Training

One thing to keep in mind about the repeated failures of our effort to train Iraqi security forces is that it's always been a bit odd to think of this as a situation where more/better training is actually what's needed. At the end of the day, whatever the shortcomings of our training and equipping mission in Iraq, after all, it's better than anything the Mahdi Army or the domestic Sunni Arab insurgency or AQI or the Badr Organization has. The issue is one of politics, legitimacy, motivation, and leadership.

Muqtada al-Sadr's men aren't well-trained or especially disciplined, but they are fighting for a cause they believe in and that's at least a first step toward creating an effective military force. No American-led training program is going to be able to make up for that kind of shortfall in the political legitimacy of the central government.

Comments

Why, if you're an Iraqi, would you feel compelled to join your countries military, when the United States gives every indication that it's military obligation is open-ended and utterly unconditional? Why not continue to rely on American soldiers, especially given the frightening history of attacks on Iraqi soldiers and policemen from insurgents? Conservatives love to attack welfare and other social programs on the grounds that they create a "culture of dependency"; I can't imagine a situation more likely to produce such a culture than that of America's adventures in Iraq.

Posted by Freddie | March 30, 2008 5:46 PM

country's, ugh.

Posted by Freddie | March 30, 2008 5:51 PM

Shorter MY: once we stop paying these guys, all bets are off.

Posted by Jake | March 30, 2008 5:53 PM

Freddie: That's exactly right. A culture of dependency and moral hazard.

The Swiss have the secret to foreign policy figured out, IMHO.

Posted by Tim | March 30, 2008 6:02 PM

American military adventurism is worth it when you consider that you're going to look even sillier than the Brits when history gets through with you. "I don't get it- we occupy their country and tell them what to do, and they STILL don't love us! Apple pie!"

Looking sillier than Victorian England is a rather exceptional achievement, so you guys can give yourselves a big old pat on the back and throw up the hook 'em horns whenever you like.

Posted by Hodge | March 30, 2008 6:02 PM

"More and better training" actually means "spend more on scum-sucking armament dealers".

Posted by Jeffrey Davis | March 30, 2008 6:06 PM

Why, if you're an Iraqi, would you feel compelled to join your countries military, when the United States gives every indication that it's military obligation is open-ended and utterly unconditional?

Also, why, if you're an American, would you feel compelled to join your countries military, when the United States gives every indication that it's military obligation in Iraq is open-ended and utterly unconditional?

I wonder why there are no shortage of security contractors? Oh yeah...money.

Posted by joejoejoe | March 30, 2008 6:22 PM

As much as it is appealing to think keeping the Army intact would have been an important piece of the puzzle in keeping Iraq sort of intact it would have been very difficult to keep it intact because it was totally Sunni lead. The stresses would have been terrible and who knows how the leadership and motivation of the troops would have evolved. All I am saying is that all the issues mentioned by MI here would have been played out keeping the Army intact and it simply might not have worked.

It certainly would have been worth a try but one cannot assume that it would have been successful.

It is so sad that the decider decided to keep the army intact and that it was undecided by someone else to disband and it seems he didn't really give a shit.

Posted by rapier | March 30, 2008 6:26 PM

Muqtada al-Sadr's men aren't well-trained or especially disciplined, but they are fighting for a cause they believe in and that's at least a first step toward creating an effective military force.

AMC is running The Godfather all weekend. This reminds me of the scene where Michael interrupts Hyman Roth's birthday party on the balcony and tells about the rebel and the police captain. Michael understood what it meant. Hyman didn't.

Posted by Joe Klein's conscience | March 30, 2008 6:36 PM

Good post and excellent point. Why train people to shoot when you don't know who they're going to shoot.

Unlike some commenters here I don't think dependency has anything to do with it. Soldiers don't just join up for the money, they also want to serve their country. And the Mahdi Army for all its many faults happens to be more nationalist than the "central" government.

The mindblowing paradox is that the US is supporting a central government which wants to do away with the "central" part. And that the national army is ordered by sectarian politicians to suppress a nationalist movement.

If I were a nationalist, Shiite soldier ordered to shoot at the Mahdi Army, I'd probably walk over to the other side too.

Posted by Hans B | March 30, 2008 7:06 PM

"At the end of the day, whatever the shortcomings of our training and equipping mission in Iraq, after all, it's better than anything the Mahdi Army or the domestic Sunni Arab insurgency or AQI or the Badr Organization has."

It's a fair point, but seems off the mark. Just to keep the mob analogy going, isn't this like comparing the training and discipline of the FBI with the Mob? The goals, necessary training, number of troops, and discipline for a national army are going to be vastly higher than for an insurgency. That's why they can win with fewer people and guns, strong moral cause not withstanding. I don't think the shortcomings of the Iraqi training efforts somehow prove that we've got a situation similar to Batista's Cuba or South Vietnam.

Posted by nick | March 30, 2008 7:08 PM

I call BullShit! E.g., the colonial British raised a very effective army in India without the soldiers having to "believe in" anything, and it wasn't as though the British were the legitimate government either.

This is simply the American military industrial complex eating up $22 billion (from Atrios) of US taxpayer money and asking for more.

Posted by Arun | March 30, 2008 7:25 PM

More/better training is always the answer when our puppets don't do so well. Its amazing how good the training is that the guys on the other side get.

Posted by Eric | March 30, 2008 7:29 PM

U.S. officials colluded with Saddam's regime for over 28 years. Like the Shah of Iran, Saddam Hussein became another son of Frankenstein, a creature of U.S. foreign policy.

Let's see what monsters we can create now...

Posted by AKBY | March 30, 2008 7:36 PM

from swimming freestyle:

"So, who did win this week? It's probably fair to say losers don't issue demands and winners don't accept those demands so readily."

http://swimmingfreestyle.typepad.com

Posted by Jay McDonough | March 30, 2008 7:43 PM

from swimming freestyle:
"So, who did win this week? It's probably fair to say losers don't issue demands and winners don't accept those demands so readily."

If my count is correct, that's the third time today you've blogwhored that particular quote here, dude. Maybe you should give it a rest.

Posted by James Gary | March 30, 2008 7:48 PM

Most liberal democracies have a professional military that is deliberately politically neutered to avoid (a la Turkey) the dangers of military interventions in politics.

Although patriotism is doubtless a huge motivation to serve, I have heard that what really gets soldiers to show bravery and discipline under fire in the actual heat of combat is their desire to protect their squad-mates, maintain the respect of their squad-mates, and live up to the professional role they have internalized.

I'm sure our army is trying to construct the Iraqi army along similar grounds. And yes, the British armies (both white Britons and 'native' in India) did have professional armies that were (mostly) politically reliable and hard-fighting. But inculcating that kind of corporate professionalism takes a lot of time.

Posted by Mike D | March 30, 2008 8:47 PM

Once you've decided to keep troops in country forever, then you need to decide what you're going to tell the folks back home their mission is.

"Training" is plausible, doesn't sound too dangerous, and presumably eventually comes to an end.

"Manning an outpost of empire into the indefinite future in the service of the hydrocarbon monster" probably didn't focus-group well.

Posted by Davis X. Machina | March 30, 2008 9:15 PM

"The colonial British raised a very effective army in India without the soldiers having to "believe in" anything, and it wasn't as though the British were the legitimate government either."

The Brits when they first arrived were no different than numerous other invaders, like the Mughals (Mongols) they replaced in the north. The issue of legitimacy, historically. had not yet arisen. The British never walked into a united India and took it over. "India" as a concept was in fact a consequence of, and reaction to, their conquest.

Since there was no "India" until the "Indians" reacted against British colonialism, it is no wonder that many inhabitants of "India" joined the army. It was a job, and quite a good one. To compare the primary loyalties of the sepoys of the Indian Army to the soldiers of Maliki's government is laughable. Whoever and for whatever reason they are fighting, it certainly isn't the same as the Pentagon. The Indian Army mutinied once. The Iraqi Army will do whatever the hell it or its real masters want, whenever it feels like doing it.

All that is to say that the constant analogies with the British colonial experience - in a pre-nationalist period - are less than helpful. In fact it is a Cheneyesque idiocy to believe that any Western power can walk in anywhere on the globe today and create some robot, proxy army to do its bidding.

All we really need to remember, if anyone insists on these comparisons, is that the Brits got their asses kicked in far more favorable colonial circumstances than present day Iraq. The US is faced with a groups with far stronger ethnic and religious identities, with firmer agendas and which are bounded with far stronger and more unified states which can aid them, than anything the Brits faced in either India or Iraq in the 19th C. So if you're going to use history as a guide, its message would be to pack your bags as soon as possible.

Posted by Estrien | March 30, 2008 9:20 PM

In theory the Iraqi army isn't just there to create chaos or kill people but to help patch the country together (and if the theory isn't right, that's another reason we're screwed). That requires a lot more training than being part of a militia. Presumably we could have gotten the Iraqi army in shape to litter IEDs around the place in no time, but that's not the job we were hoping for them to do. So it's a real failure that we're not doing a good job training them.

Or, in general, insurgency is a lot easier than counter-insurgency. (Corollary: we're screwed).

Posted by Justin | March 30, 2008 9:53 PM

If you're not our vassal you're our enemy. Look it up, it's in the Bill of Rights. :)

Posted by George Dick | March 30, 2008 10:26 PM

Matt

The main purpose of the surge was to "rescue the population from enemy intimidation." The enemy included terrorists, militias, and insurgents. (Source: David Kilcullen-Senior Counterinsurgency Advisor) An enemy can only survive and advance their goals, by having control over a fixed population through intimidation and threats. Sadr doesn't even have power over all his militias. To say that they are an "effective fighting force" is ridiculous.

After many false starts, the retraining and vetting of the Iraqi Military and Police Force are taking hold. The difference is the Iraqi security forces and the American military are living in the same place as the Iraqis. The enemy is being "hard-wired" out of the environment. Are these gains permanent? As the events in Basra have shown, the situation is very fluid.

The idea of legitimacy is an important concept. The American public fails to understand that tribal leaders have just as much influence as the central government. The power sharing takes place under the radar. We are focusing on legislative benchmarks rather than the "grass-roots changes" and quality of life issues for the Iraqis.

Posted by EWard | March 30, 2008 10:55 PM

"The main purpose of the surge was to "rescue the population from enemy intimidation."

The problem is that the US operations in Fallujah and elsewhere, and the displacement of Sunnis as a result, are what aggravated the sectarian intimidation.

See this Asia Times article which clearly shows how the US "destroyed Baghdad" by its operations before and during the "surge".

The fateful Battle of Baghdad
http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Middle_East/JC27Ak02.html

Money Quote:

The seeming paradox of an American pacification campaign generating more violence can be explained by looking at the mechanics of the offensive.

Posted by Richard Steven Hack | March 30, 2008 11:49 PM

Given the amount of cash we are passing out to buy the loyalty of our enemies, the vast quantity of weapons we've "misplaced", and the certainty that insurgents are going through our training and then going AWOL; it's not clear to me that the Iraqi Army has any significant advantage over the Madhi Army - other than the ability to hide behind the US military.

Posted by Tentakles | March 31, 2008 1:51 AM

[Muqtada al-Sadr's men aren't well-trained or especially disciplined]

Another comfortable delusion, I'm afraid. Alex Harrowell noticed that the insurgents were making use of break-contact drills back in 2005. If Sadr's men are able to engage the enemy then break off contact on command (and they are), then they're well-trained and well disciplined. This isn't the rabble that were fighting in Najaf any more.

Posted by dsquared | March 31, 2008 4:02 AM

I agree with EWard. It's a lot easier to set off the occasional car bomb and run protection rackets than it is to develop a reasonably solid military institution from scratch.

Sadr's forces do indeed demonstrate a reasonable level of competence and capability in its core cadre, but it's also clear that these characteristics fall off rapidly on the margins of the movement. And it is just wildly off the mark to attribute all sorts of noble motives to this group, which has been involved in all sorts of corrupt practices and is arguably a front for the Iranian Quds Force.

It is apparently enough for some that a group, any group, is opposed to the US. Then it can be lionized as dedicated patriots and nationalist heroes as opposed to just another tribal mafia. And any group that's allied with the US, no matter how legitimate and determined to improve Iraqi's situation, must by the same reasoning be dismissed as "puppets".

Posted by Robert Powell | March 31, 2008 4:27 AM

Powell, you are an utter idiot.

Everybody here knows full well that Sadr is not a "good guy". What he is, however, is a "nationalist" who's interested in dealing with Iran but not turning over the keys to the store. You can't say the same about Maliki. Your comment about "front for the Qods Force" indicates your total ignorance of the situation.

But even that's irrelevant. What IS relevant is that the poor Shia support Sadr and the other nationalists more than they support the ISCI, the Dawa and the Fahdila. Even some Sunni factions are willing to deal with Sadr, and he has in the past been willing to deal with them.

This opens at least some possibility that some sort of coalition government might be formed which would have some degree of popular support. Unlikely, but possible.

The problem for the US is that it is universally acknowledged that the nationalists will order the US out within a year. And since the US is not there to do anything but seize the oil, threaten Iran for Israel, and maintain permanent bases, that is not going to fly.

The end result is that the US will be thrown out within a year - two at most - of next year's parliamentary elections (unless Obama is elected and agrees to a fast withdrawl - which is possible).

Posted by Richard Steven Hack | March 31, 2008 5:25 AM

I'm not going to hold myself out as the greatest Iraq expert the world has ever seen, but I'm pretty sure that a lack of men with military training and access to weapons is NOT the most significant problem that country faces.

Posted by joe | March 31, 2008 9:53 AM

Estrien:

The Mughal Empire which the British supplanted was a coalition like the modern Iraqi state. Anyway, no value in arguing the point here.

What may be more understandable is the question - how does one drop $22 billion in three or four years and get no results? There should be significant citizen outrage over that. As I postulate on my blog, it isn't there because current citizens' grandchildren will be paying the bill.

-Arun

Posted by Arun | March 31, 2008 2:50 PM

Is Sadr a bad guy?

A wider question is: who are the good guys there? and that includes us, I am sorry to say,

From time to time we arrive at some sweeping moral conclusions, like that assassins are morally superior to suicide bombers, aerial bombardment is morally superior to IEDs, torture that is much harsher that our practices is to be frowned upon etc. Overall, however, our judgments are ad hoc and improvised, and principles hard to discern.

And to continue the thought of RSH, we are not even particularly good at sizing oil and threatening Iran, and the permanent bases surely were build with larger budget than pyramids of Egypt, but I conjecture they will be much less permanent.

The most astounding statistic is that even with oil at its most stratospheric price levels we spend more every day in Iraq than Iraq can get from oil export (our spending: ca. 250 M$/day, Iraqi export, ca. 2 x Mbbl x 100$/bbl = 200 M$/day. Of course, we do not get much from that export, and while in 4 days we spend a gigadollar, together with associated waste and lost opportunities, our losses are in teradollars.

But, on the bright side, a teradollar is not what it used to be.

Posted by piotr | March 31, 2008 6:06 PM

Powell, I'm amazed at how cynical we have become about the events in Iraq. What's surprising is how the efforts of the US Military and Iraqi forces are belittled while Sadr and his militia are praised as heroes. The truth is Sadr and his men are as ruthless as al Qaeda in Iraq. To regain both his political and criminal empire, Sadr is willing to sacrifice the lives of his own people. Iran's involvement further complicates a horrible situation.

The question is not whether Sadr and his men are a well trained military group. The reality is Basra has become the center of criminal and military activity conducted by the militias. All these groups have competing deadly agendas. Second, the police force has become a staging ground for this criminal empire. The parallel would be if the Mafia took control over Miami and terrorized its citizens.

If you read David Kilcullen, the main purpose of a counterinsurgency is to marginalize the enemy from the population they prey on. The challenge is how to conduct such an operation without the civilians paying the price. The police and militias have to be vetted.

Posted by EWard | April 1, 2008 2:32 AM