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The Dated John Rawls

29 Feb 2008 03:24 pm

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Yesterday, Tyler Cowen asked "Which 20th century classic of American conservative political thought has held up best?" Ezra Klein decided to turn it around on the liberals, noting that "Rawls would seem an obvious contender, as would Susan Moller Okin." As it happens, I finished Samuel Freedman's excellent newish book Rawls -- an extended explication of the man's body of work -- recently and among other things it served to me as a reminder of how dated A Theory of Justice seems some respects.

Now don't get me wrong, I think it "holds up" perfectly well in the sense of continuing to be a vital work of political philosophy. But in another sense of "holding up" it has pretty little to say about our contemporary political debates. The main antagonist of Rawls' egalitarian liberalism is, in the book, some form of utilitarianism which just isn't at all the structure of our political arguments at all. That's not really a failing on Rawls' part as his project is his project, and not some other thing, but it is a noteworthy aspect of the situation.

Okin's Justice, Gender, and the Family by contrast seems to me to have a much more clear and direct relevance to things people argue about today. The premise that women and men deserve political and social equality is something few people would disagree with these days, but Okin shows that some surprisingly radical conclusions about the status quo can follow from that in a way that's relevant in some obvious ways to arguments that you see in the cut-and-thrust of contemporary practical political debates. Rawls has created something vastly more theoretically ambitious, but in part in virtue of that ambition it's much less clear what the actual implications are. Arguments about what sorts of policies do or do not maximize the well-being of the worst-off turn out to be extremely controversial in ways that make it extremely difficult to say what a Rawlsian take on this or that would be.

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Comments (48)

A couple of point: first, I think you're actually quite wrong that utilitarianism (both generally and of the sort Rawls is interested in) don't play a part in our political discourse- the entire "law and economics" movement is just applied utilitarianism of a fairly vulgar sort, for example, and that plays a huge role in many political discussions. Other examples are easy to find. This doesn't play a big role in what journalists talk about, of course, but that's mostly because most of them are too dumb to get it. Secondly, I agree that Okin's book is very good and important, but it's the sort of thing that wouldn't have been written without Rawls, I think. She's largely working out what she thinks the proper implications of a Rawls-style view, after all.

Rawls's work isn't about practical political problems and it would be a mistake to think it was meant to be. In that sense it clearly doesn't address the topics of the day. But I think you're pretty clearly off in these two senses, at least.

Glancing at the screen, I could have sworn the title to this point was "I dated John Rawls."

As big as Rawls was, I don't think he holds up very well after Sandel.

It's true that there aren't many utilitarians running around in government (though there is certainly something consequentialist about the Bush Administration's defense of their tactics in the war on terror). But, I think that your evaluation of Rawls is too narrow in scope. Even if one accepts your evaluation of "A Theory of Justice", this criticism does not address Rawls' later work. What about "Political Liberalism" and all of Rawls's work on the importance of publicity conditions. Ronald Dworkin and others have provided very interesting interpretations of how a Rawlsian would address many of today's most pressing political debates: e.g. abortion, church and state issues, public school curriculum.

Curious what others think.

It's true that there aren't many utilitarians running around in government (though there is certainly something consequentialist about the Bush Administration's defense of their tactics in the war on terror). But, I think that your evaluation of Rawls is too narrow in scope. Even if one accepts your evaluation of "A Theory of Justice", this criticism does not address Rawls' later work. What about "Political Liberalism" and all of Rawls's work on the importance of publicity conditions. Ronald Dworkin and others have provided very interesting interpretations of how a Rawlsian would address many of today's most pressing political debates: e.g. abortion, church and state issues, public school curriculum.

Curious what others think.

It is amazing how narrow "liberals" are. The writer who holds up best is John Dewey (if only because so many liberals and progressives continue to use his ideas, many without even realizing it - ahem, ahem Matt).

Dewey's most accessible works are his education books, so probably the book to think about for the populace is "Democracy and Education."

It's not liberal so much as progressive. (The difference is much more than semantic, and goes back at least 100 years to the days of the first progressive movement.) But, imho, the work of political philosophy that's held up best is Michael Sandel's Democracy's Discontent. It artfully explained ten years ago the demonstrable need across the country for exactly what Obama has tapped into: the reawakening of civic engagement, an emphasis on individual citizenship, a call to virtues of community more transcendent and resonant than the maximizing of consumer choice, and an end to zero-sum partisan politics that treats political differences as the end, rather than the starting point, of discussion.

Matt, I think you're just playing the reverse-canonical work card here.

Certain aspects of Rawls' work are clearly dated now: When it appeared, it was rightly viewed as a detailed articulation and defense of the welfare liberalism that had been developing in western politics in the 20th c. Much has changed, politically, since. But there are two core features of his work that still have tremendous relevance. First, his methodology for developing answers to political questions is still widely accepted, which emphasized a back-and-forth revision process between our considered moral judgments about particular practices (such as slavery or torture) and general principles that are to justify such judgments (such as that we ought to treat like cases alike, that each person is deserving of equal respect, etc.) Second, he revived and defended the contractarian tradition of Locke, Hobbes and Rousseau. Many favor this style of political theory, even though they may reject the particular form it takes.
All in all, I think that these basic ideas of Rawls' are still relevant, still vital, and widely seen among intellectuals as one of the three or four standard views. As important as Susan Moller Okin's work is, and as influential as some of Rawls' critics have been, unlike them, you can argue with Rawls or against him, but not without him.

These list things are silly, but I will put a word in for John Hart Ely's Democracy and Distrust, although perhaps it focuses too much on the issue of judicial review.

The classics of social democracy (which Americans confusingly label "liberalism") seem to me to be Keynes' General Theory and the Beveridge Report.

You underestimate utilitarianism, Matt.

Every time someone praises 'pragmatism' or decries their opponent's 'ideological' policies, aren't they esentially appealing to utilitarianism or some other form of consequentialism, or at least damning their opponent's deontological tendencies?

Pragmatic, unprincipled, two sides of the same coin. Likewise, idealistic/principled vs. ideological.

Consequentialist and deontological moral reasoning will always be with us, as each is an a basic part of the human condition.

It artfully explained ten years ago the demonstrable need across the country for exactly what Obama has tapped into: ...

Ah yes. A "demonstrable" need. Let me know when you've managed to "demonstrate" it.

I agree with others who question Matthew's claim that "utilitarianism ... just isn't at all the structure of our political arguments." Maybe not utilitarianism per se, but consequentialist arguments seem to dominate our political discourse. Everyone's trying to argue that his policy will produce better outcomes than his opponent's. Even people whose true motive is allegiance to some inviolable moral principle (such as religious fundamentalists of the right, and anti-torture fundamentalists of the left) feel obliged to argue for their political position in terms of its supposed effect on measurable outcomes.

Political theory this, maximize well-being that..

How come you so rarely post about Darfur?

Well, I can't speak for "us". But some sort of utilitarianism is certainly a large part of the structure of my own political arguments.

Rawls leaves me cold. I studied him as an undergraduate, and avoided him as a graduate student. I never understood the appeal.

Ah yes. A "demonstrable" need. Let me know when you've managed to "demonstrate" it.

I think Sen. Obama is demonstrating it, right this very moment. But, if that doesn't float your boat, look at the number of people who vote these days, or approval ratings for the various levels of government. Not good. Since neither party has made much of citizenship and civic engagement over the past forty years, and the level of discourse has usually revolved around either "Where's my stuff?" or "They're going to take your stuff," the people who have any faith at all in our political process has decayed tremendously. Without vision, the people perish.

In any case, "demonstrable" wasn't really a key piece of what I was talking about. Sorry to burden you with an extraneous adjective.

And, before the semanticists pounce again, that should be the number of people who have faith in politics has decayed, not the people themselves. My b.

Although, I guess if you want to get Emerson-transcendental about it, you could argue the latter as well.

I think Sen. Obama is demonstrating it, right this very moment.

I don't. And I get tired of people pretending that their political preferences are the same thing as "demonstrable" empirical facts.

Then look at the two empirical, demonstrable facts I gave you: The decrease in voting percentages, and the decrease in voter satisfaction according to polls. (Both are discussed further in Sandel's book.)

But, like I said, this is really tangential to the point I was originally making.

The obvious texts for american liberalism are Galbraith's trilogy: American capitalism, the affluent society, and the New Industrial state.

Read those and you will pretty much understand the post war American liberalism.

It has been some time since I last read A Theory Of Justice, but it still seems an essential book. I take the essential underpinning of Welfare State economics and politics to be the idea that a society should sacrifice some economic efficiency for a more egalitarian society. I believe that Rawls gave a philosophical justification for such a society with the idea that in the Original Position, where you know nothing about your station in life, you would rationally choose such a trade off as being better than betting on an unknown outcome which could leave you either substantially better or worse off. I believe all Western democracies, even ours, to be Welfare States, so that such a justification is relevant even today. I would nominate Anarchy, State, And Utopia as the other great American work of political philosophy of the last fifty years. I once had a discussion with Nozick in the 90's where I told him that I was still basically on his side but had moved more toward Rawls. Nozick told me that he had as well. I would add that Rawls book is much richer than my little sketch, which others may point out is incorrect, and that the detail and exactness of the book is philosophy as its best. I would also recommend Reason And Morality by Alan Gewirth.

policies are often argued in utilitarian terms. trouble is, there's no check on this impulse to control the masses. that's where the flip-side comes in (retributivism in punishment theory, for example), and makes an argument based in what's inherently right. these arguments usually push for freedom or whatnot.

i'm not sure how people judge what is right at any given time, but it seems to be a great check. and, it applies at any time to virtually any political argument. rawls obviously fits into this picture.

Plato got it right. End of story.

Philosopher King 'O8!

Berger: Glancing at the screen, I could have sworn the title to this point was "I dated John Rawls."

As big as Rawls was, I don't think he holds up very well after Sandel.

Berger, are your two sentences meant to be apposite?

Kevin,

"Then look at the two empirical, demonstrable facts I gave you

Sorry, but the "demonstrable needs" you asserted were "the reawakening of civic engagement, an emphasis on individual citizenship, a call to virtues of community more transcendent and resonant than the maximizing of consumer choice." I'd like you see your demonstration that these are "needs" rather than just political preferences on your part.

And, again, I'd point you to the information I've already posted, vis a vis voting in America.

But, really, this has grown tiresome. Like I've said several times now, I meant demonstrable in the "obvious or apparent" sense. But, if you prefer, I can regret and denounce my use of the adjective, if that'll help you to focus on the bigger picture.

Dewey's Democracy and Education is truly a neglected foundational work--sweeping in vision, magisterial in analysis, and, unfortunately, written in Dewey's characteristic plainsong diction, which hasn't worn very well.

And notice that Susan Moller Okin's name appears nowhere in comments. Come on, gentlemen! Her book is a marvelously clear-eyed analysis of the troubled relation of family and state. To the thing itself, you nattering progressive bien pensants (as for you trolling troglodytes--whatever...).

Ha! Let's just say Sandel has a commitment to "community" that I've found enlightening...even liberating.


Like I've said several times now, I meant demonstrable in the "obvious or apparent" sense. But, if you prefer, I can regret and denounce my use of the adjective, if that'll help you to focus on the bigger picture.

"Demonstrable" is not in any sense the same as "obvious or apparent." My whole point here is that you are using language in an intellectually dishonest way, trying to pass off your subjective political judgments as if they are "demonstrable" facts. Of course, you're not the only one. But it's a pretty good sign of insecurity.

All facts are demonstrable
Some facts are apparent
Ergo some demonstrable facts are apparent

"Demonstrable" is not in any sense the same as "obvious or apparent."

Demonstrable, via Freedictionary.

1. Capable of being demonstrated or proved: demonstrable truths.
2. Obvious or apparent: demonstrable lies.

Demonstrable, via Dictionary.com.

1. capable of being demonstrated or proved.
2. clearly evident; obvious

Demonstrable, via Merriam-Webster

1 : capable of being demonstrated
2 : apparent, evident

Who's using language in an intellectually dishonest way? I would argue excessive quibbling about one adjective for semantic purposes, while ignoring the general point I was trying to make, is getting close. Then again, you're also kinda reinforcing Sandel's point about the sorry state of our civic discourse. So, thanks.

Sorry for the thread-jacking, everyone else.

Sorry, but "demonstrable" is not at all the same thing as "obvious" or "apparent." "Demonstrable" implies the ability to show or prove the truth of an assertion to others. "Obvious" and "apparent" refer to subjective beliefs whose truth cannot necessarily be demonstrated. This is not a quibble, it's the fundamental distinction between objective, empirical facts and subjective, personal beliefs. Conflating the two is most definitely dishonest.

nerd,

All facts are demonstrable

Okay, demonstrate that you are conscious. Demonstrate that your sensation of color is the same as mine. Demonstrate that you enjoy the taste of ice cream.

Two misconceptions need to be cleared up about Rawls:

1) Some have claimed that TOJ is an apologia for welfare state liberalism. This is false. While Rawls might accept welfare state liberalism as a non-ideal stopgap, his two preferred political systems (property-owning democracy and democratic socialism) would both require a fairly radical revamping of our society.

2) The popularity of Sandel simply astounds. The basic dialectic of the Rawls-Sandel "debate" is like this:

Rawls: I am not providing a theory of a person, but rather a hypothetical device of representation that helps us get clear on our own considered judgments of fairness.

Sandel: Rawls puts forth a truly bizarre and incorrect theory of the person.

And then us Rawlsians just scratch our heads while political theory types nod sagely....

Mixner: Prove that consciousness is a fact.

I can't understand why Mixner's political views aren't more popular, given his tremendous personal warmth and charm.

To be fair, I think our political discourse today is generally not focused on bettering the worst-off-- certainly not on the right, and only tangentially on the left.

Who the hell is Susan Moller Okin? I consider myself pretty well informed but I'v enever heard of this person.

Okin (who was mentioned in early comments, including by me, despite what's said by ecco locco) was a political theorist who taught at Brandies and then Stanford. She was an important liberal feminist who wrote two very good books _Women in the western political tradition_ and _Justice Gender and the Family_ and the lead essay in an interesting and controversial volume _Is Multiculturalism Bad for Women?_. She died unexpectedly and fairly young a few years ago.

What are Mixner's political views? He appeared to be questioning the puffery in Kevin's Obamaphilic interjection rather the politics, per se.

And although he might have been gentler, the point is valid: even intelligent people often simply project their political preferences onto society at large, and claim that their individual psychological need is, in fact, society's need.

Not everyone regards voter disengagement and sharp partisan division as a bad thing. Both are responses to the manner in which the political questions are framed by the elites. There is often a lack of relevant difference between our political choices except in semiotics.

Who does someone vote for if he/she wants the US out of Iraq immediately? Or, who does someone vote for if he/she opposes affirmative action? Or a complete cutoff of foreign aid? Or a balanced budget?

Be careful in hoping for more political engagement from the masses. You might get your wish someday.

Rawls is dated because he slew a straw man version of utilitarianism, leaving the stronger versions to adapt and improve.

"utilitarianism which just isn't at all the structure of our political arguments at all"

On the contrary, nearly every policy is defended or attacked in terms of how and to what degree it will make everyone better or worse off.

As a Sandel apologist, I am duty bound to correct your misinterpretation:

Rawls: I am not providing a theory of a person, but rather a hypothetical device of representation that helps us get clear on our own considered judgments of fairness.

Sandel: Despite his protestations to the contrary, Rawls moral calculus presuppose a theory of a person. (Claiming that we would all have the same preferences as this person behind the veil of ignorance doesn't make it any less a theory of a person.) This theory is truly bizarre and incorrect.

Though I'll agree that a truly sage nod seems to be the main qualification of many political theorists. Without one, you won't go far on the talk-show circuit, and then no one will buy your book.

I'd prefer my interjection be considered Sandelphilic rather than Obamaphilic, but to each his own. I like 'em both. Speaking of which,

even intelligent people often simply project their political preferences onto society at large, and claim that their individual psychological need is, in fact, society's need.

It seems you can dismiss a lot of political philosophy -- and political writing -- out of hand with this statement. Not very helpful, frankly.

Be careful in hoping for more political engagement from the masses. You might get your wish someday.

Thanks for the Menckenphilic interjection. I hope it your individual psychological need to scoff at the masses was fulfilled.

I picked up my copy of A Theory of Justice a little while ago and I got the sense that Rawls's concept of the "least advantaged representative man" doesn't fit in very well with contemporary notions of there being multiple distinct forms of disadvantage. Rawls seems to have this idea that "men" come fairly neatly ordered into levels of advantage and disadvantage, but the idea of there being different types of disadvantage doesn't fit very well into this framework. What race is the least advantaged representative men? What is his sexual orientation? Does he have any disabilities or illnesses? Which ones? Is he cisgendered or transgendered? What's his immigration status?

If we just stick all these things together, so that the least advantaged representative man is a homeless, gay, transgendered, mixed-race black/hispanic/asian/native american illegal immigrant who's blind, deaf, epileptic, diabetic, HIV-positive and suffers from a host of mental illnesses, then our the supposedly representative man isn't representative of anyone at all. But then which traits do we cut out in order to make him "representative" (of who?) and how do we make tradeoffs between fighting the various forms of disadvantage this "man" suffers from? Rawls's framework doesn't seem to offer us much of anything that can answer those questions.

"utilitarianism which just isn't at all the structure of our political arguments at all"

On the contrary, nearly every policy is defended or attacked in terms of how and to what degree it will make everyone better or worse off.

But that's not what utilitarianism is! Utilitarianism is the theory that one variety or another of summing or otherwise generating some sense of the overall level of well-being across persons is the only relevant consideration in making moral/policy choices. The fact that people make arguments based on consequentialist considerations commits them only to the thesis that consequentialist considerations are a relevant consideration, or perhaps an important consideration. It absolutely does not commit them to the thesis that consequentialism is the only valid consideration.

Incidentally, that's what I personally believe. I think consequentialist considerations are important, but that there are also morally relevant considerations of right and desert that are distinct from consequentialism and cannot be reduced it.

Elliott: you're obviously very earnest, but you're wrong.

When a Republican argues that we should cut taxes for the rich because it will boost the economy, they are making what is, in practical terms, an argument with a utilitarian or consequentialist structure. And yes, Elliott, I know those are not the same thing.

After all what is an argument with a consequentialist structure other than an argument that says we should do X because of Y, where Y is some reference to the benefical consequences of doing X?

Those Republicans arguing for their tax cuts are not doing metaethics, so they're not taking a position either way on whether welfare is the only good. But that doesn't mean the structure of their argument, as Matthew puts it, is not a consequentialist (or utilitarian) one. It obviously is, whatever else they may or may not think about various metaethical questions.

You yourself describe these as "arguments based on consequentialist considerations". You go on to say "It absolutely does not commit them to the thesis that consequentialism is the only valid consideration." Granted, but I never said it committed them to that additional thesis.

You're arguing against a straw man.

Through welfare economics, crude utilitarianism is massively influential in public policy debate. For example, the entire economics argument for free trade basically boils down to a crude utilitarian one. (Based on total wealth and Pareto optimality, not utility per se, but the distribution-free maximization of a metric of total social well-being remains the same).

Politics influences political philosophy quite a lot, but the reverse is rarely the case.

"Through welfare economics, crude utilitarianism is massively influential in public policy debate."

Its not just or even primarily through welfare economics. Contrary to Matthew's puzzling assertion, talk of consequences is the currency of almost all policy debates, particularly at the practical, real world level where people haven't been indoctrinated into the alleged horrors of utilitarianism.

i thought the consequentialism sub-thread came out of the observation that Rawls' primary target in TOJ was utilitarianism. i could be wrong, but my surmise is that Rawls didn't actually want to rule out consequentialist arguments entirely; he want to rule out the "additional thesis" that utility was the only morally relevant consideration.

i'm actually not sure where this shakes out in the dialectic between Matthew, Nate, Mike, Elliot Reed, mq, and Junius Brutus on the relevance of Rawls' work for today. but i take it that if i'm right about Rawls having some sort of hybrid account, and if, um... somebody... is right that many (most?) political arguments aren't intended to be the logical application of comprehensive consequentialism, this means that Rawls is... ah... less relevant today than he would be if anybody in political office were an honest-to-god utilitarian?

look, Rawls did all right-thinking moral philosophers a favor by giving consequentialism a black eye in round one of a long, abstract, and ultimately purely academic fight. but if he's had much (any?) direct influence on political thought outside of academia it's probably a result of his positive views rather than his rejection of utilitarianism (yes, i know that's a tricky distinction, just roll with it). also, let's please not conflate "holding up" and "being relevant" with "having influence." if that's the standard, anybody who actually followed this stuff is doomed to the unnecessarily restrictive dustbin.


Comments closed March 14, 2008.

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