse. The Bush administration's aggressive outlaw behavior has already set back the progress of international cooperation by perhaps decades and has rightly inflamed the world against us. America in Iraq is an unprovoked, illegal aggressive invasion, exactly what everyone in the world hates most. An American success in Iraq would be a defeat for me and other Americans inasmuch as it would be a defeat for the world.

Your political ancestors gave up on reforming the south in 1877, because the benefits looked slim and far out.

So how well did that work out, Matt? Was it worth it to defer all progress for nearly a century, because the Democrats of that era lacked strategic patience?

In short, you're a smarmy snit that's been rooting for America to lose for years, so why stop now.

We "let go" of Iran in the 1970s and now the place is run by mad mullahs building A-bombs to threaten the rest of the Middile East if not the whole world.

Or alternatively, we helped oust Mossadegh, providing a focal point for Iranian anger against the US and the UK during the revolution.

Your political ancestors gave up on reforming the south in 1877, because the benefits looked slim and far out.

I'm completely game to replay Sherman's march and salt the earth this time to make sure they can't come back, if that's what you are throwing out on the table.

It's completely understandable that Matthew Yglesias is feeling impatient. After all, the existence of a U.S. military contingent in Iraq has and will continue to tangibly affect his life so much that he can't help but lack strategic patience. So much is being asked of him that it's just not fair. Especially considering how much he has done already.

Iraq is on the frontlines of the War on Terrorism.

Objection, your honor. Assumes facts not in evidence.

Well, Sonic, perhaps simple human empathy is beyond understanding for you.

As for me, I don't need it, my first cousin died in Haswa in 2005 to make sure you never have to admit you are an idiot who helped destroy the lives of millions of people. Stick it up your ass.

There has been an interesting progression in Democratic positions on Iraq.

  • In 2002, key Dems voted for the war to burnish their national security credentials, long tarnished by the actions of Democratic Congresses in the 1970's.
  • In 2004, Dems were running to the right of Bush, saying we should send in more troops.
  • In 2006, they were (rightly) demanding that Bush change a failing strategy and personnel.
  • In 2007, after Bush changed strategy and personnel, Congressional Dems fought to prevent him from implementing it, to force a withdrawal timetable, and declared the strategy a failure in advance.
  • When the new strategy led to dramatic reductions in violence that became too sustained to ignore, Democrats changed tack slightly, claiming that they always knew additional troops would tamp down the violence, but the real problem was a lack of political reconciliation.
  • When examples of reconciliation at the local levels were presented, Democrats claimed that the surge was still a failure because Iraqis hadn't enacted key legislation at the federal level, on the rehabilitation of former Baathists, local elections, and an oil law.
  • Now that the first two of those three major reconciliation milestones have been achieved by the Iraqi legislature (and it has agreed to an equitable provisional arrangement for the third), we get Matt's "strategic impatience" argument. Sounds like a winner. Don't be too disappointed when your candidate pivots away from it in the general.
  • Au contraire Ed, I am virtually overflowing with empathy for the ordeal that Matthew Yglesias (the person we're talking about - the one who's "impatient") has gone through lo these many years that the U.S. has had a military contingent in Iraq.

    Aren't you?

    What a bizarre thread for Matt's blog.

    Let me try again at contrarianism from another angle. I don't think Obama is wrong to advocate a withdrawal given the apparent intractability of the Iraqi political situation. Nevertheless, I do think that Obama needs to offer something more than a calendar of troop movements. Specifically, he needs to outline a post-withdrawal foreign policy aimed at Iraq and the region--something that might plausibly forestall the worst-case humanitarian consequences.

    At the moment, this is his public posture on those questions. It's not nothing, and, in fact, it's about right for the Democratic primary. But it won't be enough against McCain.

    Obama, and all Democrats, need to move from positions on Iraq that are essentially defined in opposition to the current policy (which is--I agree--misconceived, costly, and likely to fail) toward defining a distinct, rational, and appealing Iraq policy of their own.

    "Your political ancestors gave up on reforming the south in 1877, because the benefits looked slim and far out."

    Matt's political ancestors also forced us to abandon an American ally in 1974, ensuring defeat. How did that work out for them? They were so politically damaged by it, that 28 years later, they voted for the Iraq War just to look tough. What war will Democrats vote for next time, to get over the stigma of abandoning Iraq?

    For the historically illiterate (Ed Marshall), Sherman's march was in 1864-1865.

    Re-reading my comment, I mentioned 1877.

    You might want to read up on your history.

    I know my history, and that's my personal suggestion for what reconstruction should have been. Send him back down to burn the place down and run them all into the ocean. I'm also suggesting it's not really too late to implement.

    imperialists do not have a long term view. they are interested in the success of their project only for their lifetime. during this period enough number of people acquire a vested interest in the continuation of the enterprise for the occupation to last for a few generations.

    how else can we use our excess productive capacity but by building things that get destroyed in a senseless war?

    "I don't think Obama is wrong to advocate a withdrawal given the apparent intractability of the Iraqi political situation. Nevertheless, I do think that Obama needs to offer something more than a calendar of troop movements. Specifically, he needs to outline a post-withdrawal foreign policy aimed at Iraq and the region--something that might plausibly forestall the worst-case humanitarian consequences."

    Southpaw,

    There are two problems with this. The first is that the political situation in Iraq is apparently not intractable; if it were, Iraqis wouldn't have just achieved two of the three key legislative benchmarks of political reconciliation. So the argument that we should withdraw because political reconciliation in Iraq is impossible goes away and you are left with Matt's argument that we should withdraw because he is impatient.

    The second problem is that there is a logical disconnect in advocating a policy (unilateral, premature withdrawal) that will increase the chances of the "worst-case humanitarian consequences" you fear (not to mention worst-case strategic consequences for us and our Gulf allies), while at the same time proposing some inchoate foreign policy ideas to ameliorate it. The logically consistent unilateral withdrawal position would be to acknowledge the likely consequences of such a withdrawal and argue that, as bad as they are, continuing the current strategy is worse. That would be a useful -- and honest -- debate to have, but I doubt we'll see that from a Democratic candidate this year.

    My suspicion is that both Democratic candidates understand the consequences and, consequently, if one of them becomes president, they won't bail out of Iraq. In an attempt to calm their base, which will feel betrayed (again), they will argue that conditions on the ground changed materially, or they became aware of some new information, etc. All the more reason why I suspect the pivot will begin in the general election campaign.


    If we leave Iraq, they'll fight, someone will win, and the winner will sell oil. Probably more oil than they're selling now. And we wouldn't have to spend 120 billion a year propping up a useless, incompetent government that we don't even like.

    On the other hand, if we just stay long enough, there's a chance that our Army will learn an important lesson - the same lesson that the Portuguese Army learned in Africa, the lesson that the Soviet Army learned in Afghanistan. And then they'll take people like Orion out and hang them from lampposts.

    I vote for strategic patience.

    Fred, I would be interested to know why, exactly you think the deaths of thousands of people and the trillions spent in Iraq was worth it. For the life of me I can't image that it was, even if the pony parade shows up tomorrow.

    First: What southpaw said.

    Second: "Iraqis wouldn't have just achieved two of the three key legislative benchmarks of political reconciliation."

    Really, OK, one more 'benchmark' and we're all done? Right?


    Well, we learned how just how lazy, ignorant, and wrong-headed our governing class was. We learned that about 90% of the Senate was willing to sign onto a war without even bothering to read the NIE: we learned (if we didn't_ already know) that the US intelligence community is disfunctional - although personally I'd just call them pinheads.
    We learned (if we didn't already know) that the vast majority of movement conservatives are willing to act as cheerleaders for disastrous folly for years on end. Embrace the mistake!

    We learned that Hillary Clinton _likes_ pointless invasions and bloody, expensive occupations. She sure likes this one - she stuck with it a lot longer than the average American.

    That knowledge is worth a hell of a lot, possibly as much as we've paid for it - but only if we use it.

    As was said to Ralph Wiggums: you know what you have to do now, laddies.

    While there are a lot of good reasons to not support the continued occupation of Iraq, direct comparisons to other problems (such as Haiti) where we don't feel it would be warranted to devote the money and troops that we are to Iraq is not one of them. By unjustly invading Iraq we have incurred duties of restitution to the Iraqi people that we do not have to Haitians. Now it might be that it is not possible for us to in fact make restitution, or that the best thing for the Iraqi people would be for us to leave, but there is merit to the point that if we broke it, we are responsible to try and fix it.

    Yeah, unfortunately politics doesn't really allow us to get at the right answer here.

    McCain says "the Iraq war was a good idea, and we need to be there forever."

    Obama says "the Iraq war was a dumb idea, and we need to end it."

    The correct answer is "the Iraq war was a dumb idea, and we need to be there for a long time. Doesn't this suck. Oh well."

    The Democratic base would howl in protest if someone said this, which it's hard to blame them for, since they were right about the dumbness of the war but still don't get what they want. I think independents would roughly agree with something like the unsatisfying hybrid position.

    Kerry and many Democratic politicians have been pulled in two by this situation. But rather than trying to make everyone happy they should just tell the truth and tell people to deal. "Vote for me, I won't start any more wars and I'll rehabilitate our security posture as best I can."

    McCain is coming closest to that. But he wants to start "more wars," so that's no good.

    There are two problems with this. The first is that the political situation in Iraq is apparently not intractable; if it were, Iraqis wouldn't have just achieved two of the three key legislative benchmarks of political reconciliation. So the argument that we should withdraw because political reconciliation in Iraq is impossible goes away and you are left with Matt's argument that we should withdraw because he is impatient.

    I think Andruw got you on this one, and good. I'd only add that the cliched six-month Friedman Units seem to have faded away into even more daunting four-year Cordesman Units.

    You can't seriously contend that political reconciliation is just one benchmark away when prominent advocates of sticking it out are writing sentences like this:

    "resolve the problem of National Police, local forces, ethnic and sectarian militias and integrate into ISF or civil economy (2009-2011)."


    The second problem is that there is a logical disconnect in advocating a policy (unilateral, premature withdrawal) that will increase the chances of the "worst-case humanitarian consequences" you fear (not to mention worst-case strategic consequences for us and our Gulf allies), while at the same time proposing some inchoate foreign policy ideas to ameliorate it. The logically consistent unilateral withdrawal position would be to acknowledge the likely consequences of such a withdrawal and argue that, as bad as they are, continuing the current strategy is worse.

    This is a muddle.

    "Unilateral, premature withdrawal"?
    I suppose I'd advocate a bilateral or trilateral withdrawal if our major allies hadn't already gone home.

    What's logically inconsistent about advocating a policy that has drawbacks and also trying to outline some measures to diminish those drawbacks? That's called governing. Outside of Bill Kristol's fantasyland, all policies have some drawbacks. Imagine if the Iraq invasion plan had contained some sensible measures to preserve order and quell sectarian strafe. Would that have made it a worse or less logical invasion plan?

    In any case, the "logically consistent" position you want the Democratic candidate to take up is the one I'm advocating. I do acknowledge there are consequences to withdrawal, and I do argue that continuing the current strategy is worse. What I don't advocate is stopping there and saying Oh my stars I'm like to faint because the world is cruel and Republicans are right after all. Rather, I want the Democratic candidate to acknowledge that withdrawal will be a difficult task, plan for it, and sell the American people on a more responsible and appealing approach than let's pay this price in blood and treasure for another 4 to 100 years.

    The second problem is that there is a logical disconnect in advocating a policy (unilateral, premature withdrawal) that will increase the chances of the "worst-case humanitarian consequences" you fear

    The "worst-case humanitarian consequences" have already happened. There's never been any clear reason to believe that a U.S. withdrawal would make things worse. In the short-term, there might be a rise in violence, but the surge also caused a spike in violence. The difference between withdrawal and the surge is that when the surge was over, Iraq was still in a bloody civil war, while a U.S. withdrawal is the only thing that could lead to actual reconciliation (as opposed to anti-reconciliation measures passed by a "government" that has no power).

    If you have any real evidence that a troop withdrawal would be worse for Iraq than the occupation has been, let's hear it - but it's got to be enough evidence to counterbalance the clear advantages of withdrawal: the saving of so much cost in money and lives.

    The conservative position appears to be that taxpayer money is a free resource and American lives are of no worth, and thus staying in Iraq has no costs, while the cost of withdrawal is huge. The truth is closer to the opposite: there are many clear benefits to withdrawal and only a slim chance of staying producing a good result. (And if it does produce a good result, it'll take ten years of wasting money and lives, and therefore "winning", in the unlikely event that it will happen, may not be worth it anyway.)

    The conservative position is, essentially, that big, enormously government programs should never be abandoned if there's a small chance of a good result 20 years down the road. Plus that a government employee who wants money for his pet government project, like General Petraeus, is worthy of the highest respect. It's another reason why Republicans are the party of big, wasteful government.

    I fully agree with James Robertson. Obviously spending several hundred billion more dollars and 1000-2000 more American lives in order to very slightly decrease the near-certainty that the ultimate outcome of this war will be the replacement of a Sunni tyranny with a Shiite tyranny is a bargain any sensible person would jump at.

    Meanwhile, I think Yglesias is missing a bet by not quoting Michael Kinsley's column, also from last night's Post ( http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/02/21/AR2008022101555.html ):

    "President Bush laid down the standard of success when he announced the surge more than a year ago: 'If we increase our support at this crucial moment, and help the Iraqis break the current cycle of violence, we can hasten the day our troops begin coming home.' At the time, there were about 130,000 American soldiers in Iraq. Bush proposed to add up to 20,000 more troops. Although Bush never made any official promises about a timetable, the surge was generally described as lasting six to eight months.

    "By last summer the surge had actually added closer to 30,000 troops, making the total American troop count about 160,000. Today, there are still more than 150,000 American troops in Iraq. The official plan has been to get that number back down to 130,000 by July, and then to keep on going so that there would be about 100,000 American troops in Iraq by the time Bush leaves office.

    "Just lately, though, General Petraeus has come up with another zen-like idea: he calls it a 'pause.' And the administration has signed on, meaning that the total number of American troops in Iraq will remain at 130,000 for an undetermined period.

    "So the best that we can hope for, in terms of American troops risking their lives in Iraq, is that there will be just as many in July -- and probably in January, when Bush leaves office -- as there were a year ago. The surge will have surged in and surged out, leaving us back where we started. Maybe the situation in Baghdad, or all of Iraq, will have improved. But apparently it won't have improved enough to risk any actual reduction in the American troop commitment.

    "And consider how modest the administration's standard of success has become. Can there be any doubt that they would go for a reduction to 100,000 troops -- and claim victory -- if they had any confidence at all that the gains they brag about would hold at THAT level of support? The proper comparison isn't to the situation a year ago. It's to the situation before we got there. Imagine that you had been told in 2003 that when George W. Bush finished his second term, dozens of American soldiers and hundreds of Iraqis would be dying violently every month; that a major American goal would be getting the Iraqi government to temper its 'de-Baathification' campaign so that Saddam Hussein's former henchmen could start running things again (because they know how); and that 'only' 100,000 American troops would be needed to sustain this equilibrium.

    "You might have several words to describe this situation, but 'success' would not be one of them."

    Bruce Moomaw,

    You forgot to quote this part:

    It is now widely considered beyond dispute that Bush has won his gamble. The surge was a terrific success. Choose your metric: attacks on American soldiers, car bombs, civilian deaths, potholes. They're all down, down, down. Lattes sold by street vendors are up. Performances of Shakespeare by local repertory companies have tripled.

    Skepticism seems like sour grapes. If you opposed the surge, you have two choices. One is to admit that you were wrong, wrong wrong. The other is to sound as if you resent all the good news and remain eager for disaster. Too many opponents of the war have chosen option two.

    Which option do you choose: admitting you were wrong, or hoping for disaster?

    "Skepticism seems like sour grapes. If you opposed the surge, you have two choices. One is to admit that you were wrong, wrong wrong. The other is to sound as if you resent all the good news and remain eager for disaster. Too many opponents of the war have chosen option two."

    This is true, to a large extent. The scoffing at the idea of a surge (which I did too) looks at best awkward when put side by side with today's chorus of "yeah, but". It's largely a matter of style; there should be a way to acknowledge both the success of the surge and the problems that lie ahead, without bemoaning good news.

    But surge advocates seem to be displaying an unseemliness of the opposite kind. Namely, 5 years into a war which has been on the whole disasterous, they're jumping up and down until they get everyone to acknowledge one countertrend. So instead of "The surge worked; now what's next?", the right has been writing columns for the past 6 months basically saying "Why can't these defeatist liberals admit that we were right?" We are still in a war, which is far from over. And yet the main concern of pro-war people is yet again to score points on the war.

    If it had been Haitian Voodoo fanatics, instead of Middle Eastern Islamic fanatics, that had committed 9/11 we would probably be dedicating "..120,000+ U.S. troops and $100 billion a year to the problem for an indefinite period of time,..." in Haiti in stead of Iraq in the Middle East. Your argument is like the Scarecrow in the wizard of Oz stuffed with straw.

    Colatina,

    In general, opponents of the war are still not willing to admit the success of the surge. They are so consumed by their fragile self-righteousness, and so scared that admitting any error will undermine their basic position, that their deniability shields are turned up all the way to eleven. Until they muster enough honesty and realism to admit they were wrong, trying to engage them rationally is futile. I think it will always be futile with most of them, because their position never was made on rational grounds in the first place. It was always more an expression of their loathing for Bush and the GOP.

    Mixner,

    I don't care if the surge turned iraq in to a shining democracy. I opposed the war, and continue to oppose the war, because I think it was a waste of lives and money. If going to Baghdad was the same as going to Paris I would STILL OPPOSE THE WAR. You may think that I oppose the war because I oppose Bush, or republicans, or whatever, but the fact is that I have always believed that was is a horrible thing and should be the last solution we turn to.

    You think that is irrational, I think supporting this was is irrational, which seems to be the basic trouble of this debate, we can't see any common ground because our basic assumptions are incompatible.

    "I'd only add that the cliched six-month Friedman Units seem to have faded away into even more daunting four-year Cordesman Units."

    Not 100-year McCain Units?

    "You can't seriously contend that political reconciliation is just one benchmark away"

    Iraq's certainly not going to become another Switzerland as soon as that third piece of benchmark legislation gets hammered out, but before the first two laws were passed, those goalposts were the ones repeatedly pointed to by Democrats as evidence that the surge was a failure, despite the drastic reduction in violence. To now claim that the surge is still a failure even though there has been significant progress on political reconciliation is just goalpost moving.

    "I suppose I'd advocate a bilateral or trilateral withdrawal if our major allies hadn't already gone home."

    In the event you aren't being deliberately obtuse, the opposite of a unilateral withdrawal would be one done in coordination with, and with the consent of the government of Iraq.

    "In any case, the "logically consistent" position you want the Democratic candidate to take up is the one I'm advocating."

    Great. I look forward to hearing one of your remaining candidates make it. It's a debate worth having.

    "And yet the main concern of pro-war people is yet again to score points on the war."

    I think the main concern for most is that a Democratic president might sabotage the current effort. This concern is probably overstated though, for reasons I've mentioned above.

    "Until they muster enough honesty and realism to admit they were wrong, trying to engage them rationally is futile."

    Wrong about what, the surge? They (people who were anti-war from the beginning) were right about almost everything else. I'm betting that the Republicans are grateful that failing to admit you were wrong does not put them beyond the pale of rational discourse. It's a theme I hear a lot from conservatives these days--"how can I argue with you?!" It's usually a sign that they have nothing really to say; giving up on arguments is a big relief.

    "I think it will always be futile with most of them, because their position never was made on rational grounds in the first place. It was always more an expression of their loathing for Bush and the GOP."

    No, I don't think so. I'm willing to agree that some people seem sad that the surge worked, but that's really no different that what usually happens when people see evidence that contradicts their positions. If you're frustrated that people won't change their mind about Iraq and become pro-war, you'll be much more disappointed when you try to argue about all the other political issues where people won't change their minds even when a policy really works.

    Policies are always both real-world applications of power that have serious effects on real people, as well as topics around which political power struggles are structured. Critics of the war simply had the bad fortune of being skeptical of a policy that was going to happen anyway and which any decent American should wish success for.

    Plenty of liberals, just like average Americans sometimes recoil from a policy because of its association with Bush (NCLB, immigration, etc.). But they're a capable as anyone else of getting over this from time to time and realizing when a policy has worked and when it fits with their principles. The simple fact is that the war is, liberals have learned, neither successful nor does it fit with liberal principles. That fact would override any good or bad motives they have for their war position, or any potshots they may want to take at Bush.

    What we need right now is a good dose of pragmatism. I think southpaw's comments are sound, as are Fred's. In terms of what needs to happen next, I don't really see a contradiction.

    In real terms, we have spent far less blood and treasure in Iraq than we did in Korea and Vietnam, and far more is riding on achieving a successful outcome in the Persian Gulf region than was ever at stake on the edges of mainland Asia. We have made grievous errors that have made victory more costly and difficult, but I have heard no cogent argument as to why we should accept defeat. If I understand southpaw correctly, he's noting that advocating for a self-administered defeat is not going to be a successful political strategy no matter how ignorant of the history and facts some of those on the left, as exampled routinely in these comments, are.

    The thing that makes this such a difficult argument to resolve is that we have vocal minorities at both extremes which have a deep psychological need to be seen as having been "right", facts be damned. Some Republicans have difficulty admitting to any mistakes, and blame all difficulties on their critics. Some Democrats who are reflexive, if situational, passivists either oppose all use of force, or only think it's a good idea if it is cost-free and involves no important US interests (Haiti?).

    Well, I see the fucktards are out in force tonight.

    Can't get a date, guys?

    So I'm going to just sit back and wait for the Iraqis to kick the shit out of the US military, and then I'll be around to say, "I told you so!" in no uncertain terms.

    Because nothing of significance has changed in Iraq since 2004 - the Sunnis and Shia are still going to fight, the government is going to get replaced by one which wants the US out at some point (and if not, it will simply be trashed and replaced by a bunch of insurgents and militias who will want the US out), and there will inevitably be a resurgence of violence (some people are observing that the numbers are going up as I type) which ends with US forces getting their asses kicked.

    Personally, I can't wait - but I guess I will have to since the Iraqis are going to move on their timetable, not mine.

    The only problem is that it may be this year or it may be next year - after the next parliamentary elections - before things heat up again. In the meantime, McCain might ride this to the Presidency - and doom the US to endless war forever.

    The notion that the "surge" is a success - i.e., that the current situation in Iraq in fact has anything to do with the "surge" - is laughable.

    al-Sadr just extended his cease fire. Without that, US troops would be dying today in greater numbers.

    So the right wing nitwits here need to send al-Sadr their thanks for maintaining his unilateral ceasefire for another six months.


    The Iraq War, has, of course, already cost more in inflation-adjusted dollars than the Korean War. It should pass Vietnam by the end of 2008, at current rates.

    Back in 2002, we were spending ~ 1.5 billion a year on no-fly. Now we're spending ~120 billion year and climbing, while oil is $100 dollars a barrel. What have we gained in return?

    In what objective way are we better off? Are we richer? No. Are we safer? No, since Iraq was never a threat. Will staying longer make us richer? No. Safer? No.

    I never get sane answers to either question. I don't believe that there are any.

    I support the current policy in Iraq, but it can't be called a success until the US Army is down to 50,000 troops and we aren't losing any men, the Iraqi army is doing 99% of the work and the government is functional by Mideast standards.

    I think that it's incontravertible that things are improving. So the question is: why stop now? Is it so inevitable that things will ultimately fail? Why hand a propaganda victory to Bin Laden? Why create a situation of even greater chaos and death than currently exists?

    As long as things improve, we should stay. If we ultimately run into unresolvable ethnic tension then we can leave. But what's amazing is how far we've come from the nadir. We've achieved so far in the surge what I thought would be impossible. There's no reason to bail now.

    BTW, this doesn't mean the Iraq war is a "victory". The place would have to turn into Switzerland and the mullahs get kicked out of Iran by an inspired Iranian populace for it to be called victory.

    If it had been Haitian Voodoo fanatics, instead of Middle Eastern Islamic fanatics, that had committed 9/11 we would

    The fanatics that attacked us were from Saudi Arabia. We didn't attack there. They were coordinated in Afghanistan, but that's not in the middle east.

    If we had been attacked by Voodoo fanatics, Bush would have invaded Tahiti.

    His report is full of things like "consolidate progress in Iraq forces: Independent for internal security by 2012; create ability to defend against foreign threats by 2018." He outlines goals like "Create effective criminal justice system and local rule of law (2008-2010)" and "revive national infrastructure in terms of water, power, roads, rail, petroleum exports, financial institutions, communications, etc (2009-2011)." On the security front, we're also supposed to "resolve the problem of National Police, local forces, ethnic and sectarian militias and integrate into ISF or civil economy (2009-2011)." We also need to "revise constitution to meet needs of all major factions (2008-2009)."

    All of Cordesman's 2008-2012 goals listed here were things the Bush Administration was telling us they were on the way to accomplishing back in 2003, 2004, and 2005.

    There's good reason for a lack of strategic patience here.


    "In 2007, after Bush changed strategy and personnel, Congressional Dems fought to prevent him from implementing it, to force a withdrawal timetable, and declared the strategy a failure in advance.

    When the new strategy led to dramatic reductions in violence that became too sustained to ignore, Democrats changed tack slightly, claiming that they always knew additional troops would tamp down the violence, but the real problem was a lack of political reconciliation."

    This is not accurate, or at least not fully accurate; many Democrats (such as Matt himself, for example), took the position you describe as "chang[ing] tack" from the very beginning.


    "In 2007, after Bush changed strategy and personnel, Congressional Dems fought to prevent him from implementing it, to force a withdrawal timetable, and declared the strategy a failure in advance.

    When the new strategy led to dramatic reductions in violence that became too sustained to ignore, Democrats changed tack slightly, claiming that they always knew additional troops would tamp down the violence, but the real problem was a lack of political reconciliation."

    This is not accurate, or at least not fully accurate; many Democrats (such as Matt himself, for example), took the position you describe as "chang[ing] tack" from the very beginning.


    "In 2007, after Bush changed strategy and personnel, Congressional Dems fought to prevent him from implementing it, to force a withdrawal timetable, and declared the strategy a failure in advance.

    When the new strategy led to dramatic reductions in violence that became too sustained to ignore, Democrats changed tack slightly, claiming that they always knew additional troops would tamp down the violence, but the real problem was a lack of political reconciliation."

    This is not accurate, or at least not fully accurate; many Democrats (such as Matt himself, for example), took the position you describe as "chang[ing] tack" from the very beginning.

    What would Cordesman do to fix Haiti's deeply entrenched problem if we were willing to commit 120,000+ U.S. troops and $100 billion a year to the problem for an indefinite period of time? Or maybe the federal government wants to dedicate that kind of personnel (though not active duty soldiers) and money to reducing the crime rate in Washington, DC?

    Gee, I think I see a basic wrong assumption or two in the above complaint. For instance I don’t believe the US is in Iraq to “fix” a “deeply entrenched problem” such as exists in Haiti, which is a case of corruption and ignorance causing social and economic wretchedness. If Saddam had been content to merely rule a wretched nation(such as Haiti) he could have been safely ignored and there would have been no need to destroy Iraq’s government.

    On DC: Short of somehow abrogating the corrupt and incompetent civic leaders the DC electorate continue to vote into office I can envision no outside fix that has any practical chance of working. Alas, in America civic problems such as exist in DC are traditionally left to civic institutions to solve – other than to throw federal monies at the problem – which has been done ad infinitum and no doubt will continue to be done.

    A couple of elementary observations will have to suffice; to equate the pre-Saddam Iraq to Haiti and Washington DC is wrong in so many ways that it can’t be thoroughly done in a short comment.

    the fact the Persians invented the game of chess

    A bit of pedantry: Wasn't it the Chinese who invented chess?

    Why hand a propaganda victory to Bin Laden?

    Wow. That train left the station when the US invaded. By the way, why is this bin Laden fellow still around?

    gcochran--In terms of %of GDP, in my view the only fair comparison, Iraq spending represents less than half of our peak Vietnam spending, and less than 20% of Korea's. In fatal US casualties, it's about 4,00 to nearly 60,000, and at least 40,000, respectively.

    Doing the "worth it" equation is tricky. We were spending about $70 billion a year all told, including Operation Marine Intercept and other related deployments, and in return got complicity for killing about a million innocent Iraqis with the sanctions we enforced, which had the added benefit of tightening the regime's grip on power and enriching its collaborators. We know the downsides of what we did. We don't know the downsides of what we didn't do. But I for one am glad our current problems don't include a Saddam Hussein regime freed from sanctions, fueled by massive oil reserves, in a nuclear arms race with (at least) Iran, Saudi Arabia, and Egypt, and competing with Al Qaeda and Teheran for the title of our biggest headache.


    " We were spending about $70 billion a year all told, including Operation Marine Intercept and other related deployments "

    A lie, of course. The Air Force claims that no-fly was costing 1.5 billion and there's reason to suspect that _they_ were inflating the numbers. As for the cost of enforcing sanctions, they were trivial, considering that Iraq has but one port for exporting oil.

    So why are you lying? Why are you supporting nonsense that is extremely bad for the United States? Whatever the reason, it's got to stop.

    The Iraq War may have been expensive, but it surely has done a good job of identifying poisonous idiots. But unless we use that knowledge ,it will all have been for nothing. Considerably less than nothing, in fact

    I for one look forward to the day that people like yourself [Robert Powell] are unable to get security clearances. And unable to vote, too, like other felons. Although that hardly seems enough. Afraid to bend over to pick up the soap in the shower? also good, but not enough.
    Dead and roasting in Hell? Closer, but still not quite the thing.




    The 2002 DOD budget was #329.9 billion dollars: close to a third going to each service. So where was the 70 billion you speak of hidden?

    Today, the total DOD budget including those Iraq and Afghanistan 'supplements' is 647 billion.

    But we're not really spending a lot more - not according to Powell anyhow, who is an innumerate, if not a traitor. Or possibly both. Surely it's worth it, since we're facing the greatest threat of all time, a few bandits in caves that don't have a single tank: which we fight for the most part by invading and occupying another country that had nothing to do with 9-11.

    My Senator, Pete Domenici, at least had the excuse of frontotemporal dementia. Is it catching?

    This is an appropriate moment to note the NY Times' description of how things are going right now in Basra -- which, as the article notes, is one of the BEST-run parts of Iraq at the moment, and a clear indicator of what Unified Iraq will be like if we're lucky enough to get even that far:

    http://www.nytimes.com/2008/02/23/world/middleeast/23basra.html?_r=1&hp=&oref=slogin&pagewanted=print

    Care to take bets on Iraq becoming a puppet of (nuclear-armed) Iran? I rather doubt you will after reading the article.

    Greg Cochran,

    Would you mind giving us a broader sense of your world view on defense and national security? Imagine that the American people put you in charge of national security and defense. Imagine also that we hadn't invaded Iraq a second time. A few questions for you:

    1) Would you maintain America's role as the de facto security guarantor of the Persian Gulf and the Gulf states allied with us? Which, if any other de facto or de jure security obligations would you maintain (e.g., our collective defense obligations with the recently-expanded NATO)?

    2) What missions would you consider appropriate for the U.S. military?

    3) How much would you spend on the military, and how would you spend it?

    Another question for you. Looking back over America's history, which wars, if any, do you think were worth us fighting?

    For what it's worth, we were maintaining carrier task groups and lots of associated shipping in the Persian Gulf; huge bases in Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and Kuwait; and lots of other expenses pretty much all for Iraq. The there was the deployment of hundreds of thousands to "encourage" Iraq to re-admit inspectors. It was a lot more than the Air Force budget for one part of one operation-and most importantly, it wasn't working.

    No one should seriously propose a single budget item from one service as the total cost for "containing" Iraq, nor should they be under any illusions that this "containment" wasn't falling apart, and when it was effective amounted to genocide. This may be less important to some than the exact yearly breakdown of appropriations by service, but not to me.

    I think we're going to need to examine these issues without undue hysteria, or demonization of those with honestly held opposing views. They're too important for the cartoon treatment.

    I fully agree with Mr. Powell's last statement -- and one useful item in that respect is Brian Urquhart's recent "NY Review of Books" review of John Bolton's book ( http://www.nybooks.com/articles/21052 ). Specifically, the following passage:

    "On the emergency Oil-for-Food program in Iraq, for which UN administration and lack of supervision were rightly criticized, Bolton recites the standard neoconservative denunciation of Annan and the Secretariat without mentioning who was responsible for the real scandal. It was the Security Council, including the US, that allowed Saddam Hussein's government to negotiate deals and kickbacks directly -- without UN supervision -- with the hundreds of commercial firms involved. Nor does he mention that the US and the four other permanent members of the Security Council turned a blind eye to Iraqi oil smuggling to Turkey, Jordan, and Syria which accounted for most of Saddam's illicit gains and had nothing to do with the Oil-for-Food program. He also fails to mention that the program successfully fed and provided essential supplies to some 25 million Iraqis for over six years, and thus made it possible to maintain the strict sanctions on Iraq as the United States and others wished...

    "(See my 'The UN Oil-for-Food Program: Who Is Guilty?' The New York Review of Books, February 9, 2006. The Volcker report on the Oil-for-Food Program, which Bolton calls 'devastating' for the UN, states, 'The Committee also believes that the successes of the Programme, although not extensively chronicled here, should not be buried by the allegations of corruption that have enjoyed so much attention in the media and elsewhere' [Vol. 1, p.13].)"

    If I understand southpaw correctly, he's noting that advocating for a self-administered defeat is not going to be a successful political strategy no matter how ignorant of the history and facts some of those on the left, as exampled routinely in these comments, are.

    I want to push back a little bit against the idea of "self-administered defeat." Let's take a short trip down memory lane . . .


    Gen. Tommy Franks, March 22, 2003:

    You know, Secretary of Defense Don Rumsfeld, my boss, yesterday outlined the military objectives of Operation Iraqi Freedom. Let me review them with you.

    First, end the regime of Saddam Hussein.

    Second, to identify, isolate and eliminate Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction.

    Third, to search for, to capture and to drive out terrorists from that country.

    Fourth, to collect such intelligence as we can related to terrorist networks.

    Fifth, to collect such intelligence as we can related to the global network of illicit weapons of mass destruction

    Sixth, to end sanctions and to immediately deliver humanitarian support to the displaced and to many needy Iraqi citizens.

    Seventh, to secure Iraq’s oil fields and resources, which belong to the Iraqi people.

    And last, to help the Iraqi people create conditions for a transition to a representative self-government.

    So let's review:
    1. Accomplished. Saddam Hussein is dead.
    2. Impossible, predicated on a false premise. (Nevertheless, the desired end state--no Iraqi WMD--obtains.)
    3. Arguably not fully achievable. So long as we remain in country, there is no way--short of killing everyone--to assure that no terrorists exist in Iraq.
    4. Presumably Accomplished. Not truly testable.
    5. Presumably Accomplished. Not truly testable.
    6. Accomplished.
    7. Accomplished.
    8. Thorny. Have we helped the Iraqi people create the conditions for a transition to representative self-government? Sure. Has it actually happened? In terms of elections and the appearance of a "government," pretty much. Is it worth boasting about? Not at all; the government's writ doesn't run very far.

    The Democrats contend that the best way to bring about a more worthy form of Iraqi self-government is through the pressure of a phased withdrawal (and I'm lobbying for a more detailed plan). The Republicans suggest continued presence and hand-holding will, despite its tremendous cost, produce a pleasant and useful client-state. Both parties seek an acceptable outcome, but is either outcome victory?

    Let's be clear. Neither outcome is the victory that was sought: An outward-expanding political revolution throughout the middle-east whole region that would bring an end to the oppression which fuels terrorism.

    Through the trauma of the last five years, we've learned that such a "victory" cannot be achieved by applying more military force to the nation of Iraq. We're all looking for the least-bad outcome at this point. So let's tone down the rhetoric of defeat.

    More cynically: When you send the army out in search of pie in the sky, it cannot come home victorious.

    I have absolutely no problem with the point Bruce Moomaw uses Urquhart's statement to make. My beef with the sanctions regime is not simply a matter of UN-bashing. It is primarily that we WERE complicit in this criminal enterprise, and of course with the horrific real-world consequences of it.

    The simple fact is that from the collapse of the Iraqi military in Kuwait in 1991 until the second invasion in 2003 we were doing everything we could think of to deal with the problem short of actually trying to win the war. The real costs and consequences of this essentially irresponsible, but fully bi-partisan, policy deserve to be considered along with the costs of the subsequent invasion.

    I for one think it's a matter of vital national interest that the current disaster at the UN be addressed. We need a serious international mechanism for enforcing the generally agreed-upon norms concerning wars of aggression, genocide, the proliferation and use of wmd's, and state support for terrorism. Iraq brought that need to a crisis point, and the results so far have left us further away from a reasonable solution than we were.


    The hundreds of thousands of troops in Kuwait in 2002 were invasion preparations: we didn't need them. There was no Iraqi threat, and no one who could count would have worried any about Iraqi armaments program. They were broke. I managed to come with a decent estimate of their free cash flow in 2002 (mainly from truck-smuggled oil that we winked at, as Moomaw says) and it was obvious that they weren't up to anything. My 15-minute Google-based estimate was of course confirmed by Volcker's later study.

    Powell, I wouldn't demonize you. I'd beat the crap out of you, given the chance. There's not really much point in arguing with someone who thinks that we're not spending a whole hell of a lot more in Iraq than we did in 2001, but bruises and broken bones might make you rethink things. I'd enjoy every minute of it. But there are so many damn fools: we need to automate the process.

    The only national interest we have in the Persian Gulf is the free flow of oil. We need only keep someone from going forth and conquering most or all of the oil fields: that's easy. And cheap, I might add. Nobody's even trying to build the required capacity. Iran certainly isn't.

    Oh, and I forgot: we have to keep the Caliphate from being reborn. I promise to take care of that one myself, just by keeping my lucky teddy bear animal under my pillow.

    Assuming that our current adventure in Iraq has a purpose (which I do not believe), and if that purpose were in large part related to oil, it's easy to show that we'd be better off with World War II-style Fischer-Tropf synthetic fuel plants and no foreign policy at all. The cost would be lower than the price of oil plus associated strategic costs.

    But that's talking numbers and practicality, and I can think of nothing more alien to modern movement conservatism. Certainly nothing is more alien to George Bush, the patron saint of incompetence.


    Adding to my previous comment . . . I went through all of Tommy Franks' objectives to point out that--if that's the rubric--we've basically met them. No one, of course, confuses meeting those objectives with a glorious victory (i.e. the radically unrealistic domino effect).

    So, from a messaging standpoint, we can either declare victory on the Franks model to save face. Or we can forthrightly try to patch things up as best we can like adults. But in a practical sense, you have two competing visions for what to do in Iraq: persevere at great cost or get out at great risk. Neither would lead to clear victory and neither would lead to clear defeat.

    We were trying to avoid "winning the war" during the sanctions period precisely because the Bush Sr. and Clinton administrations were rightfully afraid of the consequences of trying to "win the war" -- and one of those consequences, remember, is that at that time almost everybody DID believe that Saddam had biological weapons, and that he would either use them against us or hand them over to the likes of al-Qaeda the moment we tried to invade. The New Republic, shortly after the Kuwait War, got hold of internal military documents stating flatly that this was the main reason why Bush Sr. didn't further extend his attack on Iraq. And the CIA, you'll recall, warned Bush Jr. urgently about precisely this same possibility (or probability) in October 2002 -- and got totally ignored. Thank God that Saddam (to everyone's surprise) DIDN'T really have them anymore, or the consequences of Bush Jr. deciding to rub Daddy's nose in it Oedipus-style would have been even more disastrous.

    Of course, another consequence of our trying to "win the war" as Powell desires was that we would have needed at least three times as many troops, and thus a draft -- which as Cheney himself wrote in 1994 shortly before his body was apparently taken over by an evil alien, was in itself a good reason to avoid such a war. (The reason for the sudden flip of opinion on this subject by Cheney and Rumsfeld is -- as their long-time former friends have noted -- the single biggest remaining mystery of this administration.)

    southpaw--just to be clear, the "outward expanding revolution" idea was/is clearly pie-in-the-sky, and although it may play out over a century or so, I don't know anyone who knows much about the Middle East who ever thought it was a likely short-term prospect. This is not my idea of "victory".

    As you suggest, in some respects we "won" some time ago. If we had stuck with the original plan (the "Future of Iraq" project done by the State Department and Central Command-"ten years of work", according to Tony Zinni), we would have had Jay Garner turn over rather quickly to a provisional government with an Iraqi face, and re-deployed over the horizon as backup for it. No Abu Ghraib, no GI's dying as Baghdad traffic cops and security guards, and maybe a quick shake-out and deal between the Iraqi factions. Maybe.

    As things now stand, we have a certain responsibility to the many thousands of Iraqis who have functioned as our allies, and to the government they elected. I think it's reasonable to expect that given support similar to that we gave South Korea a half century ago Iraq will develop into a state or states that is/are reasonably pro-Western, reasonably stable and democratic, at peace with the neighbors, and pumping oil. That looks like victory to me, and I think it's what most of our troops would consider an honorable conclusion, which they deserve.

    I'm not Greg Cochran but:

    1) Would you maintain America's role as the de facto security guarantor of the Persian Gulf and the Gulf states allied with us?

    Guaranteeing their security against who? Iran?

    Which, if any other de facto or de jure security obligations would you maintain (e.g., our collective defense obligations with the recently-expanded NATO)?

    It's not an obligation, it's a choice. I wouldn't mind Europe going on its own for its defense.

    2) What missions would you consider appropriate for the U.S. military?

    Defense of American territory. Intervention abroad when a majority of the world's states agree.

    3) How much would you spend on the military, and how would you spend it?

    About half. $250-300 billion/year.

    Well those are some suggestions.


    Since every poll shows that a majority of Iraqis believe that armed resistance against Americans is legitimate - a big majority, outside of Kurdistan - I have to wonder how they're going to end up with a pro-western government. As for 'reasonably stable and democratic', that's just about the stupidest thing anyone's ever said. So why do you say it?
    Are you nuts? Is someone paying you? How much?

    gcochran,

    For an isolationist you seem to have a lot of violent urges.

    Most polls are problematic. Polls taken in a war zone by people of uncertain competence and politics who don't speak the language are useless.

    The only polls that count are elections, and Iraq has had elections that were judged free and fair by the UN. That's a check on the "reasonably democratic" item.

    I believe that in trying to determine what Iraqis think they need and want we should pay more attention to the responsible elected officials than to dubious polls. They've been pretty clear about it. The current government certainly has problems, but by any reasonable standards it's the most legitimate in the region excepting Israel and Turkey. Legitimacy is about the best predictor I know for stability long-term. So, a potential check on that item too.

    I appreciate that you think your views on Iraq are not only perfectly correct in all details but evidence of moral superiority, Mr. Cochran. You might be more persuasive if you don't confuse sanctimonious boorishness with sincere dedication to noble ideals.

    Guaranteeing their security against who? Iran?


    Powell: Go to Iraq and ask them yourself, without an armed escort. We wouldn't want bias creeping in. They'd kill you.

    I appreciate that you support the stupidest foreign policy move that the United States has ever made. Sheesh, the War College thinks it was stupid and says so out loud, during a war: I doubt if that has ever happened before.

    to steve: you don't know the half of it. This is _my_ country and I resent pinheads damaging it.
    Fury is the only appropriate response to Bush in Iraq. But of course I am not an isolationist, merely against wars with no strategic justification. Which has, unfortunately, been most of them: it's hard to see what we got out of the conquest of the Philippines or the Banana Wars in central America.

    Fred's timeline in the comment above has a few problems:

    • In 2004, Dems were running to the right of Bush, saying we should send in more troops.

    Nope. Kerry called for increasing the size of the army, but that was to keep the army from breaking under the strain of fighting two wars. He did not call for increasing the number of troops in Iraq. His plan for Iraq relied on diplomacy and increased international involvement. I don't know whether he would have succeeded. When the voters decided not to gamble on Kerry, but instead elect the candidate with a proven track record of failure, that eliminated what seems to me to have been America's best shot at achieving a decent result in Iraq.

    • In 2006, they were (rightly) demanding that Bush change a failing strategy and personnel.

    The Bush Adminstration had already replaced one failing strategy with another failing strategy at least four times. The Democrats wanted Bush to find a decent way to get out of the Iraq mess, as opposed to continuing to throw good money (and lives) after bad.

    • In 2007, after Bush changed strategy and personnel, Congressional Dems fought to prevent him from implementing it, to force a withdrawal timetable, and declared the strategy a failure in advance.

    Bush laid out a plan--the surge--which involved sending in additional troops and having the Iraqis take advantage of the temporary reduction in violence to fix the political situation. It was pretty clear that this plan, like all of the other plans before it, would fail. Never the less, the Democrats funded it.

    • When the new strategy led to dramatic reductions in violence that became too sustained to ignore, Democrats changed tack slightly, claiming that they always knew additional troops would tamp down the violence, but the real problem was a lack of political reconciliation.

    As time went on and it became increasingly difficult to pretend that the surge would to achieve its objectives, Republicans tried to lower the bar by pointing to the military successes and hoping that people would forget that the whole point of the surge was to allow political progress.

    This lent support to the position that cynics had taken all along: The Republicans never really expected that the surge would work. They no doubt hoped it would work, but like everyone else, they knew it was an extremely long shot. Their real reason for supporting the surge was to drag out the war until after the 2008 elections, when they could then try to blame the expected Democratic president for "losing the war."

    A soldier knows that he may be asked to die for his country. He should not be asked to die to improve the fortunes of the President's political party.

    • When examples of reconciliation at the local levels were presented, Democrats claimed that the surge was still a failure because Iraqis hadn't enacted key legislation at the federal level, on the rehabilitation of former Baathists, local elections, and an oil law.

    Republicans continued to try to lower the bar, rather than admit that the surge was a failure.

    • Now that the first two of those three major reconciliation milestones have been achieved by the Iraqi legislature (and it has agreed to an equitable provisional arrangement for the third), we get Matt's "strategic impatience" argument.

    The time frame for the surge was six to eight months. Is everything good that happens subsequently to be attributed to the surge? It seems equally plausible that the political situation in the United States has made it clear that the United States is going to withdraw from Iraq starting in 2009 whether the Iraqis are ready or not, so the Iraqis are coming to realize that they had better get ready.

    The situation in Iraq is better than it was before the surge started, but not as good as it would be if the surge had achieved its objectives. In an ideal world that would be the starting point for discussion.

    Kenneth Almquist's post has a few problems too.

    --To this day no one has been able to adequately describe what Kerry's actual position on Iraq was, and it was by far the most important issue in the campaign, if not the generation. His seat on the Foreign Relations Committee indicates that he was simply lying about getting more "allies" when he must have known that there was a vanishingly small chance of that no matter how nicely we talked. Moreover, his sneering contempt for the allies we already had ("Poland?") made the lie even more apparent.

    Like many appalled with the already-evident Bush mistakes in Iraq, I was fully prepared to vote for Kerry. Having attended the funeral of a popular Polish officer with a young family killed by a sniper in Iraq the day before the debate, this revolting display was a deal breaker for me.

    --It seems to me that the voting public has had a pretty consistent attitude about Iraq. As in 1991, 1994, 1998, 2002, and 2004, as in 2006 (and today) they weren't/aren't so much against the war as against LOSING the war.

    --The current impatience with Iraqi political progress seems like typical American arrogance fueled by ignorance to me. Expecting immediate "reconciliation" is about like expecting the Israelis in the '50's to sign off on an affirmative action hiring program for former SS troops. Iraq had its civil society utterly destroyed by the tyranny we overturned, and in some areas was subjected to genocide by it. There are Democrats who can't reconcile with members of their own party over the 2002 AUF vote (see some posts above). A little perspective, please.

    Given that most of the ethnic cleansing has already occurred, and that Iraqis overwhelmingly want us to leave, just set a date. The Iraqis will work it out, perhaps with a Saddam-like strongman, if need be.


    Comments closed March 07, 2008.

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