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The Forgotten Front

20 Jun 2008 12:12 pm

forgottenfront.png

Following up on yesterday's promise to catch up on the situation in Afghanistan I read, among other things, The Forgotten Front, a report for the Center for American Progress by Caroline Wadhams and Lawrence Korb. They make the case that a relatively ambitious set of aims can still be achieved, namely:

  • Deny sanctuary to Al Qaeda and its affiliates.
  • Build a stable, secure state that is not threatened by internal conflict and does not threaten its neighbors.

There's a lot of ins-and-outs to the "how" part, but perhaps the most interesting argument is the "Afghanistan Is Not Iraq" sidebar section which makes the following points:

  • Afghanistan has a legitimate government led by President Hamid Karzai that is representative of its people, despite problems with corruption, lack of capacity, and an insufficient presence outside of Kabul. While Karzai’s popularity has decreased since 2005, the majority of Afghan citizens are still supportive of his leadership.
  • A functioning parliament exists that is an effective counterweight to executive power in Afghanistan.
  • A general consensus exists among Afghanistan’s different ethnicities and communities over the government of Afghanistan.
  • The United States is not alone in Afghanistan; 37 countries make up the NATO-International Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan, and the United Nations is also playing a strong role. The Afghan government and the international community have a shared agenda and set of goals, embodied by the Afghanistan Compact, which was negotiated by 53 countries in January 2006 and is supported by the Asian Development Bank, the G8 countries, the European Union, and the World Bank.
  • The Afghan National Army is loyal to the Afghan government and not to a specific sectarian group, and sectarian strife is not dividing the country.
  • Polling of the Afghan people shows that majorities support an international troop presence and few support the Taliban. While these numbers vary regionally, and are lower in the south, the overall support is positive.
  • While more should be done, progress has been made in reconstruction efforts, including the expansion of independent media and communications, and building roads.

That seems plausible enough to me. The authors also argue that while more troops (and in particular, special forces troops trained in the appropriate kind of missions) are needed in Afghanistan, they say we don't need a huge increase. Instead, they say we need diplomatic breakthroughs with Iran and Pakistan that will create the circumstances in which stabilization is possible and go through what that might involve.

Ultimately, how plausible this is hinges on the diplomatic calculus and I really have no idea the extent to which it would be possible to convince Pakistan to do X, Y, and Z in exchange for A, B, and C. Iran is an easier case as they actually were cooperating with us in Afghanistan for a long time and then decided to change their mind, which seems ot indicate that they're not oppose in principle to cooperation. So what we have hear is a blueprint of a strategy that sounds worth attempting to me -- it's just hard to know how optimistic we should really be about a new administration's efforts at regional diplomacy.

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Comments (19)

Afghanistan has a legitimate government

That's impossible. Afghanistan is an occupied country. Therefore, it is impossible to have a legitimate government. Karzai = American puppet.

Ditto Al.

The implication that Iraq doesn't have "a legitimate government", & etc. is up-front partisan propaganda verging on Quisling press stereotypes.

The authors [Caroline Wadhams and Lawrence Korb] also argue that while more troops (and in particular, special forces troops trained in the appropriate kind of missions) are needed in Afghanistan, they say we don't need a huge increase.

So, that makes Caroline Wadhams and Lawrence Korb the Paul Wolfowitz and Don Rumsfeld of Afghanistan.

How does this go, again? General says: we need hundreds of thousands of troops to accomplish the mission. Wolfowitz/Rumsfeld/Wadhams/Korb say: no, that's silly, we only need a fraction of that.

Still waiting, BTW, to know when Matthew deploys for Afghanistan.

After all, we know that he thinks that people who support the Iraq War but haven't joined up are chickenhawks who need to join the Army. Well, same goes for Matthew and Afghanistan.

P.S.--
Where's the link to "The Forgotten Front", so we can judge for ourselves rather than rely on Matt's quickie synopsis?

The report can be found here.

Now that "J Street" has revealed itself as a Junior G-Man AIPAC - it's good to know that Afghanistan has become the staging ground for Gen-Y Michael Rubins.

"Iran is an easier case as they actually were cooperating with us in Afghanistan for a long time and then decided to change their mind, which seems ot indicate that they're not oppose in principle to cooperation."

For more on the pigheaded carelessness with which we blew off the Iranians while they were helping us see Takeyh:

http://www.amazon.com/Hidden-Iran-Paradox-Islamic-Republic/dp/B0012QGZQE/ref=pd_bbs_sr_1?ie=UTF8&s=books&qid=1213981931&sr=8-1

What about having the very rich saudis or the very rich of dubai build a power plant in the southern part of Afganistan. Create some jobs and create the infrastructure that will create more jobs. Afganistan is country of dirt poor people. Enough with the guns and bombs.

The best book I've read on modern Afghanistan is Revolution Unending by Gilles Dorronsoro. I remember having doubts about his interpretation in places, but it's still an outstanding piece of work.

I'm also not sold on the idea that Afghanistan's institutions have significant power independent of that of the people who currently control them.

I'm afraid Korb and Wadhams are still gazing at the situation through rose tinted hegemonic glasses.

1. Afghanistan is never going to be, and never has been, stabilized under a foreign occupation,ANY foreign occupation--British, Russian, American or NATO. A significant portion of the population will always see any occupation supporting government in Kabul as puppets of the occupiers. Far from being a powerful figure, President Karzai would be swinging from a lamp post within 24 hours of NATO withdrawl from Kabul. That's why he has American, not Afghan, bodyguards.

2. I never ceased to be amazed at the profound ignorance displayed by American "foreign policy analysts" when it comes to Afghanistan. Korb and Wadhams act as if the Taliban is just some theological splinter group trying to impose its will on a homogenous Afghan society. Not so. Afghan society is tribal, and what underlies the current turmoil is an ongoing civil war between the Pushtuns, dominant in the south, and the Northern tribes. This tug of war has been going on for a long time, though historically the Pushtuns have made up 50% of the population and have been the dominant group in Afghan politics. The Pushtun heartland happens to spill over the border into the western third of Pakistan, which explains the Taliban's strength there.

3. Continued NATO/American occupation is expensive and bloody. As in any guerilla war, innocent civilians are frequently the victims. Every errant NATO bomb strike embitters the local population even more. The way to pacify Afghanistan is to get out and let the Afghans sort things out themselves. That may be bloody, but no bloodier than ten or twenty more years of occupation. If we want to continue playing great power games, then we can do so by aiding the Northern tribes to conterbalance the aid the Pakistanis have always given the Pushtuns. Ironically, it is the Russians, the Iranians and the Chinese, who would be our allies in such a scheme.

4. By this stage of the game, the "threat of Al Queda" is just a red herring, a convenient excuse to continue a fruitless military adventure. Osama may lurk in some obscure cave, but it is quite obvious that effective operational initiative has spread to many other groups in countries where Moslems are inflamed by the Iraq War. Staying in Afghanistan will simply continue to inflame them all the more. The best method of suppressing Al Queda and the Taliban is to do it through our friends among the Northern tribes and by removing the main cause of the fighting---which is the military occupation of the country by western troops. If an authentic government arises in Kabul, even one which makes deals with the Taliban, there will be many incentives for Afghan politicians to keep a lid on Osama. Our chances of catching him are now, and always have been, not wild goose chases by the U.S. Marines, but by patient police work and skulduggery using local assets and allies. Anyway, Al Queda is not a military threat. It is not a threat to our economy or our political institutions. It is certainly possible that Al Queda or persons connected to it can inflict acts of terror in the future. It is time, however, to end the cowardly hysteria expressed by American media and politicians as a justification for foolish and destructive military adventures in the Middle East.

I'm afraid Korb and Wadhams are still gazing at the situation through rose tinted hegemonic glasses.

1. Afghanistan is never going to be, and never has been, stabilized under a foreign occupation, ANY foreign occupation--British, Russian, American or NATO. A significant portion of the population will always see any occupation supporting government in Kabul as puppets of the occupiers. Far from being a powerful figure, President Karzai would be swinging from a lamp post within 24 hours of NATO withdrawl from Kabul. That's why he has American, not Afghan, bodyguards.

2. I never cease to be amazed at the profound ignorance displayed by American "foreign policy analysts" when it comes to Afghanistan. Korb and Wadhams act as if the Taliban is just some theological splinter group trying to impose its will on a homogenous Afghan society. Not so. Afghan society is tribal, and what underlies the current turmoil is an ongoing civil war between the Pushtuns, dominant in the south, and the Northern tribes. This tug of war has been going on for a long time, though historically the Pushtuns have made up 50% of the population and have been the dominant group in Afghan politics. The Pushtun heartland happens to spill over the border into the western third of Pakistan, which explains the Taliban's strength there.

3. Continued NATO/American occupation is expensive and bloody. As in any guerilla war, innocent civilians are frequently the victims. Every errant NATO bomb strike embitters the local population even more. The way to pacify Afghanistan is to get out and let the Afghans sort things out themselves. That may be bloody, but no bloodier than ten or twenty more years of occupation. If we want to continue playing great power games, then we can do so by aiding the Northern tribes to conterbalance the aid the Pakistanis have always given the Pushtuns. Ironically, it is the Russians, the Iranians and the Chinese, who would be our allies in such a scheme.

4. By this stage of the game, the "threat of Al Queda" is just a red herring, a convenient excuse to continue a fruitless military adventure. Osama may lurk in some obscure cave, but it is quite obvious that effective operational initiative has spread to many other groups in countries where Moslems are inflamed by the Iraq War. Staying in Afghanistan will simply continue to inflame them all the more. The best method of suppressing Al Queda and the Taliban is to do it through our friends among the Northern tribes and by removing the main cause of the fighting---which is the military occupation of the country by western troops. If an authentic government arises in Kabul, even one which makes deals with the Taliban, there will be many incentives for Afghan politicians to keep a lid on Osama. Our chances of catching him are now, and always have been, not wild goose chases by the U.S. Marines, but by patient police work and skulduggery using local assets and allies. Anyway, Al Queda is not a military threat. It is not a threat to our economy or our political institutions. It is certainly possible that Al Queda or persons connected to it can inflict acts of terror in the future. It is time, however, to end the cowardly hysteria expressed by American media and politicians as a justification for foolish and destructive military adventures in the Middle East.

I'm afraid Korb and Wadhams are still gazing at the situation through rose tinted hegemonic glasses.

1. Afghanistan is never going to be, and never has been, stabilized under a foreign occupation, ANY foreign occupation--British, Russian, American or NATO. A significant portion of the population will always see any occupation supporting government in Kabul as puppets of the occupiers. Far from being a powerful figure, President Karzai would be swinging from a lamp post within 24 hours of NATO withdrawl from Kabul. That's why he has American, not Afghan, bodyguards.

2. I never cease to be amazed at the profound ignorance displayed by American "foreign policy analysts" when it comes to Afghanistan. Korb and Wadhams act as if the Taliban is just some theological splinter group trying to impose its will on a homogenous Afghan society. Not so. Afghan society is tribal, and what underlies the current turmoil is an ongoing civil war between the Pushtuns, dominant in the south, and the Northern tribes. This tug of war has been going on for a long time, though historically the Pushtuns have made up 50% of the population and have been the dominant group in Afghan politics. The Pushtun heartland happens to spill over the border into the western third of Pakistan, which explains the Taliban's strength there.

3. Continued NATO/American occupation is expensive and bloody. As in any guerilla war, innocent civilians are frequently the victims. Every errant NATO bomb strike embitters the local population even more. The way to pacify Afghanistan is to get out and let the Afghans sort things out themselves. That may be bloody, but no bloodier than ten or twenty more years of occupation. If we want to continue playing great power games, then we can do so by aiding the Northern tribes to conterbalance the aid the Pakistanis have always given the Pushtuns. Ironically, it is the Russians, the Iranians and the Chinese, who would be our allies in such a scheme.

4. By this stage of the game, the "threat of Al Queda" is just a red herring, a convenient excuse to continue a fruitless military adventure. Osama may lurk in some obscure cave, but it is quite obvious that effective operational initiative has spread to many other groups in countries where Moslems are inflamed by the Iraq War. Staying in Afghanistan will simply continue to inflame them all the more. The best method of suppressing Al Queda and the Taliban is to do it through our friends among the Northern tribes and by removing the main cause of the fighting---which is the military occupation of the country by western troops. If an authentic government arises in Kabul, even one which makes deals with the Taliban, there will be many incentives for Afghan politicians to keep a lid on Osama. Our chances of catching him are now, and always have been, not wild goose chases by the U.S. Marines, but by patient police work and skulduggery using local assets and allies. Anyway, Al Queda is not a military threat. It is not a threat to our economy or our political institutions. It is certainly possible that Al Queda or persons connected to it can inflict acts of terror in the future. It is time, however, to end the cowardly hysteria expressed by American media and politicians as a justification for foolish and destructive military adventures in the Middle East.

I'm afraid Korb and Wadhams are still gazing at the situation through rose tinted hegemonic glasses.

1. Afghanistan is never going to be, and never has been, stabilized under a foreign occupation, ANY foreign occupation--British, Russian, American or NATO. A significant portion of the population will always see any occupation supporting government in Kabul as puppets of the occupiers. Far from being a powerful figure, President Karzai would be swinging from a lamp post within 24 hours of NATO withdrawl from Kabul. That's why he has American, not Afghan, bodyguards.

2. I never cease to be amazed at the profound ignorance displayed by American "foreign policy analysts" when it comes to Afghanistan. Korb and Wadhams act as if the Taliban is just some theological splinter group trying to impose its will on a homogenous Afghan society. Not so. Afghan society is tribal, and what underlies the current turmoil is an ongoing civil war between the Pushtuns, dominant in the south, and the Northern tribes. This tug of war has been going on for a long time, though historically the Pushtuns have made up 50% of the population and have been the dominant group in Afghan politics. The Pushtun heartland happens to spill over the border into the western third of Pakistan, which explains the Taliban's strength there.

3. Continued NATO/American occupation is expensive and bloody. As in any guerilla war, innocent civilians are frequently the victims. Every errant NATO bomb strike embitters the local population even more. The way to pacify Afghanistan is to get out and let the Afghans sort things out themselves. That may be bloody, but no bloodier than ten or twenty more years of occupation. If we want to continue playing great power games, then we can do so by aiding the Northern tribes to conterbalance the aid the Pakistanis have always given the Pushtuns. Ironically, it is the Russians, the Iranians and the Chinese, who would be our allies in such a scheme.

4. By this stage of the game, the "threat of Al Queda" is just a red herring, a convenient excuse to continue a fruitless military adventure. Osama may lurk in some obscure cave, but it is quite obvious that effective operational initiative has spread to many other groups in countries where Moslems are inflamed by the Iraq War. Staying in Afghanistan will simply continue to inflame them all the more. The best method of suppressing Al Queda and the Taliban is to do it through our friends among the Northern tribes and by removing the main cause of the fighting---which is the military occupation of the country by western troops. If an authentic government arises in Kabul, even one which makes deals with the Taliban, there will be many incentives for Afghan politicians to keep a lid on Osama. Our chances of catching him are now, and always have been, not wild goose chases by the U.S. Marines, but by patient police work and skulduggery using local assets and allies. Anyway, Al Queda is not a military threat. It is not a threat to our economy or our political institutions. It is certainly possible that Al Queda or persons connected to it can inflict acts of terror in the future. It is time, however, to end the cowardly hysteria expressed by American media and politicians as a justification for foolish and destructive military adventures in the Middle East.

DR -- You're an idiot.

The way to pacify Afghanistan is to get out and let the Afghans sort things out themselves.

You're echoeing Condeleeza Rice? Birth Pangs of a new afghanistan? Your proposal condemns larger parts of Afghanistan to 20 years of war. No thanks.

by removing the main cause of the fighting---which is the military occupation of the country by western troops

No. The groups fighting NATO troops and the Afghan government want to control the country. They won't stop trying to control the country if the Germans, Italians, British, Canadians, Dutch, and Americans leave.

Two points:

1) There is a big difference between this discussion over Afghanistan and the pre-War Iraq debate about troop levels. Namely, we are already in Afghanistan. If you don't understand the difference, I don't know how to explain it to you.

2) DR, I'm not going to say your analysis is wrong, but you're a nameless dude on the internet and these guys wrote a whole book on the subject. You don't provide any actual evidence of your position and your prescription of two decades of civil war doesn't sound very fun. Since the proposal in the book doesn't involve overthrowing a pre-existing government, the risk/reward balance seems to be in it's favor.

Hold on. So Afghanistan has a legitimate government with broad popular support, a functioning army, and is receiving military assistance from 37 countries. The Taliban, on the other hand, has nothing. Why haven't they been beaten yet?

If you are reading books about Afghanistan, you ought to read Ahmed Rashid's Descent into Chaos. Perhaps too detailed, but Rashid's gives new details about such things as the Kunduz airlift - the airlift that Bush and Rumsfeld allowed in November, 2001, as Pakistan took ISI personnel, as well as Taliban personal, out of Kunduz, where they were surrounded by the Northern Alliance and American troops, to Pakistan, where they could set up training grounds and camps and cross the border to ... kill American troops.

You won't understand Afghanistan and Pakistan from the Afghani and Pakistani point of view if you read only the books written by Western journalists.

Speaking of Western journalists - there was a really funny column by David Ignatius at the beginning of May. He was on a Potemkin tour of Afghanistan, courtesy of the U.S. military, and he quotes one of the Bushies in the state department saying, we don't even use the word Taliban anymore, to imply that this was one solved problem! Of course, I knew, reading that, that the Taliban would probably be embarrassing the Nato troops once again soon. It is funny how neocon spinmeisters spin hardest just before some disaster is about to happen. You can just feel the rigid mindset, the optimism, the total blindness.

Matt, you need to stop reading the wrong people.

Go talk to Barnett Rubin. Read the Asia Times pieces I send you every night.

Let's dissect these points one at a time:

"Afghanistan has a legitimate government led by President Hamid Karzai that is representative of its people, despite problems with corruption, lack of capacity, and an insufficient presence outside of Kabul. While Karzai’s popularity has decreased since 2005, the majority of Afghan citizens are still supportive of his leadership."

"Insufficient presence out side of Kabul"? Try saying - "The country is ruled by drug warlords."

As for Afghan support of Karzai, thirty percent of the morons in the US still support Bush.

"A functioning parliament exists that is an effective counterweight to executive power in Afghanistan."

Because there IS NO "executive power" in Afghanistan. Karzai wouldn't be breathing if he wasn't protected by 600 US mercenaries. He has no control over the warlords who dominate a large section of his country, and no control over the sections dominated by the Taliban. He's in worse shape than Maliki in Iraq.

"A general consensus exists among Afghanistan’s different ethnicities and communities over the government of Afghanistan."

This is so vague as to be meaningless. If this is the best they can come up with...

"The United States is not alone in Afghanistan"

So what?

"37 countries make up the NATO-International Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan, and the United Nations is also playing a strong role. The Afghan government and the international community have a shared agenda and set of goals, embodied by the Afghanistan Compact, which was negotiated by 53 countries in January 2006 and is supported by the Asian Development Bank, the G8 countries, the European Union, and the World Bank."

So what? A group of failures makes up for one failure? What is the PLAN?

"The Afghan National Army is loyal to the Afghan government and not to a specific sectarian group, and sectarian strife is not dividing the country."

Really? A recent Taliban attack was predicated on the expectation that many members of the Army would defect. In addition, the recent GAO report shows that the Army and the police are poorly trained and nearly ineffective.

"Polling of the Afghan people shows that majorities support an international troop presence and few support the Taliban. While these numbers vary regionally, and are lower in the south, the overall support is positive."

By a very small margin, which is decreasing every year. All of which is irrelevant to the strategic and tactical realities of an insurgency. An insurgency can win with a relatively small level of support in the population. They just need enough support to be functional at all. Five or ten percent would be enough, and the Taliban have way more than that.

"While more should be done, progress has been made in reconstruction efforts, including the expansion of independent media and communications, and building roads."

None of which is relevant to the strategic and tactical situation of the insurgency. Road-building does not defeat insurgents.

Sorry, but this report is wool-gathering - the same sort of crap you see on "progress in Iraq".

The reality on the ground is that the Taliban gain ground every years and control perhaps sixty percent of Afghanistan. Every year their numbers increase, their attacks are more effective, and at the same time support for NATO and the US goes down as more and more Afghan civilians are killed by incompetent US/NATO military tactics.


Comments closed July 04, 2008.

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