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Basra

30 Mar 2008 10:28 am

It's a bit hard to focus on the war in Iraq while at a wedding, but as Kevin Drum wonders "what happens if the Mahdi Army beats the government forces and wins the Battle of Basra?" I have to wonder about the reverse. Maliki's hopes of a swift victory are obviously through, but what if Iraqi government forces, given enough time and Anglo-American support, manage to first crush organized armed resistance in Sadr City and then swing south and take control of Basra? Do Sadrists wind up winning local elections this fall anyway? Or does ISCI use its newfound military supremacy to intimidate people away from the Sadrists?

Suppose Maliki winds up with a quasi-democratic mandate for a not-very-popular regime that we're now committed to supporting. Imagine the best case scenario here where over the next two or three years, US military, logistical, and financial support lets Maliki build an efficacious, pro-American, regime that's a bit lacking in the old popular legitimacy but that certainly manages to hold onto power. We've got a Mesopotamian Egypt or Saudi Arabia (or Kuwait, Qatar, Bahrain, etc). Maybe that's outrageously optimistic. And guess what, it's our support for regimes like that's the main driver of al-Qaeda terrorism.

And for that matter, what does happen if the Mahdi Army beats the government forces and wins the Battle of Basra? There don't seem to me to be any scenarios in either direction where expending huge amounts of further American blood and treasure looks like a good option.

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Comments (35)

"It's a bit hard to focus on the war in Iraq while at a wedding"

Meh. Lots of similarities. Neither has a particularly coherent exit strategy, for example.

It is weird that the American media is underplaying Sadr's appearance on Al Jazeera yesterday. For a full week, Maliki's spokesmen had been appearing on the state owned tv station, claiming that Sadr had told the militia to lay their weapons down. Sadr delivered a slap in the face in his apppearance, not only refusing to call for surrender, but claiming that Maliki was another Saddam Hussein.

I can't imagine that the militias in Basra will win over the army and the U.S. airforce, but "winning" here doesn't have to entail winning in any largescale sense - whereas Sadrs' trend was and is unpopular in Najaf, that doesn't seem to be true in the areas around Basra.

Another similarity: a difficult union of vastly different people. No suicide bombers, though.

Lets see, Sadrists control Basra, American munitions kill civilians in Basra, Maliki is spirited out of Basra, Sadr calls for a cease fire, fighting continues in Sadr City. Who gets the blame for this one? Maliki? Iran? Cheney? Rice? Gates? Petraeus? The Surge? The democrats? Goodness, I miss Rumsfeld's explanations.

The most probable outcome, though, is not a victory by either side, but some sort of muddled stalemate.

If a stalemate happens, the best outcome is likely a return to the status quo of last week, but worse outcomes are easily imaginable. A resort to violence to resolve political struggles leads to unpredictable outcomes, which much more often than not are worse than the status quo. It always surprises me how few of our political leaders recognize this.

what happens when al-Sadr comes back from his religious studies and lets the entire Mahdi Army loose on the Iraqi government forces and their newfound friends the Badr Brigade? what we're seeing now is some breakaway splinters of the Jaysh al-Mahdi getting frustrated with being held back by al-Sadr's timetable, however the large central body of the militia is listening to al-Sadr so far and restraining themselves from anything more than nominal support for their compatriots. if al-Sadr returns from Qom and uses the government's "aggressiveness" against his forces as an excuse to escalate hostilities, this could get much, much worse.

CNN has Sadr asking his followers to lay down their arms. It'll be interesting to see how long the fighting continues. It seems likely that Sadr has a lot more influence and control than Maliki, but at some stage you wonder how much anyone has control of anything over there.

I know one thing for sure - for people like myself who honestly support the Iraqi people, this is an easy one. I'm supporting the Mahdi Army all the way.

If al-Sadr tries to cross the border, we'll probably arrest him or shoot him. He made an abbortive crossing attempt 6 months ago, but turned back for fear of capture.

He's not in Qom for a "religious retreat", he's putting the best face possible on the fact that we and the Iraqi government chased him out of the country and he can't get back in.

Assuming Patraeus stays true to form, we'll buy off a few of the local Sadrist commanders with construction contracts and government jobs, and they'll help us hunt down their former comrads.

If it works, we get a more-or-less stable client state with a weak central government. If it doesn't, we get a bloody mess. Both of those possibilities will cost a lot of money and probably 500 American lives. Either will have run its course by the new year.

As usual, matt is staying well within the closed circle of uninformed anti-war "wisdom". Back in the real world, Sadr has been asking for a truce since mid-week.

Now, ask yourself: does the side winning a battle usually start asking for a truce right after fighting erupts?

What's really interesting about this is that the Bush administration and McCain campaign appear to be relying on the fact that most Americans have no idea of the intricacies of Iraqi politics, and so will believe the spin that this is a case of the government cracking down on insurgents.

And what's amazing--though it really shouldn't be, given the events of the past eight years--is that the media is complicit in maintaining this public ignorance. Beyond the blogosphere, I have seen almost no mention of the fact that Maliki is backed by Tehran, that this is essentially a clash between two warlords, that Sadr is favored to win the upcoming election.

Instead, these events are presented either context-free or as us (the US, Maliki, good guys) versus them (Mahdi army, bad guys).

Have the media learned nothing?

James Robertson's idea that Sadr has been trying to surrender is pretty funny. Maliki started the siege with a 72 hour ultimatum, gave that up, then his spokesman floated a rumor that Sadr had asked the militia to lay down arms, Sadr appeared in his first interview in some months on tv in a location that could have been in Najaf or could have been in Qom and said he hadn't, Maliki then floated the idea that if the fighters did lay down their arms, the government would give them money, having tacitly forgotten the 72 hour ultimatum and the mother of all sieges, now the Sadrists have produced a program for a truce that basically involves the mediation Maliki rejected last Tuesday, and which he will probably be forced to accept now. This has not been a good week for Maliki.

As for Sadr - well, although the rightwing apeosphere never evolves on a position in which they can find an easy outlet for their ambient sadistic instincts, the American military doesn't have that option. James Glanz' piece today on what has been happening this week is the best piece of reporting on Iraq to appear in the NYT in some time. It includes this little bit:

American forces have also found that they have little choice but to respect Mr. Sadr. After years of referring to him as little more than a thug — including a vicious battle against his fighters in Najaf in 2004 — the American military has begun referring to him as “Sayyid,” the honorific title accorded to a Muslim holy man. This is particularly true when military officials praise a loophole-riddled cease-fire that Mr. Sadr ordered last August, when he said that his militia should stop fighting but could respond in self-defense if attacked first.

“We have and will continue to show restraint in dealing with those who honor al-Sayyid Moktada al-Sadr’s pledge of honor to halt attacks,” Maj. Gen. Kevin J. Bergner, a spokesman for the American military in Baghdad, said in a press briefing on Wednesday in response to a question."

"al Sayyid". Huh. The Fox fed droolers better be kept away from this news. Although never fear - they have trained themselves in self lobotomy to deal with unpleasant facts.

Installing an undemocratic, repressive and nominally pro-Western Saddam replacement is absolutely the only way that America can fully extricate itself from Iraq.

Do Sadrists wind up winning local elections this fall anyway? Or does ISCI use its newfound military supremacy to intimidate people away from the Sadrists?

Intimidation might not be all that necessary. Victory carries its own political benefits. At least some political support will flow naturally away from Sadr and toward Maliki and his government to the extent the latter are seen as capable of providing security, defeating rivals for power, delivering services and providing law and order to a ravaged and dysfunctional country.

Are those other Middle Eastern pro-American regimes democracies? Off the top of my head, I don't think any of them are.

So, if your hypothetical quasi-democratic mandate makes it's way through, the government would somewhat legitimize and elections could be held again in the future, where the Sunnis could participate this time.

Of course none of this says how long we'll be there, and it is extremely optimistic.

Don't be so down in the dumps. Didn't any schools get painted this week?

I should say that I don't think my previous comment reflects what I think will happen; it's just a lame criticism of MY's logic.

Well, here we have your classic heads-they-win-tails-we-lose situation. If Maliki wins, congratulations, American firepower has propped up the militia trained in Iran. If Sadr doesn't lose, he becomes more powerful. The US, as usual, gets the consolation prize of being even more disliked because of our airstrikes.

Well, as Gorbachev said to his compatriots in 1986, about Afghanistan, "Do we quit now, or go on to disgrace ourselves militarily?"

heedless,

yes, al-Sadr has been at religious studies in Najaf and Qom. this is not a sign of weakness, but rather a gamble on his part. should he succeed in graduating to Ayatollah (the only route to which is via the religious universities at Qom and Najaf) his words would carry more heft than those of his main rival for Shi'ite loyalties, Abdul Aziz al-Hakim, the head of the Badr Brigades now seemingly shifting his support to Maliki's government.

however, his absence has fermented some discord within his organization; with several defections and moderately rebellious offshoots that have been causing most of the trouble in Basra.

should American forces arrest or kill Moqtada al-Sadr, the backlash would be extreme. this goes double if he attains Ayatollah before his return to Iraq.

it should also be noted that your typical American solution to the problem - throw money at it - is woefully inadequate to the problems in Iraq, and the similar strategy that has been employed thus far towards the Sunnis is creating an almost certainty of severe future hostilities between all involved (Sunni tribal leaders, the Iraqi government, the Shi'ite militias, and American forces/interests).

James Robertson Writes:

"Sadr has been asking for a truce since mid-week.

Now ask yourself: does the side winning a battle usually start
asking for a truce right after fighting erupts?"

Depends on whether they believe that they can achieve their goals without fighting the battle. To draw a dreaded Vietnamese analogy. Following the partition the Viet Minh maintained a cease-fire pending elections despite the fact that they were militarily far superior to anything on the ground. They rightly believed they would win those elections handily (see Pentagon Papers).

The US believing the same canceled the elections and turned the transitional South Vietnamese state into a permanent one. The outcome of this decision is fairly well documented.

It is most likely that Sadr is viewing the situation similarly. Why should he fight a risky battle to win what he can achieve peacefully in the fall elections. Meanwhile, by calling for a ceasefire he looks statesmanlike and Maliki looks desperate and even more a puppet of the US who's fire power he needs to win the battle.

James Robertson Writes:

"Sadr has been asking for a truce since mid-week.

Now ask yourself: does the side winning a battle usually start
asking for a truce right after fighting erupts?"

Depends on whether they believe that they can achieve their goals without fighting the battle. To draw a dreaded Vietnamese analogy. Following the partition the Viet Minh maintained a cease-fire pending elections despite the fact that they were militarily far superior to anything on the ground. They rightly believed they would win those elections handily (see Pentagon Papers).

The US believing the same canceled the elections and turned the transitional South Vietnamese state into a permanent one. The outcome of this decision is fairly well documented.

It is most likely that Sadr is viewing the situation similarly. Why should he fight a risky battle to win what he can achieve peacefully in the fall elections. Meanwhile, by calling for a ceasefire he looks statesmanlike and Maliki looks desperate and even more a puppet of the US who's fire power he needs to win the battle.

James Robertson Writes:

"Sadr has been asking for a truce since mid-week.

Now ask yourself: does the side winning a battle usually start
asking for a truce right after fighting erupts?"

Depends on whether they believe that they can achieve their goals without fighting the battle. To draw a dreaded Vietnamese analogy. Following the partition the Viet Minh maintained a cease-fire pending elections despite the fact that they were militarily far superior to anything on the ground. They rightly believed they would win those elections handily (see Pentagon Papers).

The US believing the same canceled the elections and turned the transitional South Vietnamese state into a permanent one. The outcome of this decision is fairly well documented.

It is most likely that Sadr is viewing the situation similarly. Why should he fight a risky battle to win what he can achieve peacefully in the fall elections. Meanwhile, by calling for a ceasefire he looks statesmanlike and Maliki looks desperate and even more a puppet of the US who's fire power he needs to win the battle.

from swimming freestyle:

"So, who did win this week? It's probably fair to say losers don't issue demands and winners don't accept those demands so readily."

http://swimmingfreestyle.typepad.com

Just saw Krauthammer on Fox News proclaiming a BIG victory for Maliki and that Sadr's in retreat. Sigh...

While it's hard to know exactly what's happening, my sense is that the Sadrists in Basra held off (perhaps even ran off) the Maliki/SCIRI/SIIC/ISCI/Badr militias, err, government forces, saw no offensive advantage worth pressing at the moment and dictated ceasefire terms, which Maliki et al accepted entirely. For a supposed "hothead" Muqtada al Sadr has proven himself a pretty cool customer thus far...

Matt:

As someone who has lived in the Gulf region, I can assure you that these regimes are not unpopular with their people. I don't know about Egypt, but the Gulf states enjoy a very high degree of popularity among their citizens. This is mostly the case the Saudi too, despite what we constantly hear.

Please, please, PLEASE understand that basic fact - the "Gulf regimes are hated by their people" canard is one that leads to terrible analysis.

BA,

Sadr crossed into Iran during the last Mahdi uprising. At the time, he was seeking safe haven from American and Iraqi troops.

He tried to make a clandestine re-entry into Iraq a few months later (after the truce came into effect), but he couldn't find a safe crossover point and was unwilling to expose himself at one of the official checkpoints. Since then, he's been stuck in Iran, while his lieutenants squabble in his absense.

He has been studying at Qom because it gives him a reason (besides fear of capture) for his continued presence in Iran, but he (and any cleric seeking legitimacy in Iraq) would much prefer to study at Najaf. Najaf is the holiest site in Shiite Islam, (Mecca and Medina being under Sunni control) and it is also the focus of Shiism in Iraq. Qom is distinctly second best.

To the degree Sadr is biding his time at Qom, it is because he has no choice.

Matt

To understand the Iraq War, an Iraqi perspective is needed. "Kinship trumps religion" in Iraqi society, said counterinsurgency expert, David Kilcullen. Although the Mahdi Army is from Baghdad, close to half the people living in that city have close ties and relationships to rural tribes. It is not as simple as good versus evil in Basra. The reality is "clan connections, kinship links, and the alliances they foster" are playing a role.

The uprising is indicative of the complexities of this war. First, Iran exerts tremendous influence in Basra. The U.S. suspects the armor piercing bombs that are attacking American forces are coming through that city. Second, there are competing militias with their own agendas. This fight has been festering for some time through intimidation, killings, kidnappings, and corruption. Militia business activity is conducted regularly through channels of the police force.

This is the problem for Maliki, said Kilcullen. How does he rein in the militias while balancing the interests of the competing armed groups?

Szr,

Maybe part of the reason the Gulf states are popular with 'their people' is because essentially all the work there is done by people who are foriegners, and therefore not included under the phrase 'the people'. The 20% of the population in the United Arab Emirates that is native Emirati rake in the oil wealth while most of the actual work is done by guest workers...why shouldn't that 20% be happy with their government? I'm sure if you asked the Palestinians, Filipinos, Indians, etc. who make up the labor force you'd get a different answer, but of course those people aren't citizens and can be deported whenever they get restive.

Sweet!! looks like a big win for the good (relatively, anyway) guys, the Mahdi Army. :)

Sadr calls for a cease-fire -- after talks with maliki lead to a compromise -- but NOT for his fighters to turn over their weapons:

http://www.nytimes.com/2008/03/31/world/middleeast/31cnd-iraq.html?_r=1&hp=&oref=slogin&pagewanted=print

It's hard to interpret this as anything other than al-Maliki trying to stage a surprise demolition of the Sadrist party prior to the October elections, failing, and a peace treaty then being signed to maintain both parties at their current status. Tune in next October for our next exciting chapter.

Let's see, Sadr is very nationalist shiite -- he's in favor of an Iraqi shiism, not an Iranian one. Thus he keeps Iran at an arms length distance. Sadr also hates the US occupiers, and has a lot of popular support. This is in stark contrast to Maliki et al, who embrace Iran as brothers and the US as puppet-masters.

Maybe I'm nuts, but isn't Sadr exactly the kind of guy we ought to be supporting and transitioning power to? Sure, he's a Shiite strongman, but at least he's not kissing the ring of Iran, and he'll certainly be committed to making sure any Sunni extremists are toast. Given all that has gone wrong over the past 5 years, Sadr seems like the best option we've got.

Hector:

It is very, very true that the Gulf states have a large number of expatroits among them, but that further undermines the idea that the regime is hated by its people. For instance, in the UAE, you can only have non-tourist visa if you have a job (rather like most countries). This means that the streets of Dubai are amongst the most cosmopolitan. Indian workers make ten times as much money in Dubai as they do at home.

So again, you have countries full of citizens that are content and like their governments, plus a large group of expatriot workers making lots of money (in any case, much more than can be made in their home countries). This doesn't exactly sound like oppressed people chaffing under the boot of tyrants. But what the heck do I know? I only live here.

What happens is the U.S. levels Basra, (think Faluja); one does not trifle with the ego of the almighty Bush/Cheney. As they say hereabouts, there is no cure for stupid.

Based on the latest reports, Iran has negotiated a ceasefire which both sides have accepted.

This means Sadr has won - he has survived another attempt to crush his movement. As he did when he survived US attempts back in 2004, this is a very serious win for him. And it's a very serious loss for the Maliki government, and the US.

And it's a serious win for Iran who have now clearly demonstrated Washington's complete impotence in Iraq. Cheney sets up this stupid move with Maliki to try to crush Sadr before the fall provincial and next year's parliamentary elections. It fails miserably - and Iran stops the fight.

Worse, it was Cheney to set up the provincial elections, which Maliki opposed because they would demonstrate the frailty of his government. But if they weren't held, it would be even more damaging for his government.

This leaves Sadr in an even stronger position for the elections.

Major win for Sadr and Iran - major loss for Maliki and the US.

Par for the course.

The US will be out of Iraq within the next two years, one way or the other - probably violently, after the nationalists take control of the government and drive the US out.

Iran may prefer to deal with Maliki's group, but they will accept Sadr and the nationalists - as long as the Sunnis don't gain control.

I'm living in the gulf right now, and I have to (partially) disagree with szr. Yes, people dramatically overstate the degree of dissatisfaction with the regimes in the GCC states, but that doesn't mean it doesn't exist. Here in Bahrain, protests against the King by this and that group are regular occurances - usually one or two every week - and there was some serious civil unrest and violence in the 1990's. In fact, the army and police are primarily non-Bahrainis, and Shia can't serve in the army entirely because the ruling family has serious concerns about the loyalty of their citizens to the regime. These states have atrocious human rights records for a reason.

A lot of these problems get pushed down the road by the massive economic growth the GCC is experiencing, but there is some real dissatisfaction and iinstability. If/when the oil boom ends; it's hard to say what will happen.


Comments closed April 13, 2008.

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