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Meanwhile, In Abkhazia

01 May 2008 03:19 pm

Rumors of war are flying around, as folks say the Georgian government is preparing an assault on Abkhazia on the assumption that "the Georgians expect the Russian troops currently in Abkhazia to stand down when the invasion begins." This is a reminder that, at a minimum, any thought of bringing Georgia into NATO should be made contingent on some kind of stable resolution of the issues in Abkhazia and South Ossetia.

You don't make absolute security guarantees to a country in Georgia's position unless there's some overwhelming strategic rationale for doing so -- just to be nice or make the point that we don't approve of Vladimir Putin isn't a good enough reason to get mixed up in these particular separatist conflicts.

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Comments (21)

There is a very important strategic rationale for doing so - the one million bbl/day Baku-Tblisi-Ceyhan pipline that carries all that precious black gold from the Caspian to the Med, bypassing the Russians and the Iranians and ensuring that the oil isn't exported over land to Kazakhstan's neighbor, China.

I'm not much of a conspiracy theorist, but this "suicide" seems a little fishy:

http://www.reuters.com/article/topNews/idUSN0144423620080501?feedType=RSS&feedName=topNews

Are you suggesting the D.C. madam was killed by Vladimir Putin? Have they found any traces of polonium on her body?

Georgia is a pretty sketchy place and one could make valid arguments against their membership. But we already let Bulgaria in. The bar obviously must be set very low for that to happen.

I'm sort of curious where the rationale for this comes from. The only source I have seen for claims that the Georgians are massing troops for an assault on Abkhazia is the Russian government, who are hardly disinterested observers - the current Russian government has made no secret of its ultimate wish to annex Abkhazia to the Russian Federation.

On the other hand, the Russian government has itself announced a troop buildup in the area, ostensibly to counteract a Georgian troop buildup that may not exist, as a way to reinforce a "peacekeeping" battalion in Abkhazia. This is immediately after insincere Russian denials of what appears to be a Russian plane shooting down a Georgian UAV.

It seems clear to me that if you use the criterion of "This is a reminder that, at a minimum, any thought of bringing Georgia into NATO should be made contingent on some kind of stable resolution of the issues in Abkhazia and South Ossetia." you are giving Russia an absolute veto on countries entering NATO. Any country with a dispute with Russia (which the Baltic states continue to have, for example, over borders) cannot enter NATO until the Russians agree to resolve the dispute. If the Russians just say no, there is no viable way for Georgia to resolve this dispute except by recognizing the independence of (some parts) of South Ossetia and Abkhazia.

That's the unspoken line behind a statement like that, and it would be nice for it to be spoken clearly. Just go ahead and say that you think Georgia is in Russia's sphere of influence and we shouldn't meddle and be done with it.

Did you take this same line on Kosovo? I'm pretty sure there wasn't any strong strategic value there, either.

Geez, this makes the second time in a week I've read about a quasi-state (Abkhazia) in that part of the world that I never even knew existed. The other was Transnistria (in the New Yorker article about human trafficking).

PM, if it is our official policy that Abhazia should re-unite with its former central government, as Serbia postulated for Kosovo, and that Georgia is our military ally, then we enter 1914 style of brinkmanship. At the end of the day, if Russia is determined to maintain dependent independence of Abhazia and South Ossetia, Georgia, and we, can make sad faces about it and not much more. Like Serbia about Kosovo.

I am also unaware of territorial disputes between Estonia and Latvia on one side, and Russia on another.

Calipygian: the pipeline you mention is carrying Azeri oil, while Kazakhstan goes along famously, with Russia, as well as with China. I

There is a very important strategic rationale for doing so - the one million bbl/day Baku-Tblisi-Ceyhan pipline that carries all that precious black gold from the Caspian to the Med, bypassing the Russians and the Iranians

...which is yet another reason to get serious about a measure of energy independence. Then we wouldn't have to worry about the Georgians, Ossetians, and Abkhazians, except in a philosophical sense.

Or, we could piss away another eight years by electing McCain.

...which is yet another reason to get serious about a measure of energy independence. Then we wouldn't have to worry about the Georgians, Ossetians, and Abkhazians, except in a philosophical sense.

A-fucking-men.

Don't trust authoritarian powers with irredentist itches. Remember the Sudentenland?

Don't trust authoritarian powers with irredentist itches. Remember the Sudetenland?

Sorry. Hit the cancel on the misspelled post too late.

I wondered what happened to the third breakaway region in Georgia. It seems that Russian troops withdrew from the resort republic of Ajaria just back in November. So it seems there can be a happy ending. Of course there was the additional factor that the local autocrat was running a crime syndicate.

The big difference between Abkhazia and Kosovo is that the majority of the inhabitants of Abkhazia are or were in fact Georgians, and the only way that Abkhaz became a plurality in Abkhazia was by ethnically cleansing more than half of the population with outside military help. That is not the case in Kosovo, where Serbia ethnically cleansed most of the Kosovar Albanians, but this was eventually overturned through military action by NATO.

So if you are against ethnically cleansing the majority of the population to create a new state, then you can support the independence of Kosovo and be against the independence of Abkhazia and be consistent.

It's also important to mention that Abkhazia isn't vying for independence - it's vying to be annexed by Russia. Most of its residents have accepted Russian citizenship and do not desire an independent Abkhazia. So it's really a question of whether countries are allowed to annex neighboring parts of other countries unilaterally, which isn't the case in Kosovo.

Part of the whole point of NATO, in which membership assumes that an attack on one is an attack on all and that the rest of NATO will have your back if you need it, is undermined if we let Georgia in. However, this has already been undermined a bit as Zakaria pointed out when the likes of Lithuania joined because we could only defend them against a Russian invasion with a pre-emptive nuclear attack. Russian forces could overrun smallish countries sitting on Russia's borders well before we could amass troops to defend such areas. As a result, we could prevent this by locating a bunch of NATO troops in the country in question as a tripwire, much like our troops in South Korea do vis-a-vis North Korea (but to a lesser extent since NK got nukes).

However, it is doubtful they could withstand a full-out Russian assault for long because re-supplying Russian forces would probably be easier than re-supplying NATO forces. As such, we would once again be faced with the choices of either bombing Russia or admitting defeat. We don't know the consequences of what bombing Russia with conventional weapons would be, so we would be unlikely to do so unless defending a place like Georgia would be a high enough priority to risk having major cities in NATO bombed in retaliation or getting in a long, drawn-out shooting match with Russia. Russia knows that places like Georgia aren't important enough to DC, London, Paris and Brussels for us to risk that (while we could easily destroy a pre-nuclear NK with overwhelming force and deal with the consequences of a leveled Seoul and rebuild it), so they know they could probably act with a rather free hand even if NATO troops were stationed in the country in question.

As such, I don't see where the net benefit to NATO would come from Georgian independence. It's also not clear to me that we want to totally transform a post-Cold War NATO from a common security pact into a rather explicitly anti-Russian force.

Reality Man,

You do know that during the Cold War it was the express policy of the NATO alliance to use nuclear weapons in the case of a Russian invasion? At one point the plans involved ceding almost all of West Germany before the counterattack, but this was changed after the West Germans complained.

The Soviets/Russians traditionally had more numbers and better supply lines - that's why the policy of nuclear first strike was developed.

Saying to the Russians that we will attack with nuclear weapons if they invade a NATO country is a continuation of current policy.

Also, don't be so sure that the Russian can overwhelm the countries around them so easily. They failed against Finland in 1940, for example.

The real intent here is not to get into a shooting war with Russia - it's to prevent Russia from viewing the use of force as an option in disputes with its small neighbors.

Reality Man,

Your biases are showing, by the way. Georgia is already an independent country. The issue is whether Russia can annex parts of it when it feels like it.

"Also, don't be so sure that the Russian can overwhelm the countries around them so easily. They failed against Finland in 1940, for example."

In this case, it is Georgia that failed, and Georgia that would have to attack to take it back. I think they tried twice and failed. Those are facts on the ground, a bit similar to the situation, say, in Kashmir, Israel/Palestine or Cyprus.

Are we ready to commit NATO forces to eject Turkey from the occupied part of Cyprus? If not, why not? Well, surely it would cause a lot of trouble with Turkey, and what the gain would be? Apparently, not enough. And the same holds for Abkhazia and Ossetia.

NATO surely cannot be accused of is some legalist notion of consistency. Most of the time, it is finder-keeper principle.

Keep in mind that in a case of an escalation, Russia can break the Ceyhan pipeline and thus recoup the costs.

By the way, there is a difference between the cases of Ajaria and the other two regions. Ajarians are speaking the same language as Georgian, they are mostly Muslim, but apparently non-religious, so there was no ethnic conflict there. Ossetians and Abhazians speak very different languages. Equally importantly, Ajaria does not border Russia.

"You do know that during the Cold War it was the express policy of the NATO alliance to use nuclear weapons in the case of a Russian invasion? At one point the plans involved ceding almost all of West Germany before the counterattack, but this was changed after the West Germans complained.

The Soviets/Russians traditionally had more numbers and better supply lines - that's why the policy of nuclear first strike was developed.

Saying to the Russians that we will attack with nuclear weapons if they invade a NATO country is a continuation of current policy.

Also, don't be so sure that the Russian can overwhelm the countries around them so easily. They failed against Finland in 1940, for example.

The real intent here is not to get into a shooting war with Russia - it's to prevent Russia from viewing the use of force as an option in disputes with its small neighbors.

Posted by Hektor Bim | May 2, 2008 8:28 AM"

Yes, I am aware of NATO Cold War policy. However, NATO's current raison d'etre is still murky as no leader has really been able to plot a course for what NATO is going to be for. Making it explicitly anti-Russia does not seem to me to be the best course of action at this point. In addition, your analysis assumes that we should make Georgia a member. I'm not sure where that is really in any major NATO member's interest, especially American interest. We had to have a policy of nuclear first strike if the Soviets invaded West Germany in part because West Germany was key to our containment strategy and for rebuilding Western Europe as a bulwark against Soviet communism and expansionism. I don't see where we have such major interests in Georgia today that we would be willing to extend such a policy to Georgia. The Russians also know this, which is why they would probably take the threat of a nuclear first strike if they ever invaded Georgia less seriously than the same threat vis-a-vis an invasion of West Germany during the Cold War. I can see the argument in favor of continuing this threat today to make sure that Russia doesn't invade France, the UK, Germany, Poland, Italy, Spain, Turkey, etc. because we have major interests to protect there. I don't see the same applying to Georgia. I also doubt Americans would be willing to go to war with Russia over a country few have heard of if it ever really came down to it unless there are major changes in Georgia that make it rather essential to our national security.

Military technology and the current situation is also rather different today than when Stalin failed to seize more of Finland before Hitler double-crossed him.

"Your biases are showing, by the way. Georgia is already an independent country. The issue is whether Russia can annex parts of it when it feels like it.

Posted by Hektor Bim | May 2, 2008 8:31 AM"

There are two separate issues that have been discussed, whether Georgia should be brought into NATO and the issue you bring up. I was talking about the first. I don't know enough about the second to comment. I'm not sure what biases I'm supposed to be showing here. I'm rather anti-Putin and have criticized MY on multiple occasions for being to willing to give in to Russian demands about influence in what Russian consider their near abroad. I just don't see the argument that extending NATO membership to Georgia is in NATO's and individual member states' interests.


Comments closed May 15, 2008.

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