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The Stakes

27 Mar 2008 09:09 am

Anthony Cordesman on the stakes in the current fighting, which he remarks "is as much a power struggle for control of the south, and the Shi'ite parts of Baghdad and the rest of the country, as an effort to establish central government authority and legitimate rule."

The US teams we talked to also made it clear that these appointments by the central government had no real popular base. If local and provincial elections were held with open lists, it was likely that ISCI and Dawa would lose most elections because they are seen as having failed to bring development and government services.

Basically, we're helping ISCI and Dawa use force in the south to lay the groundwork for them to hold onto power that they would otherwise lose at the ballot box. For more, check out this telling post at the counterinsurgency blog Abu Muqawama which starts out by saying "You know who was cool? The Jam. What a great band. You know who isn't cool? JAM -- Jaish al-Mahdi. Those guys pretty much suck." But then by the end it says:

Why, some wonder, is the U.S. closer to the Iran-backed ISCI and Badr Brigades than it is with the Sadrites? Why does this make sense? Two Baghdad political veterans have ruefully pointed out to Abu Muqawama that while Sadr has more popular support, the ISCI crowd have something more valuable: they speak English. One former State Department veteran with whom Abu Muqawama spoke a few months ago pointed out that former Iraq honcho Meghan O'Sullivan was particularly vulnerable to falling under the sway of those politicians who didn't just speak in that confusing gutteral language where they write from right to left in co-joined letters. Ergo: they speak English, so they must be our friends! Hoo-ray, democracy!

It's always worth recalling that one major problem with U.S. efforts to micromanage political outcomes in foreign countries is that it tends to be way easier for Iraqi (or Pakistani, etc.) political actors to manipulate our leaders than it is for our leaders to manipulate political actors in foreign countries. Americans have more levers -- more money, more guns, more power -- but foreigners have a much better understanding of what's happening.

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Two Baghdad political veterans have ruefully pointed out to Abu Muqawama that while Sadr has more popular support, the ISCI crowd have something more valuable: they speak English.

But do they still need subtitles?

Re Matthews' comment "Basically, we're helping ISCI and Dawa use force in the south to lay the groundwork for them to hold onto power that they would otherwise lose at the ballot box."
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Jesus Christ on a Crutch.

Newsflash to Matthew: If you've pissed away $1 Trillion on setting up a puppet government for Big Oil , you DON'T WANT strong independent actors who will act in the best interests of the Iraqi people.

You want fearful servants. People who will betray their country for you. Because you point out that if they don't hand over the oil for a bargain basement price, you will withdraw your protection and their heads will be on stakes before nightfall.

Matthew is starting to sound like a skittish, naive debutante at her first college Fraternity party. One who whispers to her friend that she's starting to suspect that those drunken frat boys inviting her upstairs might possibly be interested in S-E-X.

In other words the truth is in what you see, not what you read. But when you ask in a strange town they say "don't know, don't care, and I've got to go, mate." It's enough to make you stop believing when the tears come fast and furious in a town called Baghdad, which I believe translates literally as "malice."

Personally, I think the problem lies in the Bush Administration's fondness for wormwood scrubs (and too many right-wing meetings.)

But as we listen to the smash of glass and the rumble of boots in Basra, it's worth recalling that what you give is what you get.

...it tends to be way easier for Iraqi (or Pakistani, etc.) political actors to manipulate our leaders than it is for our leaders to manipulate political actors in foreign countries

That isn't true.

Or, rather, it's only true when it comes to those particular local actors or exiles who say what it is that the hawks want to hear.

Who's being manipulated? They find locals or worthy exiles who help them sell or justify the policies they want to pursue anyway, and in the process, in the case of locals, they find patsies to blame if things go wrong.

Your conclusion is brilliant: I have never seen it said so well.

But if you speak Arabic, aren't you accused of going native?

Besides, God speaks English -- it's in the Bible!

Let me get this straight: we are so afraid of the popularity of a guy whose party holds 28 out of the 275 seats in the Iraqi legislature that we pressured the Iraqi government to finally authorize and schedule local elections for this year. The Iraqi government is so scared of Sadr's popularity that it agreed. Doesn't compute.

Let me get this straight: we are so afraid of the popularity of a guy whose party holds 28 out of the 275 seats in the Iraqi legislature that we pressured the Iraqi government to finally authorize and schedule local elections for this year. The Iraqi government is so scared of Sadr's popularity that it agreed. Doesn't compute.

Let me help you make the computations.

We put pressure on the Iraqi Gov to hold provincial elections because the Awakenings groups were threatening to start attacking the elected Sunni political class unless the Awakenings groups were granted power or a vote. The Awakenings sat out last round, and so have no representation (which translates into patronage - money, influence, reconstruction dollars, etc.). Without holding regional elections, many key Iraqi elements will play spoiler with respect to desired national legislation (if they don't get their localities under their control, they won't play along with the national agenda).

So, the Bush team made regional elections a priority.

Problem is, ISCI vetoed the regional elections law because they are, yes, SCARED of running against Sadr in Shiite localities (Sadr also sat out the last round of regional elections). ISCI, by the way, does not hold many more seats than Sadr, and is distrusted and unpopular in general.

Then, Cheney shows up in Baghdad. Meets ISCI's head. Attends an ISCI event. Days later, presto!, ISCI drops its veto.

About a week or so later, a large scale anti-Sadr operation is on in Basra and elsewhere.

Does that compute?

Let me know if you want me to explain in greater detail.

Matt's irony is mirrored in the comments: "...foreigners have a much better understanding of what's happening."

Is there some evidence that the presumed/potential/hypothetical electoral supporters of Sadr whom ISCI is "afraid of" have any reason to hope that he'd do a better job? How solid is this support? Is there reason to believe that there may be legitimate challengers for ISCI-held seats in the future who don't try to shoot their way into government as Sadr has?

This looks too familiarly American to me. We raise holy hell that the government isn't doing anything about the militias, then when it tries to take on arguably the most pernicious one, the same people say THIS militia has more legitimacy than the elected government. How do people claim to know this sort of thing?

Eric Martin,

You are equating a government crackdown on illegal armed gangs that are stealing Iraq's oil with the suppression of a political party that many of these gang members happen to support. The two aren't the same thing. Sadrists don't need mortars and RPGs to peacefully campaign for and vote in the local elections.

You are equating a government crackdown on illegal armed gangs that are stealing Iraq's oil with the suppression of a political party that many of these gang members happen to support.

No. I am describing turf warfare between rival militias. Now, ISCI's militia has been incorporated into the Iraqi Army, but that doesn't change things. Even then, Badr irregulars are fighting with the "official" Iraqi army.

Sadrists don't need mortars and RPGs to peacefully campaign for and vote in the local elections.

No. They need those weapons to defend themselves from Badr!!!

And, by that token, Badr doesn't need those weapons. And neither does Fadila.

Oddly, though, despite the multiplicity of armed militias, only Sadr's is being targeted.

Wonder why?

This looks too familiarly American to me. We raise holy hell that the government isn't doing anything about the militias, then when it tries to take on arguably the most pernicious one, the same people say THIS militia has more legitimacy than the elected government.

No. There was a cease fire. Sadr's militia wasn't doing anything. Further, Badr is every bit as pernicious if not more. But Badr is ISCI's militia, and ISCI doesn't have a problem with permanent bases and foreign oil investment.

How do people claim to know this sort of thing?

Reading. And analyzing.

Eric, excellent analysis!

Thanks in advance for the link where I can read the evidence that "Sadr's militia wasn't doing anything", Eric.

It seems to me that the group that's coming into the government as we have long proposed as the solution for co-opting and eventually taming the militias; is mature and responsible enough to recognize the value of a strong international ally in what is perhaps the world's toughest neighborhood; and that is amenable to having Iraq's oil reserves developed by the most efficient methods, is "every bit a pernicious" as the group which has murdered significant moderates, organized ethnic cleansing in Baghdad, has killed Coalition troops, and advocates an anti-American regime the precise outlines of which no amount of reading and analyzing seems able to elucidate. Excellent analysis!

On Manipulation: Our political elites gravitate toward those local elites who say they want to promote our policies. However, our political elites are not the only actors with power we've injected into the situation. We have competition between Iraq-based State and Defense, between DC-based State and Defense, between the Ambassador and the General (not the same as State v Defense, though certainly containing echoes), between intelligence agencies, between political appointees and civil servants, between US and allies, between Executive and Legislative, between the idealists and everybody else, etc.

At all of these points of cleavage, locals have access to leverage.

In a situation where the occupying power has multiple exclusive goals and where information is tainted by the politics around those goals, it is relatively easy to play one power group of outsiders off against another. In addition, with looming American change in November, all the US factions are lying to each other and about each other in order to make sure the blame for any single screwup as well as the whole clusterf@#k gets directed elsewhere.

We're being schooled by people who would be dead if they weren't very smart, very ruthless, very good at manipulation, and very good at politics. We're being schooled because a lot of our people aren't very smart, because the stakes aren't life and death for most of our people, because a lot of our people don't know much history, because we don't have a unified policy, because we don't have a strong leader at the top, because all of this is the nature of the beast of an American-led occupation.

@Powell: The unilateral Mahdi cease-fire has been in place since last August, and is well-documented. As for Sadr's 'anti-Americanism,' it appears to be of a nationalist strain that seems all the rage among war supporters. If Bush's motives for the continued American presence are the creation of a strong, legitimate Iraq gov't, this conveniently-timed offensive seems misplaced and self-serving. As it is, it simply appears to be a means of avoiding a similarly embarassing situation to that seen after the Palestinians swept Hamas into power.

It's quite clear that despite al-Sadr's ceasefire, his group was being targeted by the Iranian-backed Shia militias. I won't speculate as to whether Iran or the US was behind it. I suspect the US had more influence because Iran can work with al-Sadr if his group takes power - but the US can't because his group will ally with non-insurgent Sunni groups to order the US out. Ergo, it's clear the US is behind the anti-Sadr moves by Maliki and the militias allied to him.

al-Sadr's group had several thousand of their members arrested during his ceasefire. Many of his supporters urged him to cancel the ceasefire several months ago. He held out. This is why it got him - a full-scale crackdown.

He even initially agreed to this crackdown because they told him it would only target the "rogue elements" of his group that he couldn't control anyway. Then they betrayed him and started arresting everybody.

There's no doubt that this is a political move orchestrated by the US to maintain control of the Iraqi government.

What it will achieve is a meltdown in Iraq, the evaporation of the "surge" reduction in violence (which only existed because of the Mahdi Army ceasefire and the bribing of the Sunni insurgents anyway), and even possibly another "surge".

The Threat of a Re-Surge in Iraq
http://news.yahoo.com/s/time/20080326/wl_time/thethreatofaresurgeiniraq

Money Quotes:

"Maliki's government targeted Basra because it could. Unlike many other southern cities where fighting has escalated in recent weeks, Maliki has built an independent power base among the security forces there. But Tuesday's sweep of Basra could turn sour in other southern cities where the central government's power is weak. Indeed, many Shi'ites are seeing this not just as an example of the Shi'ite Maliki taking on other Shi'ites (including Sadrists) but of America backing the Prime Minister up in a de facto Shi'a civil war. Iraqi government forces have attacked Shi'ite militias and gangs in at least seven major southern Iraq cities in the past two weeks. And America has been there to support Maliki's troops every time."

""This was expected. It was just a matter of timing," said Vali Nasr, Tufts University scholar and author of the bestselling book, The Shi'a Revival: How Conflicts within Islam Will Shape the Future. "The ceasefire and the surge allowed everyone to regroup and rearm. There is still the Shi'a-Sunni conflict. There is still the Sadr-Badr conflict. The surge and the ceasefire merely kept them apart, but there has never been a real political settlement," he said. "No, the big battle for Iraq hasn't been fought yet. The future of Iraq has not been determined." Nasr said the question now remains just how deep U.S. forces will get sucked into a Shi'ite civil war.

Sadr's ceasefire did allow U.S. forces to concentrate on hunting al-Qaeda in Baghdad, Mosul and Diyala without having an open front in the south. But it also allowed the cleric to rearm, clean his own house and retake the reins of his splintering movement. However, Sadr's devoted rank and file seem to be itching for a fight now as the Iraqi government and their American backers take sides with rival factions and continue to crack down on Sadr's Jaish al Mahdi, or JAM. "Sadr has had an interest in making sure everyone knows he's still around," Nasr said. "He's not going to go down without a fight.""

Meanwhile the US blames it all on Iran - despite the fact that most of the US-backed militias were created and trained in Iran.

And here we see the goal of the entire operation - keep massive numbers of troops in Iraq in preparation for the war with Iran.

I love these credibility checks.

There will be no war with Iran, US deployments will gradually decrease over the next few years with a heavy emphasis on more bang for the buck, and my guess is that we will soon have seen the last of JAM. Can we bet on this stuff?

Powell, your credibility is on a level with Baghdad Bob...

I've got a simpler explanation: SCIRI is willing to deal with us, and JAM is not. The overwhelming sense I get from reading official US nonsense as it comes out of Iraq is that the Americans are desparate to latch on to any good news, no matter how superficial or fleeting. When Sadr was cooperating, the level of vitriol directed his way died down considerably. Now that our troops are battling him again, he's the enemy that must be stopped.

If Sadr were willing to deal with the American administration, they wouldn't mind his thuggishness half so much. He's not, so they do.

Jonathan Dworkin--and this is somehow surprising? Yes, we support those elements that are willing to work with us, and oppose those that want to fight us and our allies.

Memo to Hack--no one's credibility is affected by simply saying "you don't have credibility." Typically I state a fact or opinion, you say it's not true without supporting data, or on occasion post some contradictory information and then ignore my refutation and/or criticism of it.

We're still waiting for those strikes on Teheran you've been predicting confidently were imminent for years.

Powell: "Typically I state a fact or opinion, you say it's not true without supporting data, or on occasion post some contradictory information and then ignore my refutation and/or criticism of it."

First of all, I usually cite some relevant article. I get ALL my information from "supporting data" - not blind assertions like you do. I don't decide what's going on UNTIL I see some data indicating what is going on. This is far from your hallucinatory approach.

Second, you have NEVER refuted anything I've posted. You have "criticized" it - again, without posting any links to anything which buttresses your view point. When you have posted a link (very rarely - I can only remember one instance), you link to crap which has been discredited over and over again here and everywhere else.

What you DO is cite crap like Lord Buttface in England, the story behind that is now well known to anyone who pays attention to the news. But you don't care about that - you try to influence people who DON'T know that you're full of shit.

You're pathetic. Your only advantage is that you don't quite "rant" as well as Chris Ford.

The Goldsmith finding is an excellent case in point. As you know, I posted a site where it can be read directly (The Guardian, March '03). The assertion that the official legal finding made by Goldsmith at the request of Parliament is somehow trumped by a purloined, in-house memo described by its author as a grab-bag of speculations on every possible objection, is simply ludicrous.

The finding is air-tight, and has the weight of law. The goofy speculation and supposed telepathic insight into the inner thoughts of people like Blair and Goldsmith is pathetic.

But it is typical of your "refutations".


Comments closed April 10, 2008.

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