Josh Kurlantzick reports that the People's Republic of China is using the olympic games as a pretext for a broad crack-down on various "enemies." It's always striking -- and humbling -- to look at the often-sorry fate of Chinese dissidents and minority groups and recall that for all the hubris of the U.S. domestic conversation about "democracy promotion" everyone knows that there's really almost nothing useful we can do about human rights in China even as it's clear that the internal Chinese situation is probably the single most important variable in looking at the future of democracy.
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Working for the Clampdown
27 Mar 2008 11:11 am
Comments (22)
This has to be 4074th time you've used this for a post-title. It isn't even one of the better songs on London Calling.
lh: yes it is.
recall that for all the hubris of the U.S. domestic conversation about "democracy promotion" everyone knows that there's really almost nothing useful we can do about human rights in China even as it's clear that the internal Chinese situation is probably the single most important variable in looking at the future of democracy
It really is odd that Matthew seems to think that unless we do everything everywhere all of the time to promote democracy, it is somehow illegitimate to say we are promoting democracy.
We are promoting democracy in lots of places around the world - most prominently Iraq and Afghanistan. That we can't do so in China says exactly zero about our democracy promotion efforts. It certainly does not make them "hubris".
Matt, I think you're right on in terms of looking at China's internal politics as an indication of what Beijing may or may not do. I think most people tend to not understand or simply underestimate how extremely nervous the Chinese leadership is about any potential instability. Stability is paramount. The country could not have had 30 years of double-digit growth otherwise. Regardless of what you or I think about the Tibet and other related issues, if you're looking at it from Hu Jintao's perspective, who wakes up in the morning thinking that any day now, Tibet could go, and then followed by Xinjiang, and whatever other region, etc. What if we woke up and Texas decided to declare independence? I'm just playing devil's advocate here, but those feelings are always at the back of Chinese leaders' minds.
There may be some potential for intra-party democracy after Hu. See my article on the two rising stars in Chinese elite politics in TNR, part of the China series: http://www.tnr.com/politics/story.html?id=e9d23d4c-021a-412d-9239-7febbcf056bb
Sorry for the shameless self plug!
"as it's clear that the internal Chinese situation is probably the single most important variable in looking at the future of democracy."
I don't much like the phrasing "future of democracy."
Aren't the real issues human rights concerns, and concerns about the government being supported by popular will/mandate? (and ballot boxes may not be the only - or even the best - option for expressing the popular will in many countries, contrary to MSM and American Con. 'wisdom')
I think half our current F. Policy crisis is an obsession with imposing ballot boxes, written constitutions, cameral legislatures and bureaucratic/procedural judicial systems on the rest of the planet.
Maybe our political institutions are not the one-size-fits-all we thought they were... (See Iraq & Afghanistan)
all the songs on london calling are better songs, better than most anything before or after. that clampdown falls in the middle of the pack on that album is no reason to run it down. that such a really old, older than matt, album can remain so vital and repay long-term listeneing, should help allay matt's fears that, becuase he can't quite keep up with the frenetic samapling of the cool kids, he's missing something. he probably is missing something, but most of what he's missing is in the past. the good stuff abides, the cool stuff mostly didn't. when, as with the clash, the two coexist, the album not only abides, it merits 4074 references years later
"it's clear that the internal Chinese situation is probably the single most important variable in looking at the future of democracy."
Why is this so clear? What effect has Chinese autocracy had on the prospects for democracy elsewhere? I don't see any consistent pattern of influence. Does it have an effect one way or another on China's neighbors? Some neighbors, such as Vietnam, are autocracies, and others, such as India and South Korea are democracies. One could argue that Chinese trade supports dictatorships in Africa and elsewhere, but it also supports democracies such as Australia and Brazil.
Despite its enormous population, the internal politics of China mainly effects just China.
(Damienics)"What if we woke up and Texas decided to declare independence?"
I would freaking jump out of bed, climb up on top of my roof and CHEER!!!!
Oh my God, please, don't get me all excited like that.
That's not nice to do, Damienics, taunt me with an image of a world without Texas. Next you'll tell me Florida just broke off the continent and sunk into the ocean.
More like if Puerto Rico declared independence. China only conquered Tibet relatively recently, whereas Texas was conquered in the early/mid 19th century.
Why is this so clear? What effect has Chinese autocracy had on the prospects for democracy elsewhere?
A reasonable question, but I'd say the answer is "more than you think".
For quite some time it's been accepted wisdom that in order to be a rich country, you must also be a free country. That in order to modernize you must follow a US/Western Europe/etc model. China is proving that being a non-free country doesn't mean being 3rd world or the Soviet Union. That you can have rapid economic growth and modernization without pesky things like freedom of speech. And a lot of 3rd world dictators out there are looking at that fact with great interest.
I think Matt is perhaps underestimating what exactly the US can do about it. And not just the US, but the rest of the democratic world. Because China is now heavily dependent on consumers buying their exports, world democracies could target a section of Chinese exports and refuse to buy. Sorry, Chinese steel is no longer wanted until you stop this Tibet nonsense. Do you think it would have an effect? I do.
Phaedrus,
"For quite some time it's been accepted wisdom that in order to be a rich country, you must also be a free country."
There's a distinction between economic freedom and political freedom. Ethnic Chinese in Hong Kong and Singapore have prospered immensely under systems that have had high economic freedom (property rights, non-corrupt rule of law, etc.) without political freedom (the ability to chose their own leaders). There's nothing new about this observation -- both city-states have perennially ranked near or at the top of the WSJ's Index of Economic Freedom.
Chinese autocracy's effects on democracy - some examples:
1. complete lack of democracy for its own citizens = 1.3 billion people
2. Hong Kong
a. no more free local elections since handover in any true sense
b. no more freedom of press or speech
3. Taiwan
a. threats to takeover and eliminate the only functioning democracy of all the Sino-descended political entities
b. chilling effect on current Taiwan politics and elections which interferes with the democratic process there
"What effect has Chinese autocracy had on the prospects for democracy elsewhere? I don't see any consistent pattern of influence. "
Because of its veto in the UN, the security council is very hesitant to take any action that could be construed as interference in any state's internal matters. China threatens vetoes of them to avoid precedent that could be used against it. Because so many nations have profitable relationships with China, they do not want to annoy China for resolutions that would get vetoed anyway, so they are successfully deterred.
If China were democratic and observant of human rights, they would be less concerned about setting precedents about interference in internal matters. The SC would be more likely to be able to build consensus about how to handle such problems as Darfur.
"There's a distinction between economic freedom and political freedom. Ethnic Chinese in Hong Kong and Singapore have prospered immensely under systems that have had high economic freedom (property rights, non-corrupt rule of law, etc.) without political freedom (the ability to chose their own leaders)."
Singapore and Hong Kong were both British outposts that owed their prosperity to the legacy of colonialism, and to their nature as self-contained city-states that did not have to support a large, impoverished rural population. China is a nation of 1.3 billion people that is rapidly becoming a major economic power while remaining a tightly-controlled one-party state. This is a compelling model for would-be Third World autocrats, in a way that Singapore could never be.
However, it's also worth registering an objection to the WSJ's Orwellian definition of "economic freedom" -- in which having a large class of indentured laborers with no rights whatsoever makes your nation's economy "more free" and having strong protections for the right of workers to organize makes you "less free."
There's a distinction between freedom for capital and freedom for human beings.
China is setting a bad example, but I don't think it will be able to be followed particularly well. The Chinese government has always had a great bargaining position with respect to western governments b/c of the enormous potential market it represents. No other country in the world has that kind of opportunity. For everyone else, you'll probably have to play by the rules.
I tend to agree with those who don't see China as a "role model" for the Third World. I don't see Third World autocrats looking to China as a model for several reasons, notably that the Chinese are historically not a democracy, let alone the fact they that were a Communist dictatorship. There's simply no compelling reason for anyone in a country elsewhere looking at the notion that you can be "rich" (relatively speaking) just by being autocratic. I also don't see that as becoming a compelling arguing point against "democracy" as a system.
As for other influences, the Hong Kong situation was somewhat unique. The impact of the Chinese takeover may have changed the economic dynamics somewhat, but basically little has changed and there has been no impact on democracy elsewhere. Hong Kong was always an anomalous part of China that had to end sooner or later.
I also think China's veto in the UN is not the primary restraining element in regards to the UN acting in various crises such as Darfur. It has been (along with Russia) significant in slowing the application of sanctions against Iran - but that's been a good thing, since the sanctions are almost entirely the product of US pressure. The US veto has been more damaging, for example, in the case of UN resolutions demanding changes in Israel's behavior in the Palestinian situation.
China's "chilling effect" on Taiwan is similar to that of Hong Kong. It is is likely that sooner or later the two nations will have to reconcile in some manner - with either China recognizing Taiwan as a "sister state" or Taiwan rejoining China as a province. Given that Taiwan is a few score miles from China, expanding that effect to illustrate China's impact on democracy in general is disingenuous. It's strictly a Chinese issue of local import - except for the involvement of the US again.
If China took over Taiwan by force, it would be momentarily disruptive. But like Hong Kong, there would a transition and eventually Taiwan would probably remain pretty much as it has been, much like Hong Kong, in economic terms. While it's democracy may be reduced, the effect on the world politically and economically would be basically nil.
The problem would be the US involvement in any war between China and Taiwan.
One can disparage China's lack of freedom of speech without extending it to mean China is somehow subverting democracy everywhere. Matt's comment is too broad and resembles those "China is a growing threat" statements the war mongers make frequently.
The US is subverting democracy much worse by trying to impose it by military force on countries not ready for it.
I think it's more appropriate to say that dissident groups are using the Beijing Olympics to highlight their plights. The Chinese government is then responding to peaceful protests with mass imprisonment and "disappearances".
This morning, on NPR's Morning Edition, they interviewed the Chinese Ambassador to the US. He was asked three times if the protestors had any legitimate grievances and avoided the question each time. Also, his English was pretty bad and I'm enough of a chauvanist to think that an ambassador to America should be able to speak English decently (it's not like having to learn Dutch or Basque or anything). The dude could have come directly from a mid-80's Cold War Rambo-type movie.
"Not one of the better songs on 'London Calling'" is strongly praising by faint damn.
"Why is this so clear? What effect has Chinese autocracy had on the prospects for democracy elsewhere? I don't see any consistent pattern of influence. Does it have an effect one way or another on China's neighbors? Some neighbors, such as Vietnam, are autocracies, and others, such as India and South Korea are democracies. One could argue that Chinese trade supports dictatorships in Africa and elsewhere, but it also supports democracies such as Australia and Brazil.
Despite its enormous population, the internal politics of China mainly effects just China.
Posted by Fred | March 27, 2008 11:52 AM"
Well, if China became a liberal democracy overnight, the number of people living under freedom-protecting structures would greatly increase overnight. They also supply arms, funds, etc. to the likes of Sudan, Burma, have supported Mugabe against the popular democratic parties, etc. We have been hypocritical in this, but at least some of the countries we support we do so in a way to get them to be freer and more democratic (Japan after WWII, etc.). With China, this never happens. In addition, we underestimate how much the likes of Washington, Jefferson and Franklin influenced democratizing leaders worldwide. If there were Chinese equivalents, that could be of help as well.
"Also, his English was pretty bad and I'm enough of a chauvanist to think that an ambassador to America should be able to speak English decently (it's not like having to learn Dutch or Basque or anything). The dude could have come directly from a mid-80's Cold War Rambo-type movie.
Posted by ben | March 27, 2008 5:30 PM"
It's not like they don't have people who could speak English. I've met people formerly of the Chinese foreign policy apparatus that had lived in the US and spoke good English. This is either treating a major ambassadorship as spoils for key supporters or just laziness. When you have a major ambassadorship for a country whose language is spoken in several continents, you should have someone who can communicate with the public be the ambassador.
Comments closed April 10, 2008.
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Heads in the Sand
>everyone knows that there's really almost nothing useful we can do about human rights in China
I'm not ready to abandon my monthly contributions to Amnesty International.
Posted by bartkid | March 27, 2008 11:31 AM