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The Foreign Policy Failure

25 Feb 2008 08:36 am

Michael Signer, who worked on foreign policy and national security issues for John Edwards, has a great piece in The Washington Post about the difficulty of getting any coverage of the foreign policy distinctions between the presidential candidates. He (rightly) cites Michael Gordon's series of interview/analysis articles for The New York Times as an important exception, along with some of the stuff Jason Horowitz did for The New York Observer, but "mostly you had to look to the blogs -- places such as the Atlantic Online, the American Prospect, TPMCafe and Democracy Arsenal -- for serious, sustained foreign policy reporting."

He observes, in what I think is a telling moment, that "there were few deep contrast articles -- the sort of thing we'd see from columnists such as Paul Krugman on domestic policy." I think a large part of the issue here is simply that we don't really have a Krugmanesque figure who primarily focuses on foreign policy issues. Instead, we have a couple of other important progressive columnists (E.J. Dionne, Harold Meyerson) who don't focus mainly on foreign policy, and we have a few foreign policy focused columnists (Charles Krauthammer, Robert Kagan) who aren't interested in trying to follow Democratic Party primary policy arguments in a sympathetic and engaged way.

That said, it's clearly a problem. Not on are foreign policy issues very important, but the president's level of control over them is much, much, much higher. A president who wants to implement sweeping change of the country's national security policies can snap his finger and get it done, whereas domestic policymaking is a complicated interplay between administration, congress, interest groups, etc.

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"Not on are foreign policy issues very important, but the president's level of control over them is much, much, much higher. A president who wants to implement sweeping change of the country's national security policies can snap his finger and get it done, whereas domestic policymaking is a complicated interplay between administration, congress, interest groups, etc."

Just because you keep repeating this doesn't make it true.

The President's leverage over foreign policy is marginally larger that the President's leverage over domestic policy, but not to the extent that you keep painting it.

In a healthy political/intellectual culture, Juan Cole would have a foreign policy column in a major newspaper. Instead, Max Boot does.

That about sums it up.

I think you're still going to have to submit a resume, Yglesias.

The President's leverage over foreign policy is marginally larger that the President's leverage over domestic policy, but not to the extent that you keep painting it.

That's nutty, if only b/c domestic policy tends to be less opaque and, you know, here. Good to see that you are still currently alive, though.

"That's nutty"

I don't think it is in the least.

During the period of the last 30 years, a President's freedom to enact foreign policy without Congressional support has been severely curtailed.

But a President's freedom to use executive orders and administrative prerogative to act unilaterally domestically has not been curtailed.

Matthew's assertion might have been somewhat more tenable in the 1940 - 1975 period, though even then it would've been overstated. But over the past 30 years, it's just imaginary.

Yeah, sorry Petey -- that argument sounds sophistical to me. Whatever changes relative to the past may have taken place in recent years, it remains the case that a President's control over foreign policy is much more direct than his (or her) control over something like healthcare reform.

Look at, e.g., the Iraq War. If Bush had not initated that, we would not be there now. Sure, he needed Congressional approval -- although that issue can get really fuzzy from time to time. But the fact remains that the sine qua non is Presidential, and the President controls the administration of the war much more directly than Congress (especially if Congress is at all divided).

So Matt is making a valid point. Presidential election coverage ought to focus on foreign policy much more than it does. Problem is that many voters don't give a damn, since they haven't been more than 100 miles outside Abilene, or wherever.

But at least it does get covered thoroughly on some of the blogs.

I agree with the content of the post...

Doesn't it read a bit like Matt's cover letter, just add "Dear Mr. Keller," at the beginning?

During the period of the last 30 years, a President's freedom to enact foreign policy without Congressional support has been severely curtailed.

I think there have been efforts in that direction, but it's not the least bit clear to me how successful they've been. AFAIK and understand, it remains an open question since Iran-Contra on the Republican side whether Congress can restrict the President on FP in certain ways. (Actually, I don't think it's open, but the Barely fucking Americans are at least formally American, so let's play along.)

It also seems like the sort of area where power and its use is hard to measure. How do you measure what you do not know? Domestically, it seems more likely that the affected will bitch to someone. (Whether the rest of us will care is, admittedly, another matter.)

In FP, it's must less clear to me (a) that such things get reported, or (b) that we'd care. If we have a policy of garrotting Guatamalan puppies, who would know? More importantly, who would care? Guatamalans don't vote here.

I think you're either looking at formal attempts to restrain the President and attributing too much success to them, or you're taking into proper account actual success, but not the extraordinary free hand baseline of previously available power.

And if you don't like the Iraq example, how about torture, NSA intercepts, our relationship with the UN, our presence (or absence) in Darfur, our response to Kosovo, our position on Kurdish independence movements, our belligerence re: Iran.

Congress can oversee, advise, or try to stop some of this -- though it's hard to stop something as etherial as "belligerence." But none of it happens at all without a decision being made in the Executive branch.

To Matt's explanation of why the coverage has been so spotty, I would add one additional observation: I think there's a good bit of foreign policy fatigue out there because of the long nightmare of the Bush administration/Iraq. People just don't want to think about it any more, and we're seizing the (relative) lull provided by the surge *not* to think about it. Domestic issues seem fresher at the moment, because they haven't been beaten to death over the last four years, and aren't as g*ddam depressing.

I know the presnit hates the french and other forners - and that's good enuff for me.

"Look at, e.g., the Iraq War. If Bush had not initated that, we would not be there now. Sure, he needed Congressional approval..."

My bolding.

we don't really have a Krugmanesque figure who primarily focuses on foreign policy issues.

What this means, of course, is that you need an op-ed published on the topic, just in time for the book's release.

Or, y'know, do it now.

On the structural issue: it seems as if it's considered proper to have National Imperialism Conservatives given the keys to the foreign-policy op-ed house.

That applies regardless of which party holds the presidency, because, for some curious reason, the only people considered Serious Enough to comment on such things are the ones for whom no amount of bombing other countries is enough.

During the period of the last 30 years, a President's freedom to enact foreign policy without Congressional support has been severely curtailed.

Uh, no.

Hell, we haven't had an actual declaration of war in about sixty years. On paper, the AUMF was just supposed to be Bush getting permission to go to the UN to go ahead with the inspections process, yet everyone knew that was bullshit because 1) Bush is a lying crazy person and 2) the presidency is where you go if you want to control foreign policy. The best you can do in Congress is either to de-fund a war already in progress or approve a formal treaty. When Clinton issued the executive order to capture or kill bin Laden, he was directly in defiance of the legislation that came out of the Church Committee, yet know one is going to challenge the idea that having the CIA or the military try to kill bin Laden is a necessary thing to do. If Congress isn't willing to impeach and convict over foreign policy, which it never has had the balls to do, then the president has a huge amount of leeway in foreign policy.

During the period of the last 30 years, a President's freedom to enact foreign policy without Congressional support has been severely curtailed.

Well, that's Dick Cheney's theory and bugbear. But most everyone else is substantially more impressed by a century-long pattern of aggrandizement of presidential power in the areas of foreign policy and national security, with the growth of the national security state, and the massive executive branch defense and intelligence apparatus that goes with it, an apparatus which is essentially directed by the president.

Even if it were true that the power of the presidency in the area of foreign affairs has declined a bit in the past 30 years, what with a few extra restrictions on the CIA and all, that marginal loss of power represents only a slight subsidence from the high water mark of the imperial presidency, where the power of the presidency was already vastly greater in the foreign policy realm than in the the domestic policy realm.

A president can redraw the map of the world, send millions of refugees to flight, kill a million people and alter the global balance of power by picking up the phone and saying "go." If a president decided it was time for WWIII with the Chinese, he could engineer the provocations needed to get it started within a few days.

Keep in mind we only have Krugman through happenstance. Op-ed columns don't go to people who know policy. They go to reporters (Dowd, Broder, etc) or to wingnut welfare cases (Gldberg, Malkin, Kristol, etc.) or a combination of the two (Will, Novak).

Sure, he needed Congressional approval

He chose to ask for congressional approval, but this was largely a political ploy for the midterms. Presidents have initiated numerous military adventures without congressional approval, and I think at this point there's pretty much no chance the Congress ever invokes the War Powers Act, or whatever.

Kosovo had no congressional approval, did it?

or a combination of the two (Will, Novak).

Novak, for all his being a wingnut (undisputed), is not a case of wingnut welfare. He was a reporter who got a column, just like Broder and Dowd. He just happens to be a wingnut.

"Keep in mind we only have Krugman through happenstance. Op-ed columns don't go to people who know policy. They go to reporters (Dowd, Broder, etc) or to wingnut welfare cases (Gldberg, Malkin, Kristol, etc.) or a combination of the two (Will, Novak).

Posted by Rob | February 25, 2008 9:50 AM"

Good point. The Times didn't seem to know what they were getting into when they hired Krugman. They didn't seem to realize they were getting someone who would actually say liberal stuff and instead of just wringing his hands. After all, Krugman was known for being a moderate economist, not a liberal on foreign and social policy. MIT and Princeton aren't exactly the econ departments at Oberlin or something. They probably thought getting a Clintonian Reagan Democrat.

We don't have the kind of full-on examination of foreign policy that the columnist would like because the establishment in both parties and the MSM are on record as supporting the clusterfuck in Iraq and associated bone-headed moves in the War on Terra. After reading Lapdogs by Eric Boehlert and perusing the eager fluffing given by the MSM to GWB on Iraq and the chuck down the memory hole of the Downing Street Memo, I'm not exactly shocked that the MSM would be less than eager to review the carnage of the policies they cheerleaded. I'll give props to MY and even that chucklehead Sullivan for having the grace to sort-of regret their former lunacy on these issues, but let's just say they haven't drawn a crowd from other journos and bloggers eager to do penance and take a hard look at where we are.

I think any president would prefer to seek either congressional approval or some sort of a mandate whenever putting troops in harm's way. Lack of thereof could come back to you in a big(as in Somalia). But it seems to me a president more or less has a free hand when it comes to conventional diplomacy (or lack of thereof), sending cruise missles or even airstrikes.

As others are saying, foreign policy in the executive is in many ways as infested with interest groups (ethnic lobbies, Wall Street, arms manufacturers) as foreign policy in Congress.

MICHAEL GORDON has frequently been a shill for the Republican's mindless militarism. He coughs up the DOD's position uncritically and without any thoughtful context as if he's getting his paycheck from the DOD rather than the NYT.

Hiss propagandistic writing has been bad enough but he's done the same in person on various shows, most depressingly the PBS NewsHour.

He was the other half of Judy Miller/Lewis Libby writing team (Judy got her talking points from Lewis so only deserves half the credit Michael does).

see:
http://www.google.com/search?q=Michael+Gordon+Judy+Miller

Wow, I hadn't realized Petey was so utterly clueless about how the executive branch operates.

Try Trudy Rubin of the Philadelphia Inquirer.

Petey is exactly right. While theoretically a President could launch a nuclear war or whatever by "pushing the button", reality seems to be quite different. In fact, any serious foreign policy move is not only widely debated, it's got the fingerprints of just about every major figure in government from both major parties on it before it gets implemented.

Iraq is as good an example as any. In spite of the popular nursery story about "Bush lies sent us to the worst ever unilateral pre-emptive war", our actions in Iraq have in fact been the result of cumulative, bi-partisan policy making in Congress AND the White House that was supported by huge popular majority opinion going back at least to 1991. Since FDR we have had pretty much consensus foreign policy across the board, with periodic episodes of finger-pointing and scapegoating when things go sour.

The President's agenda-setting power is much greater in foreign policy than it is in domestic. Executive agencies and the military operate abroad with less oversight by checking powers than they do domestically. This is so obvious that I don't know why we're arguing about it.

In spite of the popular nursery story about "Bush lies sent us to the worst ever unilateral pre-emptive war", our actions in Iraq have in fact been the result of cumulative, bi-partisan policy making in Congress AND the White House that was supported by huge popular majority opinion going back at least to 1991.

This is a funny sentence, because both the clause before the comma and the one after the comma could easily be true. Neither are true in all respects, e.g. the war wasn't preemptive and the levels of popular support have fluctuated a lot more than you're allowing for, but there's nothing inconsistent about them.

washerdreyer--

With all due respect, "greater agenda-setting power", which I don't think anyone is arguing with, is a far cry from, "A president who wants to implement sweeping change of the country's national security policy can just snap his fingers and get it done...", which is what MY wrote and some here actually seem to believe.

The war in Iraq, of course, has been neither "pre-emptive" nor "preventive", because we had already been in a war there for twelve years when we invaded a second time attempting to finally get it over with. If you don't think so, check with any of the tens of thousands of us who collected combat pay while deployed to the region, or the million-odd Iraqis killed by the sanctions we were enforcing. Seemed a lot like war to us.

On the fluctuations of popular support, Gallup did big-sample, good-methodology polls about twice a year from 1991-2003 on the unambiguous question, "Would you support the use of US troops for the removal of Saddam Hussein from power?" Always a majority, at times approaching 3:1 and averaging nearly 2:1 for the whole period, answered "yes". The figure was 70% in 1993. I've always wondered how Bush and Cheney managed that.

The subtext of your second paragraph being: 'And maybe I could fill that gap.'

And indeed you could.

Powell: "The figure was 70% in 1993. I've always wondered how Bush and Cheney managed that."

Moronically irrelevant.

Obviously, despite the short term nature of the memory of the US electorate, 1993 was just two years after the Gulf War. OBVIOUSLY most Americans thought Saddam was an asshole and should be removed - because they were stupid enough to think it could be done easily.

And in fact, it could have been done easily. Instead, it was done by the least easy, most costly, most stupid, and most venal method possible.

Which, of course, is why Powell thinks it's great.

Nitwit.

Right, Hack. Americans were stupid to think "it could be done easily", AND "in fact it could have been done easily." Brilliant.

I also think it was done by the least easy, most costly, most stupid, and most venal method possible", but I asked you never to agree with me in public. Cut it out! You're usually so full of crap it's damaging to the truth when you agree with it, even by accident.

Right, Hack. Americans were stupid to think "it could be done easily", AND "in fact it could have been done easily." Brilliant.

I also think "it was done by the least easy, most costly, most stupid, and most venal method possible", but I asked you never to agree with me in public. Cut it out! You're usually so full of crap it's damaging to the truth when you agree with it, even by accident.


Comments closed March 10, 2008.

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