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Why The Air Force Can't Change

30 Jun 2008 09:04 am

Various complaints can be raised against the extent to which various security organs of the United States remain somewhat fixated on a Cold War mentality. But all the relevant institutions have to some extent adapted -- and certainly the Army and Navy busy themselves with plenty of other things besides prepping for war with China. But the Air Force seems different, stuck in the past (USSR) or hypotheticals (China) rather than dealing with the world as it is. Robert Farley has an interesting hypothesis as to why:

The larger problem for the Air Force is that both the Army and Navy have long traditions to borrow from, such that they are capable of "re-inventing" themselves while retaining a sense of identity. Both the Army and the Navy can also borrow from the histories of foreign military organizations; the Navy rather self-consciously styles itself as the modern equivalent of the nineteenth century Royal Navy. The Air Force lacks historical traditions to borrow from, both because it is such a new service, and because it has been a worldwide leader since its inception. Put briefly, the Air Force only knows the Cold War; it only understands conflict in terms of great power struggle, and as such all future planning (in contrast to short term compromises) will be oriented around that organizational purpose. To ask the Air Force not to think in terms of great power war is to ask it not to be the Air Force, but rather some other organization born at some other time for some other purpose. As such, Gates cleaning out of the brass isn't really going to amount to much; it is literally in the DNA of the Air Force to act in this way.

On another level, though, I think it reflects the fact that our current national security issues, while troubling, really don't rise to the level of enormous national emergency the way the Civil War or World War II or in a different way the outbreak of the Cold War did. Iraq or even Afghanistan just isn't a "do or die" situation that's going to create unstoppable political pressure on institutions to adapt. The fact that our country is objectively less threatened than it has been at various times in the past is, naturally, a good thing. But it also means that adaptation to the contemporary environment isn't as snappy as one might like.

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Comments (28)

It's not so much that the Air Force lacks historical traditions or has been a worldwide leader, but the rationale for its creation was singular: they had the nukes.

Pretty interesting to read about the development of the Air Force - as it was spun off from the Army Air Corps in WWII - was that they were in charge of dropping the new nuclear bombs. Hence, they planned for it, lobbied for it, and built their entire organization around the nuclear premise.

And once nukes moved to subs/land, etc, the AF was left holding the bag, back to transporting the Army.

The new question is whether the modern Air Force is going to be the new electronic warfare model that they've been prepping for.

*sighs* Ok, do any of you seriously believe the US will never fight a conventional war again? That *all* warfare in the future will be on the level of fighting insurgents and occupying countries? Is bashing the AF someway for liberal bloggers to establish their "military cred" by appearing to be more support the troops than others?

But, but, but...teh war on IslamoLibroOmbamoFascism(tm) is the transcendent challenge of our generation, and is every bit as serious as the Cold War and WWII. Heck, Joe Lieberman and John McCain say it is so, so there is a bipartisan consensus on the issue.

Yep, perhaps instead of all this hand-wringing, the Air Force should just be allowed to, well, be an Air Force? It isn't as if there isn't a lot of work for an Air Force in our current military actions ... it's just that we've decided transporting troops under fire (which sounds like a military job to me and something an Air Force might be good at -- engaging said enemy fire, that is) is something for contractors to do.

Why the $#%@ are we spending money on the corrupting (c.f. ol' Ike) military-industrial complex, when our un-industrial, non-complexed military can do the job without having to turn a profit and hence for cheaper?

Maybe we should simply leave the Air Force to focus on "the big one" and allow the other branches to fly their own planes (or drones) for the smaller missions.

The fact that our country is objectively less threatened than it has been at various times in the past is, naturally, a good thing. But it also means that adaptation to the contemporary environment isn't as snappy as one might like.

Given the status of various deficits, the massive downsizing of the US military is a given.

People like Amanda in San Jose are literally discussing our borrowing money from the Chinese in order to attack them.

Our political system probably isn't going to be able to prepare for this, because it now is too busy pandering to the Amandas.

But for those of us who are serious, the problem we really should be discussing is what sense, if any, will we be able to make of things after the Pentagon has financially been disemboweled. Sorry, but we won't then be able to muster many F-22's, frankly.

*sighs* Ok, do any of you seriously believe the US will never fight a conventional war again?

It's because the AF has an independent entity does a fairly poor job at what their true mission is. They are for supporting the boots on the ground, and if that is their mission the Army should be the ones in charge of the AF. There is no good reason why we should have an independent AF anymore.

Seriously, Jordan? Just how are A-10s, AC-130s, etc. supposed to operate with out air superiority? You're statement reeks of historical ignorance.

Well Duncan, I'd have never waged war in Iraq, that's for sure. I do plead guilty as charged, though, that I want more F-22s and less large scale occupations of foreign countries. And I certainly don't want American pilots flying 30+ year old airplanes. No, the political system is now figuring out how to pay for an expensive waste in Iraq, not upgrading and modernizing our aircraft.

I just love how disagreeing on this one topic all of a sudden makes you out to be an apologist for warmongering.

Seriously, Jordan? Just how are A-10s, AC-130s, etc. supposed to operate with out air superiority? You're statement reeks of historical ignorance.

In WWII the US Army Air Force did this, so it's you who reeks historical ignorance.

Yes, in WWII the Army Air Corp/Force provided troop support even when they didn't have air superiority. However, airpower has evolved just a little bit since then (maybe part of while the U.S. stood up an independent Air Force). Airpower has evolved even more since the Cold War - it has not devolved to the same capability that it had during WWII.

I think one of the biggest fallacies in this whole line argument is the idea that the Air Force isn't adapting and is horribly stuck in their ways. The Air Force hasn't been adapting as quickly as Gates would like. That does not mean they haven't been adapting at all.

It's also important to note that the Air Force mission needs to be separate and distinguishable from that of the Army and Navy, and has to be 'strategic'. So, the Air Force doesn't do helicopters and it doesn't do naval aviation. The question is 'what's left?'

Nobody's saying "ditch all the fighter jets!" (just some of them). As far as I'm aware, nobody who advocates rolling the Air Force back into the Army (like me, and yes I'm aware that this is an overwhelmingly unlikely event) takes this to mean "nothing but A-10s and attack helicopters from here on out!" The point about needing air superiority isn't terribly convincing one way or another; it's turtles all the way down. (i.e., if you want you can pick any point in the chain of troops - close air support - air superiority - logistical support for same) and say "here's where we need to create an independent force".

The best argument, I think, in favor of the Air Force lies in the idea of the Strategic Air Command, which admittedly wouldn't have much to do these days, but might in the future - except that the SAC as a discrete concept was dissolved fifteen or so years ago.

The best argument to my way of thinking in favor of folding the AF back into the Army is that then the Army and the Navy are completely parallel organizations that come as close as possible to being self-contained, with distinct missions and the appropriate units (transportation, air power, ground troops) to support the range of missions envisioned. (Of course, this vision is also hampered by our habit, as in Iraq, of using the Marines as just another semi-elite infantry force.)

Whatever the original rationale, the greatest utilitarian virtue of the USAF has always been air supremacy, i.e. an ability to (conventionally) bomb enemy strongholds at will and provide close air support for our own troops while simultaneously denying our adversary the ability to do such things.

We have maintained air supremacy for so long now that we are starting to take it for granted, so much so that our new fighter programs seem largely superfluous, and indeed may well be so. Hopefully, no major power will bother to build next-gen fighter jets to shoot down our bombers, A-10's, AC-130's, etc. If and when they do, the USAF will once again be at the forefront of an aerial arms race, that is, comfortably flying over familiar territory.

I'm certainly not against the idea of air superiority--it's the cornerstone of our our entire battle doctrine. Whenever we go to war, job one is for the Air Force and Navy to sweep the skys clean, and they do an excellent job.

The problem is, that looks like the _only_ job the Air Force wants to do. The Air Force gets a huge slice of the military pie, and the overriding passion of the fighter pilots who, until a few days ago, ran the place is to develop more and bigger air superiority capabilities. But we can already brush aside any enemy air forces we're likely to encounter within the horizon of planning.

It is wasteful to spend our resources on getting four or five or six generations ahead of the Chinese in fighter technology when we don't have the kinds of ground support, surveillance and airlift capabilities we need today, for wars that we are actually fighting.

Thank God we've at least lost the focus on strategic bombing, which is atrocious and of virtually no military use.

1. The USAF has not lost its focus on strategic bombing, which like air superiority is something this nation will always do because it really does result in important effects.
2. Air superiority is the only job the Air Force SEEMS to want to do when you are ignorant of what they actually do. So, yes, I'm sure it SEEMS that way to you because firmly emplanted myths never die.
3. Airpower of all kinds continues to be increasingly important to warfare in all domains and at all levels. When you look at COIN, for instance, one of the crucial differences is the presence of THOUSANDS of UAVs, and one of them (Predator) is doing all the killing that really matters--which, by the way, mostly is strategic bombing for those who don't get it--killing the leadership.
4. More of the Air Force's budget goes for "supporting" other services--by far--than any of the other services. So, who's joint?
5. IF another country decides to buy sophisticated fighters, THEN we'll just wake up and build some super-cool fighters and sweep them from the skies? Sorry. It takes dedicated, focused leadership to make that happen over a long period, usually against the naysayers to whom it SEEMS like it should be easy.
6. The Air Force provides a list of services so comprehensive and so long that it cannot be listed here. Overcoming the arrogance of those who would denigrate the phenomenal contribution of airpower to US national security is but one of the services it provides to the nation.
7. Hooah

1. The USAF has not lost its focus on strategic bombing, which like air superiority is something this nation will always do because it really does result in important effects.
2. Air superiority is the only job the Air Force SEEMS to want to do when you are ignorant of what they actually do. So, yes, I'm sure it SEEMS that way to you because firmly emplanted myths never die.
3. Airpower of all kinds continues to be increasingly important to warfare in all domains and at all levels. When you look at COIN, for instance, one of the crucial differences is the presence of THOUSANDS of UAVs, and one of them (Predator) is doing all the killing that really matters--which, by the way, mostly is strategic bombing for those who don't get it--killing the leadership.
4. More of the Air Force's budget goes for "supporting" other services--by far--than any of the other services. So, who's joint?
5. IF another country decides to buy sophisticated fighters, THEN we'll just wake up and build some super-cool fighters and sweep them from the skies? Sorry. It takes dedicated, focused leadership to make that happen over a long period, usually against the naysayers to whom it SEEMS like it should be easy.
6. The Air Force provides a list of services so comprehensive and so long that it cannot be listed here. Overcoming the arrogance of those who would denigrate the phenomenal contribution of airpower to US national security is but one of the services it provides to the nation.
7. Hooah

1. The USAF has not lost its focus on strategic bombing, which like air superiority is something this nation will always do because it really does result in important effects.
2. Air superiority is the only job the Air Force SEEMS to want to do when you are ignorant of what they actually do. So, yes, I'm sure it SEEMS that way to you because firmly emplanted myths never die.
3. Airpower of all kinds continues to be increasingly important to warfare in all domains and at all levels. When you look at COIN, for instance, one of the crucial differences is the presence of THOUSANDS of UAVs, and one of them (Predator) is doing all the killing that really matters--which, by the way, mostly is strategic bombing for those who don't get it--killing the leadership.
4. More of the Air Force's budget goes for "supporting" other services--by far--than any of the other services. So, who's joint?
5. IF another country decides to buy sophisticated fighters, THEN we'll just wake up and build some super-cool fighters and sweep them from the skies? Sorry. It takes dedicated, focused leadership to make that happen over a long period, usually against the naysayers to whom it SEEMS like it should be easy.
6. The Air Force provides a list of services so comprehensive and so long that it cannot be listed here. Overcoming the arrogance of those who would denigrate the phenomenal contribution of airpower to US national security is but one of the services it provides to the nation.
7. Hooah

Sorry about the multiple postings--guess it was sort of like "carpet bombing" eh? My bad...oorah

Am I supposed to have to feel like I have a defining opinion on the status of the U.S. Air Force?

Is that some sort of new, hip signifier?

I think the real problem here is that each of the three services seems to demand an equal share of the pie. If they didn't we could simply reduce the USAF's budget to reflect more urgent priorities that it's unwilling to address.

Well, I really don't know how you rebut an argument like, "Hooah," but I will note that that one word pretty much encapsulates the rest of the post. Esprit de corps is all well and good, but there comes a time you have to take a step back from your own training and institutional biases.

And if what Predators do is "strategic bombing" in your book, then the term has no meaning any more. You might as well say that a Marine sniper is doing strategic bombing.

Thanks for repeating the post so many times. There's an eloquent message in there about strategic bombing, as you sensed.

The Air Force, as currently constituted, is not really well suited to asymmetric warfare such as we are now spending a lot of time with. Perhaps that is why they seem to be devoting so much time to pushing the religious preferences fo their senior commanders: because they haven't got much of anything useful to do just now, and they know it.

Perhaps the solution is for them to decide to take on a coast Guard like function in space. Since NASA is resisting devoting any money or attention to even finding out how many near-Earth (as in may hit us at some point) bodies there are, somebody ought to at least gather enough information to do a threat assessment. And, if there is a reasonable possibility of something nasty hitting us, figure out how to avert the threat. Sounds like a win-win.

I will point out that the American Military has NO short-range anti-air technology that is not limited to weapons soldiers can carry. We depend ENTIRELY on the aerial arm for that.

But while new jets are cool, and I hope the air force comes up with particle beams and Stargates and such, they are slowly becoming a messianic group that has the tactical ability to incite holy Armageddon.

Freaky.

People babble about "air superiority".

Morons.

You get "air superiority" when you have more planes that are at least the equivalent of everyone else's planes - but you have more of them.

Anybody want to bet that China or Russia - the ONLY two countries on the planet with a budget even a fraction of the US budget - can EVER outspend the US on buying more and better planes?

The US Air Force ALONE budget for 2008 was something like $110 billion. The ENTIRE Chinese military budget for 2008 is $59 billion.

The Air Force has 2,090 Fighters. 1,084 F-16's alone. China has a total of perhaps 1,000 fighters, of which only perhaps three hundred are 3rd generation aircraft. And China is the second largest Air Force in the world after the US.

The Russian aircraft inventory is even smaller. Not to mention that budget problems have limited their pilots ability to get the number of flying hours needed to match US pilot competence.

So who are we spending all this money to defeat?

What country are we going to fight in - OTHER than the actual countries of China or Russia - where we would not AUTOMATICALLY have "air superiority" AFTER our bombers and submarine launched cruise missiles have destroyed every single aircraft launch facility - not to mention most of the actual aircraft - in the enemy country within the first 72 hours of a war?

Get a goddamn grip. The US military cannot be challenged in a CONVENTIONAL war by any military on the planet except China and Russia. And air superiority is relevant only in a conventional war against an enemy that can field air superiority fighters - not a nuclear war and not a counterinsurgency war and not a war against lame little outfits like Iraq and Iran.

Where the US is seriously weak is in its ability to fight against a guerrilla war - without killing half the civilians in the country a la Iraq.

And UAVs are almost useless in COIN - because most such attacks end up killing civilians. It's also very poorly cost effective to expend expensive munitions - not to mention the cost of maintaining and managing the UAV - just to knock off one supposedly "high value" target - who will be replaced the next day by his subordinate.

UAV's are what you get when you have lousy intelligence and no ability to send in a team of ground troops to deal with a situation directly because you're fighting an opponent you shouldn't even be fighting in the first place, i.e., in the wrong country with no local support.

Correcting a mistake with another - expensive - mistake is nothing to the purpose.

The Air Force hasn't been adapting as quickly as Gates would like. That does not mean they haven't been adapting at all.

Or they've been adapting the wrong way. They are buying fewer numbers of expensive airplanes, instead of greater numbers of cheaper airplanes. Yes yes, we may sometime have to dogfight with the Chinese (aerial) horde, but how and where exactly is the Air Force gonna throw down with the Chicoms? We don't have air bases in Taiwan, and China doesn't have carriers, so its up Navy and Marine aviators to fight the Chinese in the air (at least until Chinese subs sinks their carriers).

There's really no point in the Air Force building any new human piloted airframes. The AF shouldJust look at what we (and our allies) have in mothballs and refurbish what we can and strip the rest for parts. If we upgrade the engines and avionics, there are USAF F-4, F-15, F-16, as well as Navy F-4, A-6 and F-14 airframes that could be made superior to anything else in the air (avionics are the secret sauce).

I remember reading a few years ago that refurbished F-16As sold for $4 million to $10 million a model. To use the higher number, For the price of 1 F-22, you could field 10 refurbished F-16s and have $40 million to spare.

Sure the F-22 would be nice to have, but every other government agency (and every taxpayer for that matter), has to weigh what it wants versus what it can afford. Its not a crime to put the AIr Force on a diet.

The US military used to plan to fight or defend America's interests through a concept called "Deliberate Planning". The assumptions, goals, and processes were well understood. The military evaluated the threat and requirement to determine what needed to be bought, what tactics needed to be honed and was force (size) was needed.

Over the last eight years, the US changed its approach to being ready ro fight to "Capabilities Based". Rather than be bounded by "threats" and "requirements", the military was told to be "ready for anything". The previous SECDEF's inability to describe the left and right lateral limits on what the military needed to be diluted its focus -- some of the military tried to do everything and given the resource and fiscal constraints, made tradeoffs which, when haven't worked out, have become headlines.

This is "Capabilities Based" approch is difficult for all branches of the military to adapt -- and by the way, each of the branches of the US military have "cut the pie" in about the same percentage shares over the last 50 years (+/- a couple of percents...there is no "disproportionate share" by any single branch) -- and given the long procurement lead tims and the convolutive 2-year+ budget development cycle, it is easy to conclude that the military is locked into cold war thinking...when the legally described system (yeah, Congress wrote a law and President signed it long ago) lacks what we call "agility". It is difficult (short of going back to Congress and getting the President) to change funding priorities each year through the National Defense Authorization Act) to turn the ship. Can you imagine a corporation having to go to the Shareholders and get their permission to launch a product line? To change priorities? To do anything?

The second part of the problem set is the officer corps professional education's focus on concepts of "Strategic", "Operational", and "Tactical" levels of War. The corps is taught that senior officers (Colonel/Navy Captains & Generals/Admirals) don't engage in the tactical level (left to "company grade officers") but rather focus on "Strategic/National" level issues. The challenge with this is that there are only three people in the whole US Government whom operate at the S/N level - the President, the SECDER and the SECSTATE. Rather than focus on how to take policy and turn it into operations & campaigns, some US senior military leaders have stepped out of their lane. (And we've seen the results, especially in the USAF.)

Let me get off with my soapbox with this: All branches of the US military are doing great things to further freedom, protect and serve and help orient other militaries onto the concept of "Civilan Control of the Military." Most of those stories are never told (I won't get into a rant about how only "bad news" stories sell) because most service members aren't looking to toot their own horn. Whatever else you can say about the US military, it is responsive to that civilian control -- the CSAF and other US military officers have resigned/retired when they are asked...think about other countries where/when their civilian leaders have asked the same and the military has taken over their government. No matter what else you may think, remember that fundamentally, there are good American men and women trying their best for their country, to make the world a better and safer place, and that they follow orders...and sometimes they die in the performance in that service to us all.

Lots of misunderstanding and mythology to cover, but I'll address just a couple.
Strategic attack (or bombing) has always been offensive action aimed at directly affecting an adversary's leadership, conflict-sustaining resources, and/or strategy without focusing on the defeat of fielded forces. That is what Predator/Hellfire is doing in Iraq and Afghanistan and other places. It's killing the leadership of al Qaeda and the insurgency without engaging their forces directly. That's strategic attack--period. If you're still living in the past and think strategic bombing is when your B-29's blacken the sky and fire-bomb cities, well, it's not 1944 anymore.
And to the guy who said UAVs are not effective, I would defer to General Patreaus, who says they are his most effective instrument and he's begging for more and more Predators. So, I can either go with this highly informed blogger opinion, or his...
For those who are stuck on the USAF's support for F-22, remember that it's only a small fraction of the service's budget and they do much, much more than that. The "surge" in fact has been a surge in aerial bombing, with tonnage up 1000%--the surge has been more an airpower and "cash in suitcases" surge than anything. Airlifters are working around the clock, aerial refuelers, space assets surveiling and providing navigation and timing--the Air Force is more than some bloggers here are characterizing it. Learning about it is hard, blogging about your feelings is, well, easy.

JDAM is correct that there is much more to the story of airpower than can be captured on a blog, it takes time and effort to uncover that it is airpower that enables the way the U.S. military operates. The uncomfortable truth is that there is a change in the way warfare is fought and that means some communities vested in the old ways of fighting see resisting this change as a life/death struggle instead of an increase in capability for the U.S. as a whole. The fact that the 20% surge in troops on the ground was accompanied by the 1000% increase in tonnage JDAM mentioned (and a 400% increase in strikes delivering it) shows that the small increase in ground troops enabled a HUGE increase in airpower which an historical analysis will likely show made the big difference in changing the direction of Iraq. Yes it was ground troops being there, it was the airpower however that made them effective and credible to the local forces they were there to influence (similar to Afghanistan - an emerging pattern?).
The certainty of air superiority has shaped how every other branch of the military is organized and plans on fighting. As another blogger pointed out there is no real air-defense in our ground arms, they all know it is better to spend their money on other things, the USAF has it for them. ISR, communications via satellite, transport, on-call fires, etc. are all done by the USAF and they (and others in the case of GPS) free-ride off the USAF portion of the defense budget. The fact is that the other services spend their portion of the budget on their own forces, the USAF spends much of it's budget on enabling the other forces; but don't hold your breath waiting to hear that from someone in one of the organizations threatened by the changes in how warfare is waged. DoD forces just assume we can plop down supply depots and staging bases and keep the logistics flowing... it is a part of every plan we make.
Back to the original question which has been lost in the debate, the USAF does not have this behavior infused in its DNA, it is a sickness not a genetic defect - a sickness that all the services share. In this particular moment in history the USAF's case is showing symptoms but so are the others to a lesser degree. The Pentagon system has created a situation in which the defense budget is basically split the same way every year regardless of what the real national priority should be. In the case of the USAF, modernization that should have taken place did not because diverting funds to do so would have shorted other service.
In retrospect $ spent on developing an Army deep strike helicopter (Comanche) and long range artillery (Crusader) would have been better spent on fixing the Army and creating a capability to fight the type of war we are in now. It would be revisionist to say that the Army wanted to create a low-tech man intensive army prior to 2001. They were trying to do the same missions as the USAF (only less efficiently and at a higher cost). In the DoD system there is no benefit to not trying to do it all (and be self contained as a prior commenter suggested) even if it is less efficient and a poor use of our tax dollars. A strong hand from above with the power and capability to force the services to focus on providing JOINT capabilities in their domain and to clearly articulate what they need others to do in order to support them is required. This same authority needs to make sure that services follow through on those identified needs. The Army should have been able to identify the need for a Joint Cargo Aircraft and increased UAVs to the USAF and received support from the AF because the DoD budget was altered to provide $ to make it happen. The USAF, had it been given a mandate and accompanying $ to respond (from the Army budget) would have taken it's air domain expertise and created a seamless system to do both more efficiently, at lower cost, and without the friction the service rivalries infuse (and accompanying waste of manpower and time). Instead under the current system the USAF had no incentive to prioritize missions for the USA above it's own and no extra $ to spend on transforming in reaction to another services internal transformation. What is needed is a new roles and missions definition and a means of breaking out of this "equal shares" mentality that pits the services against each other for budget $. The stakes are too high to be using playground rules.


Comments closed July 14, 2008.

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