Austan Goolsbee, speaking in part on behalf of Barack Obama, says that since recent events have shown that the Fed may need to step in and rescue failing investment banks those banks should be regulated closely in much the way that commercial banks are. Greg Mankiw seems upset about this but he doesn't mount much of an argument beyond the query "Here's a question for Austan: Can an investment bank avoid such regulation if it promises never to use the discount window?"
My first read on this was that a "promise" would be no good. A bank can't "promise" not to fail. Nor can a bank promise not to be bailed out if it does fail. A bailout, when justified, isn't a favor you do for the bank. It's something you do because it's necessary to avoid larger negative consequences throughout the economy. So a promise to avoid the discount window would be valueless. But if the public is going to need to guarantee that financial institutions that grow "too big to fail" don't fail, then the public is going to need to regulate those institutions. Mark Thoma and Brad DeLong say much the same thing, with some added professional economisting and the added insight that Ben Bernanke appears to be on the side of more regulation here.
Photo by Flickr user Epicharmus used under a Creative Commons license



As DeLong notes, George Stigler and Milton Friedman were also in favor of such regulatory practices. In fact, most economists understand a moral hazard when they see one, and know that the only solution is for the entity providing the insurance (in this case the U.S. taxpayers) to impose conditions on the entities being insured (in this case investment banks) to make sure the insurance being provided does not encourage overly risky behavior.
Posted by DTM | June 9, 2008 10:40 AM