The Meaning of "The Surge"

Jim Henley unpacks a cliché:

The pretended meaning is, The US increased troop strength in Iraq for a period of time beginning in 2007. The actual meaning is, the US increased troop strength WHILE ramping up a program to pay off Sunni resistance leaders WHILE Iraq’s warring ethno-religious factions finished completely remaking Iraq’s demographic patterns, owing to tens-to-hundreds of thousands of dead and millions of exiled and internally displaced, WHILE the US turned the capital into a warren of barricades. The net result of all those changes has been a less obtrusively violent Iraq for the time being, and the whole arrangement is "The Surge" in practice, but the cheerleaders talk as if it was all due to The Surge in pretense. Meanwhile Iraq’s "calm" would count as calamity almost anywhere on earth but Darfur or Zimbabwe.

Quite so. Understanding the true nature of the business doesn't undermine the reality of the achievement, but the achievement is to make somewhat more feasible a misguided, costly, and immoral scheme for imposing a semi-permanent semi-colonial status on Iraq. But rather than selling the public on the whole disreputable salami, we're supposed to swallow it in slices. First, we need to give "the surge" a try, so we can't leave this year. Now, since "the surge" is working, we need to stay another year. Then the year after that, there'll be another reason. When conditions are worsening that is the reason to stay (see 2005, 2006) and when conditions are improving that's the reason to stay.

DoD photo by Cpl. Tyler Hill, U.S. Marine Corps.

Comments

that's the surge as a political and propaganda matter.

as a policy matter, the surge had a set of goals and has failed to reach them. in the normal use of the english language, we would therefore say the surge has failed, but in up-is-down land, the surge has succeeded beyond its wildest dreams.

see my first sentence....

Posted by howard | June 26, 2008 12:53 PM

The Surge succeeded in its main goal of removing from U.S. domestic politics the likelihood of any serious change in the status of the U.S.' occupation of Iraq. "You will admit the Surge is Working" was and is again the equivalent of "Are you saying you hate the troops," so, 2006 elections and "Iraq Study Group" or not, no change, and they get to accomplish their main goal of staying there and their secondary goal of dumping this particular pile of sh*t into the next administration's lap.

Posted by El Cid | June 26, 2008 12:53 PM

Good G-d, this is a mess.

So the ADMINSTRATION LIED, and THE IRAQIS ARE DOING TERRIBLE THINGS TO EACH OTHER, and WE'RE JUST BRIBING THEM ANYWAY, and oh, maybe the Surge worked.

Yeah, guess you were wrong about that, huh?

It's one thing to oppose a continued occupation (I want out too), but please stop pretending that every little permutation of Iraq's circumstances proves that the situation is getting more and more awful and the administration is evil. (They are, but they made the right call here)

You're turning into a mirror imge of the one-note Republicans you attack so lustily.

Posted by heedless | June 26, 2008 12:56 PM

This bears repeating:

"When conditions are worsening that is the reason to stay (see 2005, 2006) and when conditions are improving that's the reason to stay."

Posted by freddiemac | June 26, 2008 12:59 PM

McCain wants us in a never-ending cycle of surge in Iraq. It's a self-defeating strategy.

http://www.political-buzz.com/

Posted by matt | June 26, 2008 1:07 PM

It is worth recalling as well, that Bush/McCain/Exxon-Mobil plan for 100 years in Iraq, one year at a time, turns on the strategic pivot of keeping Iraqi so weak, that the Iraqis will "want" (or, at least, acquiesce in) the continued American military presence.

It is isn't just a matter of stringing the American People along, year by year. Bush et alia also have to string the nominal Iraqi government along, and the nominal Iraqi government has its own strategic problem, of how to acquiesce in American Occupation, without completely losing some minimal legitimacy.

The key so far has been to keep Iraq so weak, that the Shiite government "wants" the U.S. to stay. While the Surge was sold, as you say, one slice at a time, it was also sold in America as strengthening Iraq -- giving the Iraqis breathing room to reconcile. Meanwhile, the Surge of concrete reality relied on some critical elements aimed at actually weakening the Iraqi government, such as arming the Sunnis.

The Shiite government has been banking its oil revenue and manuevering on the ground to secure the Capital and Basra and the oil, preparing, I expect, for the civil war that follows American withdrawal. This is the most "hopeful" thing I see on the horizon. Inadvertantly, Bush's strategy has failed -- the Iraqi government is gaining just enough strength, that they may well decide to chance an American withdrawal.

Posted by Bruce Wilder | June 26, 2008 1:09 PM

The term "the surge" obviously refers to the temporary increase in the number of U.S. troops in Iraq. What else could it refer to? Is there any actual evidence that the small increase of troops accomplished anything?

To say that "The Surge" refers to anything else, such as a surge in payments to Sunni terrorists or a surge in ethnic cleansing is just silly. If those are the primary causes of the reduction in violence, then the reduction wasn't due to The Surge.

Posted by Jim W | June 26, 2008 1:16 PM

"the whole disreputable salami" is now my favorite phrase

Posted by cleek | June 26, 2008 1:16 PM

Is there any actual evidence that the small increase of troops accomplished anything?

Yes, it has barricaded the ethnically cleansed neighborhoods and kept them from reaching one another. I'm sure that did reduce inter-neighborhood violence. The question is, "Now what?" The ghetto-ization of Baghdad is merely a finger in the dike. It seems that the strategy (and I use that term loosely) at this point is "sit tight and hope that something good happens."

Posted by LFC | June 26, 2008 1:31 PM

heedless, i see you're having a little trouble with the english language, so let's try again: when you set some goals for an activity, and you don't reach those goals, you can't claim the activity "worked."

so no one here is saying the surge worked because it didn't.

now, if you want to say that the point of spending blood and treasure in iraq was so that the level of violence could remain much higher than it had been when we invaded, then you could say the surge "worked."

Posted by howard | June 26, 2008 1:40 PM

howard,

Suppose the surge really is responsible for a large reduction in violence. Then, even though this outcome is different than the primary stated goal (political reconciliation), and even though Iraq would have been much better off if we hadn't invaded, I think it is defensible to call the surge a success.

That is, given the situation that we were in when the surge started, if Iraq's situation actually did improve significantly in terms of levels of violence, due to the surge, and if this improvement is sustainable, then I think it is reasonable to call it a success. As I stated above, however, I am skeptical that much of the improvement is actually due to our increasing the number of U.S. troops by something like 10%. I am open to persuasion, though.

Posted by Jim W | June 26, 2008 1:52 PM

WHILE the US turned the capital into a warren of barricades

You mean like what Mayor Fenty is doing in DC?

That said, Howard is of course completely wrong that the surge hasn't worked - anybody with even a modicum of fairness would have to admit that it has. But if you want to believe that it hasn't, you can keep repeating it over and over, even though the reality is that it has succeeded.

Posted by Al | June 26, 2008 1:56 PM

jim w, two points in response: a.) i think we can differentiate between a happy occurence (regardless of its causation) and the objective. if the purpose of the "surge" had been to reduce violence, then great, i'm happy to give them kudos. but merely reducing violence was never the point of the surge, so to give it credit is dumbing down our scorecard; b.) i have no idea which of the many factors associated with the "surge" (including not only the troop increase but also all the "whiles" included in the original jim henley quote matthew gives us), and i care even less (i do hope that there's some lieutenants and captains who care so the manuals can be updated). to me, their is only one metric that is revelvant, the cost-benefit metric, and there are no benefits that will accrue to equal the costs of this splendid little adventure to date, so focussing on the merely tactical (did the "surge" or other factors or a combination lead to a reduction in violence?) distracts us from the strategic (how do we stop digging).

even by an "ignore all sunk costs" metric and simply looking at cost-benefit going forward, is achieving a moderate level of violence in iraq really a benefit to US security commensurate with the costs in blood and treasure?

a sane and rational US national security policy does not heedlessly deploy resources (borrowed resources, that is) to iraq as though it were the strategic center of our national security posture; insofar as we want to credit the surge for anything, we should credit it for putting front and center the critical matter, which is not the level of violence as a number on a chart but rather is an indication that iraq can continue as a single nation at all....

Posted by howard | June 26, 2008 2:03 PM

That said, Howard is of course completely wrong that the surge hasn't worked - anybody with even a modicum of fairness would have to admit that it has.

We're just saying that it hasn't worked according to definition of "success" that was given by George W. Bush in his justification of the surge.

Now you might want to redefine what the man that ordered the surge has said because the the actual outcome falls far short of the goals he set, but don't get angry at those of us who stick with Bush's own definition of success.

Posted by LFC | June 26, 2008 2:07 PM

al, having given jim w the long answer, i'll give you the short one: if you want to invent an ex post facto purpose for the surge and say it "worked," no one can stop you, but there was an actual scorecard, agreed to in advance by the administration, and the surge quite simply has not "worked" or "succeeded" or "any other word you care to throw in here as a synonym for worked or succeeded" on the scorecard.

to switch to basketball, if a coach says "our game strategy to win is to take it strong to the hole, get them in foul trouble, and outplay their weak reserves," and his team takes it strong to the hole, gets the other team in foul trouble, outplays their reserves, and still loses the game, we don't say his strategy "worked."

Posted by howard | June 26, 2008 2:08 PM

LFC: my long lost twin brother at last!

Posted by howard | June 26, 2008 2:11 PM

LFC: my long lost twin brother at last!

Howard, which one are you? ;-)

Posted by LFC | June 26, 2008 2:18 PM

Asserting that The Surge has succeeded when it obviously hasn't won't make it true. For The Surge to have succeeded means that it would have had to have brought about its goals. Not only aren't all its goals in hand, it can't be demonstrated that the goals that have been reached have been due to The Surge. In fact, a lot of the goals were the result of the bribery known as The Anbar Awakening, which starter prior to The Surge.

Maybe you meant that a lot of the goals being met are due to the fact that lots of people aren't there to be killed anymore due to them being dead, exiled, or sequestered. Which is almost like success, eh?

Posted by Jeffrey Davis | June 26, 2008 2:19 PM

Al,

It would be nice if you and your fellow Dubya\Cheney\McCain supporters would finish your sentences. Every time you write about the success or failure of the surge, you simply write "the surge has worked", but you never specify what the surge has accomplished.

The surge has worked TO REDUCE THE LEVEL OF VIOLENCE in Iraq, particularly in Bagdhad. It has not worked, however, towards ending the Sunni-Shiite civil war in Iraq, nor has it worked towards ending the factional wars amongst the Shiites themselves. In addition, the surge has done nothing to improve our national security. Al Qaeda was routed in Iraq due to the Sunni Awakening, which was a separate activity from the Surge. However, our increased troop committment to Iraq came at a time when an increased troop committment to Afghanistan was needed. As a result, the core of Al Qaeda has been able to rebuild itself in the Afghanistan/Pakistan border region, and Al Qaeda's allies in Afghanistan, the Taliban, are regaining in strength and reemerging as a threat to the Western-friendly national government in Kabul.

Now, if we had engaged in a troop surge in Afghanistan instead of Iraq, we would not only have reduced violence in Afghanistan, but the progress of the Afghan civil war would gone in favor our Afghan allies, and our enemies the Taliban and Al Qaeda would have been severly weakened or even crushed during the last year. Thus, a surge in Afghanistan would not only have worked to improve the fortunes of one of our few allied governments in the Middle East, but it would improved our national security as well. The surge in Iraq, on the other hand, has only worked to do the former.

Posted by eltoro | June 26, 2008 2:21 PM

but there was an actual scorecard, agreed to in advance by the administration, and the surge quite simply has not "worked" or "succeeded" or "any other word you care to throw in here as a synonym for worked or succeeded" on the scorecard.

Maybe you should recheck the scorecard, because by my score, the majority of the benchmarks are met.

to switch to basketball, if a coach says "our game strategy to win is to take it strong to the hole, get them in foul trouble, and outplay their weak reserves," and his team takes it strong to the hole, gets the other team in foul trouble, outplays their reserves, and still loses the game, we don't say his strategy "worked."

As I see it, if you want to use a basketball analogy, the surge has allowed us to move from being behind after the first quarter to being ahead at the half. That's success, even though we've got a way to go before we can consider the game over and it is still possible that our success in the first half will ultimately be a loss at the end of the game. But if we continue to do the things that got us the lead in the first place, we should have a pretty good chance to win the game. Assuming of course, we don't elect a President who declares defeat and quits the game merely because we haven't won the game after only a half has been played.

Posted by Al | June 26, 2008 2:29 PM

Since Al et al get to redefine what the success of the surge means, then I want to get in on this too. How about we say that the goal is for the U.S. to achieve a monthly average of less than one soldier killed every other day, or about 180 per year.

Hmmmm. Not even close. We've lost 210 this year already. I guess the surge has failed.

Posted by LFC | June 26, 2008 2:31 PM

If you want to see what has been "accomplished", just look at the results of the GAO report on the Iraq surge.

The administration lacks an updated and comprehensive Iraq strategy to move beyond the "surge" of combat troops President Bush launched in January 2007 as an 18-month effort to curtail violence and build Iraqi democracy, government investigators said yesterday.

While agreeing with the administration that violence has decreased sharply, a report released yesterday by the Government Accountability Office concluded that many other goals Bush outlined a year and a half ago in the "New Way Forward" strategy remain unmet.

But I guess Al has a different list of "accomplishments" than the GAO. I'd love to hear it Al, and see how you match it up to Bush's stated goals.

Posted by LFC | June 26, 2008 2:41 PM

Howard,

Sorry to take so long to get back to you. I'll overlook your slur against my ESL score, as my post was overwrought enough to invite such snark.

The source of my anger was not the antiwar postition, but Matt's blinkered "all news is bad news" promotion of that position.

What exactly constitutes "The Surge", and whether it has succeeded are certainly debateable. In my reading, the Surge constitutes 3 items: the troop buildup, cooption of certain local Sunni tribal leaders (often through bribery and infrastructure corruption), and a callous, practical acceptance of non-fatal ethnic cleansing. Perhaps "The Petraeus Plan" would be a better name for it.

It has been fantastically succesful at reducing AQI's influence, considerably less so at reducing Iran's, and it has not been particularly succesful at all in fostering political compromise in the national government. It has also considerably reduced Iraqi on Iraqi violence and also reduced the risk to our own troops.

Whether that constitutes "success" depends which of the various strategic goals you consider important. I call it a qualified success, but you clearly disagree.

Posted by heedless | June 26, 2008 2:52 PM

It used to be that even the democrats would want their own country to win a war. Sadly, political power is now more important to them than victory in a war.

Posted by Judd | June 26, 2008 3:07 PM

Bring back Sergeant Carlson!

Posted by Young Male | June 26, 2008 3:22 PM

Hysterical. I mean, gross and disturbing. Well done.

Posted by brianr | June 26, 2008 3:36 PM

Judd, do you really believe that is what motivates Democrats, or are you just trying to make some nasty partisan argument? If so, you're a seriously disturbed individual. You may want to consider seeking immediate help.

Posted by Edward, the mad shirt grinder | June 26, 2008 3:56 PM

Comments by Reid about how the deterioration of Iraq would help gain them senate seats makes me wonder Edward.

Posted by Judd | June 26, 2008 4:30 PM

"It used to be that even the democrats would want their own country to win a war. Sadly, political power is now more important to them than victory in a war."

Judd,

It's you Republicans that are guilty of this sin. Rather than admit that you dropped the ball on winning the war in Afghanistan against our enemies Al Qaeda and the Taliban, you continue to focus on having our military concentrate on intervening in the sectarian civil war among Sunni & Shiite Iraqis. If you were really dedicated to defeating our enemies in the war on terror, you would be seconding the call by Democrats such as Barack Obama to have a surge in Afghanistan instead of Iraq.

Posted by eltoro | June 26, 2008 4:59 PM

heedless, the bribing of the Sunni antedated the Surge. As you well know.

Ethnic cleansing as a tool of war is not "success".

Posted by Jeffrey Davis | June 26, 2008 4:59 PM

What exactly constitutes "The Surge", and whether it has succeeded are certainly debateable. In my reading, the Surge constitutes 3 items: the troop buildup, cooption of certain local Sunni tribal leaders (often through bribery and infrastructure corruption), and a callous, practical acceptance of non-fatal ethnic cleansing.

Where were these 3 items explained by the Administration or anyone involved in promoting "The Surge"? I'm pretty sure I don't remember an acceptance of non-fatal ethnic cleansing(ignoring the fact that it would be more accurate to say practical acceptance of fatal ethnic cleansing) being stated on any sort of news program as one of the new strategies to be employed during "The Surge."

Posted by Rambuncle | June 26, 2008 5:02 PM

Judd: "Comments by Reid about how the deterioration of Iraq would help gain them senate seats makes me wonder Edward."

Cue the comments by McCain's guy about how a terrorist attack on the U.S. would help him. Or is that just an normal obervation and Reid hates America? Or do you get to pick and choose as necessary?

Posted by BlueStreak | June 26, 2008 5:04 PM

Charlie Black, McCain's adviser, commented just the other day that a terrorist attack would help Republicans. So Judd, by your standard, Republicans hope that terrorists attack America.

(No, I don't believe that Republicans really hope that -- although I do agree with Matthew's recent point that the commonly accepted political wisdom that Republicans benefit from threats to the country gives the Republicans a perverse incentive.)

Posted by Edward, the mad shirt grinder | June 26, 2008 5:07 PM

You beat me to it, BlueStreak.

Posted by Edward, the mad shirt grinder | June 26, 2008 5:10 PM

Bruce is correct. The Bushies are deliberately keeping the Iraqi government weak because they know that if the Iraqi government ever gets stable enough to not need them, the US is out in six months.

This is the sole reason Sistani has not issued a fatwa to kick the US out - he's concerned that with the US-financed rise of the Sunni "Awakening" groups that the Shia control of the government is not strong enough yet.

Meanwhile, Maliki is being forced to listen to Iran more than the US as a result of this.

See here:
US pushes Iraqi Shi'ites closer to Iran
http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Middle_East/JF26Ak02.html

The threat by the government of Iraqi Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki this month to reject the United States-Iraq status of forces and strategic framework agreements was prompted in part by US demands for access to bases that were unacceptable to a highly nationalistic Iraqi population.

But an equally important factor in the apparent rejection of the agreements by Iraqi Shi'ite leaders is the absence of a US security guarantee against foreign aggression in the US proposal.

That issue loomed large for Iraqi Shi'ite officials who have long been nervous about whether the United States is firmly committed to supporting the survival of the Shi'ite-dominated regime in Iraq from plots by Sunni Arab states and Turkey to restore Sunni rule in the country.

The Maliki regime had demanded that US President George W Bush include a commitment in the statement principles they signed last November. The text of the statement included a US pledge to "provide security assurances to the Iraqi government to deter any external aggression and to ensure the integrity of Iraq's territory".

But the March 7 US draft of the agreement stated only that "the US and Iraq are to consult immediately whenever the territorial integrity or political independence of Iraq is threatened".

This commitment only to consult was clearly unacceptable to the Maliki regime. While visiting Jordan on June 13, Maliki referred to the abandonment by the US of its previous commitment to defending the Iraqi government against "foreign aggression" as "a clear point of disagreement".

The Bush administration has explained the absence of such a security commitment as related to the fact that it would have required that the agreements be submitted to the US Senate - something the administration wished to avoid.

From the perspective of the Maliki regime and the Shi'ite political parties supporting it, however, that refusal has a broader and more sinister significance. Iraqi Shi'ites interpreted it against a background of Bush administration efforts to prevent the Shi'ite regime from consolidating power and the possibility of US collaboration with Sunni Arab regimes to try to overthrow the regime because of its ties with Iran.

A common factor in this history of the "Sunni option" in Bush administration policy is the role of former prime minister Iyad Allawi.

The March 7 US draft of the framework agreement antagonized Shi'ite political leaders and alarmed Iran by using language that seemed clearly intended to give the United States both access to military bases without time limits and the freedom to use them to attack Iran.

But the most worrisome feature of the draft to Iraqi Shi'ite officials appears to have been the absence of a commitment to defend Iraq from foreign aggression, which had been one of the principles in the outline of the strategic framework signed by Maliki and Bush in November.

It was a high priority for Shi'ite political leaders because of their concern about a possible plot by Sunni Arab regimes in the region and Turkey to overthrow the Shi'ite regime by supporting the Sunni armed groups within the country.

Fears within the Baghdad regime about such a plot spiked in early June 2007 after an international meeting in Egypt had attacked the Baghdad regime. The Kurdish President of Iraq Jalal Talabani, a longtime ally of Iran, publicly accused Arab states of "conniving" against the Maliki regime.

What most alarmed officials of the regime was the attendance at the meeting by former Iraqi prime minister Iyad Allawi, who has long been regarded as the favorite of the Bush administration.

Allawi, a secular Shi'ite who had been a Ba'athist Party activist during the Saddam Hussein regime, was handpicked by US officials to become interim prime minister from mid-2004 to May 2005.

The Iraqi regime saw signs that the United States was again promoting Allawi around the time of the Egyptian conference. Maliki told CBS News correspondent Lara Logan in May 2007 that he was watching the Iraqi army "very closely" because "those still loyal to the previous regime may start planning coups".

For Shi'ite leaders, the episode recalled the period in late 2005 and early 2006 when the Bush administration shifted from reliance on the Shi'ites as allies against the Sunni insurgency to one of toying with peace with the Sunnis in order to check the power of Shi'ites who were viewed as far too close to Iran.

US ambassador Zalmay Khalilzad, a Sunni Muslim of Afghan descent, initiated a policy aimed at denying the Shi'ite regime control over police and internal security organizations. In November 2005, Khalilzad began hinting strongly at a shift toward a "Sunni strategy". The US Embassy, which had previously tolerated death squad activities and secret detention and torture of Sunnis by the Shi'ite Badr Corps, decided to confront prime minister Ibrahim al-Jaafari publicly over torture houses being run by Shi'ite officials of the Ministry of Interior.

Khalilzad then announced that he was prepared to meet with insurgent leaders and wanted to "deal with their legitimate concerns", and began referring to the Sunni insurgents as "nationalists" rather than "anti-Iraqi forces". Khalilzad then began a series of secret meetings with the insurgents, brokered by none other than the former Ba'athist Iyad Allawi.

Khalilzad openly criticized the sectarian nature of the Shi'ite parties who were in power and made no secret of the US hope that Allawi would get enough votes to play power broker in forming a new government. Even after Allawi's list did badly in the December elections, Khalilzad repeated his insistence that sectarian Shi'ites would not be allowed to control the Interior Ministry. In the end, however, the US Embassy could not prevent the Shi'ite regime from consolidating power.

The US had assuaged Shi'ite suspicions by agreeing in principle to defend the Iraqi government against foreign aggression. The March 7 US draft, however, appears to have triggered a shift toward greater distance from the United States, which implies a move closer to Iran.

The first open expression of criticism of the US draft came from Maliki's own Da'wa Party at the end of May. Two senior legislators in Maliki's party, Ali al-Adeeb and Haider al-Abadi, gave interviews on May 31 in which they complained about US demands for "a free hand" to arrest Iraqis and carry out military operations, authority for more than 50 long-term military bases, and insistence on control over Iraqi airspace as well as legal immunity for US troops, contractors and private security guards.

The Bush administration reacted by blaming Iran for the Shi'ite attack on the agreement. The New York Times quoted a US official as accusing Iran of "orchestrating a disinformation campaign to undermine the negotiations", saying, "This is Iran's playbook."

Iran clearly took advantage of the consternation of its Shi'ite allies in Baghdad to the March 7 US draft. But the impetus for the Maliki regime's shift came from the Iraqi Shi'ite sense of vulnerability to threats from its Sunni neighbors and the equivocal position of the US on the issue of a Shi'ite Iraq.

Regardless of the outcome of the negotiations on the US-Iraq agreement, to replace the United Nations mandate for Iraq that expires in December, the more fundamental impact of that equivocal US position is to nudge the Maliki regime significantly closer to Iran, which can be counted on to provide unequivocal support against any Sunni regional alliance.

Posted by Richard Steven Hack | June 26, 2008 5:13 PM

Unfortunately, Reid has backed up his words with vote after vote trying to both limit funds for the effort and withdrawing prematurely. So, yeah, he is trying for a self-fulfilling prophecy. "The war is lost." Those were Reids exact words. And I think Black's statement was disgusting and should be condemned.

Posted by Judd | June 26, 2008 5:20 PM

The other problem with calling the surge a "success" is that it isn't a success UNTIL the Iraqi government is stable (which is just vaguely possible if the nationalists get in this fall and next year in the provincial and parliamentary elections) and UNTIL the US is both willing and able to withdraw.

If the US is forced to withdraw - violently or nonviolently - as a result of the nationalists winning the elections next year, or if the elections rekindle sectarian violence, then clearly the surge has failed.

If the violence rekindles, as it did with the conflicts a couple months ago with Sadr's forces, or if it rekindles due to a Bush attack on Iran - which is likely - then clearly the surge failed. You can then argue that there needs to be a surge of, oh, say, 500,000 more troops into Iraq.

In short, it's premature to call it a "success" just because there is a probably temporary lull in the violence when nothing else on the landscape has changed.

This is not anyone's rational definition of "success."

Posted by Richard Steven Hack | June 26, 2008 5:29 PM

I think you're being too philosophical here. The whole purpose of the surge/anbar awakening/partition of baghdad was to provide a space of time where violence would be dramatically reduced....leading up to the US elections.
That way, when a Democratic president began troop withdrawals, and the fragile balance of power was disturbed, and violence picked up in the wake of that disturbance, the Republicans -- and their media cheerleaders -- could say that the 'surge' had been the answer in Iraq, and withdrawal was a disaster...as they predicted.

Posted by flory | June 26, 2008 6:40 PM

I think you're being too philosophical here. The whole purpose of the surge/anbar awakening/partition of baghdad was to provide a space of time where violence would be dramatically reduced....leading up to the US elections.
That way, when a Democratic president began troop withdrawals, and the fragile balance of power was disturbed, and violence picked up in the wake of that disturbance, the Republicans -- and their media cheerleaders -- could say that the 'surge' had been the answer in Iraq, and withdrawal was a disaster...as they predicted.

Posted by flory | June 26, 2008 6:41 PM

I think you're being too philosophical here. The whole purpose of the surge/anbar awakening/partition of baghdad was to provide a space of time where violence would be dramatically reduced....leading up to the US elections.
That way, when a Democratic president began troop withdrawals, and the fragile balance of power was disturbed, and violence picked up in the wake of that disturbance, the Republicans -- and their media cheerleaders -- could say that the 'surge' had been the answer in Iraq, and withdrawal was a disaster...as they predicted.

Posted by flory | June 26, 2008 6:43 PM

Asserting that The Surge has succeeded when it obviously hasn't won't make it true. For The Surge to have succeeded means that it would have had to have brought about its goals. Not only aren't all its goals in hand, it can't be demonstrated that the goals that have been reached have been due to The Surge. In fact, a lot of the goals were the result of the bribery known as The Anbar Awakening, which starter prior to The Surge.

================================================

Most of the comments here appear to be terminally divorced from the messiness of reality and the need for flexibility and improvisation required to deal with it. The fact that the Surge - generally speaking an increase in troop strength coupled with a change in tactics ("clear and hold") was combined with other initiatives (Anbar Awakening, security checkpoints & walls, etc) would seem to speak well for the ingenuity of the commanders in the field. It seems a naive and otherworldly attitude to call an initiative a failure because it wasn't performed in a vacuum.

When I was on active duty in the Army we were taught that plans didn't survive the first encounter with the enemy. You plan as well as you can, but have to improvise as conditions change.

Expecting any political or military initiative to unroll strictly according to plan and on a rigid timetable is silly. Nothing would ever get accomplished held to this juvenile standard.

Posted by Campesino | June 26, 2008 8:04 PM

Any plan that calls for ethnic cleansing, physical partitions, and wholesale bribery is hard to approve of. It's testament to how insane our presence in Iraq is.

Posted by Jeffrey Davis | June 26, 2008 9:32 PM

"would seem to speak well for the ingenuity of the commanders in the field."

Since none of the tactics they applied actually worked as well as Sadr's cease fire and the effects of sectarian cleansing, it's hard to find any reason to declare Petraeus particularly smart.

It bears repeating: nothing has changed in Iraq. Nothing. All the fundamental problems remain, and only when the provincial and parliamentary elections are over will the actual situation be at all clear - if then.

In light of those facts, the fact that the sectarian violence is down to pre-2006 levels is completely irrelevant.

Posted by Richard Steven Hack | June 27, 2008 12:49 AM

The Parable of the Surge

A mafiosi walks into a china shop run by a sadistic thug to take over the valuable store and make it part of "the business". In the process of struggling to take it over, bat in hand, the mafiosi successfully beats the owner to a pulp, but the struggle destroyes nearly all of the valuable goods. A few last shelves are tottering, with more precious ceramic pottery about to fall 8 feet to ruin. The supports for the shelves buckle. The mafiosi calls in fellow wise guys to "come down here quick and help me with this new store I got".

Half an hour later, 4 pairs of arms are holding up the remaining shelves while the mafiosi, hammer, nails, and fresh brackets in hand, secures the shelves. He speaks to the wise guys as he works: "See, you guys bein' here is workin' out real nice! We're gonna have ourselves a new china shop that we got from this sick bastard."

The neighborhood shop owners look on silently in fear and disgust. Many of the mafiosi's relatives hear the news about the china shop in the paper and, knowing who was responsible for the attack, shake their heads in shame for their morally bankrupt kin.

When a wise guy uncle brags to one of the "on the level" relatives about how they saved the china shop from complete ruin, the relative says nothing, understanding that the wise guy lives in an amoral world in which reason serves a corrupt end.

The wise guy goes on: "You know, you on the level types think we mess everything up. But we're gonna have a real nice china shop now that we kept those last shelve from falling. Us showin up there worked."

The End

Posted by tom f | June 27, 2008 1:49 AM