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The Popular Vote

12 Jun 2008 04:21 pm

Pew reports on the National Popular Vote movement gaining steam, with NPV proposals having passed in Maryland, New Jersey, Hawaii and Illinois with bills on the move in Massachusetts, New York, North Carolina and Rhode Island.

The way this works is that an NPV state commits to giving its electoral votes to the winner of the national popular vote if and only if states possessing a total of 270 electoral votes agree to do the same. This will, if enough states sign on, provide a "backdoor" way of transitioning to electing the president via popular vote without going through the all-but-impossible Article V amendment process. Thus far, obviously, you're seeing NPV pass in liberal states. But some cycle or other something will happen that gets conservatives worried about this. And there are plenty of right-wing states -- Texas, Oklahoma, Georgia, Mississippi, Alabama, South Carolina -- that are too big to benefit from the electoral college's overweighting of small states, and whose interests currently get ignored in presidential campaigns since they're not "battlegrounds."

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Comments (66)

North Carolina isn't liberal, and Oklahoma, Mississippi, Alabama, and South Carolina aren't big.

One problem I haven't seen addressed with the NPV proposals is that nothing (other than obvious political backlash) prevents states from revoking participation after the fact and submitting a slate of electors representing the local popular vote instead of the national popular vote. It's unlikely to arise, because the popular vote and traditional electoral college vote are unlikely to diverge, but it's precisely the exceptional case that NPV is supposed to address.

Is it really that hard to amend the constitution? The voting age was lowered to 18 with only a few years of work. A change like eliminating the Electoral College is big enough that I'd think we should go through the amemendment process for it.

This has long been a pet theory of mine, but I'm not entirely convinced that you wouldn't have Article IV problems. Allocating electors in a manner potentially at odds with a statewide vote can hardly be described as "republican."

Bad proposal. The day presidential candidates no longer have to compete for electoral votes by campaigning hard in individual states, and need only focus on racking up big popular vote totals in a broad national campaign, is the day that our system will make its final doomed descent into total mass market triviality and idiocy.

Eliminating the Electoral College without implementing some sort of runoff system would be disastrous.

The Constitution has been amended 11 times in the last 100 years, 10 if the weird history of the 27th excludes it. Since when does does an "all but impossible" event take place, on average, once a decade over the past 100 years? What form of the language are you employing, Matthew?

A Presidential election purely determined by national popular vote would be a nightmare in an election with a razor-thin margin, opening the door to contested votes in all fifty states. This measure could add the additional complexity of state A waiting to see how it's electoral vote would be distributed, based upon the outcome of ballot disputes in states B,C,D,E,F, etc.. The popular vote will never have such a close margin, you say? Yeah, sure, "never" is such a certain outcome.....

phil,

The same thing occurred to me. Imagine if states with EVs around 285 eventually sign onto the plan. It's late October. McCain looks like he has a narrow lead in the national popular vote but would be behind in the conventional Electoral College. So one week before the election, Obama uses his influence to get the Illinois legislature to pull out of the NPV coalition. This knocks the combined EV of the participating states below 270, so all of the other states pull out by their own statutes also. Obama loses the popular vote but wins by a hair in the EC. The Supreme Court gets involved. Chaos ensues...

Just the idea that we might be able to go a whole election cycle without having to hear about blue collar workers in Ohio and PA or old Jewish women in Fla...makes this something that I fully support.

Agree w/ Phil. After watching the last decade of Calvin-ball rules, I think I would be shocked if his scenario did not come to pass in the event of another EV/NPV discrepancy.

I used to think this was a really good idea, until I realized it would require buy-in (and stay-in) from at least some Republicans. As I've heard was said in the Clinton White House: "if your plan requires moderate Republicans to stand up to their own party...you need a new plan."

I really never thought of myself as quite this cynical...

I think Matt's reference to the impossibility of amendment stems from the fact that, in this instance, you've probably got at least 1/4 of the states who deem the Electoral College to operate in their favor. (In fact, I haven't thought it through but it's probably exactly half, no?) So things like the 18-year vote where you didn't have such structural obstacles aren't really good indicators.

The thing that bugs me about this proposal is, there's currently no "official" national popular vote tabulation. Each state determines its own vote and its own allocation of electors (except when the Supreme Court decides to do it for themselves, of course). How does the NPV proposal handle this?

This does nothing to address the fact that a person's vote in WY counts about 50x more than a vote in CA. Of course, if you're a tiny state (population-wise) like WY, this is a feature, not a bug.

Is it really that hard to amend the constitution? The voting age was lowered to 18 with only a few years of work. A change like eliminating the Electoral College is big enough that I'd think we should go through the amemendment process for it.

Stuff like prohibition, direct elections of Senators and the like did not affect smaller states disproportionally in any meaningful way. Changing the EC would drastically reduce the importance of a large number of small states, therefore they would rationally do everything in their power to stop it.

The last time the constitution was amended in a way that dramatically affected some states more than others was during Reconstruction, when the southern states had very limited influence on the federal government.

I would like to see some documentation that the states you've mentioned have been "ignored in presidential elections" beyond the whinings of some of the local punditocracy. I don't accept that pouring in a huge subsidy to the local media (campaign ads) constitutes "ignoring" either. I want to know exactly what issues don't get raised by presidential candidates because they are primarily of interest to Californians or Oklahomans.

Right, there isn't really any good reason I can see for the electoral college. Why should someone in Kansas have a vote that is worth more than me? You'd think Democrats would be all over this since it cost them the 2000 elections, and the small hinterland states are going to go against them for the foreseeable future.

I mean, it isn't like we are still voting for electors who will be, in all their heightened wisdom, voting for the best candidate because we live in 1796 and there is no way for information on all the good men to reach me way out in nowheresville farms. Instead we have a multi-member plurality. Are there any others out there? It is a totally bizarro backwards system that never really work like it was intended.

And you thought the Florida recount was bad? The NPV movement is a disaster waiting to happen.

This does nothing to address the fact that a person's vote in WY counts about 50x more than a vote in CA. Of course, if you're a tiny state (population-wise) like WY, this is a feature, not a bug.

The thing is that no one actually campaigns there. How much time do you think we'll spend over the next 5 months thinking about the isuses facing Wyoming?

Proportional representation (or lack thereof) in the EC is really a lot smaller an issue than the ridiculous-ness of the Senate. There's been like two instances in the history of the country where the EC vote didn't reflect the popular vote but there are literally dozens of instances per Senate session when the extrapolated votes of the Senators don't come anywhere near the preferences of the majority of Americans.

Assuming the legality of these bills holds up (sounds like a sure SCOTUS case), I'm for it. It's time for our archaic system to finally be updated. A close popular vote doesn't sound nearly as messy as the 2000 election.

The odds that a national election would narrow down to 537 votes are much smaller than they would do so in any particular state. Right now the recount disaster can happen in any number of small swing states, like Iowa, New Mexico, New Hampshire, etc.

Under NPV there would have been no recount disaster in 2000; and under NPV Bush's margin in 2004 was big enough to avoid worrying about 20,000 or so votes in Ohio.

I am unaware of a presidential election where the actual popular vote was so close that it would justify a national recount. The closest margin was in 1960 IIRC, about 300,000 votes.

So the tally is: current Electoral College = at least 3 elections where the candidate who got the most votes did not become president (1824, 1876, and 2000).

NPV = no election close enough to create a crisis.

No plan is perfect. But NPV is much less likely to result in a political crisis than the current Electoral College scheme.

Assuming the legality of these bills holds up (sounds like a sure SCOTUS case), I'm for it. It's time for our archaic system to finally be updated. A close popular vote doesn't sound nearly as messy as the 2000 election.

I'm no scholar but I'd think the case is pretty iron-clad. States have nearly an absolute right to select electors however they see fit, which is how you end up with places like Maine that allocate their electors differently than the other states.

Those people claiming that the constitution is not that hard to amend are substantially missing the point.

This is about a redistribution of power among the states. Instead of getting points for just being a state, this would make presidential representation actually flat across population. In order to pass an amendment you need the approval of states that will be reducing their influence on the national level. This is obviously not going to happen.

It's a lot different than passing an amendment that equally effects all the states that need to approve it. Much easier to get a good and popular idea through that way.

A recount is not a crisis. Hell, a revote isn't a crisis.

Responses to common misinformed critiques.

RE: revocation by states

The bill states:

"Any member state may withdraw from this agreement, except that a withdrawal occurring six months or less before the end of a President’s term shall not become effective until a President or Vice President shall have been qualified to serve the next term."

RE: Constitution

The process for amending the U.S. Constitution does not reflect the will of the people. A federal constitutional amendment favored by states containing 97% of the people of the U.S. can be blocked by the 13 smallest states containing 3% of the people.

The National Popular Vote bill is not an "end run" around the Constitution. The U.S. Supreme Court has repeatedly characterized the authority of the states over the manner of awarding their electoral votes as "exclusive" and "plenary."

The winner-take-all rule currently used by 48 or the 50 states is not in the U.S. Constitution. The winner-take-all rule was used by only 3 states in the nation's first presidential election in 1789. Our present-day system was neither specified by the Constitution nor favored by the Founding Fathers.

The congressional district allocation of electoral votes that is currently used by Maine and Nebraska is not in the U.S. Constitution. No state used that system in 1789.

States can, and frequently have, changed their method of awarding electoral votes over the years. All the U.S. Constitution says is "Each State shall appoint, in such Manner as the Legislature thereof may direct, a Number of Electors . . ."

RE: Descent into mob rule

The people vote for President now in all 50 states and have done so in most states for 200 years.

So, the issue raised by the National Popular Vote legislation is not about whether there will be "mob rule" in presidential elections, but whether the "mob" in a handful closely divided battleground states, such as Florida, get disproportionate attention from presidential candidates, while the "mobs" of the vast majority of states are ignored. Candidates spend over two thirds of their visits and two-thirds of their money in just 6 states and 99% of their money in just 16 states, while ignoring the rest of the country.

The "mob rule" comment incorrectly suggests that the current system provides some kind of check on the "mobs." There have been 22,000 electoral votes cast since presidential elections became competitive (in 1796), and only 10 have been cast for someone other than the candidate nominated by the elector's own political party. The electors are dedicated party activists who meet briefly in mid-December to cast their totally predictable votes in accordance with their pre-announced pledges.

RE: Tally and Recount fears

Current federal law (Title 3, chapter 1, section 6 of the United States Code) requires the states to report the November popular vote numbers (the "canvas") in what is called a "Certificate of Ascertainment." You can see the Certificates of Ascertainment for all 50 states and the District of Columbia containing the official count of the popular vote at the NARA web site at http://www.archives.gov/federal-register/electoral-college/2004/certificates_of_ascertainment.html

There would be less opportunity for a close election under nationwide popular election of the President than the prevailing statewide winner-take-all system.

A close outcome is considerably less likely in an election with a single pool of votes of 122,000,000 popular votes than in an election in which there are 51 separate pools and hence 51 separate opportunities for a close outcome. Moreover, a close outcome is considerably less likely in larger pool than a smaller one. Thus, a close outcome is less likely in a pool of 122,000,000 popular votes than in pools that are only 1/51th as large (about 2,400,000).

RE: Small state resistance

Some of National Popular Vote's biggest supporters are small states.

The small states are the most disadvantaged of all under the current system of electing the President. Political clout comes from being a closely divided battleground state, not the two-vote bonus.

Small states are almost invariably non-competitive in presidential election. Only 1 of the 13 smallest states are battleground states (and only 5 of the 25 smallest states are battlegrounds).

Of the 13 smallest states, Idaho, Montana, Wyoming, North Dakota, South Dakota, and Alaska regularly vote Republican, and Rhode Island, Delaware, Hawaii, Vermont, Maine, and DC regularly vote Democratic. These 12 states together contain 11 million people. Because of the two electoral-vote bonus that each state receives, the 12 non-competitive small states have 40 electoral votes. However, the two-vote bonus is an entirely illusory advantage to the small states. Ohio has 11 million people and has "only" 20 electoral votes. As we all know, the 11 million people in Ohio are the center of attention in presidential campaigns, while the 11 million people in the 12 non-competitive small states are utterly irrelevant. Nationwide election of the President would make each of the voters in the 12 smallest states as important as an Ohio voter.

The fact that the bonus of two electoral votes is an illusory benefit to the small states has been widely recognized by the small states for some time. In 1966, Delaware led a group of 12 predominantly low-population states (North Dakota, South Dakota, Wyoming, Utah, Arkansas, Kansas, Oklahoma, Iowa, Kentucky, Florida, Pennsylvania) in suing New York in the U.S. Supreme Court, arguing that New York's use of the winner-take-all effectively disenfranchised voters in their states. The Court declined to hear the case (presumably because of the well-established constitutional provision that the manner of awarding electoral votes is exclusively a state decision). Ironically, defendant New York is no longer a battleground state (as it was in the 1960s) and today suffers the very same disenfranchisement as the 12 non-competitive low-population states. A vote in New York is, today, equal to a vote in Wyoming—both are equally worthless and irrelevant in presidential elections.

The National Popular Vote bill has been approved by 18 legislative chambers in small and large states (one house in Colorado, Arkansas, Maine, North Carolina, Rhode Island, and Washington, and two houses in Maryland, Illinois, Hawaii, California, and Vermont). It has been enacted into law in Hawaii, Illinois, New Jersey, and Maryland. These states have 50 (19%) of the 270 electoral votes needed to bring this legislation into effect.

For fuller and other responses to common critiques, see http://nationalpopularvote.com/pages/faq.php

"States have nearly an absolute right to select electors however they see fit"

This is what I'm not so sure of. Article IV requires that every state provide its citizens with a republican form of government. It's by no means a foregone conclusion, but I think that a nontrivial argument could be made that when a state provides a popular vote to select electors, it is only acting consistently with the republican mandate if it bases its selection of those electors on the statewide vote. Now, you could divy up the electors in any number of ways and still satisfy the republican mandate (winner-take-all, proportional, by district, etc.), but that distribution must reflect the statewide vote. You could even not have a statewide vote (and have democratically selected state officials pick the electors) -- but if you do have one, you have to respect it.

Anyway, like I said, I'm certainly not in the majority on this one.

Responses to common misinformed critiques.

RE: revocation by states

The bill states:

"Any member state may withdraw from this agreement, except that a withdrawal occurring six months or less before the end of a President’s term shall not become effective until a President or Vice President shall have been qualified to serve the next term."

RE: Constitution

The process for amending the U.S. Constitution does not reflect the will of the people. A federal constitutional amendment favored by states containing 97% of the people of the U.S. can be blocked by the 13 smallest states containing 3% of the people.

The National Popular Vote bill is not an "end run" around the Constitution. The U.S. Supreme Court has repeatedly characterized the authority of the states over the manner of awarding their electoral votes as "exclusive" and "plenary."

The winner-take-all rule currently used by 48 or the 50 states is not in the U.S. Constitution. The winner-take-all rule was used by only 3 states in the nation's first presidential election in 1789. Our present-day system was neither specified by the Constitution nor favored by the Founding Fathers.

The congressional district allocation of electoral votes that is currently used by Maine and Nebraska is not in the U.S. Constitution. No state used that system in 1789.

States can, and frequently have, changed their method of awarding electoral votes over the years. All the U.S. Constitution says is "Each State shall appoint, in such Manner as the Legislature thereof may direct, a Number of Electors . . ."

RE: Descent into mob rule

The people vote for President now in all 50 states and have done so in most states for 200 years.

So, the issue raised by the National Popular Vote legislation is not about whether there will be "mob rule" in presidential elections, but whether the "mob" in a handful closely divided battleground states, such as Florida, get disproportionate attention from presidential candidates, while the "mobs" of the vast majority of states are ignored. Candidates spend over two thirds of their visits and two-thirds of their money in just 6 states and 99% of their money in just 16 states, while ignoring the rest of the country.

The "mob rule" comment incorrectly suggests that the current system provides some kind of check on the "mobs." There have been 22,000 electoral votes cast since presidential elections became competitive (in 1796), and only 10 have been cast for someone other than the candidate nominated by the elector's own political party. The electors are dedicated party activists who meet briefly in mid-December to cast their totally predictable votes in accordance with their pre-announced pledges.

RE: Tally and Recount fears

Current federal law (Title 3, chapter 1, section 6 of the United States Code) requires the states to report the November popular vote numbers (the "canvas") in what is called a "Certificate of Ascertainment." You can see the Certificates of Ascertainment for all 50 states and the District of Columbia containing the official count of the popular vote at the NARA web site at http://www.archives.gov/federal-register/electoral-college/2004/certificates_of_ascertainment.html

There would be less opportunity for a close election under nationwide popular election of the President than the prevailing statewide winner-take-all system.

A close outcome is considerably less likely in an election with a single pool of votes of 122,000,000 popular votes than in an election in which there are 51 separate pools and hence 51 separate opportunities for a close outcome. Moreover, a close outcome is considerably less likely in larger pool than a smaller one. Thus, a close outcome is less likely in a pool of 122,000,000 popular votes than in pools that are only 1/51th as large (about 2,400,000).

RE: Small state resistance

Some of National Popular Vote's biggest supporters are small states.

The small states are the most disadvantaged of all under the current system of electing the President. Political clout comes from being a closely divided battleground state, not the two-vote bonus.

Small states are almost invariably non-competitive in presidential election. Only 1 of the 13 smallest states are battleground states (and only 5 of the 25 smallest states are battlegrounds).

Of the 13 smallest states, Idaho, Montana, Wyoming, North Dakota, South Dakota, and Alaska regularly vote Republican, and Rhode Island, Delaware, Hawaii, Vermont, Maine, and DC regularly vote Democratic. These 12 states together contain 11 million people. Because of the two electoral-vote bonus that each state receives, the 12 non-competitive small states have 40 electoral votes. However, the two-vote bonus is an entirely illusory advantage to the small states. Ohio has 11 million people and has "only" 20 electoral votes. As we all know, the 11 million people in Ohio are the center of attention in presidential campaigns, while the 11 million people in the 12 non-competitive small states are utterly irrelevant. Nationwide election of the President would make each of the voters in the 12 smallest states as important as an Ohio voter.

The fact that the bonus of two electoral votes is an illusory benefit to the small states has been widely recognized by the small states for some time. In 1966, Delaware led a group of 12 predominantly low-population states (North Dakota, South Dakota, Wyoming, Utah, Arkansas, Kansas, Oklahoma, Iowa, Kentucky, Florida, Pennsylvania) in suing New York in the U.S. Supreme Court, arguing that New York's use of the winner-take-all effectively disenfranchised voters in their states. The Court declined to hear the case (presumably because of the well-established constitutional provision that the manner of awarding electoral votes is exclusively a state decision). Ironically, defendant New York is no longer a battleground state (as it was in the 1960s) and today suffers the very same disenfranchisement as the 12 non-competitive low-population states. A vote in New York is, today, equal to a vote in Wyoming—both are equally worthless and irrelevant in presidential elections.

The National Popular Vote bill has been approved by 18 legislative chambers in small and large states (one house in Colorado, Arkansas, Maine, North Carolina, Rhode Island, and Washington, and two houses in Maryland, Illinois, Hawaii, California, and Vermont). It has been enacted into law in Hawaii, Illinois, New Jersey, and Maryland. These states have 50 (19%) of the 270 electoral votes needed to bring this legislation into effect.

For fuller and other responses to common critiques, see http://nationalpopularvote.com/pages/faq.php

Responses to common critiques.

RE: revocation by states

The bill states:

"Any member state may withdraw from this agreement, except that a withdrawal occurring six months or less before the end of a President’s term shall not become effective until a President or Vice President shall have been qualified to serve the next term."

RE: Constitution

The process for amending the U.S. Constitution does not reflect the will of the people. A federal constitutional amendment favored by states containing 97% of the people of the U.S. can be blocked by the 13 smallest states containing 3% of the people.

The National Popular Vote bill is not an "end run" around the Constitution. The U.S. Supreme Court has repeatedly characterized the authority of the states over the manner of awarding their electoral votes as "exclusive" and "plenary."

The winner-take-all rule currently used by 48 or the 50 states is not in the U.S. Constitution. The winner-take-all rule was used by only 3 states in the nation's first presidential election in 1789. Our present-day system was neither specified by the Constitution nor favored by the Founding Fathers.

The congressional district allocation of electoral votes that is currently used by Maine and Nebraska is not in the U.S. Constitution. No state used that system in 1789.

States can, and frequently have, changed their method of awarding electoral votes over the years. All the U.S. Constitution says is "Each State shall appoint, in such Manner as the Legislature thereof may direct, a Number of Electors . . ."

RE: Descent into mob rule

The people vote for President now in all 50 states and have done so in most states for 200 years.

So, the issue raised by the National Popular Vote legislation is not about whether there will be "mob rule" in presidential elections, but whether the "mob" in a handful closely divided battleground states, such as Florida, get disproportionate attention from presidential candidates, while the "mobs" of the vast majority of states are ignored. Candidates spend over two thirds of their visits and two-thirds of their money in just 6 states and 99% of their money in just 16 states, while ignoring the rest of the country.

The "mob rule" comment incorrectly suggests that the current system provides some kind of check on the "mobs." There have been 22,000 electoral votes cast since presidential elections became competitive (in 1796), and only 10 have been cast for someone other than the candidate nominated by the elector's own political party. The electors are dedicated party activists who meet briefly in mid-December to cast their totally predictable votes in accordance with their pre-announced pledges.

RE: Tally and Recount fears

Current federal law (Title 3, chapter 1, section 6 of the United States Code) requires the states to report the November popular vote numbers (the "canvas") in what is called a "Certificate of Ascertainment." You can see the Certificates of Ascertainment for all 50 states and the District of Columbia containing the official count of the popular vote at the NARA web site at http://www.archives.gov/federal-register/electoral-college/2004/certificates_of_ascertainment.html

There would be less opportunity for a close election under nationwide popular election of the President than the prevailing statewide winner-take-all system.

A close outcome is considerably less likely in an election with a single pool of votes of 122,000,000 popular votes than in an election in which there are 51 separate pools and hence 51 separate opportunities for a close outcome. Moreover, a close outcome is considerably less likely in larger pool than a smaller one. Thus, a close outcome is less likely in a pool of 122,000,000 popular votes than in pools that are only 1/51th as large (about 2,400,000).

RE: Small state resistance

Some of National Popular Vote's biggest supporters are small states.

The small states are the most disadvantaged of all under the current system of electing the President. Political clout comes from being a closely divided battleground state, not the two-vote bonus.

Small states are almost invariably non-competitive in presidential election. Only 1 of the 13 smallest states are battleground states (and only 5 of the 25 smallest states are battlegrounds).

Of the 13 smallest states, Idaho, Montana, Wyoming, North Dakota, South Dakota, and Alaska regularly vote Republican, and Rhode Island, Delaware, Hawaii, Vermont, Maine, and DC regularly vote Democratic. These 12 states together contain 11 million people. Because of the two electoral-vote bonus that each state receives, the 12 non-competitive small states have 40 electoral votes. However, the two-vote bonus is an entirely illusory advantage to the small states. Ohio has 11 million people and has "only" 20 electoral votes. As we all know, the 11 million people in Ohio are the center of attention in presidential campaigns, while the 11 million people in the 12 non-competitive small states are utterly irrelevant. Nationwide election of the President would make each of the voters in the 12 smallest states as important as an Ohio voter.

The fact that the bonus of two electoral votes is an illusory benefit to the small states has been widely recognized by the small states for some time. In 1966, Delaware led a group of 12 predominantly low-population states (North Dakota, South Dakota, Wyoming, Utah, Arkansas, Kansas, Oklahoma, Iowa, Kentucky, Florida, Pennsylvania) in suing New York in the U.S. Supreme Court, arguing that New York's use of the winner-take-all effectively disenfranchised voters in their states. The Court declined to hear the case (presumably because of the well-established constitutional provision that the manner of awarding electoral votes is exclusively a state decision). Ironically, defendant New York is no longer a battleground state (as it was in the 1960s) and today suffers the very same disenfranchisement as the 12 non-competitive low-population states. A vote in New York is, today, equal to a vote in Wyoming—both are equally worthless and irrelevant in presidential elections.

The National Popular Vote bill has been approved by 18 legislative chambers in small and large states (one house in Colorado, Arkansas, Maine, North Carolina, Rhode Island, and Washington, and two houses in Maryland, Illinois, Hawaii, California, and Vermont). It has been enacted into law in Hawaii, Illinois, New Jersey, and Maryland. These states have 50 (19%) of the 270 electoral votes needed to bring this legislation into effect.

For fuller and other responses to common critiques, see http://nationalpopularvote.com/pages/faq.php

Responses to common critiques.

RE: revocation by states

The bill states:

"Any member state may withdraw from this agreement, except that a withdrawal occurring six months or less before the end of a President’s term shall not become effective until a President or Vice President shall have been qualified to serve the next term."

RE: Constitution

The process for amending the U.S. Constitution does not reflect the will of the people. A federal constitutional amendment favored by states containing 97% of the people of the U.S. can be blocked by the 13 smallest states containing 3% of the people.

The National Popular Vote bill is not an "end run" around the Constitution. The U.S. Supreme Court has repeatedly characterized the authority of the states over the manner of awarding their electoral votes as "exclusive" and "plenary."

The winner-take-all rule currently used by 48 or the 50 states is not in the U.S. Constitution. The winner-take-all rule was used by only 3 states in the nation's first presidential election in 1789. Our present-day system was neither specified by the Constitution nor favored by the Founding Fathers.

The congressional district allocation of electoral votes that is currently used by Maine and Nebraska is not in the U.S. Constitution. No state used that system in 1789.

States can, and frequently have, changed their method of awarding electoral votes over the years. All the U.S. Constitution says is "Each State shall appoint, in such Manner as the Legislature thereof may direct, a Number of Electors . . ."

RE: Descent into mob rule

The people vote for President now in all 50 states and have done so in most states for 200 years.

So, the issue raised by the National Popular Vote legislation is not about whether there will be "mob rule" in presidential elections, but whether the "mob" in a handful closely divided battleground states, such as Florida, get disproportionate attention from presidential candidates, while the "mobs" of the vast majority of states are ignored. Candidates spend over two thirds of their visits and two-thirds of their money in just 6 states and 99% of their money in just 16 states, while ignoring the rest of the country.

The "mob rule" comment incorrectly suggests that the current system provides some kind of check on the "mobs." There have been 22,000 electoral votes cast since presidential elections became competitive (in 1796), and only 10 have been cast for someone other than the candidate nominated by the elector's own political party. The electors are dedicated party activists who meet briefly in mid-December to cast their totally predictable votes in accordance with their pre-announced pledges.

RE: Tally and Recount fears

Current federal law (Title 3, chapter 1, section 6 of the United States Code) requires the states to report the November popular vote numbers (the "canvas") in what is called a "Certificate of Ascertainment." You can see the Certificates of Ascertainment for all 50 states and the District of Columbia containing the official count of the popular vote at the NARA web site at http://www.archives.gov/federal-register/electoral-college/2004/certificates_of_ascertainment.html

There would be less opportunity for a close election under nationwide popular election of the President than the prevailing statewide winner-take-all system.

A close outcome is considerably less likely in an election with a single pool of votes of 122,000,000 popular votes than in an election in which there are 51 separate pools and hence 51 separate opportunities for a close outcome. Moreover, a close outcome is considerably less likely in larger pool than a smaller one. Thus, a close outcome is less likely in a pool of 122,000,000 popular votes than in pools that are only 1/51th as large (about 2,400,000).

RE: Small state resistance

Some of National Popular Vote's biggest supporters are small states.

The small states are the most disadvantaged of all under the current system of electing the President. Political clout comes from being a closely divided battleground state, not the two-vote bonus.

Small states are almost invariably non-competitive in presidential election. Only 1 of the 13 smallest states are battleground states (and only 5 of the 25 smallest states are battlegrounds).

Of the 13 smallest states, Idaho, Montana, Wyoming, North Dakota, South Dakota, and Alaska regularly vote Republican, and Rhode Island, Delaware, Hawaii, Vermont, Maine, and DC regularly vote Democratic. These 12 states together contain 11 million people. Because of the two electoral-vote bonus that each state receives, the 12 non-competitive small states have 40 electoral votes. However, the two-vote bonus is an entirely illusory advantage to the small states. Ohio has 11 million people and has "only" 20 electoral votes. As we all know, the 11 million people in Ohio are the center of attention in presidential campaigns, while the 11 million people in the 12 non-competitive small states are utterly irrelevant. Nationwide election of the President would make each of the voters in the 12 smallest states as important as an Ohio voter.

The fact that the bonus of two electoral votes is an illusory benefit to the small states has been widely recognized by the small states for some time. In 1966, Delaware led a group of 12 predominantly low-population states (North Dakota, South Dakota, Wyoming, Utah, Arkansas, Kansas, Oklahoma, Iowa, Kentucky, Florida, Pennsylvania) in suing New York in the U.S. Supreme Court, arguing that New York's use of the winner-take-all effectively disenfranchised voters in their states. The Court declined to hear the case (presumably because of the well-established constitutional provision that the manner of awarding electoral votes is exclusively a state decision). Ironically, defendant New York is no longer a battleground state (as it was in the 1960s) and today suffers the very same disenfranchisement as the 12 non-competitive low-population states. A vote in New York is, today, equal to a vote in Wyoming—both are equally worthless and irrelevant in presidential elections.

The National Popular Vote bill has been approved by 18 legislative chambers in small and large states (one house in Colorado, Arkansas, Maine, North Carolina, Rhode Island, and Washington, and two houses in Maryland, Illinois, Hawaii, California, and Vermont). It has been enacted into law in Hawaii, Illinois, New Jersey, and Maryland. These states have 50 (19%) of the 270 electoral votes needed to bring this legislation into effect.

For fuller and other responses to common critiques, see http://nationalpopularvote.com/pages/faq.php

Greg, I could be wrong, but I believe that the standard employed by many states to automatically trigger a recount would have applied in 1960 and perhaps 2000. In any case, what have we had, 54 national elections? That is far too small a sample size to make conclusions about it being unlikely to happen. If you think 1824, 1876, and 2000 were bad, just wait until a couple hundred million votes are recounted by hand, by varyig local standards, each one subject to legal challenge.

But some cycle or other something will happen that gets conservatives worried about this.

Matt, you're making a heroic assumption that in this event Democrats won't suddenly become champions of small state interests and the "wisdom of the founding fathers."

The position of both parties on this issue seems more tactical than ideological.

MY, thanks for posting this, I hadn't realized the NPV was pending in the New York legislature and have now contacted my Assemblywoman (who it turned out was already supporting it, so I thanked her). Susan, other than writing to my State Assemblyperson and Rep., what else can I do?

"Responses to common misinformed critiques.

RE: revocation by states

The bill states:

"Any member state may withdraw from this agreement, except that a withdrawal occurring six months or less before the end of a President’s term shall not become effective until a President or Vice President shall have been qualified to serve the next term.""


I don't really see this holding water. Unless I'm missing something, how is a law that promises to do things in the future ironclad? In the hypothetical situation mentioned earlier, Obama could just get Illinois to pass a new law saying they're opting out effective immediately, and select their electors by some other method. That overwrites the six-month promise.

The only way I could see for this is to have each state actually amend their constitution, and make the amending process take longer than would allow such a last-minute reversal (I'm not sure on the exact details of state constitutional amendment practices). But given enough time nothing is irreversible, and short of making it an amendment with a sufficiently long amending process, it's not a problem to reverse things in short notice if one doesn't mind the political consequences.

RE: Small state resistance

Some of National Popular Vote's biggest supporters are small states.

The small states are the most disadvantaged of all under the current system of electing the President. Political clout comes from being a closely divided battleground state, not the two-vote bonus.

Small states are almost invariably non-competitive in presidential election. Only 1 of the 13 smallest states are battleground states (and only 5 of the 25 smallest states are battlegrounds).

I made this point above with respect to Wyoming - no one campaigns there because a) it's very small and b) it's not competitive but I wouldn't be surprised if a large number of the smaller states would not want to get into change EC allocation simply because it opens a can of worms that might someday lead to a questioning of Senatorial allocation - where the small state advantage is certainly not trivial.

If I were WY legislator for example, I just wouldn't want to go there even if the risk is small. You might see a split then between small states with concentrated populations (AK/HI) v. small states with very distributed populations (MT/WY).

Taking the Senate off the table, theoretically, HI and AK could actually benefit from a shift from the EC towards a popular vote Candidates would see Honolulu and Anchorage as attractive markets for votes and would thus campaign there, driving exposure and money to HI and AK markets.

By comparison, you'd still have no one campaigning in MT and WY because there's not much to be gained by campaigning hard for Cheyenne or Billings voters.

I think Adam's right: the question of actually enforcing this compact is a thorny one. If a state chose to pull out at the last minute, i.e., its legislature said we're going back to the old way, the idea that this compact would trump the plenary authority the constitution gives each legislature is, I would think, highly dubious.

Doesn't this, by the way, have to be ratified by Congress, as an interstate compact?

As the U.S. becomes a one party state, the electorial college will be irrelevant. In 2016, the only important election will be the Democratic Primary since the Republican Party will be irrelevant.

More reform should be put on the Democratic Party process so that Iowa and New Hampshire do not end up electing the president for the other 48 states.

Hey, the popular vote doesn't count for nominating Presidential candidates, why should it suddenly count for electing the President. Heck why the need to have conventional elections in every state. If some states want to select their Electors by a show of hands in living rooms and high school gymanasiums, that sounds like a wonderful expression of our democracy as well.

Doesn't this, by the way, have to be ratified by Congress, as an interstate compact?

I don't think it does, for the very reason you state. As the initiative is conceived, each participating state would enact simple legislation, which it is free to repeal at any time.

Because no participating state is technically bound to continue selecting electors in this way (i.e. the state could pass another law specifying a different method at any time), the initiative does not create anything equivalent to a compact--and doesn't need congressional ratification. The initiative, therefore, is relatively easy to enact because it does not alter the legal rights/obligations of any state, but that very quality also makes it easy to unwind.

Has anyone considered fraud? Under the current system, a fraudulent state could flip its outcome. Under an NPV system, a fraudulent state could also magnify its turnout numbers.

This does nothing to address the fact that a person's vote in WY counts about 50x more than a vote in CA.

And the bullshit of fixing the House at 435, leading to unrepresentable districts, is its own ongoing problem.

Susan, I don't think your argument regarding small-state resistance—that "political clout comes from being a closely divided battleground state, not the two-vote bonus"—makes sense. Political attention, which swing states have, is not the same as political clout. It's just that the political clout of non-swing states, whether large or small, is taken for granted; it's the starting line.

Yes, a candidate has to win over voters in swing states, because those are where enough voters are persuadable (under a winner-take-all system) for there to be any electoral-vote gain in doing so. But how many swing states you need to win is determined by the number of electoral votes you already get from your safe states; if you have safe states, you already start part of the way to 270.

So, suppose you're Wyoming. Then you say, "Wyoming votes about 70% for Republicans in presidential elections. That's 170,000 votes that we know will already go to the Republican; and those votes will get him 1/90 of the way towards an electoral college majority. So since he knows he can count on Wyoming, he's 1/90 of the way there without doing any work." On the other hand, under a popular-vote system, being able to count on about 170,000 votes from Wyoming without doing any work gets you only 1/365 of the way to a majority. Thus, small non-swing states, under a popular-vote system, lose their ability to give their favored candidate a built-in advantage.

To put it another way which I think probably turns out to be equivalent: The problem that is to be solved is that sometimes the electoral vote doesn't match the popular vote. But the fact that small states are overrepresented in the electoral college means that, when that happens, it's a priori more likely that the electoral vote will differ from the popular vote in favor of the candidate favored by small states. And why should small states want to change that?

Will

A recount threshold of a margin of 0.5 percent or less (the Florida standard) - applied to 122 million votes nationwide - would result in a recount if the margin were less than 610,000 votes.

But the sheer size of the margin is also a factor is where recounts are concerned. As a practical matter, a 610,000 margin is not going to be overturned. I've done some election law, and regardless of the total quantity of the overall vote, when the margin starts to exceed 1000 votes, the result does not change.

A national recount would only be in order if the margin were 100,000 or less IMHO. I pick that number because I think that's about the maximum cumulative numbers of votes that could be manipulated nationwide.

Someone said this up above:

I'm no scholar but I'd think the case is pretty iron-clad. States have nearly an absolute right to select electors however they see fit, which is how you end up with places like Maine that allocate their electors differently than the other states.

This is true in the abstract, so long as the method chosen does not interfere with other constitutional rights. They could not hold an election where only men get to vote, for instance. So really you just get back to the issue of whether the agreement itself is unconstitutional. The problems with NPV's plan are numerous. Chief among them is that it robs small states of their 2-vote bonus. Currently there are, if memory serves, some 30 states who will lose relative influence under a straight popular election based on the 2000 census. Any of these states would have standing to bring suit to challenge. Sure, some small states are supporting NPV's plan, but some aren't, and won't. They can't be deprived of political influence by unconstitutional measures. Second, NPV relies on dubious precedent to support their notion that this interstate compact doesn't need congressional approval. The SC in Tennessee v. Virginia long ago took any real power out of the compact clause, but that case itself was very poorly reasoned, and the errors have been compounded since. No case has ever confronted the question of whether states may compact to deprive other states of political, rather than economic, power. Does that even sound remotely constitutional to anyone? Third, and this is iffy, the SC might extend their NY v. US and US v. Printz line and say this offends a "structural provision" of the constitution. Since the workings of the electoral college are carefully laid out in the constitution, it can be changed only through constitutional amendment. It therefore offends Article V and Article IV. Just a theory though. Frankly I think the whole thing is so likely to be tossed out with such dispatch that I can't believe they are wasting their time.

"The process for amending the U.S. Constitution does not reflect the will of the people. A federal constitutional amendment favored by states containing 97% of the people of the U.S. can be blocked by the 13 smallest states containing 3% of the people."

But in practice never has been. You look at amendments that failed, such as the ERA, and the average population of the states ratifying tracked very closely the proportion of the 50 states ratifying. Of course, an amendment which falls differently on small states than it does on large states would probably not track this past experience, but that's the experience to date.

I think the killer here is that there's no real enforcement mechanism that can keep states from tactically withdrawing from the compact. State legislatures simply can't, as a matter of law, bindingly commit their future behavior, short of amending state constitutions, which isn't proposed here.

The only way it really works is if you get enough participating states that the compact works even if a few of the biggest states renege.

There's really no need for 270 EVs worth of states to sign on to make this work. Say just NY and TX did. In today's political climate, that would pretty much have the same effect. The same candidate is unlikely to win both, and there's no way one loses the popular vote and still wins the EC by a big enough margin to offset the lost state.

So if a state "commits" to do this, and then reneges, is there a recourse ? Or does this just depend on the reliability of the local Secretary of State ?

Or what happens if a State Supreme Court says just before the election "this compact is not valid for our state."

About the only small state that would lose "influence" under this plan is New Hampshire, since it's swingy and small. People will still go to Michigan, Ohio, Florida because there are many people there. When was the last time anyone went to Utah to campaign, anyway?

I think people are overstating the extent to which this plan will restructure American politics. I doubt Republicans will spend all their time in New York and California if enough states ratify the agreement--those are pretty liberal states overall. And I doubt the Dems would spend all their time in Texas and Georgia.

Ultimately, the game would be the same--trying to get large swaths of the middle to support you. And the Electoral College is a silly, silly idea that is fundamentally undemocratic and stupid. I don't get it--other countries, even big ones, use the popular vote to determine who wins. I've never heard of another country with a bullshit institution like the Electoral College that adds an unnecessary layer of abstraction. If it's necessary to add another layer of abstraction to undo the damage, so be it.

Brad, maybe I'm missing something but i don't see how it deprives any state of their rights or their 2 vote bonus. The agreement is to award electors based on the national popular vote. Any state in the union can choose not to do so.

The reasoning in NY v US and Prinz was that the federal government could not reduce the states to departments of the federal government, and that the SC gets to draw the line. This doesn't seem like a state-national issue at all, it just seems like an exotic way to assign electoral votes. But nothing in the detailed description of the electoral college system contradicts it, nor does anything in the 15h, 19th, or 26th amendments that I know of. Could you be more specific. The cases of NY v US and Prinz were more clearly overbearing direct orders to the states, and they were not unanimous decisions by any means. So it seems odd to say that this scheme is *obviously* going to be tossed out.

There is an easy way to avoid a candidate winning the popular vote and losing the Electoral Vote. Just raise the number of the House of Representatives. Having an average House District that´s is almost twice the size of the smallest state is neither fair or democratic.

But sure, even if Democrats complains about Electoral College there is no way that House Democrats would want to lose THEIR political power...

There is an easy way to avoid a candidate winning the popular vote and losing the Electoral Vote. Just raise the number of the House of Representatives. Having an average House District that´s is almost twice the size of the smallest state is neither fair or democratic.

But sure, even if Democrats complains about Electoral College there is no way that House Democrats would want to lose THEIR political power...

One big problem it seems to me, is it makes fraud a lot easier. By definition in the current system, fraud to be effective must occur in a state that is pretty closely divided (a battleground state). In a national vote, fraud could take place entirely in the reddest of the red (or bluesest of the blue) states. It would be hard to find in a recount because essentially no one in that state has interest in exposing the fraud (and the state would be the one doing the recount).

They address this, in the national vote thing by saying fraud is less effective because one vote fraud only counts one vote. But since you can do the fraud in places where the peer pressure is so overwhelming one way to allow the fraud to happen, it really isn't clear to me it wouldn't be easier to rig an election.

"Thus far, obviously, you're seeing NPV pass in liberal states. But some cycle or other something will happen that gets conservatives worried about this.

You're joking, right? Conservatives are going to be worried if they gain a new way to win (the popular vote) without losing the old one (the electoral college)? When have you last seen the Republicans refuse a structural advantage?

Some people don't seem to realize that reneging won't work unless LOTS of states do it. Take the example of Illinois brought up earlier--where Obama loses the popular vote but wins in the electoral college after Illinois opts out of the NPV compact. Illinois has 21 electoral votes, and suppose the rest of the states in the compact have 249 (giving 270 total). Since the Republican won the popular vote, he would get ALL of the 249 votes automatically, even if Illinois changes its mind. This means that for Obama to win the presidency, he would need 249 of the remaining 268 electoral votes from states not in the compact (currently, lots of very red states). Bottom line: Once both enough blue and red states opt in, one state flipping won't change the result.

the 12 non-competitive small states have 40 electoral votes. However, the two-vote bonus is an entirely illusory advantage to the small states.

Illusory to the small states, perhaps. Not illusory at all in its effects, since it gave us George W. Bush. If you take at the two electoral vote bonus for winning a contest, Gore would have beaten Bush 225 to 211 in the Electoral College.

Of our two other elections where the popular vote winner did not win the electoral vote, 1876 would also have been a different result if not for the two vote bonus. Instead of Hayes (dubiously) winning 185 to 184, Tilden would have won 150 to 144.

1888 would not have been affected - Harrison managed to narrowly win virtually the whole of the north (except New Jersey and Connecticut), while Cleveland won the popular vote thanks to massive support in the South. Thus, Harrison would have won regardless of the two vote bonus.

But simply getting rid of the two vote bonus would go a long way towards repairing the defects in the system.

That's like saying it doesn't matter if one domino falls over. You wouldn't get just one state flipping. The whole compact would fall apart.

Agreements like this need enforcement mechanisms to work, and there's no enforcement mechanism.

I'd say Andre has nailed it: The effective way to accomplish this, no amendment needed, is to increase the size of the House until the Senator contribution to the electoral college is swamped.

Re-neging:

Do we have to worry about a state signing this compact, and then when it really matters, backing out and awarding electors based on their local results instead of NPV?

Thing is, the state can allocate electors however they want. They can call up a session of the legislature, and just have a party-line vote that Republicans always get the EV's. They don't because most people believe in democracy, and it would be political suicide.

So if the local pressure was strong enough, the legislatures would be forced to hew. But if democratic norms aren't strong enough, then we could get into a HRC-MI-FL scenario where rules are being changed on the fly and half the population doesn't care because what they really care about is electing their guy.

Good grief, I do not understand why the popular vote fetishists cannot see the obvious problem.

Under popular vote rules, it's more important for a Republican to lose by "only" 100,000 votes in California than it is to win by 10,000 votes in 6 or 7 swing states. Likewise, pop vote rules would make it more important for a Democrat to lose by "only" 100,000 votes in Texas than it is to win by small margins in multiple swing states.

That's the freakin' problem with the popular vote. It makes losing big states by smaller margins more important than winning small states, which would profoundly distort Presidential elections in ways we can't even imagine today.

Mike

Oh, and the reverse is just as true. Popular vote rules would mean a Republican increasing his victory margin in Texas or a Democrat increasing their victory margin in California by 100,000 would be more important than winning 9 other states by 10,000 votes each.

Mike

MBunge:

Why is that a "problem"?

Seriously. It seems to me what you're saying is "The problem with a popular vote system is that it would be more important to get 100,000 people to vote for you than to get 10,000 people to vote for you." And... that's not a problem; that's the way a system of election should work.

This is true in the abstract, so long as the method chosen does not interfere with other constitutional rights. They could not hold an election where only men get to vote, for instance.

This is true of directly-elected offices. And each state's government must be a republican form of government under Article IV Section 4. But unfortunately, unlike the change in how we elect senators (Amendment 17), Article II Section 1 remains clear:

"Each State shall appoint, in such Manner as the Legislature thereof may direct, a Number of Electors, equal to the whole Number of Senators and Representatives to which the State may be entitled in the Congress"

There is no requirement for a popular vote of the state's citizens to be involved at all. This is why, for instance, the 2000 Florida legislature was prepared to anoint the Bush slate of electors as the legitimate ones, regardless of recounts or court decisions.

All in all, I'm with Andre and Brett Bellmore(!?!): it's far past time to increase the size of the House of Representatives, and make them representatives again.

"Seriously. It seems to me what you're saying is "The problem with a popular vote system is that it would be more important to get 100,000 people to vote for you than to get 10,000 people to vote for you." And... that's not a problem; that's the way a system of election should work."


Uh, no. What I wrote is that pop vote rules make winning by 100,000 votes in a big state more important than winning 9 small states by a total of 90 thousand votes. It also makes losing a big state by 10,000 votes more important than winning 9 small states by a total of 90 thousand votes. Under pop vote rules, in our Presidential elections, the two things that would overwhelmingly matter more than everything else would be...

1. Running up the score in big, base states.

2. Trying to lose by the smallest margin in your opponents big, base states.

Pop vote rules will make losing Texas or California by 52/48% more important than winning a dozen or more small states by 60/40%. The distorting effect that will have on Presidential elections, and the whole political process by extension, is hard to define but easy to predict.

Mike

"Seriously. It seems to me what you're saying is "The problem with a popular vote system is that it would be more important to get 100,000 people to vote for you than to get 10,000 people to vote for you." And... that's not a problem; that's the way a system of election should work."


Uh, no. What I wrote is that pop vote rules make winning by 100,000 votes in a big state more important than winning 9 small states by a total of 90 thousand votes. It also makes losing a big state by 10,000 votes more important than winning 9 small states by a total of 90 thousand votes. Under pop vote rules, in our Presidential elections, the two things that would overwhelmingly matter more than everything else would be...

1. Running up the score in big, base states.

2. Trying to lose by the smallest margin in your opponents big, base states.

Pop vote rules will make losing Texas or California by 52/48% more important than winning a dozen or more small states by 60/40%. The distorting effect that will have on Presidential elections, and the whole political process by extension, is hard to define but easy to predict.

Mike

It still seems to me that you're trying to make it into a problem that, under a popular-vote system, winning more votes is more important than what states those votes come from. That doesn't sound like a "distortion"—that sounds like removing the distortion that currently exists. Getting 100,000 votes in a big state should be more important than getting 90,000 votes in nine small states; it's more votes.

"Getting 100,000 votes in a big state should be more important than getting 90,000 votes in nine small states; it's more votes."


The United States of America isn't a small New England town with 65 people living in it. The folks who live in Iowa have different economic and cultural interests than the folks in Idaho. The people who live in Iowa and Idaho have different interests than the folks who live in New Hampshire. People in Iowa, Idaho and New Hampshire have different interests than the folks in Rhode Island. People in Iowa, Idaho, New Hampshire and Rhode Island have different interests than the folks in New Mexico. People in Iowa, Idaho, New Hampshire, Rhode Island and New Mexico have different interests than the folks who live in West Virginia. And peple in Iowa, Idaho, New Hampshire, Rhode Island, New Mexico and West Virginia have different interests than the folks in Hawaii.

Yet, under popular vote rules, the interests of the people who live in Texas will be about twice as important as the interests of folks in Iowa, Idaho, New Hampsire, Rhode Island, New Mexico, West Virginia and Hawaii...COMBINED. If you can't understand how that will tilt the political process and how that tilt will inevitably cause serious political, social and economic problems...you really need to think harder on the subject.

Mike

Given the collapse of the Republican party, people should not worry about the general election. What will affect politics more in the one party future is that Iowa and New Hampsire have a much larger say in who the president than California, Texas, New York combined.

In the 2016 election, the next president will be determined some time between the New Hampshire primary and the a couple of week later in some undetermined time. The idea that the Republicans will continue to dominate Texas and Florida after the Obama Admnistration opens the borders and puts all of the illegal aliens on the fast track to citizenship is laughable.

There are others problem with today´s configuration of the EC. For example, even if Montana is almost twice the size of Wyoming both states have the same number of electoral votes. Gerrymandering wouldn´t be such a issue if several states weren´t losing representatives.

Worst, there is big chance this year of a tie in the EC. Again, increasing the size of the House of Representatives would mean having the advantages of both systems. And there would be no need to ammend the Constitution.

But House Democrats knows that their life would become tougher and that they would lose votes. So, probally there is a little bit of hipocrisy here.

Anyway, increasing the number of Representatives should be the major demand of Democrats.

So, Mike, essentially you're arguing that, although Texas has twice as many people as Iowa, Idaho, New Hampshire, Rhode Island, New Mexico, West Virginia, and Hawaii, the interests of the people of Texas don't deserve twice as much consideration (because something that harms their interests harms twice as many people as that list of other states)?

There's a coherent argument to be made for that, but you're not making it; you're just claiming that it's self-evident that interests which are shared by fewer people deserve more attention (per capita) than interest that are shared by more people.


Comments closed June 26, 2008.

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