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What He Said

09 Apr 2008 03:14 pm

Phil Carter, at his new WashingotnPost.com home, reviews the Petraeus/Crocker fest:

They overstated the threat posed by al-Qaeda in Iraq in an effort to justify the mission -- a mindset that has generated a deeply flawed strategy. They also overplayed the surge's success -- downplaying or discounting factors that likely did more to create today's improved security conditions. While their "Anaconda" strategy looks cool on a PowerPoint slide, it confuses the issues of control and influence, putting too much stock in America's ability to engineer success in Iraq. And, perhaps most tellingly, the two men made the case for perseverance without placing Iraq in the context of vital U.S. national interests, offering only apocalyptic predictions of what would happen if we don't stay the course.

Indeed. And, look, one can hardly blame them. It's bizarre to take two officials with such a limited (albeit, obviously, important) mandate and have the administration throw them out there as frontmen for a hugely controversial policy that implicates every aspect of national strategy.

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Comments (26)

I wouldn't have thought that after Colin Powell's debacle at the UN that they could find people who have reputations to consider who would be willing to peddle such transparent nonsense.

Nobody stranger than people.

Isn't politics just another name for peddling nonsense with straight face?

Our resident right wing trolls will be in here in a second to tell us how these two guys are "professionals with a long history of service to this country who were confirmed by Congress with no complaints who are the most knowledgeable people about Iraq" and to doubt their testimony is to be ignorant of history and our "vital national interests" in the Middle East.

How'd I do, Powell?

Speaking of peddling nonsense with a straight face, Powell is the master of it on this blog - as Petraeus and Crocker are masters at it on the national level.

And there's no difference between them. All three are mindless hacks who would sell their asses to Dick Cheney in a heartbeat. They're nothing more than sock puppets for the criminal scum running this country.

Reminds me of something Abbie Hoffman once said. He said, "Never call a cop a Nazi because they like that. It fits their self-image." Instead, he used to call them "Jew faggots" - he was Jewish, so he could do that - because that's how cops insult each other.

In that context, since the above three scum enjoy being called right wing trolls and hacks, we should find something more hateful in their own terms to use. Anybody got any ideas?

Juan Cole is good today as well

"One can hardly blame them"? Are they overstating or aren't they? Might overstatements like this have dire consequences? How can you not blame them if this is the case, or do you just assume that nobody takes these fancy generals seriously because you don't? Sullivan has a similarly baffling reaction.

Someone explain to me why this is ok. I really don't get it. Thanks.

from swimming freestyle:

"Perhaps if we look at the problem like grown-ups, not petulant kids who demand the game be played their way or no way...

No one wants a shattered Iraq, full of sectarian militias battling each other, a nonfunctional government, and a bitter, pissed off populace. Instead of stubbornly adhering to a simplistic, "if I just wish hard enough it will happen" Bush strategy (a long term military presence to tamp down violence waiting for the Iraqi government to get it together), why not consider how we help the Iraq government function more effectively? If our current strategy is not yielding the desired results (some end point for U.S. involvement), isn't it smart to change strategy until you find one that works?

Isn't that what grown-ups do?"

http://swimmingfreestyle.typepad.com

I have worked as a military historian for 25+ years and will now share with you the only statement of fact anyone can make regarding the success/failure of the surge: we won't know if it worked or not for at least another 6 months.
We announced a temporary surge, slowly built up troop levels, and now await the drawdown. The enemy we are fighting is not a conventional army in uniforms with a chain of command and a nation-state backing it. We are fighting insurgents; smart, capable insurgents. They knew the surge was temporary – as did anyone paying any attention to the war.
So we increase troop levels and violence drops. What does that mean? Did we kill/capture enough insurgents in the early days of the surge to bring about a permanent change? Did we cause a large number of insurgents to rethink their goals and permanently give up the use of force? Did the insurgents simply decide to go back to their day jobs for the 6 – 12 months during which our levels would surge?
I could tender a guess, as could anyone. But remember – we would be guessing. Six months from now we’ll know a lot more than we do today.
FWIW I ignore anyone who makes any definitive claims regarding the success or failure of the surge as it is simply impossible to make such a call today.

I have worked as a military historian for 25+ years and will now share with you the only statement of fact anyone can make regarding the success/failure of the surge: we won't know if it worked or not for at least another 6 months.

Just one more Friedman Unit, huh dude? Give me a break.

James Gary: Wow, that was fast. 5 minutes for an expert to "refute" me. FWIW I consider the Wars in Iraq and Vietnam to be the two biggest foreign policy mistakes this country has ever made. I was opposed to the War in Iraq from day 1. I said above I could make a guess, but, having some actual knowledge regarding counterinsurgency warfare I preferred to accept reality (Bush ain't gonna withdraw the troops before leaving office) and say 6 months from now we'll have an answer. My guess would be this: it ain't gonna work.
Now, being the obvious expert you are, please explain in terminology more advanced than what one would normally encounter on a middle school playground (ok dude?) how it is you know for a fact as of 9 April 2008 the surge has failed. Be sure to include some actual details. Don’t get me wrong, snark and slang go a long toward making a point, but the occasional fact helps as well.

I can only feel sorry for the General. Civilian control of the military being what it is, he doesn't get to say: "This is a bad idea and I oppose it." All he can do is make the best he can of a bad situation. And try to justify the orders he is sworn to obey.

Now there are those who say that what he ought to do is just resign if he doesn't agree with the policy. But all that does is leave the military in the hands of exactly the kind of people that you don't want there -- those who think that the current policy is a great one.

Others will say that the military should refuse to obey orders that they think are wrong. But how would they like it if the judgement of the military led them to refuse to obey orders that those people happend to agree with?

In short, any general who is put in charge, even if he is making the best of the situation, is going to be blasted by everybody who doesn't like the President's orders. (Even though they would object just as loudly if he refused to obey orders of a President that they happened to agree with.) What they ought to be doing is blasting the people who elected that President. But I guess that's not as satisfying -- merely objectively correct.

Really, Bob. Given that the political reconciliation (remember, that was the point of the surge) has manifestly *not* taken place in the "reduced" levels of violence. With the drawdown, the cap is taken off and the violence levels will increase, as the underlying issues have not changed.

To reduce this to a "guess" is the act of a simpleton, not a military historian. There is some remote pony-level chance, but any rigorous reading of the data concludes (with very minor caveats) that it is a failure.

Petraeus/Crocker seem to have attempted honest candor, within the obvious conflicting interests with which they find themselves embroiled. Their jobs in Iraq are staggeringly challenging. It must be very clear to General Petraeus that his mission is a fool's errand and may in fact (cough) be weakening the strength of the US. The measured responses both men have given to questions by Congress is testament to their loyalty. I wonder if either has completely voiced his own opinion.

Bob, regarding your response to James Gary, you can only appeal to our expertise once. Only in theology are you allowed to use the "argument from authority". Otherwise, you have to provide actual arguments.

Shifting the burden of proof is a neat trick, but ultimately bullshit here. If you want a *certain fact*, then of course that cannot be done. But if you create a false dichotomy between a certain fact and a WAG (wild-ass guess), then -- with all due respect to your immense experience -- you are not a very good historian. We will not have that level of certainty six months, six years, or six decades from now.

nolaboyd: So the surge is over and no reconciliation took place. Looks like I need to start paying attention. Or maybe the surge isn’t over yet and it is thus impossible to say it has failed. It’s even possible (I certainly admit unlikely) that Maliki is working successfully behind the scenes and some from of reconciliation will soon become evident.
Look, I mostly agree with what you said, but when you state as objective, verifiable fact that the surge has failed (past tense for something that’s not even finished yet – see a problem?) I will refuse to ride your bandwagon. From the first week of the surge on - coincidently enough - everyone who was for the war all along grabbed hold of any sign of success as proof of success: anyone opposed to the war grabbed hold of any sign of failure as proof of failure. It's awfully difficult to see that as objective examination of facts.
And the apparently arcane knowledge that sometimes the most important political deals are being made quietly in backrooms really needs to get more air time.
If I were gonna bet the mortgage on this, I’d bet on failure. That is not the same as saying all proof is in and in any objective sense the surge failed.

Bob, of course you're right if you keep on talking of "proof" and "objective sense". But we're not Davidson and McDowell in a epistemology discussion here, we're talking about politics and history, which never admit of this level of certainty, even after the fact.
Political and historical judgments are always hermeneutical, not simply descriptive. Six months from now, even if Iraq reprises its Garden of Eden role, we won't be able to say in the "objective sense" that it was the surge that did it.

So when we say the surge has "failed", it means that there is not reasonable way to account for the existing data and still maintain the pretense of success.

This judgment matters politically. If you dispute it because of your impossible criteria, then you are either arguing in bad faith, or your arguments are cover for those who argue in bad faith. Either way, they are inappropriate to this argument.

And as an aside, a historian has no particular expertise in reading the events that are happening right now. Training in history develops a different skill set, though obviously it increases relevant knowledge.

nolaboyd: I give. This is like arguing creationism with a fundamentalist. From literally the first week of the surge on, what I said above is absolutely true - everyone who was for the war all along grabbed hold of any sign of success as proof of success: anyone opposed to the war grabbed hold of any sign of failure as proof of failure. Don’t take my word for it; go through the archives of a few anti-war blogs and a few pro-war blogs.
The position you held going into the surge dictated how you perceived it from day one. By the end of the first week, virtually every major conservative pundit had declared success; virtually every liberal pundit had declared failure. That any such argument was fundamentally fraudulent is the point I’m making here.
Now tell me how you were busily analyzing information in the first weeks of the surge and hadn’t made up your mind yet, but over time you came to see some problems. When you’re done, I’m gonna get on my rainbow colored unicorn and fly to the moon.

Bob, it's all nice that you're pissed off with other conversations, but don't bring it into this one.

Your implication that all of us are intellectually fraudulent (excepting you, of course, who had a perfectly open mind, with no preconceptions about anything at all) is a little bit insulting, and in violation of the rules of civilized discourse, is it not?

Psychologizing your opponent is the worst form of argument, which is why partly I said you were not a very good historian. You don't know the motivations of the people you argue with, and you have no empirical data to support your arrogant assumption that your intellectual integrity in this is greater than mine. Anyone who thought that the surge had a 50/50 chance of working -- and thus had no preconceptions at all -- is either ignorant of everything that has happened in that last five years, has no knowledge of the ethnic/tribal/religious realities of Iraq, or is just not very bright. I hadn't made my mind up yet, and am an optimistic person by nature, but I would have been a fool to ignore the available data.

It's nice to be the only honest man, Bob, but it's only in the world of your own making. Fundamentalist indeed.

Nolaboyd: “Bob, it's all nice that you're pissed off with other conversations, but don't bring it into this one.” My sincerest apologies. Didn’t mean to coarsen the level of discourse with someone who had already said to me “To reduce this to a "guess" is the act of a simpleton, not a military historian” and “Shifting the burden of proof is a neat trick, but ultimately bullshit here. If you want a *certain fact*, then of course that cannot be done. But if you create a false dichotomy between a certain fact and a WAG (wild-ass guess), then -- with all due respect to your immense experience -- you are not a very good historian.”
You have my word, from now on I will play on the Elevated Field of Discourse ™ you have brought to the game.
I never said I am in possession of a “perfectly open mind” “the honest man” or filled with “intellectual integrity” (fine examples all of that Elevated Field of Discourse ™). And to be blunt, I’m as tired of this as I’m sure you are. I was just about to start listing examples of “it’s over, we lost” moments from history which suddenly became “holy shit, how’d we pull that one out?” moments but, I see no point. You know everything, you can predict the future with 100% certainty, and are a man who knows beyond any doubt how the most complex situations will be resolved.
Not are capable of making educated, and more often than not correct guesses, which is all I’ve ever claimed to be able to do – no, you know with absolute certainty. That my guesses line up perfectly with your facts is proof to you I’m some sort of concern troll. To me it’s proof you’re a pompous ass. Ooops. Sorry, momentarily slipped off that Elevated Field of Discourse ™ you so thoughtfully brought along.
All I ask is you let me know who’s gonna win the next 10 Super Bowls so I can make some money.

Bob, qua military historian- like Gen. Petraeus- appears to be an illustration of the old adage that when all you have is a hammer, everything looks like a nail. The questions of whether the surge has "worked", and where to go from here, are simply not military questions at all. They are political / diplomatic questions. It's the absence of even well-formulated questions in this Administration about Iraqi society and regional diplomacy- they don't even know what they don't know- let alone the hammering out of actual defined goals in these areas- that's the crux of the problem. The tools of both generals and military historians are of little relevance- they can only begin to advise you how to reach your goals when you actually HAVE goals. Right now we're there because we're there and we have to stay, well, because we have to stay. (Just as we started in the war in the the first place, well, who knows why really given all the different rationales that have been floated from time to time.) Sorry, that doesn't begin to cut the mustard.

" I can only feel sorry for the General. Civilian control of the military being what it is, he doesn't get to say: "This is a bad idea and I oppose it.""

No, General Petraeus is not off the hook. This was His Strategy. And in addition the question of historical and military and political relevance, there's the question of morality.

If he believes the garbage he's peddling, then fine, he's a fool and I'm sure Bush will find another one once he awards Petraeus the Medal of Honor and ushers him out the door.

However, if he's believes that the strategy is not working or that the orders he is obeying are wrong, he has a moral obligation to say so. Period.

Jay McDonough:

No one wants a shattered Iraq, full of sectarian militias battling each other, a nonfunctional government, and a bitter, pissed off populace.

Are you fucking kidding me? What war have you been watching?

You know how the US is now directly funding Sunni groups that are openly telling Western journalists that they intend to use these weapons against the authority of the Shiite-majority government in Baghdad? That's because the US wants a shattered Iraq.

You see the US support the Shiites who call for dividing the country against the Shiites who call for leaving the country unified? That's because the US wants a shattered Iraq.

It shocks me that there are people who can't see this, and it seems like most Americans just don't want to understand that their government is actively breaking Iraq up. This is more clearly seen in the region though. I guess that's some consolation. Turkey for example speaks of it more openly.

The US has to choose between a unified anti-American Iraq or no Iraq. No Iraq means civil war, division and chaos. The US is clearly. Clearly. Choosing no Iraq.

To say the US wants to minimize US casualties given it still prevents the formation of an anti-US unified Iraq, means that the US wants to minimize US casualties given the dismemberment of Iraq.

That is what the US is doing. That is what the US is choosing. To make the other choice means facing and repudiating the priorities that up to now have made the choice to dismantle Iraq a decision so uncontroversial that it isn't even discussed. It is also the priorities that made a decade of sanctions and then an invasion of Iraq seem like reasonable policies both to Democrats and Republicans and throughout the US political spectrum.

...if he's believes that the strategy is not working or that the orders he is obeying are wrong, he has a moral obligation to say so. Period.

From his perspective - a military perspective - it did work. Fewer soldiers are dying, his enemies aren't as active as they were before, etc.

He's not a politician, which is what a lot of commenters are just dying to believe. And I know the surge has been attributed to General Petraeus - no doubt he's played a large role in planning it - but I doubt he ran up to President Bush one day with a portfolio and said "Boy, do I have a great idea!" and presented him with this. The SecDef and POTUS thought that the Iraqis needed a period of relatively low violence, and they asked the General how would achieve such a goal. The result of that is the surge.

The General is in a no-win situation; a fool's errand that he's obliged to complete. He's making the best out of what is a shitty mission in the first place. It's basically Bush saying "Hey, I fucked this all up militarily, diplomatically, politically, and all sorts of other ways. Fix it for me with guns." The military can't be held accountable for the political failures of Bush, Cheney, Rice, and Maliki, and probably the Ambassador. That's what this comes down to. And Bush should be ashamed of himself by throwing the General to the dogs.

The Ambassador, on the other hand - I suspect he's a bit more partisan on this issue, as he's in an appointed position.

Arnold's right.

All of this is a considered strategy - and a lot of it was learned from Israel and the Palestinian situation. Israel is trying to divide the Palestinians between Hamas and Fatah. They actually supported Hamas in the early days of its existence for exactly that reason. And now they're trying to accelerate that.

The more Hamas and Fatah shoot each other, the less they shoot at Israel. The more Hizballah and the other Lebanese parties shoot each other, the less they shoot at Israel. Bush signed a document authorizing the CIA to support Sunni groups - next to Al Qaeda - against Hizballah in Lebanon for the same reasons - that ended up with a shootout between one of those groups and the Lebanese army.

The US is doing the same thing in Iraq - the more the Sunnis and Shia shoot each other, the less they shoot at the US. The same with the Sunnis and Al Qaeda. This is why the US is paying the Sunni insurgents $300/month - it's a welfare program to keep them from shooting at us, and at the same time let them get ready to start shooting at the Shia.

The Israelis went into the Kurdish area of Iraq soon after the invasion for exactly the same reason - and to acquire connections they could use against Iran - again, for the same reasons, to get Kurds shooting at Iranians - and to obtain an oil pipeline from Kirkuk to Haifa.

The US is doing the exact same thing in Iraq - breaking the country down. The plan is to do exactly the same thing to Syria and Iran and eventually Saudi Arabia, Egypt - everybody who is in any way a threat to Israeli and US hegemony in the ME.

"It shocks me that there are people who can't see this"

Doesn't shock me - I know most people are morons.

"From his perspective - a military perspective - it did work. Fewer soldiers are dying, his enemies aren't as active as they were before, etc."

It was Petraeus himself who said that the goal of the surge was to use increased security to create the political space necessary for political reconciliation. He was the one who chose an explicitly political goal as the criteria to judge success or failure in Iraq. He isn't just some general stuck with a bad assignment. He was chosen explicitly for his views.

"He was chosen explicitly for his views."

Precisely.

To assume that our generals are some how apart from politics, history and morality is to ignore Washington, George McClellan, Eisenhower, Douglas MacArthur,...... Their role in our political and moral history is omnipresent. Without any comment on his political motives, good or bad or utterly absent, General Petreaus knows this.

"The General is in a no-win situation"

Agreed. It is an extraordinary burden that few will ever face. But he, like everyone else that is faced with such an overwhelming task, cannot compartmentalize the military perspective from the political and historical and moral ones.

If he does not believe the surge has worked from any of these intertwined perspectives, I believe he has the obligation to say so.

Isn't it much simpler than all this? Al-sadr declared a cease-fire and the surge started to work. The cease-fire begins to fray, the surge doesn't work as well anymore. Why do we continue to think we are in control and that it is the things WE do that make a difference in Iraq?


Comments closed April 23, 2008.

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