A Friend in Need

Eric Martin rounds up some evidence that "should make US policymakers wonder whether, yet again, we are backing the less popular local elements simply because they tell us what we want to hear." That seems wrong to me. The would-be imperial power has to back the "less popular local elements." The key thing is to find groups that are strong enough to hold on to power with external support, but too weak to come to be in a position to kick the ladder of external support away.

Yes, it seems stupid for American soldiers to be risking their lives for the sake of Iranian-backed Islamist parties' struggle against a nationalist Islamist party, but that's the perverse logic of the situation. If ISCI had more popularity and legitimacy, they wouldn't need us. And if they didn't need us, we wouldn't want them, just as we don't really want anything to do with the self-confident Sadrists. The only problem is ginning up domestic political support in the United States for the gambit. Hence we hear a lot about Iranian support for Sadrist elements or even al-Qaeda, and very little about Iranian support for their primary allies in Iraq -- allies who just happen to be our allies too.

Comments

Hence we hear a lot about Iranian support for Sadrist elements or even al-Qaeda, and very little about Iranian support for their primary allies in Iraq -- allies who just happen to be our allies too.

You don't hear much about it, but not for lack of screaming. Almost the only charm of the Iraq War is watching the hegemon keep doing more and more stupid, self-destructive things. (You'd almost believe that George Bush was secretly in the employ of the Saudis.)

Posted by Jeffrey Davis | March 26, 2008 12:38 PM

"The only problem is ginning up domestic political support in the United States for the gambit. Hence we hear a lot about Iranian support for Sadrist elements or even al-Qaeda, and very little about Iranian support for their primary allies in Iraq . . . "

The propaganda needs of the Administration do provide an illustrative object lesson and natural experiment, with regard to the corruption of the American news media and the punditocrisy.

The evil Iranian myth will be echoed by such media outlet and pundits, who have no committment, whatsoever, to reality, and every committment to established power.

It would be quite hopeful, if there were even a glimmer of awareness among politicians or pundits of the center and left, that American policy might be better oriented toward detente with Iran.

Posted by Bruce Wilder | March 26, 2008 12:46 PM

Best analysis of the situation anywhere.

Conversely, if the neocons really want to prove that their's is not an imperialistic project, they should support a faction that may or may not need us but definitely has popular backing.

Posted by gregor | March 26, 2008 1:09 PM

Sometimes people ask me why anyone should study philosophy. Being able to fully understand the pulls of a situation like this one and lay out the inherent problems succinctly is as good a practical reason as I could imagine. Nice post.

Posted by Former Philosoph | March 26, 2008 1:21 PM

Yes, it seems stupid for American soldiers to be risking their lives for the sake of Iranian-backed Islamist parties' struggle against a nationalist Islamist party, but that's the perverse logic of the situation.

Let us be clear, these "soldiers" are "volunteers." This is what they signed up for, and they should stop bellyaching.

Posted by helpern | March 26, 2008 2:21 PM

The only problem with this post is that it isn't true. If Sadr's political movement were more popular than then dominant Shiite coalition, it wouldn't have just 28 seats in Iraq's 275 seat legislature. Sadr is like an Iraqi Al Sharpton, but with a militia. That simile probably does Sadr a disservice though: he is smarter than Sharpton.

Sadr seems to realize that he doesn't have the political power to build his own dominant coalition in the Iraqi legislature, and he doesn't have the military power to overthrow it. So he seems to be trying to use military confrontation to enhance his political status in the lead up to the local elections, similar to how Sharpton built up his political profile with rallies and protests.

Posted by Fred | March 26, 2008 2:31 PM

Matt gets it exactly right.

(You'd almost believe that George Bush was secretly in the employ of the Saudis.)

No, the Saudi regime is totally reliant on continued American hegemony. Perhaps the Chinese?

Let us be clear, these "soldiers" are "volunteers." This is what they signed up for, and they should stop bellyaching.

One of the multiple issues with that point of view is that the soldiers were lied to, in one way or another, by the "respectable", "serious" political establishment and the corporate media. All of us were, and are regularly.

Posted by Kalkin | March 26, 2008 2:34 PM

helpern: hmn, I am not so sure that they did sign up to be lied into strategically brain-dead neo-imperialistic projects. And anyhow they aren't volunteering any more so it might not be such a smart move.

Given geo-political realities, the US should cut a deal with the Iranians before we get dragged into losing wars in Iraq, Afghanistan and Iran (and who knows where else). The logic of the situation is forcing this to happen anyway, so everyone may as well collect all the benefits of such a strategic agreement (like the one the Iranians proposed in 2003 but was so casually discarded).

Posted by Chris Dornan | March 26, 2008 2:39 PM

Chris Dornan! Are you suggesting peace with Iran? As a possibility? The power able to get this collection of delusional sociopaths to do that should start with peace in the Palestine, an easier accomplishment.

Matt's got the Shia wars down. I would add that the government has to get Sadr out of the picture because he would win any election held in Baghdad or the south. And the US doesn't want Sadr, for the reasons Matt gives. The government had to attack him because he called a cease fire to speed our withdrawal. The current attack seems tailor made to support leaving our forces at 150k+ for the foreseeable future.

Now weave in the reason for the US rental of the remains of revolutionary guard (renamed concerned citizens councils or maybe concerned local citizens) and the PKK. They both need us, but they are terrorists; they both hate Persians, but they hate us too.

Posted by Peter Driscoll | March 26, 2008 3:01 PM

A couple of things about Sadr's political power. Sadr's choice for prime minister was the previous prime minister Jaafari. SCIRI's choice, which was also the expressed preference of both the United States and Iran was a different person, Mehdi, if memory serves.

Sadr beat Sciri, the US and Iran in a head to head political fight within the UIA parliamentary coalition and Jaafari was put forward to be nominated.

The president of the United States said Sadr's choice would not stand. The US Secretary of State personally flew into Baghdad with Britain's prime minister to coordinate the effort to prevent Jaafari's reinstatement (certainly through bribery and threats).

Sadr compromised: Instead of Jaafari, he'll accept Jaafari's deputy Maliki. The preference of the foreigners was still a non-starter.

This episode demonstrated that Sadr, even more than Maliki, is the single most powerful native figure in Iraqi politics.

Provincial elections have been postponed since then, for over two years now. One anonymous American insider told Informed Comment that the specific reason for the delay is fear that Sadr's party would sweep provincial elections.

If the US wanted to get out, it would turn the keys over to Sadr and leave. But Sadr would be a more effective and vigorous opponent of the US/Israel-favored regional vision than Hussein was. For example Sadr's support for Hezbollah during the Lebanon War was as strong as Iran's.

Preventing Iraq from being a country that would support Hezbollah or Hamas is the closest thing to a one-sentence explanation possible for the US invasion.

Unfortunately for the US, the people of Iraq think Hezbollah and Hamas are right and Israel is wrong, just like the people of essentially every Middle Eastern country. There is no prospect of Iraqi preferences changing which means the US has a choice of a slow defeat or a fast defeat in its project.

Posted by Arnold Evans | March 26, 2008 3:16 PM

Fred:
Besides being untrue, the real "problem with this post" is that it typifies the disgusting, reflex anti-Americanism which assumes automatically that we must be allied only with unpopular Quisling types in any country we're present in.

I think the fact that Sadr won 28 out of 275 legislative seats is better data on his actual political clout than Arnold Evans' speculation on the internal dynamics that brought Maliki to power, particularly in light of the fact that Maliki has gone to Basra himself to oversee the decimation of Sadr's forces there. In any case, I think we'll be finding out a lot more about this fairly soon depending on how things go in Basra, followed by Sadr City. I think Mr. Sadr's in for a rough time.

On the other hand, I think Mr. Evans has an excellent point when he writes "Preventing Iraq from being a country that would support Hezbollah or Hamas is the closest thing to a one-sentence explanation for the invasion of Iraq." Polls certainly show that most people in Iraq, like most people in the Islamic world in general, think "Israel is wrong". They certainly should, given the 24/7 propaganda barrage laid on by the mostly fascist dictatorships of the region. Polls, however, need a lot of interpretation. History, and the research of seriously credible experts, indicates that in general support for the "Palestinians" is a mile wide and an inch deep. Most people in places like Iraq and Iran don't really give a damn about the Pals compared to the more pressing concerns they are facing in their own countries. In actual frontline states like Syria, Jordan, and Lebanon, the governments have done more to exploit and oppress their fellow Arabs from Palestine than the Israelis have.

Posted by Robert Powell | March 26, 2008 4:15 PM

Excellent post.

Posted by Steve Sailer | March 26, 2008 4:15 PM

Reidar Visser, a historian of Southern Iraq, has an excellent commentary about Basra. The gist of the piece is that the Battle of Basra neither about getting rid of unruly militias nor about federalism, but a temporary alliance between Maliki & the Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq to take on the Sadrists. Maliki (hopefully) gets to enhance his stature as Prime Minister & consolidate his power base in the security services, & the ISCI gets to weaken a major rival.

Posted by Peter H | March 26, 2008 4:42 PM

Reidar Visser, a historian of Southern Iraq, has an excellent commentary about Basra. The gist of the piece is that the Battle of Basra neither about getting rid of unruly militias nor about federalism, but a temporary alliance between Maliki & the Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq to take on the Sadrists. Maliki (hopefully) gets to enhance his stature as Prime Minister & consolidate his power base in the security services, & the ISCI gets to weaken a major rival.

Posted by Peter H | March 26, 2008 4:43 PM

Matt gets it mostly right. Powell, as usual, gets it mostly wrong.

I wouldn't say that al-Sadr is the most powerful man in Iraq. However that situation has changed over the last four years. al-Sadr back in 2003 was not in a position to challenge Ayatollah Sistani's backing of the Shia factions that dominate Parliament. And there was no love lost between the two clerics.

But in the last four years, Sistani's influence has waned somewhat, at least in the political arena, while al-Sadr is definitely a "kingmaker" now.

He seems to have had some loss of confidence in his ability to influence events, recently, or so it seems with his alleged self-imposed "exile" and retreat to bolster up his religious credentials in an attempt to become a full-fledged Ayatollah.

However, he is still in charge of his movement and has spent the last half year trimming it and making it more effective.

He is the only Shia to try to accommodate the Sunni political factions and the only Shia to try to mend fences with Hakim Shia faction. Many observers feel he is the only one who might be able to put together a coalition government that might stand some chance of being functional.

Apparently this means he is still seen as a threat to both the US and Iranian ambitions in Iraq - more so the US, in my view, as I think the Iranians could work with him if his group were leading the government or part of a coalition.

But for the US, he's a total non-starter because he is adamant about kicking out the US occupation - and for reasons of oil, this cannot be allowed.

So anything negative that happens to him is going to be at US orders more than Iranian orders.

So that clearly explains what is happening now. The US is using Maliki to try to take Sadr down yet again. It won't work, but in this case it's likely that it will be used to justify a war with Iran by blaming the violence on Iran.

It's just possible, given the confusing alliances in Iraq, that Iran might be assisting some of the al-Sadr "rogue elements" in Basra and the south, or some of the other Shia factions there. But it's far more likely that accusation is merely a ruse to justify disabling al-Sadr's group in advance of the Iraqi elections on the part of Maliki's crowd while at the same time boosting the war talk against Iran.

Posted by Richard Steven Hack | March 26, 2008 4:52 PM

The only problem with this post is that it isn't true. If Sadr's political movement were more popular than then dominant Shiite coalition, it wouldn't have just 28 seats in Iraq's 275 seat legislature.

This is misleading. The United Iraqi Alliance, the Shiite-dominated party & senior coalition player, holds 128 seats. Up until last year, the Sadrists were part of the UIA. Their 28 seats made them the 2nd-most powerful bloc within the UIA, after the Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq (ISCI) (36 seats). They're definitely a powerful player within the Shia community.

I do think Matt is being simplistic in characterizing this a battle between a US puppet against popularly backed forces. It's more accurate to characterize it as the US taking sides in a intra-Shia power struggle.

Sadr seems to realize that he doesn't have the political power to build his own dominant coalition in the Iraqi legislature, and he doesn't have the military power to overthrow it. So he seems to be trying to use military confrontation to enhance his political status in the lead up to the local elections, similar to how Sharpton built up his political profile with rallies and protests.

Sadr is the one who's stuck to a unilateral ceasefire since last August (undoubtedly for reasons of self-interest), despite the fact that he's been under constant attack from the US & the ISCI, & it's the Maliki government that decided to launch the operations in Basra. As the Reidar Visser piece I linked to above discusses, Maliki & the ISCI have a joint interest in weakening the Sadrists.

Also, the conflicts are not just about the upcoming elections. There's a huge struggle in Basra for control of oil smuggling revenues.

Posted by Peter H | March 26, 2008 5:23 PM

think the fact that Sadr won 28 out of 275 legislative seats is better data on his actual political clout than Arnold Evans' speculation on the internal dynamics that brought Maliki to power, particularly in light of the fact that Maliki has gone to Basra himself to oversee the decimation of Sadr's forces there.

First of all, it's 30 seats, not 28 by my count. Also, there are other Shiite parties that vote almost seamlessly with him.

Second, there is no one dominant party, so pointing to Sadr's number in the parliament is meaningless unless you compare it to something. ISCI? Dawa? Perhaps they have more, but not by a lot. And regionally, both of those parties are worried about losing ground to Sadr.

Third, Arnold Evans is absolutely correct about Sadr's role in selecting Maliki, and it's not "speculation." This was heavily reported in both US and Arab media at the time. It wasn't even intended as a secret. The Sadrist current made it known which candidates it backed, as did ISCI and Dawa - and Sadr played kingmaker, blocking the ISCI/US choice(s). Maliki has turned against Sadr of late, and has recently tended to side with ISCI more, but that doesn't change history.

In any case, I think we'll be finding out a lot more about this fairly soon depending on how things go in Basra, followed by Sadr City. I think Mr. Sadr's in for a rough time.

You know, people have been predicting Sadr's demise for years now. I know, because I periodically write about the premature death notices. Thus far, he's proven rather resilient. And, importantly, not dead.

Posted by Eric Martin | March 26, 2008 5:34 PM

In any case, I think we'll be finding out a lot more about this fairly soon depending on how things go in Basra, followed by Sadr City. I think Mr. Sadr's in for a rough time.
"You know, people have been predicting Sadr's demise for years now. I know, because I periodically write about the premature death notices. Thus far, he's proven rather resilient. And, importantly, not dead."
Posted by Eric Martin

You mean he is not dead yet.

Sadr is alive because of his father's name, and because the US wisely following Sistani's advice and advice of others not to openly whack him. If he is blasted by a "un-named Shiite militia" of rivals, and he has many, the US and the Centrist Shiites escape blame for another firebrand biting the dust in a country that mostly wants the fighting to end and start living the better life that 100 buck a barrel oil and rapid development of 5-6 major oil fields yet to be pumped guarantee.

Sadr has US, UK, Sunni, blood on his hands. I won't be sorry if he meets his past-due just desserts.

Posted by chris ford | March 26, 2008 6:32 PM

Ford: Do try to STFU.

Or at least stuff your KKK hood in your mouth once in a while and just suffer in silence as we demonstrate how ignorant you right wing nuts are.

Posted by Richard Steven Hack | March 26, 2008 11:58 PM

Thanks to Peter H and Eric Martin for insightful comments. It seems to me that the freely-elected Iraqi government is, unsurprisingly, involved in an inevitable process of sorting itself out between groups aiming to continue the process we encouraged of bringing militias willing to work with us into the tent of legitimate government, and to deal with those insisting on being outsiders. It's entirely logical to do so on a "one at a time" basis rather than launching a comprehensive anti-militia offensive that would probably fail.

I'm in no position to predict the outcome. But I think it's probably fair to assume that Maliki and ISCI are betting on being strong enough to pull it off, and I wouldn't want to bet against them at this point. What I've seen that looks like evidence indicates that Sadr's power has been in decline, and this action could represent a watershed event.

Posted by Robert Powell | March 27, 2008 4:06 AM

Sadr is alive because of his father's name, and because the US wisely following Sistani's advice and advice of others not to openly whack him.

Your tautological analysis leaves me...no reaction really. What a non-statement.

Posted by Eric Martin | March 27, 2008 9:54 AM